

# The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society



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<p><b>Abstract</b></p> <p>The Government Resolution on The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, for its part, upholds national sovereignty, the security of society and the livelihood of the population in all security situations.</p> <p>The Resolution takes internationalization as well as changes in the security environment and structures of society into account. It lists and defines society's vital functions, determines their desired end states and assigns strategic tasks to ministries. Society's vital functions are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of Government affairs</li> <li>• International activity</li> <li>• National military defence</li> <li>• Internal security</li> <li>• Functioning of the economy and infrastructure</li> <li>• The population's income security and capability to function</li> <li>• Psychological crisis tolerance</li> </ul> <p>The Resolution describes the threats that jeopardize the vital functions and their stability. There are altogether nine threat scenarios, including 61 associated special situations. A competent ministry has been assigned to each special situation for the purposes of preparedness and situation control. Supporting ministries are also designated, if required.</p> <p>In order to secure society's vital functions, a total of 50 strategic tasks have been assigned to ministries. Each competent ministry includes the resources needed for developing and maintaining the tasks in its operating and financial plans, within the existing spending limits.</p> <p>Crises jeopardizing our security are managed in accordance with this Resolution and existing statutes. The severity and extent of the situation at hand determines the level at which the state manages and coordinates the crisis. The competent ministry leads the activities and coordinates measures, supported by other ministries. The meetings of permanent secretaries and heads of preparedness, being permanent cooperation bodies, assist the competent ministry. When necessary, the other relevant authorities, companies and organizations are invited to participate in the coordination of measures.</p> <p>Matters are presented to the Government once the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy has prepared them. The Prime Minister's Office assists the competent ministry with matters pertaining to the situation picture, premises and communications. The Government Communications Unit supports the competent ministry and coordinates crisis communications.</p> <p>Building on the previous Resolution, this Resolution lists five focus areas. The focus areas take into account society's progressively growing dependence on technology as well as their extensive intersectoral significance. The focus areas chosen are the state situation management capabilities including the review of powers, health protection, electronic information and communications technologies (ICT), security of energy supply as well as preventing and combating serious environmental accidents.</p> <p>Each ministry, within its mandate, shall steer and monitor the implementation of tasks and the development of required capabilities related to securing society's vital functions. The Security and Defence Committee, cooperating with the meeting of the heads of preparedness, is responsible for the joint monitoring of the Strategy. The monitoring provides for the updating of the Strategy as well as for coordinating total defence development measures and is based on routinely produced public administration documents.</p> <p>Society's capability to secure its vital functions is tested in preparedness exercises. They are organized as sector-specific, as limited special situation exercises and as large, nationwide preparedness exercises.</p> <p>The Security and Defence Committee was responsible for updating this Resolution. All ministries and key civil service departments were represented in the working group that prepared the update. This Resolution replaces the previous Government Resolution, adopted in 2003.</p>		
<b>Keywords.</b> National security, vital function to society, total defence, strategic task, crisis management model, threat scenario, special situation		

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# THE STRATEGY FOR SECURING THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY

## INTRODUCTION


One of the fundamental tasks of the state leadership is to guarantee the security of the population, society and the state itself. Increasing national and international interdependency as well as simultaneous societal development require that we assess and develop Finland's security more comprehensively than was done in the past. Previously, the Government Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Society, adopted in 2003, was created from the viewpoint of functions. This review of the Resolution has now been completed to conform to the anticipated development in our security environment in the near future.

Parliament handled the Finnish Security and Defence Policy Report in 2004, in which the principles, objectives and implementation criteria for Finland's security and defence policy were provided. The review of the 2003 Resolution, conducted by the Security and Defence Committee, is one of the tasks listed in the Report.

This reviewed Resolution takes into account the increasing internationalization as well as changes in the security environment and societal structures. Special attention is paid to the consequences of Finland's membership of the European Union. International interdependency and the activities of the EU and international organizations, such as NATO, have created new forms of cooperation that can also enhance the crisis tolerance of Finnish society. Other aspects of the review include, inter alia, changes in our legislation, the state administration's *VALHA 2005* preparedness exercise, including its subexercises, as well as lessons-learned reports from various crises. The review also takes into consideration the report describing the preparation, content and preparedness functions of the 2003 Resolution.

The present Resolution harmonizes the ministries' preparedness activities, adhering to both the division of duties provided in the Government Rules of Procedure and to coordination provisions. Society's vital functions are secured in accordance with the arrangements for normal conditions. Ministries are to include all of the measures required by the Resolution in their standard operating and financial plans. Each ministry directs its respective administrative sector's preparedness as well as relevant legislative improvements. The activities of the business community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also considered.

The Resolution has been compiled from the viewpoint of societal functions that are vital in all situations (*figure 1*). It also describes the threat scenarios that jeopardize vital functions, including the most important special situations within each scenario. A ministry primarily responsible for preparedness and situation management has been designated to each special situation in accordance with its mandate. Other ministries support the competent ministry. In order to secure society's vital functions, strategic tasks required by the security environment have been assigned to ministries.



*Figure 1: The principle of securing the vital functions*

The Resolution sets desired end states for vital functions as well as requirements related to sustaining and developing the ministries' strategic tasks. Furthermore, the Resolution assigns the focus areas for development as well as the standards for the organizing of monitoring and preparedness exercises.

Each ministry, within its mandate, directs and monitors the implementation of measures relating to securing vital functions and the required development of capabilities. The Security and Defence Committee, cooperating with the meeting of the heads of preparedness, is responsible for the joint monitoring of the Strategy. The monitoring provides for the updating of the Strategy as well as for coordinating total defence development measures. It also facilitates the informing of the political leadership of the situation. The Government shall decide on the date of the next review of the Strategy-based Resolution.

This Resolution replaces the Government Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Society, adopted on 27 November 2003.

# 1 THE OBJECTIVE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY


## 1.1 The objective

In line with the objectives of the Finnish security and defence policy, the aim of securing the vital functions of society is to safeguard the country's independence, preserve security in society and maintain the livelihood of the population. The Government Resolution on the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society<sup>1</sup> (SSFV, hereafter the Strategy) sets out the Government's guidelines for ministries. It concretises the report on the Finnish security and defence policy and augments other Government guidelines concerning various sub-topics of security.

The Strategy coordinates the administrative sectors' measures required for preparedness and securing vital functions by defining:

- vital functions of our society and their desired end states
- common threat scenarios and associated special situations, including preparedness obligations
- the ministries' strategic tasks required for securing functions, including development requirements, and
- focus areas, the schedule, monitoring arrangements and exercises.

On the one hand, the Strategy aims to avoid duplication of development efforts and, on the other hand, to prevent a situation in which capabilities required for securing the vital functions are not developed. Ministries are to direct the preparedness of their administrative sector and related legislative measures on the basis of the Resolution.



*Figure 2: Ministries take the guidelines of the SFVS into account as they direct their administrative sector and while preparing legislation.*

In addition to the authorities, the Strategy also provides information and harmonizes the principles of preparedness among the business community and NGOs. Furthermore, it is a vehicle for providing information to the general public as regards tangible Government-led measures to strengthen the security of society and the population. The Strategy conveys information to our international partners concerning the basic principles of policies and thinking as regards the security of Finnish society.

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviation: SFVS

## 1.2 The actors and their responsibilities

### 1.2.1 The public administration

**The President of the Republic** conducts Finland's foreign policy in cooperation with the **Government**. The Government is responsible for national preparation of decisions to be made in the European Union, and decides on concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision requires the approval of Parliament. The **Prime Minister** directs the activities of the Government and oversees the preparation and consideration of matters that come within the mandate of the Government.

