Speeches
Minister of Defence Jussi Niinistö at The Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE) Seminar in Helsinki
Honourable chairman, ladies and gentlemen,
In today's seminar we have heard excellent presentations on Russia's foreign and security policy from a variety of perspectives. It is clear that the current security policy challenges between Europe and Russia have been simmering for a long time. At least from Finland's perspective, Russia is an age-old super power. In the course of centuries, Russia has searched for its identity and its place both in Europe and in the global world order. Different approaches such as Eurasian ideas, panslavism or Europeanism have in turn prevailed as to what is the ultimate character of the Russian state, the Russkaja ideja.
After the end of the Cold War era it was quite commonly thought that the usability of military force had also ended, at least among the more developed countries. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO took place maybe faster and more widely than expected. Who could have anticipated during the Cold War era that one day NATO would expand not only into countries of the former Warsaw Pact, but also into the territory of the former Soviet Union. Right to the borders of Russia.
The chaos that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to a situation where Russia's political positioning in relation to Europe was reviewed. It seemed clear, however, that the EU held the upper hand economically while NATO did the same militarily.
At the same time Russia's influence on the structures of the international security architecture was crumbling. The frustration that Russia's leaders felt was manifested in the striking speech delivered by Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev in the ministerial meeting at the OSCE Conference in December 1992 in Stockholm. Kozyrev stated that Russia would defend its interests in the territory of the former Soviet Union both economically and militarily. Furthermore, former Soviet republics were to join the new Russian Federation without delay. A little later Kozyrev said that his speech had only been a rhetorical trick and an example of what would happen if hardliners were to gain power in Russia.
Another more recent example is from February 2009 in Munich when President Putin accused the United States of unilateralism, stoking the arms race and breaking against international law. Putin threatened that Russian missiles would be directed at Europe if the United States did not give up on the missile shield plan. The speech astonished the West but gained a lot of praise in Russia.
The speeches by Kozyrev and Putin may seem strange; however they reflected well Russia's frustration, resentment against the West and a sense of having been betrayed. They also predicted a development which we have witnessed during this decade: the return of power politics in Europe. Russia did not at any point de facto approve of the post-Cold War security solution in Europe. On the one hand, Russia feels betrayed and, on the other hand, under siege by the West.
Despite Russian rhetoric and political stand-taking, Western Europe did not believe that military force would be a useful tool to achieve political goals in the post-Cold War era. A number of European states started to cut their defence budgets, reduce defence materiel procurement and gave up general conscription.
Armed forces were developed in line with the requirements of international crisis management operations. In NATO, the focus shifted from collective defence to crisis management. Russian armed forces were in a financial whirlpool, facing a succession of reforms which were at least partly failing. Despite an economic downturn Russia was determined to increase the resources of the armed forces.
This was followed by a peaceful period over a few years until a political process started in Ukraine. As a result, Russia feared losing its influence in Ukraine. eventually Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in Eastern Ukraine. By doing so Russia violated international law and the key principles which provide the basis for European security arrangements.
This development led to sanctions imposed by the EU and counter sanctions by Russia.
NATO suspended military cooperation with Russia and increased its presence in the eastern member countries. Chilly reminders of the Cold War era were starting to be felt in the air.
The Syrian civil war has also put a strain on the relations between Russia and the West.
Russia has shown in Ukraine and Syria that it possesses both capacity and will to use military power to push its goals. Because of its centralised power structure Russia is capable of making quick decisions; this makes it an unpredictable actor. These characteristics combined with the measures Russia has taken have caused a lot of concern especially in the Baltic States.
As a result of the changed security situation, many European countries and NATO have started to pay focus again on the military defence of their territories. The Baltic Sea which used to be called "The Sea of Peace" has gained an entirely new significance and it has evoked new kind of interest in terms of military policy.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Russia has displayed a strong resolve to re-establish its great power status. A phrase that has repeatedly appeared in the security policy discussion in Russia is "Russia has been besieged"; this has turned into sabre-rattling, shows of military force and related information influencing.
