



## MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SEMINAR ON GLOBAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY 2030 HELSINKI 28-29 NOVEMBER 2007

The Ministry of Defence of Finland organised a seminar "Global Security and Strategy 2030: Trends, challenges and implications for defence and security" on 28 – 29 November 2007 in Helsinki. The aim of the seminar was to provide an analytical framework for the Ministry of Defence's strategy, which is currently under revision. The seminar was conducted in close cooperation with the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of the National Defence University and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), which were commissioned to prepare a study in support of the Ministry of Defence strategic planning process. The study "*Predictions regarding international actors up to the year 2030*" was conducted in order to anticipate a range of potential future trends and challenges in key areas of the world. The study is available on a website <http://www.defmin.fi>.

The seminar topics were introduced by Finnish researchers and international guest speakers in order to gain different perspectives on strategic thinking. The seminar promoted successfully discussion and exchange of views between various experts both nationally and internationally and across the government offices in the field of security, defence and global change.

While recognising that it is impossible to make definite predictions of the future, the seminar provided insight of major challenges by identifying implications of the most relevant trends and drivers affecting Finland's security environment. By analysing some of the key players and major regions of the world in the light of political, economic, social, environmental and demographic trends, the seminar facilitated assessing how these changes may affect Finland's defence and security in the future. When it comes to the analysis of Finland's security environment in the light of future trends and challenges, local and regional aspects were given particular importance.

### **Opening remarks**

Mr. Pertti Salolainen, a member of the Parliament of Finland and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, highlighted in his opening remarks the importance of trend analysis and strategic planning as a basis for defence capability development within 20 years timeframe. New security environment is affecting players and new global trends challenge traditional scenarios. Effective response to new challenges requires seamless inter-agency cooperation, effective dialogue between institutions and adjusted decision-making which are also in the interest of the Parliament.

In his message on international crisis management Mr. Salolainen emphasised the need for rapidly deployable tools and long term efforts on stabilisation and reconstruction. Comprehensive and coordinated international crisis management policy is needed. The EU and NATO should recognise their new roles in global security architecture. More effective cooperation between organisations should be encouraged.

Mr. Salolainen stressed the importance of enhanced security and defence cooperation within the EU: the European Defence Agency and the EU battle groups should show the way. Lessons from Finland's participation in the EU battle groups may be useful to Finland's possible participation in NATO Response Force. Mr. Salolainen mentioned also the Nordic cooperation in the field of security and defence as one of the most topical issues for Finland.

Mr. Salolainen highlighted the ongoing work on the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2008 which examines change in Finland's security environment. The Government Report provides valuable guidance for defence planners and the Strategy 2030.



### ***Session I: Setting the stage***

The aim of the session was to give a broad picture of trends and challenges likely to take place in global security environment by 2030. It was recognised that predicting future is a tricky and difficult task. There is a great risk for "over securitization" of trends and challenges, which should be avoided. Using scenarios in strategic planning is a crucial method for the analysis of trends and possibilities and their interaction in today's complex world. Sufficient information networking is necessary for the success of any analysis and chosen methods.

First of all, some theoretical assumptions were presented highlighting Fukuyama, Huntington and Mearsheimer. It was recognised that there are many different interpretations of potential futures. Developments after the Cold War were examined in the light of the wars in the Balkans in 1990s and the September 2001 attacks. It was concluded that major challenges remain in Afghanistan and Iraq, attention should be paid more on humanitarian crisis like in Darfur and individual rights and ethical issues are increasingly important part of the stage.

Exchange of views on possible trends and challenges by 2030 focused on so called ring road issues: globalization, global inequality and climate change. Tension between interdependence and competition at the global forum was underlined. During the session, following topics gained particular attention: first, a climate change as a vehicle for potential disputes. Second, a challenge posed by energy as there will be 50 percent increase in demand of energy by 2025. Third, the challenge of fundamentalism. Fourth, fragile states as a complex picture which should be seen today in the light of globalisation and its effects, not as a totally new phenomenon.

Coming to key players in the future world politics, outcomes of future elections in the United States and Russia as well as the developments of the EU foreign policy and NATO were highlighted. From one perspective, the United States future foreign policy is likely to face a rising economic challenge from Asia and increasing competition on energy resources. Russia was called a best friend of the Western Europe: a special effort is needed to build a strong relationship, and this should include aspects of energy policy. International confrontation with Iran and possible instability in Pakistan were mentioned as a part of rather negative future scenario.