Important aspects of foreign and security policy and other matters concerning Finland's relations with other states, associated key internal security issues, significant total national defence issues and the coordination of these issues are handled at the joint meeting of the **President of the Republic** and the **Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy**. The Government directs, supervises and coordinates the securing of functions vital to society. Each competent **ministry** does the same within its respective administrative sector. In order to facilitate preparedness and to instigate activities, all competent **authorities** employ their statutory powers, which are already quite exhaustive in normal conditions.

In emergency conditions, the Government, subject to a Parliament decision, may be authorized to use the additional emergency powers provided in the Emergency Powers Act. The decision to begin using powers pursuant to the State of Defence Act is taken by Presidential Decree, subject to a Parliament decision. Separate provisions are adopted on the powers of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, relevant ministers and the Chief of Defence in dealing with military command matters relating to the Defence Forces and the Border Guard.

**Government** decisions are made either at plenary sessions or within the ministry concerned. The ministries cooperate with each other as necessary, under the leadership of the competent ministry. In addition, ministries direct the state provincial offices and other subordinate sectors of administration within their respective mandates.

The **Prime Minister's Office** assists the Prime Minister in the overall management of the Government and in coordinating the work of the Government and Parliament. The Office coordinates the preparation and consideration of EU-related matters. Similarly, the Office coordinates the dissemination of Government information and organizes the general conditions and services for the proper functioning of the Government. The Prime Minister's Office is responsible for the Government's collective preparedness for emergency conditions.

The **Permanent Secretaries** have the task of directing and supervising the activities of their respective ministries. They are responsible for preparing the administrative sector's objectives, monitoring their implementation and ensuring the preparedness and security of the sector. The **Meeting of Permanent Secretaries** and the **Meeting of Heads of Preparedness** are permanent cooperation bodies. The Meeting of Permanent Secretaries and the supporting Meeting of Heads of Preparedness coordinate the administrative sectors' crisis management activities in special situations and also assist the Prime Minister's Office with regard to the Government's common preparedness for emergency conditions. When the matters being dealt with so requires, the Secretary General of the President of the Republic participates in the meeting of the permanent secretaries. **The Meeting of Preparedness Secretaries** assists the heads of preparedness. Government crisis management activities are described in more detail in chapter 3.2.

**The Ministry of Defence** is responsible for coordination of total defence activities. **The Security and Defence Committee** assists the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy on matters relating to total defence and its coordination. The Committee moni-

tors changes in the security and defence policy situation and evaluates their effects on total defence arrangements. The Committee has the task of monitoring and coordinating the different administrative sectors' total defence measures.

Appropriate ministries direct the various fields of activity for which **regional administrations** are responsible. The state provincial office, being the state authority for general public administration, operates under the leadership of the provincial governor and cooperates with regional and district authorities. It also guides the preparedness of the local authorities and municipalities. The Employment and Economic Development Centres, being regional shared service centres, are responsible for carrying out employment and economic development matters on behalf of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Labour. Regional Environment Centres are responsible for the regional activities of the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Municipalities play a key role in preparedness, as it is their specific duty to organize basic services and to safeguard society's vital functions under normal conditions. The municipal managers, together with the municipal boards, direct preparedness in accordance with the law.

With regard to security of supply, **the National Board of Economic Defence** (NBED), including its sectors, is the expert and cooperation body liaising between the authorities and the business community. The NBED operates within the administrative sector of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Board analyses the different sectors' security of supply, provides relevant information and makes proposals in order to improve the security of supply. **The National Emergency Supply Agency** (NESA), being the secretariat of the National Board of Economic Defence, implements the Board's proposals and manages the Security of Supply Fund, which is an independent fund outside the State Budget. The NESA, cooperating with all administrative sectors, operates as the architect and executor of planning and operations relating to the maintenance and development of the security of supply.

### 1.2.2 The business community

Companies base their preparedness on economic grounds, contracts with their customers and associated risk management issues. Insofar as society deems these commitments insufficiently extensive, preparedness responsibilities are augmented by statutory obligations. The extra expenses that are incurred from preparedness requirements can be compensated by public means, subject to the provisions of applicable statutes. The authorities monitor and coordinate statutory preparedness. In some fields, the private company takes action while the authority's plays a purely supervisory role. Examples of such fields are the non-durable consumer goods and the financial sector. Statutory preparedness obligations must not disturb the market or create unfair trading conditions. Special attention must be paid to national and European Community competition law.

Increasing demands for cost-effectiveness constantly reshape the structures and models by which the public administration and free enterprise operate. Advances in business technology have resulted in increased production and services, and society as a whole is more networked and interdependent than ever before. Simultaneously, the drive to focus on core competencies has resulted in more outsourcing and subcontracting of support services. Information and communication technology (ICT) services, transportation and the office ownership and management are amongst the areas where outsourcing is most common in the service sector. Because of this development, the significance of the business community from the viewpoint of securing society's vital functions is steadily growing.

Businesses and trade associations participate in contractual preparedness planning in the various bodies of the National Board of Economic Defence. The operating conditions of the public administration, security authorities and key companies providing services to each other in emergency conditions must be guaranteed in all security situations. Critical factors in production that have to be



safeguarded comprise personnel, premises, vehicles and transportation, raw materials, energy and other production elements as well as information and telecommunications systems. As interdependency between the public administration and companies continues to grow, mutual obligations must be incorporated into service contracts. In order to test the operational models, it is now more important than ever that these companies participate in preparedness exercises.

In the global market, companies tend to disperse their value chains to different countries and continents, to wherever the required functions can be produced most cost-effectively. Because of this trend, companies and countries are becoming ever less interdependent in terms of their financial success. The scope for national control is steadily diminishing.

### **1.2.3 Non-governmental organizations**

In the securing of society's vital functions, along with the public administration, the authorities and the business community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that base their activities on voluntariness play a significant role in providing everyday security as well as in improving crisis tolerance. The participation of these organizations builds on their own set of objectives which must always be taken into account in cooperation planning. In modern society, also the individuals in various networks have a more important role with regard to preparedness and associated dissemination of information.

The strength of NGOs, in comparison to the authorities, is that they are usually more attuned to individual needs and, hence, capable of providing immediate assistance. Organizations are often extensively networked, nationally and internationally.

It is characteristic of voluntary work that, when needed, the actors can rapidly activate their operations without the guidance of the authorities. Therefore, especially in the early phases of operations, organizations may provide many observations and an abundance of information which could augment the activities of the authorities. Hence, in conjunction with various types of crises, it is necessary to identify which voluntary organizations can play a part in managing the consequences and should thus be invited to participate in the coordination. This cooperation must also extend to preparedness and exercises.

Non-governmental organizations expediently supplement the authorities' activities. At the same time, the authorities can increasingly focus their resources in areas which, for one reason or another, do not lend themselves well to voluntary activities. By supporting the authorities, NGOs play an important role in, for example, search and rescue, maritime search and rescue, civil defence and firefighting, voluntary defence as well as organizing blood supply and first aid. Various voluntary organizations and NGOs run sports, cultural, youth and other societal activities, representing a significant segment of our civil society.

## **1.3 Security situations**

Society must be able to secure its vital functions in all circumstances. When it comes to preparedness, the arrangements for normal conditions and measures are crucial. In particular, Especially the the electronic- mediacommunication, telecommunication and energy- supply systems required that are used for situation management and for securing the vital functions must be secure and robust enough, even under normal circumstances, to withstand the demands that may be placed on them during already contain sufficient redundancies in their normal conditions' architecture. Otherwise, they fail to meet the requirements of different abnormal conditionsdisturbances and emergency conditions. A "security situation" may refer to Security situations mean normal conditions, abnormal conditions or and emergency conditions, in which a special situations may arise.

