

CONTENTS

GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION ON SECURING THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY	5
STRATEGY FOR SECURING THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY	12
INTRODUCTION	12
1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STRATEGY AND CENTRAL PRINCIPLES	14
1.1 Objective of the strategy	14
1.2 Principles for securing the functions vital to society	14
1.3 Command structure	16
1.4 Security situations	17
1.5 Threat scenarios	19
2 TARGET STATE OF THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY	22
2.1 Functions vital to society	22
2.2 State leadership	23
2.3 External capacity to act	24
2.4 National military defence	26
2.5 Internal security	27
2.6 Well-functioning economy and society	30
2.7 Income security of the population and its capacity to act	35
2.8 Crisis tolerance	37

3 DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING OF CAPABILITIES	39
3.1 Principles of development and monitoring	39
3.2 State leadership	41
3.3 External capacity to act	42
3.4 National military defence	43
3.5 Internal security	44
3.6 Well-functioning economy and society	48
3.7 Income security of the population and its capacity to act	51
3.8 Crisis tolerance	53
3.9 Development priorities in the next few years	54

ANNEXES

1	Definition of concepts
2	Description of threat scenarios
3	Example outline of a readiness plan

Government Resolution
on Securing the Functions Vital to Society

Issued in Helsinki on 27 November 2003

1 GROUNDS FOR THE RESOLUTION

Internationalisation and structural changes in society greatly affect the country's ability to secure vital functions. In addition, the Government's report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001 paid particular attention to the threats associated with further international integration.

In accordance with the report, the Government embarked on a project to define the areas vital to the functioning of society and to draft action and development plans.

This Government Resolution and the related document (Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society) define society's vital functions and establish targets and development policies that will guide each administrative branch of the government in dealing with its strategic tasks in all situations. Ministries are also designated responsibilities for co-ordinating these functions.

In this Resolution, strategic tasks refer to tasks which are needed to secure the functions vital to society in all situations. They are based on current legislation and the existing division of powers between the different authorities.

The functions vital to society are as follows: state leadership, external capacity to act, the nation's military defence, internal security, functioning of the economy and society, securing the livelihood of the population and its capacity to act, and their ability to tolerate a crisis.

According to the objectives of Finland's security and defence policy, the securing of society's vital functions contributes to the safeguarding of national sovereignty and citizens' livelihood and security.

1.1 Principles for securing vital functions

The principles to be observed in securing society's vital functions are the following: maintaining democracy and the principle of the rule of law; effective and appropriate use of society's resources; standardisation of the command structure; organisations and areas of responsibility; flexible adjustment of preparedness; ensuring cost-effectiveness; securing necessary resources; making best use of the international dimension; and monitoring and developing preparedness and performance.

1.2 Security situations

Finnish society must be able to safeguard its vital functions as well as possible under normal conditions, disruptive situations and exceptional conditions.

It must be possible to prevent and combat the threats that occur in normal conditions, and the legislation and resources meant for normal conditions must be sufficient for dealing with the effects of these threats.

In disruptive situations, the state leadership and the authorities must take special measures and co-operate more closely to combat a threat and to recover from it. In

special situations additional resources and powers, provided in the legislation governing normal conditions can be introduced. A disruptive situation may require amendments to enacted legislation.

The Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act define disruptive situations as situations that cannot be controlled with the normal powers and resources of the authorities.

1.3 Threat scenarios – threats affecting the functions vital to society

A threat scenario is a description of disruptions to the security situation that potentially affect national sovereignty and citizens' livelihood and security. A standard set of threat scenarios is used to harmonise planning by the authorities and other parties involved so that they can ensure the uninterrupted operation of the functions vital to society.

In this Government Resolution, the set of threat scenarios comprises threats to information systems; illegal entry and movements of people jeopardising security; threats to the population's nutrition and health; environmental threats; economic threats; organised crime and terrorism; major disasters; international tension; serious

violations of Finland's territorial integrity and threat of war; armed attack and war; and the aftermath of war.

2 TARGET STATE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY

2.1 Development principles for securing the functions vital to society

In normal conditions, the necessary performance capability to secure the functions vital to society is developed and monitored over periods of four years at a time, focusing on the following:

- The Government Resolution and the related Strategy;
- The development programmes of each administrative branch and their integration into the operation and financial plans and budget proposals;
- Revising the plans for securing the functions vital to society in each administrative branch; and
- Preparedness exercises at the national level and in each administrative branch.

The above also includes the Government's own reports on securing the functions vital to society. The Government proposes necessary political guidelines in

such reports, and these reports are then submitted to Parliament.

The Government Resolution and the related Strategy guide the ministries in their work, ensuring that they develop and maintain the performance level needed to secure the functions vital to society.

Drawn up independently by each administrative branch, the development programmes are plans to develop, maintain and monitor the performance level required for the strategic tasks and to co-ordinate the measures for which the particular administrative branch is responsible.

Political decisions concerning the development programmes are made when appropriation limits, the budget and legislative amendments are decided on.

The plans and arrangements for securing the functions vital to society must be revised on a regular basis and always when essential changes take place in the national security environment. The uninterrupted operation of the arrangements is verified in preparedness exercises, which are organised within each administrative branch of the Government and for the state administration as a whole.

In developing legislation, the adequacy of the authorities' powers

to act must be safeguarded for all security situations in order to prevent and combat threats and to control the effects. Work to revise the legislation on emergency powers must be started without delay.

2.2 Target state for the functions vital to society and the development of performance capabilities

By defining the target state for the functions vital to society, each administrative branch aims to develop its performance capability and its legislation to ensure that the operation of vital functions can cope with the assessed threats and challenges.

In the target state for **state leadership**, Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Government and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice will have the necessary resources to make appropriate decisions as required by the security situation. The Prime Minister and his Office are responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

The existence of a democratic constitutional state is safeguarded in exceptional conditions, too, by ensuring the ability to hold elections and by ensuring that the highest overseers of legality can continue to perform their duties, and by

guaranteeing legal protection for individuals as laid down in the Constitution. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

In developing the preconditions for safeguarding the functioning of the state leadership, priority is given to situational awareness, which is essential for managing the functions vital to society. This must facilitate the state leadership's timely decision-making in all security situations. In addition, special attention is paid to building protected and secure electronic information and communications systems needed by the state leadership.

External capacity to act means that the international contacts of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions abroad and other administrative branches of the Government, and the preconditions for foreign trade are all secured. Assistance for Finnish citizens abroad must also be secured. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

External capabilities are primarily developed by ensuring that protected communication links function in all situations between Helsinki and the diplomatic missions abroad. This applies in particular to

the links with Finland's Mission to the EU.

In the target state for the **national military defence**, the defence system's performance will be correctly assessed for the purpose of repelling potential military aggression, thus creating a preventive threshold against military threats. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

The key issue in the development of the nation's military defence is to prevent and repel a strategic strike. The development of the defence system must provide the state leadership with alternative security policy decisions.

The target state for **internal security** focuses on maintaining the principles of the rule of law, public order and security, the capability to protect and rescue the population and prevention of illegal entry. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

In developing internal security, priority is given to the judicial system's ability to function, intelligence gathered in co-operation with other authorities to identify serious crime including terrorism, the rescue services required to deal with accidents and disasters, the border control system at the EU's

external borders and the combating of illegal immigration.

In the target state for the **well-functioning of the economy and society**, trade and industry, public finances and the national infrastructure are safeguarded to secure the operation of functions vital to society and citizens' livelihoods. The measures are co-ordinated by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

In developing the functioning of the economy and society, the focus must be on protecting and securing the uninterrupted operation of basic technical structures that are critical to society. Special attention must be paid to electronic information and communications systems that are vital to society and control the operation of basic technical structures.

In the target state for **the income security of the population and its capacity to act**, the population's capacity to act, its health and livelihood and the prevention of social exclusion are supported by social and health care services and social security. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

When the essential elements for securing the population's income security and its capacity to act are being developed, it is important to support citizens' livelihoods and increase regional co-operation in the production of social and health care services. It is particularly important to ensure control of radiation, the detection and management of biological and chemical threats, and the development of a care system and expert guidance to deal with resultant illnesses.

It is essential to develop the readiness to deal with serious epidemics and other threat scenarios endangering public health.

In the target state for **crisis tolerance**, citizens must have the will to act for national sovereignty, livelihood and security even in the most demanding exceptional conditions. The Ministry of Education is responsible for co-ordinating these measures.

The development of crisis tolerance aims at strengthening citizens' will and capability to contribute to national security if the functions vital to society are threatened.

2.3 Focal areas for developing performance in the near future

Situational awareness required for managing the functions vital to society. Situational awareness is needed to support the state leadership's decision-making capability. The compilation, analysis and distribution of relevant information in all security situations must be organised and regulated under the leadership of the Prime Minister's Office.

Intelligence gathered to identify serious crime including terrorism. Intelligence exchange must be developed between different authorities to ensure that threats from criminals to the functions vital to society can be identified, as well as the potential targets.

Electronic information and communications systems. The functioning of the country's internal infrastructure is a vitally important consideration in the development of electronic information and communications systems. The basic structures of electronic information and communications systems and the authorities' own security networks must be protected and secured in normal conditions to ensure that they can resist threats affecting them in exceptional conditions, too.

Health protection. Preparedness to deal with threats to public health such as sudden serious epidemics must be developed. It is especially important to ensure that public health care can release experts and other resources without jeopardising the basic functions of health care.

3 APPLICATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION AND THE RELATED STRATEGY

This Government Resolution is based on the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, prepared by the Committee for Security and Defence Affairs. Each ministry will produce further instructions for its own administrative branch as necessary. This Government Resolution and the related Strategy repeal the Defence Council memorandum of

1999 entitled *Contingency planning for disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances in society*, which the Prime Minister's Office issued as an instruction to each administrative branch of the Government.

This Government Resolution and the related Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society will be revised as soon as changes in Finland's security environment so require. The Committee for Security and Defence Affairs must prepare revisions to Resolution and the Strategy, for submission to the Government in 2006.

 COMPETENCE: Decree on the Government, Section 3, subsection 1, paragraph 11.

STRATEGY FOR SECURING THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

In the Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy published in 2001, the Government allotted the Security and Defence Committee the task of drawing up a strategy for national precautionary measures. This entailed defining the functions vital to society and drawing up action plans and development proposals. The national strategy was to focus on maintaining the functions vital to society and to consider these in their entirety, without being constrained by ministerial or administrative boundaries. The Government stated that the national strategy should consider the effects of internationalisation, structural changes in society and economic and other forecasts. The vital functions covered by the strategy will be monitored more closely than those, which are subject to normal precautionary measures. The intention is that the national strategy for precautionary measures will be updated regularly and its policy recommendations included in the Government's next security and defence policy report.

During the preparation of the strategy it has become evident that readiness as a concept is too limited to describe the maintenance and securing of the functions vital to

society in all situations. Readiness and the related obligations of the authorities as prescribed by the Emergency Powers Act are tools to secure the functions vital to society. Therefore the proposals for the national strategy in the Government Resolution on securing the functions vital to society are entitled *Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society*.

The purpose of this strategy is to guide the different administrative branches of the Government in developing and maintaining the performance required by the functions vital to society and to provide a common basis for planning and co-operation between the administrative branches. One of the central principles of the strategy concerns the international dimension of these functions. As a member of the European Union, Finland makes extensive use of the international opportunities for furthering its national security and welfare interests.

The first chapter outlines the purpose and task of the strategy, the central principles, security situations and the threat scenarios common to all participants. The second chapter portrays the target state of the functions vital to society, which Finland aims to reach by 2010. To achieve this, the administrative

branches of the Government will have to develop the performance capabilities required by the functions vital to society. The policy for developing this capability is formulated in the third chapter.

All thirteen ministries have contributed to drafting the strategy, and the Security and Defence Committee has acted as the co-ordinating body. The Government Resolution and the related strategy redefine the threats identified in the 1999 memorandum of the Defence Council. They also prioritise the vital functions to be maintained in all security situations and propose development guidelines for the

administrative branches in order to ensure the level of performance required for these vital functions. The Government Resolution and the related Strategy replace the Defence Council memorandum.

The securing of functions vital to society requires that the strategy be updated regularly. The next Government Resolution on the subject will be submitted in 2006. The Security and Defence Committee will be responsible for preparing the resolution and the related strategy.

1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STRATEGY AND CENTRAL PRINCIPLES

1.1 Objective of the strategy

In accordance with the goals of Finland's security and defence policy, securing the functions vital to society contributes to securing national sovereignty and the livelihood and security of the population.

The objective of the strategy is to guide the different administrative branches of the Government in developing and maintaining the performance level required for the strategic tasks for which they are responsible and in dealing with their duties in all security situations.