For Finland's future security environment, especially aspects on climate change and energy were highlighted. Speakers stressed the importance of local and regional trends and a need to assess them profoundly.

### ***Session II: Key players in 2030***

The examination of the United States showed that in the 2030 multipolar world order the United States may still be a leading power. However, it seems unlikely that the United States could finance a policy of global dominance. In the long term the United States foreign policy may be characterised by less unilateralism and more emphasis on alliance relationships. Increasing power of China and Russia may challenge the United States world power status. This would happen without direct military conflict while political and economic tensions are potential.

It was predicted that the United States may maintain a high level of economic growth until 2030. The oil dependency will be reduced and nuclear energy will play a more central role. It was assessed that a technological progress and more cooperative approach in fight against climate change is likely to occur in the United States. The global war on terrorism was predicted to lose some of its dominance in the United States foreign policy. However, Islamic extremism and terrorism may continue to be a major threat for the United States. A view was expressed that the United States presence in the Middle East may decline and Palestinian state is likely to be formed with the United States support.



For the United States future military superiority, it is likely that main threats rise from asymmetrical warfare. In the United States, expeditionary warfare capabilities are most likely further developed, emphasis will be in IT orientation and precision strike capability, and the number of unmanned weapon systems is increased. Space domination and modernization of nuclear deterrence play also an important role. It was outlined that in the long term NATO remains important for the United States with effective crisis management capacity and new global partnerships. Relationship between NATO and the EU may be formalised.

A more favourable scenario was built on following assumptions: first, unipolar moment for the United States lasts longer. Second, dynamism of the United States economy will be maintained. Third, resolutions are found for the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Fourth, the Chinese economy declines. Fifth, decline in Islamic extremism will take place. A less favourable scenario assumes that first, the United States economy will be in crisis. Second, Russia and China will strengthen their power political position. Third, failure in Iraq and Afghanistan may have destabilising effects in the Middle East. A less favourable scenario would imply risks of instability and problems in NATO with potential effects on Finland in case Finland joins NATO after 2010.

During a broad exchange of views on Russia, it was summarised that by 2030 Russia is likely to belong to the group of major actors with the United States, the EU, China, Japan and India. Russia's economic growth may be based on natural resources and energy. In Russia, the development of new generations' weapons systems and modernization of current weaponry will continue. A view was expressed that in the future there is no simple power political games for Russia but complex reality with new choices and new agencies. Logic of power politics is completely new today and actors like private companies and civil societies will play a stronger role. However, Russian foreign policy may be engaged in new coalitions. Russia is likely to maintain a special relationship with the CIS countries, not least because of energy. Integration of Russia to the EU should be promoted, using lessons from European integration process. In the long term, Finland may benefit from strong and stable Russia, but a return of geopolitics would cause a challenge for a small country to face alone.

A more favourable scenario in 2030 was built on the following assumptions: international cooperation may dominate Russian foreign policy and Russia may tighten its strategic partnership with the United States and NATO. Energy trade with other major powers may create stability in the Eurasian region. According to a less favourable scenario, strengthened authoritarian leadership leads Russia to isolation, uncompromising foreign policy and eagerness to confront geopolitical conflicting interests by military power. Moreover, a less favourable scenario includes unsolved situations in Caucasus (Chechnya) and the Central Asia. Internal problems in Russia like negative demographic trends and clashes between different ethnic groups would also be counted in a less favourable scenario.

It was outlined that two major questions may be dominant for China as a key player in 2030: first, how long can China maintain its present pace of economic growth and second, what kind of behaviour outsiders can expect from China in the international community? It is probable that Communist Party leaders will not genuinely open the political decision-making process in China and it is probable that China's economic growth will not continue at the present rate for the next twenty years due to potential social unrest, shortages in electricity supply, increasing pensions and health costs and effects of serious environmental problems. In the case of Taiwan, it was noted that it is unlikely that Beijing and Taipei reach agreement over the political status of Taiwan, even though it is probable that they will begin to discuss the issue. Unresolved issue of Taiwan's future status is likely to remain a decisive driving force in Chinese-American relations. From one point of view, there are still number of issues where the United States and China may have a common interest: rogue states, pandemics, aiding victims of natural catastrophes etc.



A view was expressed that if there is a future conflict in the Far East, it potentially implies following elements: first, Theatre Missile Defence which the United States is building in the Western Pacific. Second, India and China are engaged in missile development and end products are likely to be sold to interested countries of the region. Third, the space race of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and India has obvious military aspects. Fourth, the United States is offering India dual-use technology for developing nuclear electricity generation which produces negative reactions in China.