In normal conditions, the focus in securing vital functions is on preventing, combating and managing various threats and on recovering from them using legislation and resources for normal conditions.

In abnormal conditions, the competent authorities and, if necessary, the state leadership need to resort to exceptional measures in order to manage the situation. It may be necessary to invoke special powers, laid down in legislation for normal conditions, re-allocate/adjust appropriations, reassign personnel, provide other additional resources and review statutes. It is essential in abnormal conditions to improve cooperation and to guarantee the preconditions for situation management. Of prime importance is the task of generating, maintaining and analysing the situation picture, and disseminating it to those who need it. In abnormal conditions active measures must be taken to provide information on the situation itself, on the measures taken by the authorities, on the instructions they issue and on the state leadership's policies.

Emergency conditions are laid down in the Emergency Powers Act and in the State of Defence Act. The statutory powers provided for by these acts may be invoked and exercised only in situations that can no longer be controlled by means of the authorities' regular powers. The Treaty Establishing the European Community defines situations in which Member States must enter into negotiations with each other to ensure that any the measures which, that an individual single Member State may be called upon to take, cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the common market

#### 1.4 Threat scenarios and special situations

A **“threat scenario”** is a general description of disturbances in the security environment which, should they materialize, could jeopardize the security of society, the livelihood of the population or the sovereignty of the state. As illustrated in figure 3, these kinds of situations fall between the threats against the individual and global threats. Because of existing interdependency between these threat levels, no clear boundary lines can be defined.




Figure 3: Threats on the global, national and individual levels.

Threat scenarios have not been altered since the previous Resolution. However, some details and headings have been amended to better respond to the current security environment. By combining two military threat scenarios, the previous ten scenarios have been reduced to nine. The scenario entitled “international tension” in the previous Resolution has also been revised and renamed so that

it better corresponds to the kind of political situations that now arises. The threat scenarios included in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society are:

- a disturbance in the electricity grid
- a serious disturbance affecting health and income security of the population
- a serious disturbance in the functioning of the economy
- major accidents and natural disasters
- environmental threats
- terrorism as well as organized and other serious crime
- threats linked to migratory flows
- political, economic and military pressure, and
- the use of military force.

Threats to against society's vital functions may arise individually or several may emerge simultaneously. The origins, exact targets and objectives of such threats are difficult to predict. It is equally hard to anticipate their scope, and whether or not their consequences might transfer from one of the levels mentioned above to another. Threat probability estimates also vary and can rapidly change. The most dangerous security situation to befall Finland would be a large-scale war.

Even extensive preparedness is not enough to anticipate or prevent all threats. Ultimately, an assessment system capable of predicting and monitoring them is required. This system must be able to analyse security trends, compile scenarios and detect even weak signals concerning changes in the security environment.

In the European Union, threats may involve Member States in different ways and also affect Finnish society. Preparedness must observe the factors which pose a danger to the population and society even in normal conditions. The relative importance of threats varies from country to country. Terrorism is the most serious threat cited in the European Security Strategy as well as in the largest European countries. In Finland terrorism is considered as a part of serious organized crime.

This Resolution identifies **special situations**, which signify unanticipated or sudden threats or events in normal, abnormal or emergency conditions that can endanger the security of society or the population. Special situations may require non-standard situation management and communications and a particular special situation can be included in several threat scenarios.

Threat scenarios are maintained as part of state administration's normal prediction and follow-up work and are updated during time of the Resolution is reviewed. On the basis of the described scenarios, the competent authorities compile more detailed **threat estimates** for their own fields of responsibility. These estimates specify the origin of the threat, the target, the form it takes, its probability, the way it affects the authorities' capability to carry out their tasks as well as response options.

The threat scenarios are listed in Annex 1. Special situations associated with the scenarios as well as the ministries responsible for preparing for them are described in Annex 2.

### **1.5 Preparedness responsibilities regarding special situations**

Preparedness for special situations is one component in each administrative sector's overall preparedness arrangements. Preparedness encompasses all measures required to ensure that duties can be discharged as smoothly as possible in all security situations. Such measures include, inter alia, contingency planning, advance preparations and preparedness exercises.

Figure 4 illustrates the scope of preparedness for special situations. Preparedness is based on threat scenarios as well as on the key tasks required to manage a situation. These include information gathering, the maintenance of a situation picture, prevention and other preparedness measures and crisis management.




Figure 4: Scope of preparedness regarding special situations

The threat environment, preparedness as well as the management of an ongoing situation must also be examined from a geographical perspective. A crisis affecting Finland may escalate into a global crisis. Conversely, a global crisis and, especially, a crisis within the EU, may rapidly influence the policies and decision-making in Finland. Furthermore, it is increasingly common for Finnish organizations and citizens are increasingly often to operate in areas more crisis-prone than Finland.

With regard to preparing for a special situation, the administrative sector within whose mandate the matter primarily belongs is the competent one. The aim is to maintain unchanged: the line of authority for securing society's vital functions; organizations operating in normal conditions, the distribution of duties and responsibilities in special situations.. Ministries take the development of preparedness legislation into account within their respective administrative sectors. It must be possible to promptly launch the required measures in a prognostic manner, albeit often on scant information. Controlling the situation may necessitate a rapid transfer of additional resources from other administrative sectors, the business community or from elsewhere in society.

Annex 2 lists the special situations for which ministries are tasked to prepare. They are to be taken into account in the competent authorities' contingency plans, in which the items listed in the annex are to be included. Full use may be made of different administrative sectors' extensive work on preparedness, including contingency plans when preparing for special situations.

Plans made for special situations must also include sections detailing exercises and advance preparations. The competent ministries bear the responsibility for organizing exercises dealing with special situations as well as making the required intersectoral cooperation arrangements.


## 2 THE VITAL FUNCTIONS OF SOCIETY AND THEIR DESIRED END STATES

### 2.1 The entirety of the functions

The Government presents the required political guidelines for securing society's vital functions in security and defence policy reports, submitted to Parliament for approval. The government report mechanism gives the Government and Parliament an opportunity to regularly and thoroughly discuss issues related to the broader concept of security. Government reports assess the development of our security environment and, based on this, define due policy guidelines for Finland's policies.

The vital functions encompass the indispensable intersectoral functional entities of society, the continued operation of which must be secured at all times. This Strategy builds on specified and described functions that are vital to society. Functions vital to society include:

- Management of Government affairs
- International activity
- National military defence
- Internal security
- Functioning of the economy and infrastructure
- The population's income security and capability to function, and
- Psychological crisis tolerance



*Figure 5: The vital functions are secured by carrying out the strategic tasks properly*

A desired end state has been established for each function, thus, making it possible for ministries to determine their respective strategic tasks as well as relevant maintenance and development needs. Finland's membership in the European Union, activity within the United Nations, under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and in other international venues were taken into consideration as the descriptions of the said functions, their desired end states and the development requirements for the strategic tasks were compiled.

### 2.2 Management of Government affairs

**Management of Government affairs encompasses the combined activities of the Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Government as well as ministries in drawing on the resources of the nation as required by security situations.**

**Finland's participation in the EU decision-making and the upholding of democratic rule of law are elements in the management of state affairs.**

The objective is an end state in which everything is in place to enable Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Government to make decisions with regard to safeguarding society's vital functions in a given security situation. Decisions are taken in accordance with standard procedures and support systems must be kept operational at all times.

The correctly timed decision-making of the state leadership is supported by compiling a situation picture required in the management of society's vital functions. In order to guarantee the flow of information, all administrative sectors provide required information and contribute to the Government's duty and warning system.