1.2 Principles for securing the functions vital to society

Democracy and the principle of a constitutional state

The inviolability of human dignity, the principle of popular representation, the division of government functions, the conformance with the law of the official exercise of power and other principles of the rule of law will be maintained in all situations, and the rights of individuals will be safeguarded. Only temporary exceptions to the provisions on basic rights will be permitted if this is

seen to be necessary in the event of an armed attack or similar exceptional conditions threatening the nation.

Everyone involved

The vital functions will be secured through effective and appropriate use of society's resources. This requires that the state and local authorities co-operate with the private sector and that measures are co-ordinated in all situations. Total defence offers a wide range of tools to plan and ensure this. Civil society, churches and other religious communities may contribute to achieving these goals.

Clear division of responsibilities

The Government has a leading role in the task of securing the functions vital to society. The prime minister and his office are responsible for co-ordinating the work. Each ministry integrates the vital functions within its purview into the overall scheme. Specific strategic tasks are the responsibility of the competent ministry or other authority, which will be responsible for maintaining and developing the necessary level of performance to ensure that the tasks can be performed in all situations. For this purpose, the ministries responsible for the

strategic tasks will organise the necessary co-operation with other ministries.

The command structure needed to ensure the vital functions and the organisations and division of responsibilities in normal conditions will not be changed during disruptive situations or exceptional conditions unless this is deemed absolutely necessary.

Flexible adjustment of readiness

Securing the functions vital to society requires that readiness be flexibly adjusted in preventing and combating threats and managing their effects. In this way the appropriate scope and efficiency can be achieved and situational assessment of resources made. The legislation necessary in adjusting readiness must ensure that the authorities have sufficient powers to act in quickly changing situations, too.

Cost efficiency

The functions vital to society will be secured in a cost-efficient manner so that the procedures and systems applying in normal conditions will also apply to preventing and managing threats and recovering from their effects in various disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. The performance and powers required for maintaining vital

functions will be developed on the basis of the action model that applies to normal conditions. This will reduce the tendency to build overlapping systems and organisations.

Securing resources

The measures and required resources outlined in the development programmes for securing the functions vital to society are included in the operating and financial plans and budget proposals. The primary means for finding additional resources is through the reallocation of funds within each administrative branch. Necessary resources for maintaining the functions vital to society will also be secured through rationalisation and by giving up performance capabilities no longer considered essential. The powers to act will be safeguarded through necessary amendments to the legislation. Projects to help secure vital functions can also be financed from off-budget state funds.

International dimension

Finland's success is based, among other things, on global integration and the international division of labour in many fields. On the other hand, this also increases the country's vulnerability in insecure situations. Networking has led to interdependency even in preventing

and combating threats. Each vital function in society has a significant international dimension. Finland should make efficient use of the advantages offered by European Union membership to further its national security and wellbeing and to strengthen its status internationally. Continuing to play an active role in international organisations, such as the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, will consolidate Finland's ability to secure the functions vital to society.

Monitoring readiness and performance

The maintenance and development of national security require an exact knowledge of the readiness and performance of each of the administrative branches of the Government in regard to securing the vital functions. The ministries responsible for specific strategic tasks monitor the readiness to carry out those tasks and the related performance capability. The Security and Defence Committee is responsible for the overall monitoring of readiness and capability and for reporting on this to the Government. This process produces information for the state leadership on whether resources have been correctly allocated to secure the vital functions.

1.3 Command structure

The Government leads, monitors and co-ordinates the securing of functions vital to society, the competent ministry being responsible for its own administrative branch. In matters of military command, the President of the Republic makes the decisions. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy prepares important matters pertaining to foreign and security policy and any other matters concerning Finland's foreign relations and matters concerning total defence.

In co-operation with other ministries, the Prime Minister's Office deals with matters pertaining to, for example, the security service in the Government and the ministries and precautionary measures against disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. One of the functions of the Ministry of Defence is to co-ordinate total defence.

The Security and Defence Committee, which assists both the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, observes changes in the status of security and defence policy and assesses their effects on the arrangements for total defence. In addition, it observes the measures taken in different administrative branches of the Government in connection with total defence and

co-ordinates the preparation of national defence matters.

Permanent secretaries are responsible for the uninterrupted operation of matters and for the effectiveness of actions in the ministries under all conditions. They are responsible for ensuring that the administrative branches have the capability to operate without disruption, even under exceptional conditions. The meeting of the ministries' chiefs of readiness is a permanent co-operation body established to deal with precautionary measures in various security situations. Each ministry's permanent secretary or an official appointed by the permanent secretary acts as chief of readiness. This function involves leading and monitoring readiness planning within the administrative branch, making necessary advance preparations, and developing and maintaining co-operation with other administrative branches of the Government. A readiness committee consisting of representatives from the most significant administrative branches plays a role in making preparations for disruptive situations and exceptional conditions.

The Planning Board for Defence Economy, together with its various subordinate bodies, monitors co-operation between the authorities and trade and industry in matters relating to security of supply. The

Planning Board follows the situation and produces information and proposals for improving security of supply in co-operation with the National Emergency Supply Agency, which implements and finances the proposals.

1.4 Security situations

Normal conditions involve threats, which can be prevented and combated and their effects managed within the framework of the laws and resources intended for normal conditions. The more reliably society functions in normal conditions, the better it is capable of combating threats to national security in other security situations.

In normal conditions, the focus in securing the functions vital to society is on preventing various threats. By efficient identification and combat of threats it is possible to avoid serious incidents or prevent their consequences from escalating into serious disruptions or exceptional conditions.

Along with other measures, the systems built for normal conditions create a basis for the action to be taken in disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. In particular, the electronic communication and telecommunications systems needed for command and control and for monitoring the functions vital

to society must be protected. The continuity of their operation under severe exceptional conditions must be ensured in advance, under normal conditions.

In a **disruptive situation**, the state leadership and the authorities must take special measures to combat a threat and successfully cope with it. Disruptive situations may require introduction of the special powers referred to in the legislation governing normal conditions. It may also be necessary to reallocate funding, order personnel to serve in particular sectors of the economy or find additional resources through other means. Legislation may even have to be amended.

A disruptive situation may require that the co-operation and command and control functions of the state leadership and other authorities are made more effective. This applies particularly to creating and maintaining situational awareness and providing information about it. In disruptive situations, information must be actively provided about the current situation, the political guidelines and the measures and instructions of the authorities.

Exceptional conditions are, by definition, situations, which cannot be controlled with the normal powers and resources of the authorities. Article 297 in the Charter of the European Union defines

exceptional conditions as serious internal disturbances and war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, which may affect the maintenance of law and order.

The broad definition of exceptional conditions has remained unchanged for a long time, but the detailed content has undergone considerable change. Different periods of time have produced significantly different assessments of the possibility or likelihood of exceptional conditions emerging. Securing the functions vital to society requires that all exceptional conditions be taken into consideration. There must always be up-to-date arrangements for possible exceptional conditions, as it is not possible to develop the necessary capabilities at short notice.

Exceptional conditions call for additional resources and legislative measures. Situations must be handled with well-timed, extensive and effective measures. The Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act provide for enhancing powers and resources in situations, which meet the conditions required by legislation. The readiness plans of the different administrative branches of the Government may require legislative amendments to be enacted. These will have been prepared in advance according to the assessed need.

The Government, the state's administrative authorities, state-owned companies, other state officials and municipalities must ensure that their tasks are performed with as little disruption as possible, even under exceptional conditions. The obligations applying to privately owned companies in exceptional conditions will be based on the legislation and on agreements or voluntary co-operation. On the basis of the legislation, the state leadership can order companies whose functions are vital to society to take precautionary measures against disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. Such obligations may be incorporated into the terms of licences, for example.

1.5 Threat scenarios

A threat scenario is a potential disruption affecting the national security environment. The scenario is couched in general terms without discussing the concrete security situation. The use of threat scenarios aims to harmonise the planning conducted by the various authorities and other bodies for the purpose of securing the functions vital to society.

Threat identification is based on a threat scenario and aims to identify sources of threats or designated actors. It describes the development

of a concrete security environment and specifies the likely forms that the threat will take and the repercussions or objectives, and modes of action.

Threat assessments, which are made by each of the administrative branches of the Government, define the threat identification by means of intelligence and other information. A threat assessment makes it possible to assess measures, which the administrative branch must take to prevent or combat the threat and to cope with its effects.

The set of threat scenarios used for planning how to secure the functions vital to society is revised every four years in connection with the strategy revision, or at any other time as necessary. The administrative branches are responsible for updating the threat identifications and threat assessments relevant to their strategic tasks. The Security and Defence Committee is responsible for updating the set of threat scenarios.

Threats to functions vital to society may emerge separately or simultaneously and may be linked to each other. Assessments of their likelihood vary and may change quite rapidly. It is not possible to foresee all threats. Similarly, it is not possible to take precautionary measures against all threats to the

extent that they could be entirely prevented.

Threats to the European Union or its member countries may affect the member countries to different degrees and may have a direct or indirect impact on Finnish society. In the same way, any threat to Finland may affect other member countries.

In normal conditions, threats affecting the functioning of the economy and society and internal security may emerge which, if realised, could lead to exceptional conditions. A disaster situation or an economic crisis may occur separately or as part of the exceptional conditions. The most serious exceptional conditions in which Finland could become involved are an armed conflict or a war. In such a conflict, political, economic, informational and military resources will always form an integrated whole. Non-state actors may also be permitted to use force or threaten the use of force. Not only could states, or the persons, organisations and structures standing for them, be targeted, but also intergovernmental organisations and coalitions, companies, various communities, civic organisations and individual citizens.

Threat scenarios directed against the functions vital to society are as follows:

- Threats to information systems
- Illegal entry and population movements jeopardising security
- Threats to the nutrition and health of the population
- Environmental threats
- Economic threats, which include disruptions to international trade and production as well as economic decline or depression
- Organised crime and terrorism
- Disaster situation (local or large-scale)
- International tension, which may be caused by a war between foreign powers or a threat of war or a particular incident beyond Finnish borders
- Serious violation of Finland's territorial integrity and a threat of war, which could take the form of a regional crisis in Finland's neighbouring areas or political, economic or military pressure
- Armed attack and war, which could take the form of a strategic strike or a large-scale attack, and the aftermath of war.

Any of these threats could cause a disruptive situation and lead to exceptional conditions or could in themselves be considered exceptional conditions. The set of threat scenarios is a general description of the threats that could disrupt functions vital to society and, as a result, jeopardise the state's sovereignty and the livelihood and

security of its citizens. The threat scenarios are described in Annex 2.

2 TARGET STATE OF THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY

2.1 Functions vital to society

The functions vital to society include can be divided into seven broad areas contributing to national sovereignty and the livelihood and security of citizens. The ministries are each responsible for the strategic tasks relevant to their own sphere of operation.

State leadership refers to the work of Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Government (ministers) and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice in ensuring that national resources are used as required by the prevailing security situation. The Prime Minister's Office is responsible for co-ordinating the necessary operating conditions for this. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for co-ordination the measures required for the maintenance of a constitutional state.

External capacity to act means the capacity to maintain contacts with foreign powers, ensure that Finland's representatives take part in the work of the EU's bodies and other international organisations, receive necessary assistance and support and provide such to other countries, secure the continuity of foreign trade, and assist Finnish nationals abroad. The Ministry of

Foreign Affairs is responsible for co-ordinating the necessary measures.

National military defence is designed to prevent and control military threats affecting Finland, provide executive assistance to control other types of threat and permit Finland's participation in international military crisis management. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for co-ordinating the necessary measures.

Internal security is needed to maintain the legal system's capacity to act and prevent and control threats to the population's safety and the functions vital to society. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for co-ordinating the necessary measures.

A Well-functioning economy and society is necessary to safeguard trade and industry, public finances and the social and economic infrastructure. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for co-ordinating public finances and administration, the Ministry of Trade and Industry for co-ordinating basic functions in society and the Ministry of Transport and Communications for co-ordinating electronic information and communication systems and transport system.

Securing the income of the population and its capacity to act

means maintaining the social security and social welfare and health care services required by citizens. It will also prevent social exclusion and promote stability in society. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for co-ordinating the necessary measures.

Crisis tolerance means maintaining and developing the national will to manage threats emerging in security situations and to cope with their effects. The Ministry of Education is responsible for co-ordinating the necessary measures.

2.2 State leadership

In its target state, the state leadership (i.e. Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Government and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice) will have the necessary decision-making capabilities to ensure that the functions vital to society are maintained as required by the security situation. The leadership of other key authorities in the central government administration will safeguard the tasks necessary to maintain functions vital to society.