Power politics has indeed re-entered the European security policy agenda.
A significant part of Russia's foreign policy can be explained by furthering of national interests, which aims at establishing a great power status. Russia's objectives and goals and, to a certain extent, also methods differ as to the forum: is it dealing with the global arena, the territory of the former Soviet Union or the European Union.
On the global level, Russia's great power status is based primarily on nuclear weapons, membership in the United Nations Security Council and the legacy of the Soviet Union. Playing a role in the Syrian war is important for Russia also because this is a proof that its armed forces are capable of action in an international context. Seeking parity with the USA is an important objective which, however, is almost impossible for Russia to achieve globally.
Russia's goal is to achieve an undeniable supremacy in the former Soviet territory. Russian policies in the fields of economy, energy and military matters support its power position. Even the use of armed force is not excluded if Russia feels that the interests it has defined legitimate are threatened.
Russia underlines its special rights over the sovereignty of independent states in the so called near abroad. When it comes to foreign policy, Russia feels that the near abroad must take account of its great power status and legitimate interests in their decisions.
While Russia demands the West to treat it as an equal, in its own relations with the near abroad it has pushed aside the principle of sovereign equality of states. For example, in setting the 2014 military doctrine Russia regards governments that rise to power in the near abroad as a threat to itself if they are "anti-Russian" and especially if they seize power through a coup. This is based on a fear of yet another "colour revolution" similar to the one in Ukraine.
In its time, the Soviet Union followed two different sets of rules of international law in its foreign relations. General international law was applied to its relations to the rest of the world while socialist international law was followed when dealing with socialist countries; for example, socialist international law did not ban the use of armed force.
According to Brezhnev's doctrine, socialist states did not have internal competence to decide on their own social system. We remember the suppressing of the Prague Spring in 1968. In today's Russia this type of approach to spheres of influence seems to be on the increase. Although not spoken out directly, this is justified by "historical rights".
Throughout times great powers have aimed to determine the rules for their own operating environment. The most concerning issue in recent development is that Russia de facto annexed the regions it had occupied such as the Crimean Peninsula, Southern Ossetia or Abhasia.
In the past Russia had a different toolkit for the near abroad states and for other foreign states; this approach seems to be changing. A single toolkit is taking shape; the tools of power politics that have been used for the near abroad can now be used for other foreign states when needed, too.
One such tool may be geopolitics-related geo-economy where the control of energy sources and energy networks is an essential means for exercising political influence and, when necessary, an addition to the actual hard power politics. Energy-policy related bids for power have been most obvious in Central Asia.
Ladies and gentlemen,
During the last decade Russia has, to a certain extent, questioned the existing security order and undermined it in many different ways through its actions and interpretations. Russia feels that the measures it has taken are a legitimate response to the West who is deceiving and besieging it.
A negative spiral has arisen and, as a result, especially in the Baltic Sea region tension has grown and military activities have intensified.
The crisis in the relations between Russia and the West has undeniably impacted the European security situation. Russia desires to restore its former influence in the territories of the former Soviet Union, consolidate the annexation of Crimea to Russia, restrain the integration of former Soviet republics into the European Union and prevent NATO from expanding.
Russia intensified its military activities in the Baltic Sea region already before the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. In addition to greater activity in the air and at sea, Russia has also conducted large-scale and unannounced military exercises.
A successful overseas operation in Syria has lasted already over a year. There Russia's support to Assad's administration has been crucial.
As to Kaliningrad, Russia aims to cause confusion through the deployment of the Iskander system. While Iskander missiles are an important part of Russia's capabilities in warfare in the Baltic Sea region the deployment also seems to be a political barometer for relations with the West.
Distinguished seminar participants,
our security environment has changed and, as a result, in a great many European countries measures have been taken to reform armed forces and reassess decisions - or in some cases to restore the military to where it was before idealism.
NATO member states in the Baltic Sea region have also decided to act. There are more aircraft to monitor the airspace in the Baltic region, military exercises have been organised and the United States have sent troops to the Baltic States and Poland.