The core elements of ministries and key government agencies have access to protected command shelters. The national situation management system<sup>2</sup> is considered capable of operating when staff are properly trained and when the premises and facilities meet the readiness requirements of security situations. The state leadership's command facilities and telecommunication links enable statutory decision-making. Electronic telecommunication and data processing systems include sufficient redundancies, protecting the confidentiality, integrity and access of data.

The aim is an end state in which Finland's contribution to the EU's decision-making is guaranteed by safeguarding the national preparation of EU issues and participating in the work of EU's bodies.

Communications support the state leadership and guarantee the dissemination of correct and timely information to the general public and the media. Communications and situation picture generation operate in close cooperation. Both internal and external communications are guaranteed.

Citizens' participation in decision-making related to society's functions is safeguarded. Elections are held in a statutory manner. Early elections cannot be held until at least 50 days have elapsed.

The aim is a state of affairs in which the constitutional right to protection under the law is guaranteed. Decisions depriving people of individual rights and freedoms or as well as placing responsibilities on them will require a legal basis. Individuals shall be based on an act. Acts restricting basic rights may do not affect the core right to content such as life, protection of health, personal freedom, protection of property or other core basic rights. People trust in the lawful functioning of society. Human rights obligations are observed. The realization of basic and human rights is monitored, as is the legality of the authorities' actions.

The resources and preconditions of the judiciary are safeguarded in such a way that individuals, communities and businesses may rely on independent courts of law to deal with cases concerning their rights and responsibilities or official decisions in accordance with proper legal procedure. The authorities are capable of discharging their statutory duties.

## **2.3 International activity**

**International activity refers to the capability of maintaining contacts with foreign states as well as guaranteeing that Finnish positions reach the institutions of the European Union and international organisations and actors. Furthermore, it means the capability of being able to obtain any needed external assistance and support as well as providing these to other states, assisting Finnish citizens abroad and safeguarding the preconditions of foreign trade.**

<sup>2</sup> A command system operated by the state authorities; not unlike the command and control system used by the military.

In the desired end state international activity is guaranteed by upholding the capabilities of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Finland's diplomatic and consular missions abroad as well as other administrative sectors' international contacts, the preconditions of foreign trade and the preparedness to assist Finnish citizens abroad.

Finland's positions and opinions can be conveyed to foreign states and other international actors. Finland's participation in the work of the EU institutions in charge of the EU's external relations is secured, as is the functioning of the domestic mechanism responsible for the preparation of relevant matters. Finland is capable of meeting its obligations as well as seizing the opportunities which result from the EU's Member States' political commitment to proactively implement the EU's solidarity clause. In addition, any possible requests and offers regarding support and assistance can rapidly and reliably be communicated to other countries and international organizations.

All ministries, within their mandates, bear direct and increasing responsibility for EU matters as well as international activity and cooperation.

In order to support decision-making related to international activity, a dependable and real-time picture of the situation related to the international operating environment can be compiled. Relevant information is distributed within an information system which is coordinated and run by the Prime Minister's Office.

In the desired target state, the operating conditions of the network of diplomatic and consular missions are sufficient. The human resources in the Finnish missions abroad always correspond to the requirements of the situation at a given time. Missions closely cooperate with those of other EU Member States and Nordic countries. In order to protect and assist Finnish citizens abroad, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Finnish missions abroad must maintain sufficient consular services and capabilities. Furthermore, they must run an efficient and interactive communications system vis-à-vis the citizens and the authorities.

Dependable and secure telecommunications exist between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its key missions abroad. Likewise, the authorities' communications to the EU, to foreign countries and international organizations function reliably. For their part, Finnish authorities provide the required support to the missions of foreign governments in Helsinki.

Foreign trade is safeguarded so that that import and export, vital to the security of supply and the functioning of the business community, can go on uninterrupted.

Evaluations and decisions regarding Finland's participation in international crisis management are made under the leadership of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in cooperation with other relevant ministries. The Ministry of Defence leads the maintenance of the capabilities required in international military crisis management.

The Ministry of the Interior maintains civilian crisis management preparedness at a level which enables Finland to meet its international civilian crisis management obligations, to dispatch civilian experts to international crisis management operations as well as to sustain the relevant domestic capabilities. Finnish experts are competent, professional and well prepared for these tasks. Should major accidents occur, the Finnish rescue service is capable of dispatching rescue personnel and relief supplies to the affected area as well as to assist the Finnish citizens in the area. Finland also has the capability to accept international civil protection assistance, if required.

The other ministries participate in international crisis management in accordance with the scope of responsibilities of their administrative sectors.

## 2.4 National military defence

**National military defence means the planning and use of society's resources in preventing and combating military threats against Finland.**

In the desired end state, the capability of our military defence creates a credible deterrence in our security environment against the use of or the threat of using military force. The credibility of the deterrence necessitates a demonstrable capability, appropriate to the military capacities within the security environment.

Finland's independent action is guaranteed and the functioning of society is safeguarded in all security situations. Defence planning and the flexible employment of defence capabilities prepare to prevent and, if necessary, repel political, economic or military pressure or the use of military force against Finland. A further aim is, through joint action with other authorities, to prevent the use of asymmetric means of warfare against society.

The defence system compiles and maintains a situation picture providing the capability to conduct real-time decision-making, monitor and safeguard territorial integrity, support other authorities in protecting society's vital functions and targets, and prevent and repel military threats.

## 2.5 Internal security

**Internal security encompasses the measures which guarantee the preconditions for the rule of law, prevent and fight crime against Finland and its population, prevent accidents and environmental damages and other comparable disturbances and threats, and are used to manage their consequences.**

In the desired end state the internal security situation picture enables appropriate and correctly-timed decision-making. The internal security situation picture is compiled from sub-pictures comprising public order and security, emergency services, border management and immigration. The law enforcement system guarantees the preconditions for the police as well as other law enforcement and investigative authorities. It also upholds the constitutional rule of law. Public order and security protect the basic infrastructure of society, prevent and combat terrorism, organized and other serious crime as well as serious disorderly conduct.

Emergency and maritime search and rescue services prevent and detect major accidents and issue relevant warnings. The goal is to prevent accidents altogether and to reduce their escalation by minimising their damages. Civil defence sustains rescue services in emergency conditions, protects the population and prepares for necessary evacuations.

Flood control and dam safety measures are used to prepare for sudden events and accidents as well as for gradual processes such as climate change. Oil and chemical spills at sea are rapidly detected and controlled. It must be possible to comprehensively correct their consequences.

In the desired end, state border management guarantees tranquil conditions at our borders as well as the expeditious and safe conduct of border traffic. Furthermore, it prevents and combats illegal immigration as well as trafficking in and smuggling of human beings. Managed migration guarantees high-standard permit consideration and regulated migration. It also prevents and combats illegal



immigration. The management of a major influx of asylum seekers also includes the capability of receiving the migrants and providing them with basic services appropriate to the situation.

## 2.6 Functioning of the economy and infrastructure

**The functioning of the economy refers to the economic exchange which meets the population's and the business community's basic needs and supports a sufficiently healthy state economy. The maintenance of infrastructure means the technical structures and organizations which are necessary to provide a livelihood for the population and for the functioning of society. This entirety includes the safeguarding of the state economy, the financial market and the insurance business as well as securing the electronic ICT systems and transports. Furthermore, sustaining society's basic economic functions, a competent labour force, preserving a first-rate education system and research structure as well as understanding and adapting to the changes in the environment are also included.**

In the desired end state, public authorities promote the general goals of the economy, i.e. economic growth, employment, price stability and the fair distribution of earnings. Decisions regarding state revenue and expenditure guarantee the resources required by the branches of government. Furthermore, the functioning of the money supply, payment systems and financial services has to be secured by appropriate arrangements. A surplus state economy is the most effective means by which to respond to challenges in all security situations.