To ensure that the state leadership is capable of timely **decision-making** in directing the functions

vital to society, situational awareness will be continuously maintained. In addition, information should be distributed in all security situations. As laid down by legislation, decision-making for state leadership purposes takes place in. Procedures that must be duly carried out in all circumstances on a 24-hour basis.

In addition to being members of the Government and leading their ministries, ministers have an important role in the Council of Europe. The Prime Minister leads the Government and the President of the Republic makes most of his or her decisions in the Council of State. The officials in the ministries prepare matters for decision by the Council of State, the President of the Republic and Parliament. The officials handling the preparations and decision-making process must co-operate across administrative boundaries and with those at the political decision-making level.

The ministries implement the decisions made by the state leadership. The command and control systems employed by the administrative branches of the Government must enable them to implement these decisions in all situations.

The individual's right to participate in decisions concerning the functions of society, which is inherent in

popular representation, must be safeguarded. It is the task of the Ministry of Justice to ensure that elections are held according to the law even in exceptional conditions. Similarly, any restrictions on the individual's rights and freedoms as well as any obligations imposed on them must be based on the law. Legal security is guaranteed for the individual in accordance with the Finnish Constitution and laws restricting civil rights must not interfere with the core of civil rights. Compliance with human rights' obligations is guaranteed. The authorities in charge of supreme legality control overseeing legality and the law must ensure compliance with civil and human rights and the legality of measures by public authorities, even in exceptional conditions.

Finland's participation in decision-making on the external activities of the EU must be secured in all conditions. This will be achieved by maintaining a preparatory mechanism for in Finland, by participating in the EU's meetings or by issuing guidelines to the Mission of Finland to the EU before meetings. The Prime Minister's Office is in charge of co-ordinating the preparation and discussion of matters to be decided at the EU and for ensuring that the Council of State has the necessary resources to function, even under exceptional conditions.

The **command and control system of the state** is fully functional when the personnel, command and control facilities and communications are ready to function in all situations. The officials carrying out the preparatory work for the state leadership's decision-making must be trained to act in different security situations. The state leadership must have appropriate command and control facilities and communications to enable it to make decisions in all situations. The functioning of electronic communication and information systems requires that the transmission and handling of information be safeguarded in advance, under normal conditions, and without interfering with the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.

2.3 External capacity to act

In its target state, the external capacity to act will be secured by maintaining and developing the necessary readiness of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the foreign service, international contacts in other administrative branches of the Government, preconditions for foreign trade, and assisting Finnish citizens abroad.

The tasks of the **Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the network of diplomatic missions** include the

promotion of relations with foreign powers, contribution to decision-making in the EU's external relations and playing a role in other international structures.

It is essential that Finland is able to make its views known to foreign powers and other international actors. In addition, to Finland's own domestic decision-making procedures its participation in the work of the bodies responsible for the EU's foreign relations must be secured. Any offers of or requests for support and assistance from Finland to other countries and international organisations must be forwarded quickly and reliably in all conditions.

Effective decision-making requires a reliable and well-timed situational awareness and efficient distribution of the relevant information. Finland's missions abroad play a key role in compiling such information. The networks and systems needed for acquiring and disseminating information will be maintained as extensively as necessary in view of the conditions and requirements. The operating conditions for the network of diplomatic missions must be safeguarded to the extent needed. For example, the mission must be appropriately staffed at all times, and in exceptional conditions the opportunity to co-operate closely with other EU and Nordic countries

must be pursued as much as possible.

Good communications between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and diplomatic missions and between the missions themselves must be safeguarded in all conditions, in particular the uninterrupted operation of secure and protected two-way communications. Similarly, direct communications must also be ensured in all conditions between the authorities of Finland and those countries which are of special significance to Finland in all conditions. The necessary conditions for communication to and from the foreign missions in Helsinki must also be safeguarded in all conditions.

Each ministry must be capable of contributing to the preparatory work for EU decision-making that falls within their remit and other types of international co-operation. This should take place directly or via the network of missions of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The conditions for **foreign trade** must be safeguarded in all circumstances. It is essential to ensure that imports and exports essential for the nation's food supplies and its trade and commerce are not disrupted. It is particularly important to ensure that there are no disruptions to the operation of the EU single market,

and therefore special attention must be paid to vital goods, services and infrastructure, including financial transactions and transportation. In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the systems for surveillance of the import and export trade are functioning properly. When operating in the single market and in areas covered by the common trade policy it is important that the procedures comply with the EU's terms of reference; however, the need to secure supplies may require direct negotiations with the authorities of countries which play a central role in the import and export trade and transportation.

The resources and systems required to supply economic and other **assistance to Finnish citizens** and repatriation where necessary must be ensured in all conditions.

2.4 National military defence

In the target state for national military defence, the performance of the defence system must be sufficient to deter military threats in the prevailing security environment and to safeguard national sovereignty by repelling any attack.

The **defence system** has to be able to form and maintain a military strategic situational awareness as required for effective decision-making, and to monitor and

safeguard territorial integrity, provide executive assistance for the protection of vital functions and targets, combat military threats and participate in international military crisis management.

To create and maintain a military strategic situational awareness, the intelligence and control system has to be capable of observing the development of Finland's security environment, assessing changes in the environment and producing information on the prevailing situation. The system will produce an early warning about the development of military threats, which will enable Finland to launch timely and suitable counter-measures. The intelligence and control system has to allow for flexible adjustment the state of readiness by ensuring that the state leadership is military strategic situational awareness is current and complete.

Surveillance of land and sea territory and airspace for the purpose of safeguarding Finland's territorial integrity also requires co-operation with other surveillance authorities. Territorial surveillance must be capable of detecting, clarifying territorial offences and violations. Territorial violations must be prevented or countered by use of force or other methods. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of and co-

ordinates the action of the territorial surveillance authorities.

In addition to the state leadership, the Defence Forces co-operate with other authorities to protect sensitive targets and functions. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of and harmonises the necessary measures.

In combating military threats and defending the entire country, national sovereignty and the livelihood of citizens will be safeguarded in all situations. To achieve this, the Defence Forces' readiness will have to be constantly maintained throughout the country, the necessary forces called up for service, core materiel for wartime troops decentralised and vital targets protected.

When repelling a strategic strike, the aim of the defence measures will be to protect and maintain national decision-making capability, society's capacity to act and the operating capability of military defence. As a result, the aggressor will be prevented from reaching his goal. The key issues in defence are to safeguard territorial integrity, protect sensitive targets and functions, inflict losses on the aggressor and stop any attempts to paralyse the defence system.

The objective in repelling a large-scale attack is to keep possession of

strategically important areas and, by taking advantage of the depth of the territory, to delay and wear down the invader so that the superiority needed to repel and defeat the enemy can be achieved in a decisive place of our own choosing. Defence is the joint responsibility of the military commands, the navy and the air force.

The defence system must be capable of producing troops for national defence, some of whom will be suitable for international crisis-management tasks. Decisions about taking part in international military crisis-management operations are made at the national level. By participating in military crisis management, the aim is to prevent external crises from escalating and affecting Finland and to control such crises.

2.5 Internal security

The aim of internal security is to maintain the legal system's capacity to function, to prevent and control threats affecting the security of citizens and to ensure the uninterrupted operation of functions vital to society.

Securing the legal system and social order requires that we ensure the capabilities and co-operation of the police and other investigating authorities, the system

of prosecution, the judiciary and the executive authorities. In addition, whatever the conditions, citizens' rights and freedoms can only be restricted within the limit of the law. Legal protection of the individual must be safeguarded. According to the Constitution, the rule of law must be secured in all conditions and the authorities must be able to perform the duties required of them by law.

The executive system which implements the decisions of the judiciary must ensure that legal protection is guaranteed in all situations. Citizens must be able to enjoy the protection of life and health, individual freedom, protection of property and other rights as provided for by law. In addition, every citizen is or titled to have decisions concerning his or her rights and duties dealt with by independent judicial organs through legal procedures. The resources of the court system and prisons must be assessed to ensure that they can meet the requirements of each situation.

To ensure public order and security, it is necessary to establish, maintain and promote awareness of internal security, protect key infrastructure and prevent crime and serious disorders.

The Ministry of the Interior must promote situational awareness of internal security, maintain it and

distribute the necessary information. Situational awareness must be sufficient to allow correct and timely decision-making and must include awareness of the international security situation, in particular the security situation in Finland's neighbouring areas, and assessment of cross-border crime. In addition, it must identify the factors affecting public order and security and the emergency services.

When protecting key infrastructure, it is vital to detect threats to and attacks nationally important systems, sites and functions and to ensure their smooth operation. The police must have the 24-hour capability to deal with any threat or criminal act that could jeopardise functions vital to society.

Crimes that seriously threaten citizens' basic rights and the underlying structures of society and the economy, and serious disruptions to the functioning of society must be combated in all situations. It is essential that the police have sufficient reserve personnel and the required competence. Surveillance of foreign nationals must be maintained at a sufficient level. In combating terrorism, it is essential to establish the necessary situational awareness of terror its activities that could threaten Finland, possible targets and suspicious individuals staying in

Finland or threatening Finland. The police must have enough personnel trained in combating terrorism, sufficient technical capabilities and legislative authority.

For effective operation of the emergency services, threats must be detected and warnings issued at an early stage. The population must be protected; the emergency services maintained and environmental threats and damage combated.

It is essential to have detection systems in place to detect threats to the population, property or the environment. The relevant authorities must be contacted without delay. Other authorities and the rest of the population must be informed of the situation so that appropriate protective measures can be taken. Adequate surveillance, alarm and information systems must be in place to ensure the compilation, handling and distribution of situational information as well as the necessary co-operation between various authorities. Co-operation is also essential at the international level in the exchange of information and in acquiring information concerning threat scenarios.

Civil defence measures must ensure that there is sufficient capacity in emergency shelters. In addition, it

must be possible to evacuate the population from threatened areas.

The emergency services must be ready to deal with risks and threats in all conditions. Voluntary organisations must be able to offer their assistance and international co-operation must be secured.

Environmental threats and damage must be prevented as far as possible. Threats and damage that have already occurred must be detected and contained as soon as possible and the damage repaired. Environmental threats and damage include oil spills, dangerous substances affecting the environment, radiation, the pollution of groundwater, lakes and rivers, and soil, floods, and mass destruction of organisms. The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for co-ordinating the authorities' measures to combat environmental threats and damage.

Border control and the management of a potential mass influx of foreign nationals require that situational awareness at borders be maintained and communicated to other authorities. The capacity of border control authorities to act must be safeguarded and provision made to deal with the consequences of such a mass influx.

To ensure timely political, economic and operational decisions based on extensive and reliable information, situational awareness at borders must be maintained and conveyed to the leadership in charge of the nation's security. Situational awareness at borders must identify internal and external factors affecting border security. Surveillance of situational awareness at borders must be able to produce information on illegal entry, its organization and other forms of cross-border crime.

The capacity of the border control authorities to act must be safeguarded in all conditions. Illegal entry must be prevented and uncovered at the EU's external borders. The key issue is to be able to check traffic at external borders and effectively control the entire border between Finland and Russia. The capability to manage special situations, improve surveillance and react to rapidly changing situations must be maintained on all Finland's borders. In addition, Finland must maintain the capability to reinstate border checks at the most important checkpoints of the internal borders of the Schengen Agreement.

If a mass influx of refugees occurs, the border control authorities must have the capacity to receive them and arrange safe conditions for them. Border control must have well-established procedures to deal

with the situation. The Ministry of Labour is responsible for planning and issuing guidance on how to receive refugees and asylum seekers. The employment authorities must have contingency plans to extend the capacity to accommodate such persons and arrange temporary protection for them when necessary. Reception centres must be able to organise guidance for refugees and asylum seekers and ensure their well-being. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for establishing the identity of refugees and asylum seekers, recording personal descriptions, handling applications and expelling persons from the country, if necessary.

2.6 Well-functioning economy and society

In the target situation, the nation's economy, trade and industry and infrastructure will be safeguarded to ensure that the functions vital to society and the livelihood of the population are maintained.

Functioning of the national economy

To ensure a well-functioning economy, the Government must take measures to promote macroeconomic goals, such as economic growth, full employment, stable prices and a just income

distribution. Decisions concerning Government revenue and expenditure and the arrangements for money supply and financial services must safeguard the necessary resources for the work of the state's administrative units and the livelihood of citizens. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the planning, implementation and co-ordination of these measures. Furthermore, challenges that may emerge in exceptional conditions can be most effectively dealt with when the state's economy is in surplus.

It is important to ensure economic stability, an effective fiscal policy, efficient tax collection, moderate borrowing and an effective budgeting system. The effectiveness of fiscal policy and tax collection must be carefully considered because the consequences of decisions affecting taxes are felt in the level of public funds after just a couple of months. The tax collection systems must function in all conditions, and precautionary measures must be taken to arrange alternative methods and systems of taxation.