Nato decided, in the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, to create a Forward Presence by deploying battalions also in the Baltic States and Poland. Deploying a battalion to each of these countries signals that an armed attack against one of the NATO member states leads irrevocably to counter-measures by the entire Alliance. Russia has noted that it will respond to the deployment of NATO battalions in Eastern Europe.
While boosting NATO's deterrence, the Warsaw Summit underlined readiness for a dialogue with Russia although practical civilian and military cooperation have been frozen. It is important that in the current security situation NATO aims to maintain a dialogue with Russia about developing confidence and transparency building measures, for example.
Published at the Summit, the joint statement by the EU and NATO leaders set closer cooperation between the EU and NATO as an objective; this is now being implemented. There is discussion in the EU about developing defence cooperation, and NATO monitors and evaluates the possible effects of this discussion on NATO's activities. As a rule, developing European capabilities is seen to benefit NATO.
From Finland's perspective, the decisions made at the Warsaw Summit to increase military presence and boost NATO's deterrence bring stability in the current security situation to the Baltic Sea region and also more widely.
Ladies and gentlemen,
as a result of changes in the operating environment, defence budgets are increased, readiness is improved, exercise scenarios are revised and defence system structures are checked in European countries.
It has not been necessary for Finland to revise current policies. The primary task of the Finnish Defence Forces continues to be the defence of own territory. Out territorial defence system has proved to be a well justified solution and we shall develop it further in the future.
We are also committed to maintaining general conscription and defending the entire country. Our defence solution has proved enduring.
Although there has been no need to change the basic guideline we, too, have had to respond to the changed situation. Intensified military activity close to our borders and the difficulty to foresee developments in the security environment require us to have better readiness than before. We continue to further that for example by legal measures and increased resources.
Based on the system of general conscription, the Finnish Defence Forces train annually over 21 000 conscripts and about 18 000 reservists in reservist training. In addition, through voluntary national defence about 28 000 reservists receive training on the annual basis.
In recent decades, elsewhere in the world the trend has been from general conscription to selective conscription or a professional army.
This was to a large extent the result of the end of the Cold War and, as I noted previously, of an idealistic belief in a world where at least developed countries would no longer fight wars and where armed force would not be a tool to achieve political goals.
What took place in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine showed that, ultimately, the world had not changed as expected. This led especially Northern European countries to reassess the importance of conscription.
Sweden plans to reintroduce conscription for a selected number of both men and women whereas Norway introduced last year a gender neutral system where all citizens can be conscripted.
In Estonia, too, the national defence system is based on general conscription. Lithuania decided, in 2015, to reintroduce permanently general conscription.
In Germany conscription was a much discussed theme at the end of August when the German government handled a proposal on civilian defence in a catastrophe.
Poland and Latvia have so far decided not to introduce conscription but the topic has been discussed there, too.
Ladies and gentlemen,
idealism could not, after all, carry us sufficiently far in situations where national interests were tested. A key theorem in the classical political realism is that states maximize their efforts to further national interests within all available means.
It was naively assumed in Europe that all states want ultimately the same: a democratic system, economic well-being and getting rid of national borders. At the same time nationalism was becoming a suspicious ideology. An idea of an "Arab Spring" was taken to the Middle East and North Africa, and the results can be seen by all.
It is, after all, a fact that different states look at the furthering of national interests from very different perspectives. Both means and goals can be different.
I am sorry to say that at the moment it looks like the traditional power politics has returned as a means to achieve political goals. Changes in the security environment and the multi-purpose use or threat of power have become "a new normal".
Each state aims to organise its defence in the best way it deems possible: some invest in an independent national defence while others seek security in military alignment. It is in any case clear that cooperation among countries who share the same set of values is vital.
I would like to conclude by reminding you that, in a situation like this, it is important not to react when provoked, and to maintain a dialogue with other countries so that we can together address common security issues. It is also highly important to be able to read the other party's body language. What Russia really thinks is not always what comes to mind first.