The key argument on South Asia was that the developments in the region depend much on relations between India and Pakistan. The region has many faces, many stories and many challenges. In case of political deadlock, economic factors may be a driving force in the future to solve disputes. For India and its increasing power, energy supply and economic growth require outstanding foreign investments. For the stability of the region, much depends on Pakistan's reaction in case of conflict escalation. Nuclear confrontation between the countries of the region is not likely.

It was summarised that positive political and economic developments in South Asia have a positive impact especially on the Finnish economy. Impacts for Finland may reflect possible conflicting interests between the EU, Russia, The United States and China in South Asia. Possible negative effects for Finland could arise by economic recession in the region. Finland should support the social development, equality, environment and forest protection in South Asia in the future, but be aware about the risks at the same time.

Brazil's future position by 2030 was also analysed. Brazil is likely to remain a regional power and a leader of MERCOSUR. Relations with the United States may be at the core while ties with Europe will have a little direct impact on politics. It is likely that Brazil will move closer to the West as a result of its increasing economy and military power speeded by availability of energy and natural resources. Brazil may become a major player and self-sufficient in global energy market by 2030 of which it has a major advantage in comparison to China and India. Crime will be a major challenge to Brazil and calls for deep structural change. In summary, advantages for Brazil in the long term are steady population and economic growth, surplus of natural resources and democratic governance.

### ***Session III: Nordic region***

The session outlined the strategic situation in the Northern Region in the post Cold War era and focused on the scope for potential instability or military conflict in the area. It was outlined that geopolitical challenges and their military strategic implications today are fundamentally different from those of the Cold War period. Major difference is that there is no threat of a large scale invasion today. Coming to the strategic parameters of the Northern Region, energy, resource management, jurisdiction and transportation are likely to be factors playing a key role in the future. Scarce resources may have a security impact either directly or indirectly (in the sense that global warming is opening up new sea lines of communications through north-west and north-east passages).

A view was expressed that in the Northern Region the use of force in order to expand into the land territory of other countries may be ruled out in the future. Stability and strategic competition is called a normal condition. It was underlined that resources in question, although important, are not critical to the survival of the nations and peoples of the Northern Region as both energy and food are available from other sources and regions. Confrontation escalating to conflict would be limited and essentially about economic interests.

Coming to force design in the future, the importance of highly trained, standing forces capable of delivering the necessary and stabilizing military presence and forces capable of reacting at short notice in support of political crisis management was highlighted. Achieving this within the constraints of the budget and the ever increasing cost of military capabilities sets a challenge. It is likely that small and medium sized countries are forced into the sort of defence cooperation scheme.



### **Session IV: International organisations in 2030**

An overview on a likely position of the European Union in 2030 stimulated arguments that the EU should be seen rather among *key players in 2030*. It was recognised that the swift pace of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy from the Maastricht Treaty to 2007 has been unpredictable. However, there are challenges for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the ESDP. These are related to the present institutional framework which undermines effective decision making and the limited CFSP budget in relation to increasing EU operational commitments. As long as defence budgets are not likely to increase, a more efficient pooling of capabilities should be stressed. In the future, the success of the Union as a credible external actor will depend on the coherent use of Union's political, economic, security and development instruments. It is expected that the Reform Treaty will serve better that purpose.

It was outlined that the strength of the CFSP has been in its ability to evoke transformation, an example of Croatia's integration to EU structures was given. In the long run, economic growth of new EU member states will make the whole Union more powerful. From one point of view the EU perspective has been essential to maintain a peaceful track in the countries of the Western Balkans. A status of Kosovo and Kosovo's economic state pose a major challenge in the future. The EU should support regional cooperation and promote effective multilateralism in the Western Balkans. EU's approach should be based on realism and understanding that crises can still erupt.

Some key trends setting a particular challenge to the EU by 2030 were outlined. The EU must have a clear vision on how to face energy efficiency demands and climate change. It was also reminded that China and India may be among four biggest economic powers in the future. Moreover, by 2030 the EU likely shares only 9 percent of total world population. However, it was considered that these potential future trends and their potential impacts should be carefully assessed.

The United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions were introduced as the corner stone of the multilateral system and global governance structure. Following questions are topical: Will these institutions remain powerful or will they lose their position? What will be new challenges what these institutions are likely to face? How should the institutions be developed to be able to continue playing a constructive role in the changing global environment?