The effectiveness of the budget system ensures that funds are allocated for particular purposes as necessary. Based on the Government's proposals, the Ministry of Finance prepares the state budget and supplementary

budgets, and Parliament makes the final decisions. It allocates sums for various uses and directs the necessary revenues to cover them. Supplementary budget proposals consisting of just a few cost items can be prepared within about a week. This requires that the various ministries co-operate efficiently and are able to propose and decide on savings and spending reallocations in their budgets.

The nation's financial system and money supply must be safeguarded. Financing activities, payment transactions and the money supply, which are all linked to the international economy, must be ensured in all conditions. The Bank of Finland, as Finland's monetary authority, plays a significant role as an actor in payment transfers in all security situations.

It is the responsibility of the debt recovery authorities to see that recovery proceedings are initiated in exceptional conditions, too.

Maintaining society's basic functions

To maintain society's basic functions, it is necessary to secure energy supply, food supply, housing, availability of labour, technical amenities the education system, and the production of goods and services vital for the population's livelihood and for national defence.

To secure society's basic functions it is necessary that the social insurance system functions in all conditions. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is responsible for harmonising the tasks needed to maintain the basic functions.

The securing of energy supply includes the production, transfer and distribution of electricity and heat, the import, production and distribution of fuels and the required equipment maintenance. Energy supply must support the goals of a well-functioning energy market, efficient use of energy, energy saving, increased use of domestic energy, and ensuring a high level of energy technology and a sufficiently diverse and economical capacity for acquiring energy. The security of energy supply is maintained at a higher level than required by international agreements because of the demanding climatic conditions in Finland. Electricity and heat production and fuel supply are secured through decisions made at Government level. Energy production and consumption are controlled to meet the demands of contingency planning and international obligations.

Maintaining food supplies involves securing the primary production, processing and distribution logistics of foods, household and institutional food processing capacity, and water supply and sewerage systems. It

also involves securing the availability of production inputs required by the food supply chains. The aim of ensuring security of food supply is to maintain sufficient domestic production of basic foodstuffs, a well-functioning food distribution system, and efficient food monitoring and inspection services. The population's access to good nutrition and water supply and sewerage must be secured. Precautionary measures will be taken to guard against the effects of a single poor season. Plans concerning the production and consumption of foodstuffs will be designed to meet the requirements for national security of supply. The maintenance of water supply and sewerage systems must secure the availability of clean water for household consumption and environmentally safe sewerage at reasonable costs. The authorities responsible for the safety of foodstuffs and combating animal diseases must be able to take necessary measures.

The Government and the municipalities must ensure that the housing situation is at least adequate. To ensure a sufficient housing stock in disruptive situations and exceptional conditions it is essential to be able to quickly increase the housing supply, for example through regulations.

To secure the production of goods and services, the operating conditions must be maintained for companies that are essential to the national economy. The livelihood of the population and the capability for national defence must also be maintained. Emphasis must be given to the emergence of well-functioning, safe and competitive markets and secure preconditions for foreign trade. Trade policy must maintain the operating environment in a way that allows companies internationally comparable opportunities for improving their competitive edge. It is vital to ensure a regionally balanced structure of trade and industry. Production of goods and services must be possible with minimal interruption in all situations. Contingency planning for harmonising production and consumption and appropriate controls must be maintained. The production capacity of key materials needed in national defence must be maintained to meet the requirements of the Defence Forces.

The employment authorities must ensure the availability of labour and provide necessary guidance in all conditions. In the event of an economic crisis or major disaster with long-term repercussions it may be necessary to control the labour market on a temporary basis to ensure that people's basic income security is maintained or to deal with the aftermath of a disaster. In the

most demanding exceptional conditions, a general obligation to work may be necessary in order to secure the labour supply and thus the provision of necessary goods and services.

The Government and the municipalities must ensure that the built environment meets the necessary economic, security, health, environmental and welfare requirements. They must ensure that this is sufficient construction capacity, especially for prime building project, to meet the needs of military defence, civil defence, energy supply, transport infrastructure and other technical systems. It is also essential to be able to observe the state of the environment in all conditions and to detect any long-term detrimental changes and assess their effects.

Maintenance of education and research systems must secure key secondary and tertiary education services, vocational and professional training in key fields and research services. In disruptive situations, some educational services may have to be temporarily transferred to other educational establishments or even suspended for a certain period. During exceptional conditions, the continuity of education and research related to functions vital to society must be secured by amending the

legislation and state funding allocations is necessary.

Well-functioning electronic information and communication systems and transportation

To ensure the smooth functioning of information and communication systems it is important to:

- secure electronic communication networks and their information security;
- determine basic security levels for services and technical systems;
- ensure that the regulations on construction and maintenance of systems are observed;
- co-ordinate the development and use of networks used by the authorities;
- safeguard the state's information processing capacity; and
- provide guidelines for the public administration's electronic services, the administration of government and information security.

It is important to ensure that companies involved in telecommunications, postal services and television and radio services follow the procedures established in legislation and in the related ministerial regulations. The duties of these companies to conduct their own contingency planning must be monitored and end any changes co-

ordinated. Graphical communication must be safeguarded at a defined basic level. Operation of the information technology systems related to information networks must be safeguarded through the joint efforts of the relevant companies and ministries.

The prerequisites for successful operation of the transport systems essential to society, must be safeguarded in all conditions. The precautionary security measures of organisations responsible for route construction and transportation services, and the precautionary and security measures of ports, airports and other transportation system hubs must be monitored and guidance issued where necessary. To safeguard foreign trade shipments it is necessary to maintain a sufficient capacity of ice-reinforced vessels. Care should be taken to ensure Finland retains the capacity to perform essential air transport services under all circumstances. The infrastructure and main logistical chains must be secured; in exceptional conditions transport equipment may be temporarily requisitioned to ensure the functions vital to society.

The Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for co-ordinating electronic information and communication systems and transportation. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for securing

a common basis for the administration of government, and for information processing and information security. In exceptional conditions, a regulation unit for processing information will be established in the Ministry of Finance.

2.7 Income security of the population and its capacity to act

The social and health care services and social security support the health and livelihood of the population and its capacity to act. They also combat social exclusion. Maintaining the population's capacity to act decreases the need to use social and health care services and improves people's ability to earn a livelihood.

Maintaining the social security system will ensure that everyone has access to basic subsistence and care. Basic income security must be secured for every one during unemployment, illness, disability for work, in old age and on the basis of a child's birth or losing a parent or guardian, as the law provides for. Income security consists of pension security, social allowances and other subsidies. Social allowances include income support and child benefit, for example. Subsidies are used to promote and maintain the livelihood and social security of individuals families and communities

and their capability to act. By securing the functioning of the social insurance system, the basic livelihood of the population will be secured.

To ensure that **social and health care services** function effectively, all the institutions and outpatient care units that produce health and social services will continue to be supported. Basic social services, such as children's day care, welfare services for the aged and the disabled, child and adolescent welfare services and care of intoxicant abusers, must be maintained in all situations. . Outpatient services at hospitals and health centres must be safeguarded. In addition, the health care system must be capable of dealing with illnesses caused by radiation and biological and chemical agents. Some of the necessary social and health care services could be produced in co-operation with the private sector and the third sector. Municipalities must arrange social and health care services to meet the needs of their inhabitants.

To ensure successful **detection, follow-up and combat systems in the case of health threats**, an efficient system is maintained to detect and register epidemics and disease accumulations, assess risks in co-operation with various authorities and report epidemics. The NBC laboratory system

supporting these must be able to identify and manage health risks caused by radiation (N), microbes (B) or chemicals (C). The system consists of local, regional and central laboratories. The authorities responsible for food production and supply and animal diseases are also involved.

The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is responsible for radiation monitoring. The National Public Health Institute and the National Veterinary and Food Research Institute are responsible for planning, issuing guidance and providing expert services in the field of biological monitoring. The National Public Health Institute maintains a follow-up system on epidemics. The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health is responsible for planning, issuing guidance on and providing expert services in the field of chemical monitoring. Radiation monitoring must provide continuous information on radiation levels in the environment and must react quickly to unusual radiation situations. It must also produce necessary information on the measures for protecting people, the environment and economic activity. Radiation monitoring in the environment covers automatic monitoring of external radiation and the detection of radioactive agents in foods and the environment. For these purposes the following are maintained: a comprehensive,

external automatic monitoring network; laboratories of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority; regional A laboratories; and local food and environment laboratories.

Municipal laboratories and the state's regional and central laboratories are responsible for maintaining the BC laboratory network. A number of complementary factors must be in place to ensure that the national follow-up, management and combat system for epidemics is maintained. Follow-up is based on entries made in the epidemic register by doctors and laboratories responsible for recording epidemics and relies on fast centralised gathering of data on suspected epidemics, disease accumulations and, if necessary, new types of diseases or symptoms. Continuous classification by microbe strain in expert laboratories is essential for detecting new threats. First reaction capability, assessment and expert guidance must be maintained to combat serious chemical threats. These will continue to be concentrated in the state's environmental and occupational health research institutes and specialist units.

In addition to the systems for detecting, monitoring and combating threats to health, sufficient care capacity and a well-functioning expert guidance system must be

maintained to deal with threats and diseases caused by radiation and biological and chemical agents.

2.8 Crisis tolerance

In its target state, the nation's crisis tolerance will be manifested as a strong will to protect national sovereignty and maintain the livelihood and security of the population even in the most severe exceptional conditions. The nation's crisis tolerance will be maintained through social coherence, information services, and educational, cultural and spiritual activities, and voluntary work in support of the nation's security arrangements.

The task of **information services** is to collect and distribute timely information, prevent rumours and combat negative psychological influences. The Prime Minister's Office will be responsible for the overall development and co-ordination of information services in the state administration, while each ministry will be responsible for providing information on its own branch. The Finnish Broadcasting Company will broadcast news bulletins from the authorities in situations where news is essential in saving and protecting human lives or when there is an impending danger of extensive damage to property or the environment.

To maintain **education**, central educational services must be secured with as little interruption as possible. This will strengthen the population's crisis tolerance. Teaching must provide the tools to understand and the capabilities to manage threats in security situations and to cope with the effects.

Strengthening the nation's **cultural identity** will consolidate the sense of purpose in society. Cultural functions will need to be provided to an appropriate extent: concerts, theatre, various cultural events, library services, physical exercise, and activities for adolescents. By protecting and, if necessary, objects of cultural value to a safe place, the nation's historical heritage will be safeguarded for future generations.

Churches and other religious communities are independent of the state. As a rule, they cannot be assigned new tasks without amending the legislation. As long as the spiritual work of churches and other religious communities can continue uninterrupted, their spiritual service to the nation will be safeguarded. Some of their services also have a social dimension, such as funerals and social work, and it is important that these can continue uninterrupted.

Voluntary work supporting security is an important area in civil activities and in maintaining civil

society. Voluntary work enables a fast and wide distribution of information and skills, and it can

provide valuable support for the tasks of the authorities.

3 DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Principles of development and monitoring

The performance requirements that need to be satisfied to secure the functions vital to society will change as development occur in the external and internal security environments. Such developments can include both long-term changes in a certain direction and rapidly developing and unforeseen changes. To secure the functions vital to society, it is essential that performance requirements be adjusted according to the long-term changes in progress. This must also allow for flexible responses to unforeseen and rapidly developing changes in the security environment. To ensure that the functions vital to society can be secured in all conditions, the maintenance and development of performance capabilities and the abandonment of elements no longer necessary are both essential in allowing the state leadership the necessary freedom to act. Monitoring of performance will ensure timely and accurate adjustments as necessary.

The performance requirements for securing of the functions vital to society are adjusted and reviewed over periods of four years at a time. This process involves the following:

- Government resolution and related strategy documents are published, together with explanatory background to the resolution;
- Development programmes are drawn up for each administrative branch of the Government and integrated into each ministry's operating and financial plans and budget proposals;
- Revisions are made to the plans for securing the functions vital to society in each administrative branch; and
- Readiness exercises are carried at national level and within each administrative branch level.

The review process also includes the Government's own reports on securing functions vital to society. The Government proposes necessary political guidelines in separate reports which it submits to Parliament for decision. The procedure provides the Government and Parliament with a regular opportunity to discuss all issues related to national security. The reports normally give an outline of developments in the security environment, Finland's policy and the development of national security. Apart from foreign, security and defence policy measures and

military measures, the issues also cover national security in civil sectors as an integral component of total defence and the securing of functions vital to society.