The functioning of the public economy is assessed as an entity. In emergency conditions, municipalities' responsibilities have to be re-evaluated in order to secure adequate funding for key functions. Economic stability, an effective taxation policy and collection of taxes, controlled central government borrowing as well as the efficiency of the budgeting system are safeguarded. An effective taxation policy and tax collections are implemented in advance since decisions regarding taxes materialize as revenue within approximately two months in the state treasury. Tax collection arrangements function properly and alternative taxation methods and tax collection arrangements have been planned.

An efficient budgeting system guarantees that appropriations can be allocated to their appropriate purposes in the given situation. In the desired end state, it takes approximately one week to prepare a minor supplementary budget containing a limited number of expenditure items. This requires good cooperation between ministries as well as readiness to make proposals and decisions on savings and reallocation of appropriations. State revenue generation is guaranteed in all security situations. Efficient revenue collection reduces the risks inherent in business operations.

The primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The Bank of Finland is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and, for its part, implements the Euro zone's single monetary policy as defined by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.

The stable functioning of the financial and insurance markets as well as key services is secured through cooperation among the proper authorities and companies. In the desired end state the finance system, payments and money supply are safeguarded. Serious financial crises and emergency conditions require measures which are jointly implemented within the Eurosystem. However, national arrangements also have significance.

Insurance coverage of the population is provided for. The insurance business as well as the associated payment of pensions and other benefit compensations, as elements in the population's income security and the basic security infrastructure, are guaranteed.

In the desired end state, public authorities implement measures at their disposal to secure the basic functions supporting the nation's economy, its innate adaptability and the population. The general goals of security of supply are scaled to safeguard the population's livelihood and to uphold society's vital functions as well as the material preconditions for national defence. These arrangements are in place to safeguard the population, should the normal functioning of the market not generate sufficient security of supply. The premise of Finland's security of supply is the proper functioning of the single European market.

The availability of energy has been secured by measures implemented by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the EU and Finland. Energy supply, comprising fuel and power supply, is safeguarded at the level provided in the Act on Safeguarding Security of Supply. Due to our special conditions, security stockpiles of imported fuels have not been allowed to fall below the minimum levels of EU obligations and IEA agreements regarding the stockpiling of petroleum-based products. A versatile, economic and sufficient power generating capacity, forming the basis for the supply of electricity, is secured.

The electronic ICT systems, used by society and the general public, are reliable and secure. The functioning of these systems has been appropriately safeguarded through cooperation arrangements between the proper authorities and companies. Information security in communication networks has been implemented and statutory basic security service requirements have been assigned to communication services and technical infrastructure. Compliance with regulations concerning system construction, maintenance and functioning is monitored. The operational communications systems used by the security authorities and the state leadership are efficient and uniform. The state administration's general data processing architecture has been safeguarded. Electronic public services, the state information management and information security are adequately guided.

The development and maintenance of the Government's common systems is centralized. The state's information security arrangements are included in system architecture. All government information systems conform to information security requirements. The uninterrupted functioning of key information systems is guaranteed as required. The public administration has access to a secure telecommunications network. As information system services are contracted, the effects of outsourcing are assessed from the viewpoint of the functioning of the state, especially its security.

In the desired end state, technical warning systems are available with which official warnings and advice via electronic media can rapidly be issued to Finnish citizens, both home and abroad in large and sudden catastrophes.

The preconditions for society's necessary transports are safeguarded in all security situations. In order to guarantee domestic transports, the public authorities regulate the preparedness and security measures of organizations responsible for constructing and managing transport routes, ports and harbours, airports and other transport hubs. In order to maintain foreign trade, availability of the required vessels is seen to. Finland will retain the independent decision-making capability to carry out air transports required for the functioning of society and the security of supply in all situations. Transport infrastructure and key logistics chains are secured. Contingency plans include the use of transport equipment for the most important tasks with regard to securing society's vital functions in emergency conditions. When it comes to securing Finland's vital transports, state guarantees can be issued in situations where commercial insurance is unobtainable.

Food supply guarantees a sufficient, healthy and safe nourishment to the population as regards the energy and nutrient content. The supply of production inputs (including labour force) needed in the primary production and processing of foodstuffs, logistics, household and mass caterers, and water services is secured. Basic agricultural production ensures the raw material supply for the food and feed industry. Food industry that is founded on self-sufficient production of most agricultural prod-

ucts and emergency stockpiles of cereals and certain production inputs is capable of processing the amount of food that meets the regular consumption and to deliver these to the consumers via the trade sector in all security situations.

In the desired end state water supply guarantees access to clean drinking water as well as appropriate sewerage and wastewater management, as required for health and environmental protection. Large population centres do not depend on one water source alone. Access to alternative water sources required by society's vital functions and food supply is guaranteed.

The preconditions of companies that are indispensable to the national economy, as well as the means of subsistence for the population and national defence are guaranteed. Society's basic infrastructure is safeguarded and access to a sufficient amount of critical goods and services concerning the livelihood of the population is guaranteed. Industrial production capabilities as well as the research and development of high-technology products are maintained. Production of the most important defence consumables is secured as required by the Defence Forces.

The labour force is sufficient and can be assigned as required. When the population's basic services or accident consequence management so require, the labour force can temporarily be reassigned to needed areas. The general work obligation principle guarantees a sufficient number of workers for companies that are important to the securing of society's vital functions, national defence and society's basic services.

In the desired end state sufficient housing is guaranteed by increasing supply or, if necessary, by imposing regulatory and other measures on housing. Sufficient construction capacity and availability is earmarked for sites of primary importance as regards military defence, civil defence, energy supply, transport routes as well as society's other technical systems and health care.

The state of the environment is monitored in order to detect in time harmful long-term changes in the environment.

To uphold the education and research system, key education services, the training of professionals and research facilities are safeguarded.

## **2.7 The population's income security and capability to function**

**The population's income security and capability to function refers to society's capability to provide comprehensive social security and social and health care services. These prevent social exclusion, promote harmony in society and the population's independent coping and functional capacity. This entirety includes social insurance, social benefits, social and health care services, protection of the health of the population and a healthy environment.**

In the desired end state, the constitutional rights to a life of dignity and the essential means of subsistence and care are guaranteed for all. In order to sustain social protection and to prevent social exclusion, civic structures as well as welfare and social policy measures in various fields are maintained. These include employment, housing, education, income and social protection for the entire population regardless of age, gender, wealth, status or domicile. All sectors in society bear particular responsibility for social protection and the prevention of marginalization.

Key social and health care services are secured by supporting the functioning of service providers, such as hospitals and health centres as well as social welfare institutions and outpatient care units. This entails an adequacy of staff, pharmaceuticals, vaccines and medical supplies as well as the functioning of critical infrastructure. Regardless of the time of the day, citizens have access to urgent social and health care services in all parts of the country. The health care system is capable of

providing diagnostic and medical services for illnesses caused by radiation and biological or chemical agents.

In the desired end state a reporting and laboratory system is maintained to ensure the detection, monitoring and prevention of health risks, both for infectious diseases, diseases communicated between humans and animals and readily contagious animal diseases, and plant diseases and pests and suspected foodborne and waterborne epidemics. Different authorities cooperate in risk assessment and epidemiological analysis. The CNRB expert guidance establishments, associated centres of excellence as well as laboratory systems connected to these are capable of identifying and controlling health hazard situations caused by nuclear weapons or accidents at nuclear plants (N), microbes (B), radiation sources (R) or chemicals (C).

Access to pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical devices and supplies is guaranteed. State emergency stockpiling guarantees the sufficiency of crisis-specific medicines and health care devices and equipment.