Natural catastrophes, violent conflicts, terrorism, international crime, extreme poverty and fragile states will present major challenge for a multilateral system. Response of the international community to these challenges requires a shared vision, a long term commitment and inter-agency approach. Security should be defined as a broad concept. The strategic importance of the developing world for global security was underlined.

Two future scenarios for the multilateral system were presented for consideration. "Business as usual" scenario consists of increasing number of actors with fragmented actions at the global and country level. The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions reform may be slow and lack coordinated and coherent action. The multilateral system may fail to provide normative and operational framework. There is also a fear that this power vacuum could be filled by various bilateral initiatives, private sector actors and new powerful country groupings. A more optimistic scenario is characterised by improving cooperation at highest level of decision making, successful and comprehensive reform process of the UN system and the UN increasingly speaking at country level with one voice.

In summary, it was underlined that an effective multilateral system will result from good cooperation and coordination at all levels, taking into account the needs of private sector and civil society. Rising political and economic powers such as China, India and Brazil play a key role to make multilateral system powerful. It is also important that multilateral institutions strengthen their legitimacy and



credibility among the developing countries. Finland's role and responsibilities should aim at enhance cooperation both at the national and the international level.

The examination of NATO's future role and functions proved that collective defence remains a core function of the organisation in the long term. Regardless the United States commitment, a united approach among European members is likely to set a challenge. Along enlargement within Europe, a diversification of membership increases. The road is likely to be towards a more balanced transatlantic relation. At the same time there may not be any separate European pillar inside the organisation. Enhanced cooperation and division of labour with the EU will be amongst most important goals of NATO. Russia is likely to remain critical towards NATO in the future.

A view was expressed that NATO has a major role in transforming forces for expeditionary operations in the future. NATO's success will be measured by operations. A debate over new tasks may continue to take place. Crisis management is likely to remain the main task of NATO outside Europe. According to a more favourable scenario, NATO operations will be successful which may improve significance as well as the image of the organisation. NATO's major role in transformation and standardisation would be maintained, better global image of the organisation would be enhanced and common interests and values would be promoted. A less favourable scenario would mean unsuccessful operations leading to deficiencies, divisions, lack of coherence and popularity and finally difficulties to strengthen NATO's role and capacities. It was predicted that Finland is likely to be a NATO member in 2010s due to organisation's acceptable role in crisis management and success in operations. This may weaken a common image of national defence and conscript service. A Finnish profile in NATO would be of a transatlantic and loyal member.

Analysis on the OSCE highlighted wide security aspects the organisation covers. In the course of history the OSCE has been able to adapt to changes with flexibility. It was predicted that the existence of the OSCE as an institution will not be threatened by 2030. For the members of the OSCE, there is undeniable, though limited, utility of the organisation as a multinational discussion and negotiation forum with proven capability to reform.

For the OSCE it is expected that moderate adjustments will take place in various issue-areas like increase in the powers of the Secretary-General. Confidence and Security Building Measures may cover new mechanisms for restricting the acquisition of arms by sectors of the population within a state and preventing the escalation of lawlessness in confrontations between population groups. New soft security areas may cover environmental issues, prevention of root causes of terrorism, crime and human trafficking, and economic issue-areas.

However, it was foreseen that there may not be substantial increase in the significance of the OSCE in the foreseeable future. OSCE may be structurally incapable of rising to any more influential position and reform process may be disturbed by repeated tensions between Russia and Western participating states. It is probable that Russia will work for an OSCE that is content to concentrate exclusively on traditional security issues. Implications for Finland may come mostly through the EU. High level of participation in OSCE activities relative to Finland's resources is likely to remain a dominant trait. Finland holds the chairmanship of the OSCE during the year 2008.

### ***Session V: The future of warfare***

Challenges for the future of warfare were discussed especially in the light of lessons learnt from Afghanistan and Iraq. From one point of view, focus of warfare has changed from the Cold War nuclear proliferation confrontation to fight against terrorism. The role of non-state actors has become increasingly important. It was underlined that the nature of conflicts has changed, but conventional warfare means still remain important. Robust conventional capabilities are still needed. Potential for future conflicts between states has still relevance in defence planning.



Exchange of views on future capabilities underlined the importance of doctrine, education, training, specialisation and new kind of forces. Credible, rapid and reactive forces are required in future warfare. Networking and information sharing has to be promoted and rapid and reactive decision-making capacity has to be developed. Adequate industrial standards and applicability of new technology form a key framework for success. The United States preserves its role as the lead nation in the defence technology.