The Government resolution and the related strategy document set out the target state for each of the functions vital to society and the principles and focal areas. In addition, they define the strategic tasks necessary to secure the vital functions, and the associated performance requirements and division of responsibilities. They also establish the framework for development programmes of the different administrative branches of the Government. The performance requirements of each of the administrative branches are interrelated and should therefore be considered as a whole. This is done by the Security and Defence Committee and at the meetings of the chief of readiness meetings when the development programmes are being co-ordinated.

Each administrative branch of the Government draws up its development programme independently and determines the contents itself. Apart from the development, maintenance and monitoring of the performance capabilities required for the strategic tasks, the development programme will outline how the tasks are to be co-ordinated. Threat assessments

specific to the administrative branch must also be drawn up. Development programmes must consider the needs and potential of civil society and the private sector. The relevant ministries and the Security and Defence Committee together monitor the performance needed to secure the functions vital to society.

The practical measures included in the development programme will come under the relevant ministry's operating and financial plans and budget proposals, and they must therefore be taken into account when appropriation proposals are prepared. In addition to funding, ministries must secure the capacity of their administrative branch to perform the allotted strategic tasks by drafting or amending the necessary legislation. The Government first prepares the budget ceilings and appropriations for the development programmes, and Parliament then makes the final decisions.

The Government, other state authorities and municipalities must maintain the readiness to discharge their duties without interruption in all conditions. As provided by legislation, the scope of this obligation also applies to companies, which can make an important contribution to the securing of vital functions. Readiness plans and measures

must be checked on a regular basis and always when significant changes occur in the security situation, threat assessments, society or the international environment. It is useful to re-examine readiness plans after a development programme has been drawn up. The plans are also checked in readiness exercises, which are organised within each administrative branch and the state administration. An example of a readiness plan is given in Annex 3.

The different administrative branches of the Government arrange exercises and seminars to train their personnel and test and develop performance capabilities. Arranged approximately every four years, national readiness exercises consist of exercises for all the administrative branches, including different administrative levels and sectors. This provides concrete and practical information on the securing of functions vital to society and the necessary co-operation, generating useful feedback for future revisions of the strategy and contingency plans.

3.2 State leadership

The state leadership must establish and maintain the appropriate level of situational awareness to enable it to make timely decisions needed to secure the functions vital to society.

In a networked society, it is not enough that decision-makers have access to branch specific information only. A joint assessment of the situation in each administrative branch of the Government must be made and maintained, and information about this assessment must be distributed, even in normal conditions. The organisational arrangements and regulations needed to assess the situation must be based on the same principles in all situations. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister's Office, a system will be developed for continuous assessment of the security situation and for information exchange between the different administrative branches of the Government.

The competence of civil servants must be updated through training co-operation between the ministries and other authorities, and by rehearsing communication procedures for disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. These activities will be standardised as appropriate.

The focus in developing the election system should be on the ability to conduct elections and referendums in exceptional conditions. Basic and human rights and legal protection for individuals must be guaranteed even in exceptional conditions and when revising legislation. Tasks that will be essential in exceptional

conditions must be planned and practised in advance. These include the supervisory tasks of the Government's Chancellor of Justice and Parliamentary Ombudsman, law-drafting and related guidance by the Ministry of Justice, and the role of inspections in setting norms.

Aspects of Finland's contribution to the decision-making process of the European Union that will need developing in order to cope with disruptive situations affecting Finland or the entire Union include the use of different procedures and communication channels.

The state's command and control system must be maintained and developed to respond to potential threats. In developing information and telecommunications networks, the possible effects of disruptive situations and exceptional conditions must also be considered. The availability of appropriate premises and infrastructure must be sufficient to allow vital functions to be managed and secured in all situations. The command and control back-up systems must be tested and the relevant personnel trained on a regular basis. The procedures that apply to normal conditions will provide the basis for developing the command and control system for disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. The emergency accommodation and facilities

needed to ensure that the state leadership functions can be secured in all conditions must be designed to secure uninterrupted operation.

3.3 External capacity to act

The aim in developing Finland's external capacity to act is to secure the Government's communications with foreign powers and other international actors in all situations. To achieve this, the ability of Finland's foreign missions function effectively must be safeguarded, in particular the operation of protected and secured communications between Helsinki and Finland's foreign missions. The ministries and the main government agencies must also have reliable direct connections with their foreign counterparts, especially those of the EU countries.

Central to securing the functions vital to society are Finland's Mission to the European Union and other missions functioning in international bodies. Communications with these missions and the prerequisites for their operation must be secured in all major capitals, including those of the EU countries. The missions serve the entire state administration and the rest of society, and this should be taken into account in the planning. The technical capability of the missions to communicate with the authorities will be improved.

Special attention will be paid to the missions' capability to assist Finnish citizens in disruptive situations and exceptional conditions and to repatriate them if necessary. In most cases this applies to remotely situated missions in crisis areas whose resources and communications must be secured.

The conditions to conduct foreign trade effectively can only be secure through extensive co-operation between the authorities and with companies and the other economic actors concerned, whether in Finland, the EU or elsewhere.

3.4 National military defence

The refocusing of Finland's national military defence will be completed. It will no longer focus on the capability to repel a large-scale attack but will instead focus on strengthening the capability to prevent and repulse a strategic strike. Another focal point will be the ability to raise defence readiness to support foreign and security policy capabilities. Both focal points will improve Finland's ability to participate in international crisis management, which will be an area of growing importance.

Development of the defence system will focus on the command and control system, the army's readiness formations, military crisis-management capability and war

economy arrangements in the information society. The wartime strength of the Defence Forces will continue to be reduced, to a maximum strength of 350,000 by the end of 2008.

The Defence Forces command and control system must conform to wartime requirements, which is the basis for developing the peacetime command and control system, too. The main objective of development is to integrate the planning, command and control and intelligence systems of all services into one secure joint system. The demands of European crisis management must also be considered in developing the command and control system.

The intelligence, surveillance and command and control systems will be developed to respond to the requirements of a strategic strike and regional crisis. The emergence and networking of the information society and the threat of information warfare require that the Defence Forces participate in developing information networks at the national level.

The Army will focus on developing its readiness brigades and supporting helicopter transport and the troops for territorial defence and defence of the Helsinki region. The firepower of the Army must also be improved. The Navy will focus on

the protection of maritime connections, in other words mine clearing, mine laying, anti-submarine warfare and escorting. In the Air Force, priority will be given to improving the operation of interceptors and maintaining their performance.

The Defence Forces will also be introducing ever-more efficient methods and procedures to manage financial and material resources. The maintenance and logistics systems and the related war economy arrangements will be more closely integrated with each other and with the systems adapted by trade and industry where necessary.

3.5 Internal security

To ensure that social order is maintained not only in normal conditions but in disruptive situations, too, the Ministry of Justice is improving the precautionary measures in place throughout its sphere of operations. This involves improvements to premises and equipment and personnel training. Prosecutors and courts will play a key role in maintaining the principles of the rule of law in all situations.

In disruptive situations and exceptional conditions, it is essential that people can rely on legal protection measures, that the right

to be heard is maintained and that the actions of the authorities do not prevent events from being clarified and assessed at a later point. In a crisis situation, a competent authority must be promptly available and key personnel must possess the necessary competence. The legislation on crisis situations gives administrative courts additional responsibilities in regard to safeguarding legal protection for citizens. The preconditions and procedures must be established to safeguard prompt handling of such matters.

The authorities' rules of jurisdiction must be specified in advance so that the powers needed in exceptional conditions are already in place. Measures will be taken to alter these rules of jurisdiction in response to changing situations as necessary.

Alongside the electronic systems operating in the Finnish legal system, it is essential to maintain a sufficient level of know-how among the personnel to ensure that manual handling can be carried out if necessary. Protection of information systems will be improved.

The technical level of equipment in the judiciary's premises will be improved to ensure that even the most serious forms of crime can be safely dealt with. The prison administration will take measures to deal with increasing crime rates and

new forms of crime. Internal risks to prison operation will be carefully considered when prison security systems are developed. The level of safety in transporting prisoners will also be improved.

To establish and maintain situational awareness of internal security, national authorities will exchange information, international data will be acquired, and information will be analysed and compiled. This will largely be the responsibility of the police. Information exchange between the authorities will be increased and delays reduced. International networks for acquiring information will be extended and the availability of information will be secured, even in exceptional conditions. The necessary telecommunication links for all eventualities will be secured in normal conditions.

To maintain public order and security, co-operation and executive assistance between different authorities must be further developed. Development of different forms of co-operation will be continued.

The main objective of the intelligence measures being taken to combat serious crime, including terrorism, is to improve the functioning of the present system in cooperation with all concerned. This involves careful examination of

intelligence and investigation methods, the consideration of charges, and court procedures. Methods to combat serious crime using intelligence measures will be developed in close co-operation with the authorities from Finland's neighbouring areas and with the European Union. Intelligence must be able to clarify the threats caused by criminals to the functions vital to society as well as the potential targets.

The resources needed to investigate serious crime will be secured by assigning reserve police to maintain public order. To meet the challenges of international organised crime, joint investigation groups will be set up with the law and order authorities of the other countries concerned.

By the end of 2005, a network of state emergency centres will be set up to detect and warn against threats, and with a capacity to provide fire and rescue duties, policing, and emergency social welfare and health services. Emergency centres will receive emergency calls from the public and will call for extra assistance if necessary. The data produced by the emergency centres will be used on assessments of the internal security situation.

The emergency centres will have the necessary capabilities to

establish and maintain situational awareness. They will be capable of providing facilities and telecommunication and information technology for provincial administrations and other authorities to compile situational information and establish an assessment of the situation and distribute necessary information about it. Telecommunication links and other arrangements will be planned and safeguarded to ensure that a situational assessment can be rapidly made at a regional level and nationally.

The technical and organisational requirements for a warning system based on the Defence Forces' air situation picture will be met and the system taken into use.

In accordance with international conventions, early warning and other warning systems will be made ready for use.

To ensure the availability of appropriate emergency services in disaster and crisis situations, the emergency services organisational structure will be centralised by establishing co-operative arrangements between municipalities in the 22 emergency regions. The regional system will be based on a dense, decentralised network of fire stations and effective use of resources. By reducing overlapping tasks and reorganising

administration, the necessary resources will be made available for all basic tasks in the emergency services.

The authorities obliged by law to participate in emergency services will contribute to joint planning, which will be co-ordinated by the emergency services' authorities in the event of major disasters. Special training and the necessary resources allocated for this will be available during exceptional conditions and in demanding disaster and threat situations. By using the joint communications network for public authorities, co-operation and leadership will be more effective.

By participating in development of the EU's rescue services mechanism and international co-operation in the field, Finland will be helping to build a system that gives it the capability to receive and provide assistance in managing major disasters.

Maritime safety in the Baltic Sea, and in particular in the Gulf of Finland, will be improved through bilateral and multilateral measures. By participating in decision-making in the European Union and the International Maritime Organisation, Finland will be able to exert its influence in decisions on vessel requirements. Comprehensive sea traffic control for the Gulf of Finland

is being developed in co-operation with Estonia and Russia. Finland will increase its oil pollution control capacity and at the same time seek to encourage Estonia and Russia to do the same.

The European Union is developing a new financial instrument for cross-border co-operation. It is designed for use with the new neighbours of the EU for whom membership is not a current issue. The instrument will facilitate the rationalisation of present financing programmes and improve the ability to handle the various challenges and threats to the EU's external borders and border areas. As a financial instrument covering the entire eastern border of the EU, it should strengthen Finland's co-operation across its eastern border.

The development of situational awareness at national borders requires close contact with the relevant European Union bodies and bilateral co-operation between border control authorities. It is essential to develop good contacts with neighbouring countries and the Baltic littoral states.

Border checks and the border control authorities' capacity to act are focal areas for development of the border surveillance system. The system will be based on the need to deal with increased cross-border traffic, the changing structure of

passenger traffic movements, the development of border crossing points and any deterioration in the Russian Frontier Guard's capacity to act.

As part of the process to develop the European Union's crisis-management capability, Finland is actively contributing to the development of civilian crisis management. The focus is on creating capabilities to carry out field tasks in accordance with the EU's decisions and Finland's commitments.

In combating illegal entry, the focal areas to be developed are closer economic co-operation, expansion of trade, development co-operation and conflict prevention. To improve the capacity to manage a mass influx of immigrants attention will be given to the ability to receive and provide protection for such people. The possible effects of an enlarged European Union will also be taken into account. The Employment and Economic Development Centres must draw up letters of intent with municipalities and other potential organisers regarding the establishment of reception centres and arrangement of temporary protection. A national register of these Centres will be set up at the Ministry of Labour so that, in the event of a mass influx of foreign nationals, situational awareness can be maintained effectively.