## 2.8 Psychological crisis tolerance

**Psychological crisis tolerance refers to the nation's capacity to endure stress in security situations and to overcome the consequences. The nation's psychological crisis tolerance is preserved by maintaining social integrity, communications, education, cultural identity and protection of cultural heritage, religious activities as well as non-governmental activities focused on bolstering defence will and crisis tolerance.**

In the desired end state the nation's psychological crisis tolerance is epitomized as a collective will to uphold national sovereignty and to maintain the population's livelihood and security in all security situations.

The continuation of teaching and basic educational structures is secured. The continuance of teaching strengthens the sense of security among children, adolescents and adults and also builds confidence in the post-crisis future. Educational and civic activities support citizens' sports, cultural, youth and societal interests; all of which expand the role of the civic society.

Culture is a key element in the formation of a person's identity and self-esteem. The Finnish identity makes it possible to maintain and strengthen the nation's cultural integrity. A strong sense of identity fosters inclusion and the individual's capability to commit to common goals. On the other hand, it is also the prerequisite for accepting diversity and cross-cultural dialogue.

In the desired end state, invaluable national cultural heritage is protected in all security situations. Many of the things included in the national cultural heritage, such as real estate, individual objects and works of art, are symbols of our national identity. By visibly protecting them in crisis conditions, the citizens' sense of security and solidarity is strengthened.

The functioning of the state churches as well as other religious denominations is guaranteed in all security situations in the spirit of religious freedom and tolerance. Similarly, the uninterrupted functioning of the societal services they perform, such as diaconal work and funeral services is also supported.

### 3 SECURING THE VITAL FUNCTIONS

#### 3.1 Basic principles

The securing of the functions vital to society builds on long-term and sufficient resource management, on the ability to flexibly use resources just in time, and on the capability to employ and coordinate the resources already in use. Competent ministries direct the authorities' resource management. Ministries steer this development by designating strategic tasks, focus areas and preparedness obligations for special situations. When competent ministries manage and assign resources, they must always take the roles of the business community and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) into account.

The ministries' strategic tasks and related development requirements build on the analysis of recognized threat scenarios as well as on the conditions imposed by concrete special situations which are derived from the scenarios. The main focus of the objectives of preparedness exercises as well as in resource management is on each ministry's capability to control the special situations included in its preparedness obligations. The ministries' strategic tasks are listed in Annex 3.

Generally accepted principles are followed in securing society's vital functions. These include: democracy and the rule of law, the sharing of responsibility across society, the retention of the normal division of duties, flexible preparedness control, cost-effectiveness, the safeguarding of resources, the taking into account of Finland's membership of the EU and the international dimension, the monitoring of preparedness management and coordinating measures.

**Democracy and the rule of law.** The following values are preserved: the inviolability of human dignity, the principle of representative democracy, separation of powers, legitimacy in the exercise of public powers as well as other principles included in the rule of law. The rights of the individual are guaranteed in all situations. Legislation is required to introduce any temporary derogations from basic rights. Provisional derogations of the basic rights that may be deemed necessary in emergency conditions.

**Sharing responsibility across society.** Vital functions are secured by efficiently and appropriately coordinating society's resources. For this purpose, state and municipal authorities as well as the private sector must cooperate and coordinate their respective measures in all situations. The operational model in this Strategy provides a wide range of instruments for the efficient and appropriate use of society's resources. For their part, NGOs as well as churches and other religious communities can support the common effort.

**Retaining the normal division of duties.** The regular lines of authority for securing vital functions, the organisations responsible for it under normal conditions and the normal division of duties are maintained unchanged as far as is feasible in all security situations.

**Flexible preparedness control.** Resources and readiness levels are appropriately regulated to prevent and combat threats, to manage consequences and to achieve the required level of effectiveness in securing society's vital functions. Legislation must also provide the authorities with sufficient powers in unexpected and rapidly arising special situations.

**Cost-effectiveness.** Society's vital functions are cost-effectively secured by developing the procedures and structures for normal conditions in such a way that they are also viable in special and abnormal situations as well as in emergency conditions. Unnecessary duplication of systems and organizations is reduced by coordinating the development process across all levels of government.

**Safeguarding of resources.** Ministries include their strategic tasks and relevant maintenance and development requirements in their own operating and financial plans and budget proposals. Development is planned within the spending limits, as authorized by the Government. Reallocation of appropriations is the primary vehicle for designating additional resources within an administrative sector. Resource allocation required by preparedness is to be coordinated among the ministries, when necessary. Required additional resources can be designated from the National Emergency Supply Agency's security of supply fund, in accordance with the rules of the fund. Administrative sectors are responsible for providing the necessary powers by amending regulations, as appropriate to the control of special situations.

**Taking Finland's membership of the EU and the international dimension into account.** National preparedness arrangements take account of the opportunities and uncertainty factors that arise as a result of international developments. The underlying causes of Finland's success are, inter alia, globalization and the closely associated international division of labour in many fields. International interdependency as well as the activities of the EU and international organizations have created new forms of cooperation, which can also be used to improve the crisis preparedness of Finnish society. Each vital function of society contains its intrinsic significant international dimension.

**Monitoring of preparedness development.** The administrative sectors' measures for developing and maintaining preparedness are monitored. This makes it possible to suitably and properly guide national preparedness. Each ministry monitors the development of capabilities required by the strategic tasks within its mandate.

As presented in figure 6, the securing of society's vital functions can be separated into two sequential phases: the preparedness phase and the crisis management phase, triggered in responsespawned by a special situation. Preparing for the escalation of the situation and other possible special situations does not stop during the crisis management phase.




Figure 6: Securing the functions vital to society = preparedness + crisis management

**Coordination of measures.** The overall goals of coordination are to avoid unnecessary duplication as well as to identify and designate tasks previously overlooked. Subject to legislation, the competent authority is always in charge of making decisions, during and after the implementation of coordination. Some or all administrative sectors may be cooperation partners. Depending on the case, the same also applies to the representatives of the business community and NGOs.

The body responsible for coordination must make certain that everyone uses commonly accepted and understood terminology. The coordinating body also seeks consensus among all parties with regard to implementation monitoring. It also leads the planning on possibly required exercises. Via monitoring, all parties can make certain that issues and tasks have been correctly understood and that everyone implements the agreed measures. The body responsible for special situation coordination makes sure that all relevant parties have the same understanding of the situation. Furthermore,

it ensures that required communication, including informing the representatives of foreign states, is coordinated.




Figure 7: Threat and risk analysis as well as the use of necessary resources require constant coordination.

## 3.2 Crisis management

### 3.2.1 The state crisis management model

In order to control threats against the population society and the state, a uniform crisis management model, tested in exercises, needs to be in place. All relevant actors must be familiar with the model. As the vulnerability of society increases, it is essential that initial situation management and coordination on unexpected and rapidly emerging special situations be implemented without undue delay.

Special situations which jeopardize society and the population are managed in statutory manner as well as by observing the principle of legality, the established division of administrative duties and relevant statutes. The divisions of duties customary under normal conditions as well as operational models are retained as long as possible.

The meeting of the permanent secretaries and the meeting of the heads of preparedness are permanent cooperation bodies. The level of situation management and coordination is determined by the seriousness and the extent of the situation. Top state leadership may also launch the required measures.

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Prime Minister directs the activities of the Government and oversees the preparation and consideration of matters that come within the mandate of the Government. The President of the Republic, within her/his powers, participates in decision-making concerning matters which affect Finland's relations with foreign states. Government-level management procedures are to be observed in international affairs, whenever required.