It was pointed out that security in crisis area is a precondition for economic development and prosperity. Alongside credible military means, civil-military coordination from early stage of planning is needed to achieve effectively crisis management objectives. A new matrix is emerging with a need for the integration of inter-agency capabilities.

It was underlined that new requirements for warfare in the future and new lines of action need to be better communicated to the people. Media's visible role in warfare is recognised. Education for that purpose has to be better integrated into planning. Western countries have to adapt to the idea of warfare – own defeats in the battlefield are hard to accept in the world of modern technology.

### ***Session VI: Challenges of radicalisation***

The exchange of views on the topic indicated that the world has entered into a new ideological confrontation: a reason behind radicalisation is a complex picture of internal and external factors. Negative effects of globalisation and global inequality are among driving factors.

Fundamentalism was seen as a counterforce not only to the Western values but also to the disappointments the Arab world has faced in their own history of political and economical developments. From one point of view it was foreseen that violence derived from political, social and economic problems might be reality in the Middle East in 2030. It is not only religion but also social and economic conditions that define the status of different groups of people. According to the most probable scenario, economic and social problems may be in the centre of crises in the Middle East in 2030. For example, in Iraq conflict between groups may have a serious impact on economic development.

It was outlined that Muslim radicalisation is a part of global anti-Western, particularly anti-American, ideological radicalisation. A view was expressed that the true elements in the ideological conflict should be revealed. There should be a understanding that the main enemy is radical ideology, not religion, a country or a group of people. Powerful public-opinion policies to change the image that the West is crusading against Islam should be practised.

A view was expressed that bridge-building between “Western” and “Muslim” populations should take place at all levels, but especially at the level of youth, media and internet. In a de-radicalisation strategy, media and youth are main fronts at the global level. A strategy should be based on information and education. Diversity and non-monolithic nature of radicals have to be taken into account in a strategy. At the regional level, coherent policy should be formed. Claims on “Western double-standards” should be deconstructed in media and education.

Democratization, political reform and a peaceful regional integration of the Arab region were outlined as necessary steps towards stability in Europe's most important neighbourhood. The EU lines of action should imply promoting security, justice and democracy, disrupting networks of radical individuals and the most important, affecting attitudes of the young generation. The EU should adopt a society-based approach, including direct cooperation between institutions. Key principles of EU strategy to counter radicalisation should be a clear benchmarking and realistic achievable objectives. For countries like Finland, it was proposed that the use of good reputation in the fields of good governance, anti-corruption and high technology, including communications is prioritised.



**List of moderators and speakers:**

**Moderators**

*Dr. Risto E.J. **PENTTILÄ**, Director, Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA, Dr. Raimo **VÄYRYNEN**, Director, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Pauli **JÄRVENPÄÄ**, Director General, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Major General Arto **RÄTY**, Director of National Defence Policy Unit, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Mr. Toby **ARCHER**, Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs*

**Speakers**

*Mr. Pertti **SALOLAINEN**, Member of Parliament, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee, Dr. Peter R. **NEUMANN**, Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, Dr. Juha **MARTELIUS**, Director of Research, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Lieutenant Colonel Mika **KERTTUNEN**, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University of Finland, Mr. Lauri **TÄHTINEN**, Doctoral Researcher, Cambridge University, Major Juha **MÄKELÄ**, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University of Finland, Dr. Pekka **SIVONEN**, Professor, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University of Finland, Ms. Linda **JAKOBSON**, Director of China Programme, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Markku **KIVINEN**, Director, Aleksanteri Institute, Ambassador Benjamin **BASSIN**, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, General Sverre **DIESEN**, Chief of Defence, Norway, Dr. Olli **REHN**, Member of the European Commission, Ms. Marjatta **RASI**, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Colonel Juha **PYYKÖNEN**, Director, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University of Finland, Dr. Tommi **KOIVULA**, Senior Researcher, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University of Finland, Dr. Sven **BISCOP**, Senior Researcher, Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium, Ambassador Antti **SIERLA**, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, General (ret.) Jack **KEANE**, the United States, Colonel Dr. Thomas **WILL**, Bundeswehr Transformation Centre, German Armed Forces, Paul **COLLINS**, Head of Capability Development, European Defence Agency, Dr. Jaakko **HÄMEEN-ANTTILA**, Chair of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Helsinki, Mr. Christian **JOKINEN**, Researcher, University of Turku, Dr. Magnus **RANSTORP**, Research Director, Centre for Asymmetrical Threat Studies, Swedish National Defence College*