3.6 Well-functioning economy and society

Public finances

Tax collection systems will be improved to guard against situations where the functioning of electronic communication and information systems is at risk. The Ministry of Finance must develop methods to safeguard communications systems to ensure that taxes can be paid and collected in all situations. Simplified tax collection methods must also be developed for exceptional conditions and disruptive situations.

Three-quarters of state expenditure is made in accordance with statutory budget commitments. To improve the effectiveness of reallocating budget items, it is necessary that even in crisis situations assessments of the economic effects of such reallocations can be based on more reliable assumptions and calculations than at the moment. Improved calculation methods based on revenue and expenditure will be developed for assessing the economic effects of legislative amendments and budget reallocations. A project will be launched to determine how to secure the functioning of these systems and to develop possible alternatives. The development and resource needs of each organisation contributing to the budget proposal will also be examined. Proposals

emerging during the project will need to be tested in connection with the normal supplementary budget proposals.

The banks and other key actors on the financial markets must ensure that back-up systems and vital operating information are kept separate from the actual computer centres. An assessment of how money supply and payment transfers can be secured most effectively will be carried out in a project involving the following: The Finnish Bankers Association, Financial Supervision, Social Insurance Institution, The Finnish Pension Alliance TELA and the credit card company Luottokunta.

The Ministry of Finance will improve the data security and convenience of the state's cash management system. This will take account of the various requirements for different security situations and, in particular, the need to combat threats affecting electronic communication and information systems.

Society's basic functions

Securing the availability of energy is essential for society's basic functions. Decentralised energy production based on a variety of fuels and sources will be promoted. Domestic energy production and the use of national energy resources will be developed. EU membership and

international and Nordic co-operation over the security of energy supplies will also be taken into account in Finland's national arrangements for the security of supplies.

Development of the basic infrastructure for the production, transfer and distribution of energy will be continued. The security of the power transmission and distribution system will be improved to deal with any threats occurring in normal conditions or disruptive situations. The increased use of natural gas in place of coal means that the need to store oil as a backup for coal will have to be reassessed.

Arrangements for securing food supplies will need to take account of the enlargement of the European Union and future agricultural reforms. Security of supply will be based on maintaining sufficient production of basic foodstuffs, which will mean maintaining a certain processing capacity in Finland. The aim is to actively contribute to the development of the EU's agricultural policy.

Securing the production of goods and services will involve contingency planning by key companies, stockpiling of the most critical materials, various agreements on security of supplies and other precautionary measures. To ensure continuity of production,

the capacity of different transport modes will be maintained and developed, and spare parts for heavy road vehicles and fuel supplies secured. Construction capacity will be developed to meet the maintenance needs of the technical infrastructure, and the energy supply, civil defence and national military defence needs in all security situations.

To support military defence readiness, the ability to maintain and repair technically demanding weapon systems and information system technologies and system integration will be improved. For high-technology products, industrial capacity and research and development will be maintained. Through participation in international material procurement and technology projects, the domestic defence industry will be able to develop new competence and products to meet the requirements of the Defence Forces.

EU membership will enhance economic stability and security, even though the EU's arrangements for security of supply have not yet been agreed. Finland seeks to develop a common policy on security of supplies for the internal market. In ensuring its security of supply, Finland will need to rely more and more on international co-operation with authorities and companies.

Security of critical raw materials and other materials will also be improved through international agreements. The basic supplies essential for the population will be secured locally through national arrangements and by maintaining technical basic structures essential for society. In security of supplies, the focus will be shifted towards improving the quality and capabilities to act. In addition to the precautionary measures taken to secure the key areas, public security of supplies will be promoted as part of the regular work and risk management of companies and organisations.

Analysis and monitoring of areas of general vulnerability in society and the effects of threats will be improved. This will be aided by improvements in expertise and in the capacity to manage various disruptive situations and exceptional conditions.

With its expert knowledge, the Planning Board for Defence Economy (PBDE) has an important role to play in planning and developing precautionary measures. It acts as a bridge between trade and industry and the authorities. In collaboration with the inter-governmental conference, the PBDE follows developments in the security of supply in different areas and the various factors affecting it. It also produces information for supervision purposes and proposals for

developing security of supply, and organises training in precautionary measures. The PBDE's organisation and operating methods will be improved to better respond to changes in society.

In order to secure the availability of the workforce and to improve supervision, it is vital to make more efficient use of domestic resources than before. In parallel with the humanitarian policies on immigrants and refugees, Finland's immigration policy will also take into account the anticipated workforce needs.

The necessary resources will be secured for setting up a register of obligatory work to be performed in exceptional conditions. The use of the register will need to take account of changes in information systems and resource needs.

Maintenance of technical facilities will ensure uninterrupted access to services in all situations. Focal areas in developing services will include the production and distribution of heat, electricity and water and a well-functioning sewerage system.

Electronic information and communication systems and transportation

The functioning of information and communication systems and of communications based on them will

be developed to meet society's needs and will take account of general technical developments and the needs and benefits of international co-operation. The focus will be on communications for the state leadership and the security of its citizens, and on communication arrangements facilitating efficient action by the security authorities. The Ministry of Transport and Communications will co-ordinate the development and use of networks used by the authorities, with particular attention to security issues in society. The work of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, which is an agency under the Ministry of Transport and Communications, will be developed in line with its role as the administrative authority responsible for data protection and information security matters.

In contingency planning, a concerted effort will be made to secure Finland's international communications. Security and information security measures will prevent interference from abroad aimed at compromising internal communications and information technology systems. Developments in weapons technology and other kinds of technical development will be considered when planning how to ensure the functioning of these systems in the event of any threat. Their performance will be tested by

conducting regular readiness exercises.

Traffic and transport arrangements will be developed to respond flexibly in disruptive situations and to be able to incorporate new arrangements to secure vital passenger and goods transport in exceptional conditions. The continuity of Finland's foreign trade transport in particular will be secured. The performance of transport arrangements will be tested by conducting regular readiness exercises.

3.7 Income security of the population and its capacity to act

To support national resources, systems and competence in social and health care measures will be taken to increase international co-operation and project participation, exchange of experts and information, and co-ordination of action.

Statutory income security benefits will be paid in accordance with existing regulations for as long as possible. To ensure this, the financial basis of the benefits must be safeguarded, the information systems must be in working order and basic banking functions must continue without interruption. Even in the most demanding conditions, minimum income security must be

arranged. This means that measures must be taken to ensure uninterrupted granting and payment of state-funded minimum benefits as part of the municipal income security system.

Basic health care will be developed as a regional and functional entity in co-operation with the third and private sectors. Collaboration and the division of responsibilities in special health care will be arranged in accordance with the agreed areas of special responsibilities. Joint procurement of drugs and materials will be developed. The availability of crisis-specific drugs and equipment will be ensured in disruptive situations and exceptional conditions. Regional co-operation will be developed in the production of social welfare services with due consideration of regional service needs. By enhancing regional co-operation, the functions vital to social and health care will be secured and contingency planning in this administrative branch will be improved. This will ensure the availability of treatments for illnesses requiring special competence and capabilities, together with the necessary resources, equipment and expert services. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for ensuring that the services provided by communities and the third sector are integrated into the process of

securing the functions vital to society.

In monitoring radiation and detecting and controlling biological and chemical threats, necessary equipment, technical systems and personnel resources will be secured. The maintenance of an automatic measurement network and the measurement readiness of a laboratory network in all conditions will be secured with appropriate equipment, sufficient and appropriate infrastructure and radiation measurement competence. The equipment stock will be renewed on a permanent basis, new equipment and methods will be purchased and personnel resources secured. To detect and control biological and chemical threats, Finland should have a laboratory network based on high-level diagnostics capacity with enough expertise in other types of diagnostics, too. National emergency services and special field units must be developed to deal with biological (B) and chemical (C) threats. The task of the special field units is to support and develop the functions of the B and C laboratory network.

The follow-up, control and combat system for curbing epidemics will be developed and collaboration secured with the authorities dealing with foods and animal diseases. To report effectively on epidemics,

expert reserves will be trained and methods developed. Capabilities at the district hospital level and at national level will be developed to detect and identify patients and potentially contagious cases, with the possibility of isolating and quarantining them if necessary. To deal with health hazards and illnesses caused by radiation or biological and chemical agents, the functional capabilities and resources of the health care services will be improved. These will be developed and maintained to keep them at the level required by threat analyses.

The legislation on social and health care will be amended so that the relevant ministries and the State Provincial Offices can, where necessary, issue orders which commit municipalities and municipal federations to undertake measures to secure the functions vital to society. The state subsidy system in social and health care will be revised to ensure that the necessary services and competence are maintained in municipalities and municipal federations to support the functions vital to society. In addition, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health must reserve sufficient funds to manage sudden situations, which endanger public health, and must develop and maintain the necessary readiness by purchasing special vehicles or equipment, or by other appropriate measures. To secure the special social and health care

functions, which are the responsibility of the public sector, resources can be allocated from the National Emergency Supply Fund.

3.8 Crisis tolerance

The aim in developing crisis tolerance is to strengthen the will and confidence of the population to cope with the effects of threats emerging in various security situations. A strong national will is a significant factor in preventing most threats and in combating threats and coping with their effects.

In developing information services, the focus will be on distributing accurate and timely information to the population about their rights and obligations, and on the prevailing situation and action taken by the authorities. Each administrative branch of the Government is responsible for developing its own area of operation. All developments will be co-ordinated by the Prime Minister's Office.

In education and research services, measures must be developed to ensure that services can be temporarily transferred to another educational establishment or research unit if necessary. There must be a readiness to reduce and even temporarily suspend education and research if the scope and duration of a disruptive situation or

exceptional conditions so require. The development of tuition arrangements for disruptive situations and exceptional conditions will need to consider potential threats and their effects in different security situations and the needs of threat management.

In all conditions, cultural, physical education and youth services will be continued to an appropriate extent on the basis of legislation and available resources. Availability of library and information services will be safeguarded. By taking objects of cultural value to safe locations if necessary, the nation's historical heritage will be safeguarded.

Voluntary work supporting the nation's security will be organised to strengthen the actions of the authorities. Voluntary work may be used to teach and develop knowledge and skills needed in security situations. In developing voluntary work, the focus will be on more effective co-operation with civil organisations to manage threats and cope with their effects.

3.9 Development priorities in the next few years

Securing the functions vital to society will require extensive co-operation between ministries and between their administrative branches, and with the private

sector. Total defence offers a diverse set of tools for co-ordinating the necessary measures.

The strategy for securing the functions vital to society sets a number of goals to be reached. It also defines the necessary tasks to be performed to safeguard national sovereignty and the livelihood and security of the population. The foremost task of the strategy, however, is to define the target state of each vital function and prioritise the steps needed to reach that target state. The ministries' development programmes will set out the measures to reach these goals. The monitoring systems in the ministries and their administrative branches will play a particularly important role in implementation of the strategy. They will be used to monitor progress towards the target state and for making the necessary political decisions about priorities.

In the second decade of the new millennium, the strategic tasks of the ministries in maintaining the functions vital to society will focus increasingly on performance capabilities. The following areas will require careful consideration:

1) Situational awareness needed in securing the functions vital to society. A system should be developed under the Prime Minister's Office to ensure the

appropriate level of situational awareness needed for decision-making by the state leadership. In normal conditions, pre-analysed information from the administrative branches of the Government will be collected and used by the state leadership for assessing the situation. In exceptional conditions and during disruptive situations, the ministries and a number of central government agencies will support the Prime Minister's Office in collecting, analysing and editing the information.

2) Use of intelligence in detecting serious crime, including terrorism. Intelligence will be developed in co-operation with other authorities for the purpose of identifying threats to society's vital functions and the possible targets. Methods to combat serious crime will be developed in close co-operation with the authorities of Finland's neighbouring areas and the European Union.

3) Electronic information and communication systems. The focus in developing electronic information and communication

systems will be on the operation of the internal infrastructure. Development of these systems will be based on securing the protection of telecommunications networks and information systems in normal conditions. The basic structure of the systems will be sufficiently protected and secured in normal conditions to a standard that allows them to cope with threats in exceptional conditions.

4) Health protection. The readiness to deal with sudden serious epidemics and other threat scenarios jeopardising public health must be developed. The capacity of public health care to release experts and other resources without risking the basic functions of health care must be given particular attention.

The needs of these four development areas outlined above are such that measures must be taken urgently to ensure that the functions vital to society can be secured in all security situations. The target state of these areas must be reached within the next few years.

ANNEX 1:

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Graphic communication refers to regularly published newspapers and periodicals and other printed products.

Security of supply means the securing of basic functions essential for the livelihood of the population, the country's economy and national defence, in the event of exceptional conditions.