In well-functioning crisis management arrangements, the line of authority is clear. Situations are proactively managed and sufficient resources are immediately put into use. Intersectoral coordination bodies, such as the meeting of permanent secretaries and the meeting of the heads of preparedness, assist in the coordination of measures. Whoever is responsible for situation management is also responsible for the content of communications. The Prime Minister's Office provides support in matters relating to the situation picture, premises and communications. The Government Com-

munications Unit supports the Government. All other necessary authorities, companies and organizations are included in activities required for situation management.

As illustrated in figure 8, the state crisis management model comprises the following key phases and responsibilities:




Figure 8: Levels of coordination in crisis management

In line with the aforementioned principles, the state's crisis management model is illustrated in figure 8. According to the model, the competent authority initiates measures as per its regulations and informs the preparedness organization of its administrative sector. The Prime Minister's Office runs the Government situation centre, which builds on cooperation among ministries and supports Government-level management.

The ministry empowered by the law to do so leads activities and coordination among ministries, when required. The Prime Minister's Office makes certain that a competent ministry has been designated. The permanent secretary bears primary responsibility for the preparedness of his/her administrative sector as well as for managing the security situation.

The measures of different administrative sectors and, when necessary, the business community and NGOs, are coordinated by the permanent secretaries' meeting. The meeting is chaired by the State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, or the permanent secretary of the competent ministry, The meeting of the heads of preparedness, led by the state secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, or the permanent secretary of the competent ministry, supports permanent secretaries with regard to operational activities.

When the Prime Minister so decides or the competent minister proposes it, matters are brought before the Government to be dealt with in the manner agreed on with the Prime Minister. On the initiative of the Prime Minister, either the joint meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (CCFSP) and the President of the Republic or just the Committee may prepare the



Government decisions. The Committee is augmented by inviting the competent minister and pertinent experts to attend. The other cabinet committees deal with issues pertaining to their mandate. Decisions required by the situation are taken at the Government plenary session, by the competent ministry or some other competent authority.

The crisis management model takes into account the obligations imposed on the Presidency country or the Member States by the EU's emergency and crisis coordination arrangements sets on the Presidency or member nations,

This crisis management model does not impinge on the role or tasks of the Security and Defence Committee.

The operational capabilities of the highest-level state leadership as well as the required support organization and systems are maintained through regular exercises.

### **3.2.2 Crisis communications**

It is particularly crucial, in special situations, to adhere to the key principles governing central government communications. The administration must be rapid, reliable and as straightforward as possible in responding to the heightened demand for information by the media and the general public. Communications are carried out through the usual channels i.e. through the media, via the Internet, by e-mail and by telephones.

In a crisis situation, it is important that communications are based on correct information and on conclusions based which are themselves on correct information. With regard to the commencement and success of crisis communications, it is crucial that those responsible for communications promptly receive germane information regarding events that require intensified communications. For this, the authorities' communications units must be an integral part of their respective duty and standby systems.

The general rule is that those running the activities are also responsible for the content of the communications. Other authorities provide support. Each authority is responsible for disseminating information about their own activities. However coordination, contacts and cooperation are of particular significance. The Government Communications Unit is responsible for the Government's and the Prime Minister's communications, as well as for coordinating the dissemination of official information. It is important for both the communications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, responsible for international communications, and the communications of other key ministries in the situation to be linked into crisis communications arrangements at as early a stage as possible.

As the crisis escalates, communications are further intensified and communications control may be centralized in the Prime Minister's Office. If necessary, a Government Information Centre is established. The Centre can issue orders to state authorities as regards the content of information. The authorities and the media work in close cooperation. No efforts are spared to guarantee the proper functioning of and the independence of the media.

As part of their role in maintaining overall psychological crisis tolerance, communications maintain the psychological and social fabric of society and helps strengthen confidence in the authorities. Communications should also serve to prevent rumours, combat negative opinion making and prepare for information operations. Crisis communications and relevant responsibilities are included in the strategic tasks of the Prime Minister's Office.

### 3.3 Strategic tasks of the ministries in securing the vital functions

#### 3.3.1 Management of Government affairs

**Guaranteeing the proper functioning of the Government (Prime Minister's Office, PMO).** Legislation and procedures pertaining to Government organization and decision-making are sustained. The required premises, technical systems and support structures are maintained. Functional requirements are coordinated with Parliament and the President of the Republic.

Premises and the other support structures must be developed in such a manner that they facilitate the management of society's vital functions in all security situations.

The Government situation centre, which relies on cooperation among ministries and is run by the Prime Minister's Office, is reinforced so that it can support Government-level civilian crisis management (Government, Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, meeting of permanent secretaries, meeting of heads of preparedness) in all security situations.

The ministries' own situation centres must be operational even in normal conditions and their staff must regularly participate in exercises. As premises are being developed, particular attention must be paid to rapidly emerging special situations and to need to be able to the open situation centres post-haste in the command shelters.

**National coordination of preparing and handling issues relating to the European Union (PMO).** National coordination arrangements and the functioning of the authorities are secured so that Finland is able to influence decision-making within the EU.

Cooperation between the EU's bodies and Finland is intensified so as to develop crisis management capabilities. Furthermore, Finland actively participates in the EU's emergency and crisis coordination arrangements with a view to ensuring that the EU can effectively support its Member States in crisis management. Ministries are responsible for issues relating to the EU within their respective mandates. The function of the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs is to coordinate preparation and handling of issues relating to the European Union.

**Functioning of Government communications (PMO).** The ability to support the Government and the Prime Minister through communications is maintained. This encompasses the coordination of interauthority communications, dissemination of correct and timely information to the general public and the media as well as every ministry's responsibility for disseminating information concerning issues within its own administrative sector.

The Prime Minister's Office has established a working group to prepare new guidelines for crisis and emergency conditions communications, due in March 2007. A uniform evaluation system has been developed for the purpose of monitoring and assessing Government communications.

A number of measures are being taken to develop the authorities' joint telephone and Internet-based communication services. Examples include the setting up of a citizens' portal to serve crisis communications. Duty and standby arrangements for communications staff are in operation. A sufficient number of civil servants are selected earmarked and trained for crisis communications.

**Maintenance of the situation picture (PMO).** A prognostic and real-time situation picture is compiled to support Government decision-making and communications.

The situation picture is developed by taking into account and utilizing the authorities' other pre-existing or future IT environments. Cooperation and planning that serves the compilation of the situation picture is improved among the different sectors of administration. Cooperation between the gathering of information, the compiling of the situation picture and communications is intensified and tested. The range of instruments for gathering information is widened by, for instance, developing the monitoring of open information sources. National structures tap into the cooperation with the EU's Situation Centre (SitCen).

**Guaranteeing protection under the law (Ministry of Justice, MOJ).** The functioning of the courts of law and penalty enforcement authorities, as well as cooperation between them, are safeguarded. Equal protection under the law for the population is guaranteed by, among other things, up-to-date statutes and efficient enforcement of criminal liability.

The resources of the judiciary and the prison service are tailored to meet demands of the situation. When powers provided for in the Emergency Powers Act are invoked, the powers of the judiciary are updated so that the principles underlying fair trials can be adhered to.

**Holding elections (Ministry of Justice, MOJ).** The necessary technical arrangements are made to ensure that general elections can be held in accordance with the law in all security situations. Furthermore, the preparedness to hold early general elections is maintained at all times.

Organisational arrangements, data systems and election materials are kept up-to-date in compliance with schedule and operational requirements. The Ministry of Justice is not the only entity involved in preparedness requirements. Electoral district committees, municipal central election committees, the Population Register Centre and local register offices also have a role to play. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs collaborate in providing voting opportunities for Finns residing abroad. Required funding and communications arrangements for the elections are maintained.