In **disruptive situations**, special measures are required to combat a threat and successfully deal with it. In such situations, special powers, laid down in the legislation that governs normal conditions may be introduced. It may also be necessary to introduce a supplementary budget to reallocate funding, to order personnel into different service fields or obtain additional resources through other means. A disruptive situation may require amendments to enacted legislation.

Information warfare refers to the set of means used to produce information or process it, with the aim of influencing the technical or mental capability of the enemy to conduct war. It also refers to information operations performed in normal conditions, where this is aimed at influencing a state or society in a desired way.

Situation of mass influx refers to the uncontrolled entry of a large number of people who have had to leave their homes or permanent country of residence without the possibility of a safe return, as a result of an armed conflict or otherwise violent situation or an environmental catastrophe.

Total defence means the use of all military and civilian measures to safeguard Finland's independence and the livelihood and security of its citizens against any kind of external threat. Co-ordination of total defence means co-ordinating public sector measures, (i.e. those of the Government, state authorities and municipalities) with the measures of the private sector and citizens' voluntary activities to maintain the vital functions of society in all conditions.

The third sector most commonly refers to all organisations, funds and similar bodies whose operations are characterised by non-profit-making activities, self-government, privacy and voluntary contribution.

Sudden influx of refugees refers to a situation where a large number of people from third countries enter the European Union without the possibility of returning to their homeland (a specific country or geographical region). This applies regardless of whether they enter the European Union of their own free will or with assistance, for example through an evacuation programme.

Retaining the principles of the rule of law means that national sovereignty as enacted in the Constitution, the principle of popular representation and the legal aspects of the public use of power are taken into consideration in all situations to ensure that people's rights and duties are observed as provided for in legislation. During a crisis, the independence of the courts is of particular importance for the national right of self-determination and for guaranteeing people's legal protection. The authorities responsible for internal security and executing the decisions of the judicial system will ensure that the principles of the rule of law are observed.

Emergency services refers not only to the rescue services but also accident prevention and civil defence. Rescue services are the urgent measures taken in the event of an accident or an impending accident to protect and rescue people and property, protect the environment, limit damage and alleviate the consequences. Rescue services are also deployed in equivalent situations that are caused deliberately or where such consequences are imminent. Civil defence means the protection of people and property, dealing with rescue tasks in exceptional conditions and taking precautionary measures against such situations.

Exceptional conditions are situations provided for in the Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act which cannot be managed with the normal powers and measures of the authorities.

The defence system comprises command and control systems, the command structure, intelligence and control systems, wartime unit production and mobilisation systems, the supply and logistics system and the echelons and forces of the Defence Forces.

Border security is the responsibility of the Frontier Guard and involves preventing, uncovering and combating illegal entry in particular; in co-operation

with other authorities, the Frontier Guard also takes part in combating crime that threatens the nation's internal and external security. Border security measures include border control in land and sea areas, border controls at border-crossing points and all international measures related to these.

Terrorism. An offender performs an act of terrorism if his or her purpose is to:

- 1) arouse grave fear among the population;
- 2) force a government or any other authority or an international organisation to do or tolerate something or leave something undone;
- 3) repeal or change a country's constitution or significantly shake its legal system or cause particularly extensive damage to its economy or its basic structures;
- 4) cause particularly extensive damage to the financial circumstances of an international organisation or the basic structures of such an organisation.

Information and communications system refers to communications networks and the networks and systems connected to them which are designed to process the information.

Information security means the use of appropriate measures to protect different forms of information, services, information technology systems and telecommunications in order to manage the risks involved.

Situational awareness means the understanding by decision-makers and those assisting them of the events that have taken place, the circumstances surrounding them, the objectives of the different parties and possible further developments, all of which are needed to make decisions on a particular issue or set of issues. The creation and maintenance of situational awareness can be promoted by updating and providing information as necessary, for example using pictures, texts and charts.

Serious crime refers to a single serious offence, an extensive set of offences, or an offence or offences conducted by professional or habitual offenders or an organised criminal group. The focus of action in combating serious crime will be a person, a group of people or a community suspected of planning, preparing or committing a serious crime, of contributing or having contributed to a serious crime, or having committed a serious crime with the objective of achieving substantial personal, social or economic gains or to cause extensive material damage.

Basic systems of communication include the communication networks referred to in the Communications Market Act, the systems necessary for their operation and all the terminals connected to these systems.

ANNEX 2:

DESCRIPTION OF THREAT SCENARIOS

1 Threats to information systems

Information systems should be understood in a wider context that includes all systems used for storing, transferring, collecting and otherwise handling information. Availability of data is today a prerequisite for the functioning of almost all systems.

Information systems are subjected to different types of threats or combinations of threats even in normal conditions. These include threats to:

- Confidentiality of information: an outsider accesses confidential data without permission;
- Integrity of information: an outsider can change the original data;
- Availability of information: the user entitled to use the data cannot access the information or information service needed;
- Management of an information system: for example the functioning of servers is impeded or slowed down, or privileges are given to intruders.

Threats to information systems can be caused by external actors, personnel or technical faults or damage. Possible external actors threatening information systems include hackers operating on an individual or group basis, criminal gangs, terrorist organisations, private companies and governmental organisations.

Malicious programmes, intrusions, changes to data or preventing the use of programmes related to them are all forms of attack against legitimate data. Attacks can be carried out physically or with electromagnetic radiation. Other means include preventing access to power sources, physical destruction of hardware, high-power microwave weapons (HPM) or an electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear explosion. Also radio communications used in data transfer can be subjected to intelligence and electronic interference.

Intrusions and attempts to intrude into the information systems of private individuals, companies and public authorities are daily events. Companies can experience data security breaches, which cause serious disturbance and economic losses. In addition, data security breaches entail a risk that credibility

is lost and functions based on information technology are paralysed. For society as a whole, the most dangerous form of intrusion would be a foreign government gathering illegal intelligence about various information networks and control functions of different systems. With good data collection, compilation and analysis systems, a considerable amount of data is easily available from public or at least from non-encrypted sources. Illegal acquisition of data would increase significantly if society were to face a disruptive situation or exceptional conditions. Attackers can prepare future intrusion attempts even in normal conditions by feeding malicious programmes into various systems, which can later be activated.

In normal conditions, attacks against the integrity of information are often related to white-collar crime. There may be attempts to manipulate publicly used databases for propaganda purposes. In serious disruptions and exceptional conditions, false or misleading data may be fed into different databases and systems.

There are many attacks each year concerning data availability. The easiest way to achieve this is to spread computer viruses, which manipulate and destroy files and even cause physical damage to hardware. The threat of computer viruses is on the increase. The function of servers may be slowed down or even paralysed. Attacks of this kind do not usually last for a long time but they can significantly hinder access to data. In the worst case, some information systems may be controlled from beyond national borders.

Information technology systems are dependent on power supply. Power cuts occur even in normal conditions, whereas in serious disruptions and exceptional conditions the production, transfer and distribution of electricity may be cut off for long periods of time. In the event of war, command and control systems and their information processing and transfer systems would be primary targets for the enemy.

A number of factors affect the threats to information systems and the way these threats are combated. For example, the development of technology and software is exceedingly fast and existing hardware and applications are often replaced by the next generation products very quickly. Their compatibility with existing systems cannot be guaranteed, however.

Public authorities and companies outsource large parts of their information systems, and most data transfer is executed by the systems of private companies. Many of the functions in different fields use the open Internet

network. Competition changes our ideas about the reliability of use: often it is cheaper for a company to tolerate the effects of disruption than to try to ensure an almost disruption free operation of systems. Economic principles do not often take into account the possibility of exceptional conditions. On the other hand, in crisis situations private companies tend to prefer close co-operation and mutual support. For public authorities and companies, the question of responsibility in disruptive situations and, in particular, concerning the subsequent effects, is often complicated.

The turnover of personnel is high in the information technology sector. This can cause security risks and also dependency on key personnel. However, the high level of know-how in information technology places Finland in a good position in comparison with many other countries.

2 Illegal entry and movements of population that jeopardise security

Regarding illegal entry, Finland is both a target country and a country of transit. Immigrants come from conflict areas and countries and areas where the standard of living is clearly below that of Western countries. Central European countries receive the most illegal immigrants. There are currently millions of people in the European Union who have no legal status. The number is on the increase, because tens of thousands of people enter the Schengen Agreement area as a result of deficient border control. The chosen policy towards border controls and refugees will have a significant effect on Finland's future situation. Illegal entry into Finland is expected to increase. This may lead to a situation where a very high number of people live outside society's structures and official control, which could then lead to a number of threats, such as disruptions to social order and growing incidence of crime, terrorism and epidemics.

Human trafficking has increased to the extent that it can be compared to international drug trafficking. Illegal entry and stay in a country can lead to other forms of crime, and it also increases inequalities. In addition, terrorists may try to take advantage of the asylum granting system. Illegal entry can also result in working without legal permission, which is a problem especially in Central Europe. It is possible that the use of such illegal workers will increase in Finland in the future, with the free movement of people.

A natural disaster or one caused by man may result in sudden population movements into the Community, which would also affect Finland. Armed conflicts, a nuclear catastrophe, a natural disaster or a serious deterioration in

living conditions in Finland's neighbouring areas could mean a large-scale influx of refugees fleeing to Finland.

3 Threats to nutrition and health

Ageing personnel, the increasing average age of patients and the concentration of the population in towns and cities pose a problem to the health care system. Availability of drugs, vaccinations and medical equipment are more and more dependent on imports. New threats include radiation and biological and chemical weapons, which could be used to disrupt society's functions and in acts of terrorism.

Free movement of people has contributed to the threat of epidemics, too. New diseases and diseases previously unseen in Finland may cause serious epidemics. The Finnish health care system is already facing a great challenge in drug-resistant bacteria and viruses. The HI virus has spread considerably in Finland's neighbouring areas. In some countries AIDS poses a threat to the very fabric of society.

People, foodstuffs and water for household consumption can all carry agents that cause epidemics. The current health care system in Finland is well able to meet the challenge of curbing those epidemics and diseases for which cures exist or can be found.

So far the population's health has remained good. However, the public health effects of a general deterioration in physical condition have not been assessed. Being overweight and the consequences of that are an increasingly common phenomenon. The physical stamina of young people has declined considerably in the past ten years. These factors may further burden the health care system in the future.

People living outside the normal structures of society are a challenge to the social security system. They constitute a potential breeding ground for a number of threats such as disruptions to social order, crimes, terrorism and epidemics.

4 Environmental threats

Environmental problems have a detrimental effect on the ecological balance of the earth and may lead to serious regional or even global crises. In recent decades, environmental conditions have deteriorated significantly in many areas of the world, and environmental catastrophes have been on the increase. There are many problems: exhaustion and overuse of natural resources, floods and droughts, destruction of the ozone layer, pollution of oceans and inland waters, and deterioration of the quality of air. The main reason for polluted air and climate problems is the increasing use of fossil energy sources.

Environmental threats in Finland are mainly connected to global environmental problems, in other words to events that occur beyond its borders. In addition to global problems, such as climate change, destruction of the ozone layer and exhaustion of natural resources, it is of utmost importance for Finland that environmental issues are dealt with effectively in its neighbouring regions: in their industries, energy sectors and other economic activities. In addition, the prevention of toxic discharges and accidents and the existence of emergency measures to combat environmental risks are of great importance. Continued negligence of environmental issues may lead to serious damage to, for example, forests, seas and rivers, with extensive detrimental consequences for the entire country.

In many areas of the world, scarce and diminishing water resources, polluted water and limited availability of water are a growing problem. Access to already limited water resources can create tension between states. Deterioration of the quality of groundwater is a serious problem in European countries, including Finland.

5 Economic threats

Stagnating or slowly growing economies and economic decline in some significant countries pose external threats to the EU's economic development. On a global scale, growth rates vary considerably. This may prove to be significant for the economies in the entire world. The economies in Eastern Europe have considerable growth potential if structural reforms are continued. In these countries, the maintenance and renewing of decaying infrastructure require extensive investment, which will limit economic growth.

Economic development around the world will provide opportunities for the economies of the EU countries. However, the fact that vast areas lag behind poses a problem. Liberalisation and diversification of world trade are a prerequisite for the economic development of the EU, including Finland. If protectionism generally increases, it will result in the formation of regional blocks and will retard growth.

The functioning of the EU's structures is a significant factor for Finland's economic development. If the EU cannot meet current challenges, the competitiveness of the Union and, consequently, its member countries will weaken. Ageing and shrinking populations will weaken economic revival and slows down potential economic growth in Europe.

Normal economic upturns and downturns may lead to economic decline or depression in some areas or fields. A worldwide depression is possible if a high number of significant economic regions experience a deep economic decline at the same time. Any conflicts arising between different economic regions may also have serious implications for Finland.

During an economic decline and particularly in times of serious disruption or exceptional conditions, new situations will arise in the financial markets and in public finances because economic activity will decrease and lead to general economic caution and, consequently, reduced tax revenues. Negotiating a loan from the loan markets will become more difficult. At the same time, more money would probably need to be allocated to dealing with the employment situation and taking other public measures.

The state of Finland and companies active in Finland are likely to face a financial crisis only as part of a wider financial crisis situation in Europe.

Finland's economic structure no longer depends solely on the forestry industry. Information and communications industries are today an essential part of Finland's economic prosperity. Problems occurring in these sectors could cause serious difficulties for employment and the state economy.

In their efforts to acquire critical products and services from abroad, Finnish companies or foreign companies based in Finland may temporarily experience difficulties because of fluctuations in supply and demand, or in the event of a natural disaster or war elsewhere. A complete halt in imports and exports in the long term is regarded as highly unlikely, even in exceptional conditions.

Exceptional conditions could emerge if imports of fuel, other forms of energy, raw material or various other items were impeded or stopped, or if international trade was otherwise suddenly disturbed, thus causing a threat to the livelihood of the population or to the basis for economic activity.

The strategic significance of energy is expected to grow in the future. A major part of the energy consumed in the European Union is imported from outside the Union. When the oil and gas reserves of the North Sea are exhausted, up to 90% of the energy consumed in the EU will have to be imported. The most important oil producers are in the Middle East and Russia. Interdependency is likely to diminish security policy threats. If dependency is one-sided, energy may become a means of gaining influence. Politico-military stability in the Middle East and Russia or disrupted production could lead to a serious shortage of energy. In exceptional conditions, Finland could quickly experience critical problems in its access to energy.

Insufficient production of foodstuffs is potentially a worldwide problem. Poor crops and problems in processing and distribution may weaken the food supply; in exceptional conditions the problems may turn critical. The dependency of logistic chains on many different systems would make it difficult to deal with possible disruptions, especially if stocks are reducing at all levels. Finland's northern position creates specific demands both on food supply and the related precautionary measures.

6 Organised crime and terrorism

Led for the most part from abroad, organised crime is on the increase in Finland, too. There are currently dozens of foreign criminal groups, which meet the criteria set by the EU. When the new EU countries start to fully apply the Schengen provisions, free movement of people may cause a rise in crime because organised crime has close contacts across borders. Large-scale white-collar crime is likely to increase in Finland.

Drugs are the main line of activity in organised crime. Other areas include trafficking in highly taxed products, property offences, procurement offences, money laundering and human trafficking. Tens or even hundreds of thousands of Finns are affected by drugs-related crime and its side effects every year. Finland's neighbouring areas face serious drug-related problems, which include the rapidly spreading H1 virus.

Finland currently has a very low level of corruption, but organised crime frequently aims to influence the authorities through bribes. The biggest threat is that organised crime will spread and become rooted in the legal structures of society, which would make counter measures extremely difficult.

Terrorism aims to intimidate the local population, force the authorities or an international organisation to take specific action, or refrain from it, or seriously destabilise a country's or organisation's political, constitutional, economic or basic social structures, or to destroy them.

Acts of terrorism pose a serious threat to internal security. Terrorists may use bombs or suicide attacks, chemical, biological and radioactive agents or 'cyber terror', which is directed at telecommunications and electronic storage systems.

There are no recognised threats of terror to Finland. Threats may become a reality, however, if Finland forms an alliance with a party to an international conflict, because the situation may lead to terrorist elements striking at Finnish targets. It is also possible that Finnish people or companies could be targeted abroad.

In addition, Finland could be used as a platform or a transit country for an act of terror, or as a logistic support area or a place to accumulate assets. Terrorist strikes carried out in other countries could also directly affect Finland. Such effects could include the use of weapons or damage through environmental impacts.

Acts of terror in other countries can have indirect effects on Finland. These include closer monitoring of the movements of people and money, and increasing security regulations in various fields.

7 Major disaster

Exceptional weather conditions are thought to be on the increase. Extensive floods, rains and powerful storms could in particular cause serious damage to habitation, industry, agriculture and traffic. A major flood would have serious consequences: industrial activity would be interrupted and people evacuated, and agriculture could suffer extensively. Natural disasters could cause long-term damage to the distribution of electricity and telecommunications across vast areas. Serious damage to various technical systems as a result of natural phenomena or crime could have repercussions comparable to major disasters.

Major disasters could also include accidents in the chemical industry or in the transportation of chemicals. The Gulf of Finland is a potential disaster area, with its busy transport of raw materials and passengers. A burst in a dam threatening human lives is also a potential major disaster.

Serious nuclear accidents or infectious diseases spread as a result of a wilfully caused major disaster are examples of disaster situations that would lead to exceptional conditions. A similar situation at a local level could be a serious accident in water supply or transport of chemicals.

8 International tension

Politico-economic competition will always prevail at some level between countries and alliances. If their strategic objectives are dissimilar and there is insufficient co-operation, such competition may lead to a fight for influence and, ultimately, to serious international tension. Various parties may try to take advantage of the situation, for example by weakening the internal cohesion of the EU.

If national interests are threatened, the threshold for resorting to the use of armed forces may be lowered, and such measures may be increasingly used to add pressure and gain political objectives.

International crime, terrorism, nationality-related problems and problems related to minority groups could lead to armed conflict. This could cause international tension, with at least an indirect effect on Finland. In a limited conflict, professional armies with high technology would be operationally superior to armies representing traditional agricultural and industrial societies. Western countries, and particularly the United States, have military superiority, but this could be challenged in a number of ways.

The era of nuclear weapons management through current agreements between the major powers is coming to an end. Both the amount and quality of nuclear weapons and the defensive measures against them referred to in the agreements have been questioned. There are indications of a lowering threshold for using nuclear weapons. Technological developments and the doctrines of the major powers suggest that the use of nuclear weapons could be considered in a regional war. Despite agreed reductions, both the United States and Russia would still have enough nuclear weapons to destroy any enemy.

An increasing number of countries have access to nuclear technology. There is a serious danger that extreme groups could get hold of nuclear weapons technology or radioactive agents. Instead of a nuclear explosion, so-called dirty bombs could be used to spread radioactive agents. Crisis-management forces operating in crisis situations in the Middle East and Central Asia, in particular, could run the risk of exposure to radiation.

Despite a number of restricting agreements and bans, several countries possess or aim to possess chemical and biological weapons. Terrorists have used these weapons, too. Chemical weapons are most likely to be used in an armed conflict, whereas the use of biological weapons is a growing threat in terrorist activities.

Internal developments in most European countries and the development of relations between them appear to be positive. There are, however, a number of uncertain factors affecting development in many countries. The continuity of current policies is not assured, at least in the long term, and there are countries in Europe and in its neighbouring areas, which may face internal crises. Repercussions of such a crisis could extend to Finland as well.

The enlargement processes of NATO and the EU will place a growing proportion of Europe under common security arrangements. However, the enlargement process may also generate negative reactions and suspicion in the countries remaining outside. There is considerable overlap between membership of the EU and membership of NATO, and co-operation between them will be further developed. As the number of member countries significantly increases in both organisations, some countries are likely to group together to discuss certain issues and it will become increasingly challenging to find common views and objectives. Another factor affecting the situation is the growth in traditional power politics in European security policy after the tensions of the Cold War era.

EU and NATO countries are likely to take more responsibility for crisis management in Europe and its neighbouring areas. Finland will continue to take part in military and civilian crisis management within the framework of the UN, the EU and NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. The ongoing crisis-management operations will continue for several years, and these will rely on both military and civilian resources.

9 Serious violation of Finland's territorial integrity and threat of war

The risk of a war between states and alliances in Europe remains insignificant, but the risk cannot be entirely ruled out. It should be noted, however, that other states and international organisations may increasingly intervene in the internal affairs of economically and militarily weak and politically unstable countries.

Finland's geostrategic position as a neighbour of Russia continues to be a significant factor when assessing the future security situation. Russia's strategic aims include the protection of the military bases in the Kola Peninsula and the St Petersburg region. After Nato's enlargement, it will border Russia both north and south of Finland. In security and defence policy planning, Finland has to be prepared for possible adverse developments.

The armed forces in Finland's neighbouring areas are facing radical changes. The number of troops is to be reduced (except for the Baltic States), but the fighting power of the remaining and new troops will be considerably increased. Intelligence and command and control capabilities in the armed forces are to be stepped up to an unprecedented level, and the firepower will have a longer range and be more accurate, which means that massive use of firepower will no longer be necessary to the same extent as before. Troops will be better protected, and both troops and weapons systems will have good tactical and operational mobility. In addition, the major powers will also be able to transfer troops more quickly from one strategic direction to another. The transformation of armed forces will also be accompanied by new combat methods.

Military power can be useful both in deterring threats and in actual military operations, some of which can be conducted in secret. Military methods, which are more robust than a show of power, can also be used in exerting pressure. As weapons systems and methods of electronic warfare are developed, the impact of a deterrent can more easily be extended to the territory of a country under pressure without actually starting a war. When pressure is exerted, methods of information system warfare and psychological warfare can be used as part of information warfare. Pressure can be intensified by special task force strikes, for example, and even by territorial violations.

10 Armed attack, war and the aftermath of war

The aim today is to ensure that military operations are of short duration, well planned and highly accurate. It is therefore likely that an armed conflict will be

characterized by a long escalation phase followed by a fairly short intensive phase, during which one or both parties sustain serious losses. Limited use of power, such as a strategic strike, will also be a typical method of warfare in the coming decade. To avoid losses and to weaken the enemy's mental resistance, weapons could be directed at vital social, economics or political targets, support and logistic systems of operational forces and the less effectively protected elements.

A strategic strike can make use of all the services, combined with other (non-military) means. Intelligence, electronic warfare and firepower could all be used in depth of the entire operational area.

When an offensive is started, effective firepower will be directed at civil administration locations, command and control posts, energy supply, airports, harbours, information transfer systems, critical points for troop mobilisation s, fighting forces and weapons systems. Air force units, missiles, artillery and electronic warfare units will be used. Special task forces will be used in strikes against some of the targets. The aim would be to isolate the country, for example by paralysing transport connections.

The massive use of firepower could be followed by an attack by airborne troops, landing troops and other troops, which will be on stand-by in peacetime. Their task could be to take over nationally important key locations, partially preventing mobilisation, defeating the defending troops and taking over air defence components in order to gain air superiority. If the readiness of the defending troops has been raised to level that makes these goals unachievable, attacks by army troops and frontier troops could be used to create the right conditions for a large-scale attack.

A large-scale attack against Finland remains a potential threat in the foreseeable future, but it would not be possible to keep the preparations for such an attack entirely secret because they would have to be spread over several months.

In a large-scale attack, the aggressor would aim to quickly gain control of the entire battle area and its different dimensions. A massive use of firepower would aim to create a favourable basis for a large-scale attack, which would be carried out simultaneously in several directions and dimensions. Military operations would be carried out day and night and the weapon impact would be directed against all locations regarded as important. Air strikes and use of missiles, electronic warfare and special task force operations would take place across the

entire territory. Army troops would fight at the same time in an area hundreds of kilometres deep. The core areas of the country facing the aggression would be isolated in an attempt by the aggressor to prevent the country from continuing to fight and to stop possible assistance from reaching it.

The aftermath of war could continue for years. The economy and the livelihood of the population would be to restored through political decisions and the use of various control measures.

ANNEX 3:**EXAMPLE OUTLINE OF A READINESS PLAN**

Companies that are important for securing the functions vital to society must maintain their readiness to operate in all conditions as required by the Government, other state authorities and municipalities, and as outlined in the legislation. Planning and other necessary measures must be reviewed on a regular basis and always when the situation requires.

Planning and the resulting preparatory work are an essential part of creating and maintaining readiness. In each organisation, this will involve other measures, too. Security, information security, emergency planning and related preparations for example, will all be important in normal conditions and in some disruptive situations. Contingency planning covers the planning of the organisation's operation in disruptive situations and exceptional conditions and the necessary measures to be taken in advance to secure the operation. Different plans must complement each other.

A contingency plan may include the following:

- Purpose of the organisation's overall operation
- Definition and judicial basis of the tasks and operation
- Drawing up threat assessments or defining situations which pose a threat to the operation in different security situations
- Implementation of important tasks (including available resources)
- Security, information security and emergency measures
- General prerequisites (protecting the functions)
- Maintenance and development of plans and the responsibilities for precautionary measures and their organisation
- Training and other measures to maintain readiness.

Special plans for different branches may be enclosed with the readiness plan.