### 3.3.2 International activity

**Maintaining contacts with foreign countries, the institutions of the European Union's bodies and key international actors (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, MFA).**

Maintenance of contacts with various actors guarantees that Finland can send its representatives to meetings or transmit information via IT networks and thus convey its positions and opinions to the attention of foreign states and other international actors. This involves safeguarding the functioning of foreign missions in Finland as well as Finland's capability to transmit or receive requests for assistance, along with the capability to act accordingly.

As regards treaties or other international obligations, the ministry within whose purview the matter falls deals with them. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs assists other administrative sectors in the coordination of international affairs. However, the Prime Minister's Office coordinates treaties and other international obligations that fall within the competency of the EU.

In order to meet these objectives, an appropriately proportioned network of diplomatic and consular missions is maintained in relevant locations abroad. This structure, as well as contacts with the EU institutions and key international organizations, must include secure and reliable telecommunication systems. The preconditions of foreign missions in Finland are secured. Independent of the security situations, Finland is prepared to make use of the possibilities available in the EU on the basis of the solidarity clause, to which the Member States adhere as well as to meet its obligations. Networks

and systems which are required to gather and exchange information for the administrative sector to be able to monitor and assess the situation are maintained at a level that corresponds to the circumstances and demands of the situation. To support decision-making and communications, preparations are made by the Government Preparedness Unit in the Prime Minister's Office to develop real-time situation awareness.

The network of missions is tailored to satisfy the demand for consular services created by the growing number of tourists and the needs of business community also outside the EU. The telecommunications links of the Foreign Service are developed by increasing and improving wireless solutions and communications systems, as standalone as possible, and by harmonizing it with state IT systems (such as the authorities' secure ICT system).

**Protecting and assisting Finnish citizens abroad (MFA).** The preparedness to assist and protect the interests of Finnish citizens abroad in situations where their security is or has become threatened is maintained. This involves, in particular, sufficient and effective consular services and well-functioning on-call and alert system.

In order to maintain a satisfactory service and response capability, the MFA's consular rapid deployment teams are kept in operational readiness. Furthermore, the functioning of the on-call and alert system, as well as corresponding IT systems in the Diplomatic Service is guaranteed. Missions are to maintain up-to-date contingency and evacuation plans, proper contacts with the authorities of the host state, possibilities to cooperate with the missions of the Nordic countries and other EU Member States as well as good working relations with the local Finnish community and travel organizers. Capital-to-capital contacts particularly focus on an appropriate exchange of information between the Nordic countries, EU Member States and EU institutions. Furthermore, in line with the EU's consular cooperation, Finnish citizens can make use of other EU Member States' consular services.

In addition to the authorities, contacts with the Finnish Red Cross as well as airlines and travel organizers are maintained. Moreover, by tapping into IT solutions utilizing the Internet and mobile devices, the MFA guarantees a sufficient capability to receive information from the general public and to provide information to it. This involves, among other things, issuing travel advice based on an up-to-date situation picture.

**Securing Finland's foreign trade (MFA).** By applying trade policies which comply with the trade legislation of the European Community, the preconditions are guaranteed for the import and export that are vital to secure appropriate living conditions for the people and the functioning of the business community.

Regulating foreign trade is a part of the European Community's common trade policy, in which the Member States exercise joint jurisdiction. Unless specially permitted in Community legislation, a single Member State's individual trade policy measures are prohibited. Nevertheless, in order to maintain public order and security, the Treaty of the European Union allows import and export restrictions for the purpose of protecting human, animal and plant health. On corresponding grounds, the free movement of labour and capital can be restricted. Should the security situation compel Finland to implement national measures affecting the Single Market, consultations with the other Member States and the European Commission would be required.

An undisturbed functioning of the Single Market, for its part, guarantees the availability of strategic products. A Member State can take action which it deems necessary for its key security interests and which relates to the production of and trade in weapons, ordnance and military supplies. The World Trade Organization (WTO) rules include exemptions on national security interests.

It must be possible to control and, if necessary, regulate the export of strategic products in domestic undersupply situations. It must also be possible to link domestic trade regulations to the export and import regulations of comparable products. Finland's membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) entails that problems relating to monetary and foreign exchange policies must be primarily solved through the EMU's common procedures.

In addition to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Finnish authorities participating in the regulation of foreign trade, pursuant to their mandates, are the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Labour.

**International military crisis management (MOD).** Finland participates in international military crisis management operations. The objective is to prevent and limit crises as well as to prevent their effects from reaching Finland.

Finland supports the development of the EU's crisis management capability to strengthen the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Finland will improve its capabilities of participating in NATO-led crisis management operations in the future. To this end, cooperation to develop military interoperability, force planning and the necessary capabilities are sought. Finland will also actively participate in NATO exercises. In order to improve interoperability, relations with the United States are developed bilaterally, within the framework of the EU and also as a NATO Pfp country.

The Defence Forces' international interoperability is developed in line with EU and NATO standards, needs and focus areas. Special attention is paid to developing network-centric warfare capabilities as well as rapid deployment and niche capabilities. Troops earmarked for crisis management are trained and evaluated in a manner enabling international certification.

The development of the Defence Forces' international cooperation aims to create the capability to operate in all command echelons as well as with various modes of operation and technical systems. Another aim is that all services and niche capabilities are able to participate in international cooperation and operations, in line with our international obligations. Furthermore, capabilities required for receiving military assistance and providing host nation support are created.

**Civilian crisis management (MOI).** Finland's commitments to the EU and other international organizations are implemented by supporting the development of their civilian crisis management capabilities and by deploying experts to international crisis management operations. Domestic capabilities facilitating civilian crisis management are also seen to. Civilian crisis management activities are coordinated with military crisis management, where applicable.

Finland supports the further development of crisis management capabilities, deploys civilian experts to international crisis management operations and sees to the required statutory capabilities at home. The civilian crisis management recruitment system and training of experts ensures that experts can efficiently and promptly be dispatched.

Civilian crisis management training is concentrated in the Crisis Management Centre to be established at the Emergency Services College. The electronic recruitment roster is further improved to harmonize it with that of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Experts' terms and conditions of employment are maintained at a sufficiently high level, ensuring the recruitment of top experts. The solution for the rapid readiness requirement in civilian crisis management lies in establishing and training civilian expert rapid deployment teams.

**International disaster response (MOI).** The preparedness for international disaster response is maintained. This involves the capability to provide and receive rescue personnel and relief supplies.

International disaster response activities are developed in such a manner that Finland is able to provide and receive assistance during major accidents and that Finland can participate in the EU's Civil Protection Mechanism and in other international rescue cooperation. Personnel training is also developed and required equipment as well as other necessary gear is procured. The availability and transport options of rescue supplies are studied.

### 3.3.3 National military defence

**Preventing and repelling military threats (Ministry of Defence, MOD).** A sufficient military capacity to prevent the use of military force against Finland is maintained. The use of force is repelled by protecting society's vital functions and targets as well as by holding areas vital to the defence. The aggressor is defeated by all services' joint operations in areas favourable to the defender.

The structure and operations of the Defence Forces are tailored to conform to our foreign and security policy guidelines. Finland's defence solution builds on general conscription. Voluntary defence activities support the training of wartime troops and their readiness. Defence in the 2010s will increasingly focus on the defence of targets and society's vital functions. Cooperation between the Defence Forces and other authorities is highlighted in all threat scenarios. The organization of the Defence Forces as well as defence materiel are developed by taking into account changes in warfare, advances in technology and international cooperation. When it comes to defence development, special attention is paid to Finland's capability to participate in the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, it shall be taken into consideration that Finland retains the option of seeking membership in NATO in the future

Up until 2012, development of the defence system will concentrate on improving the performance of operational Army forces, air defence, and the Defence Forces' integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control system. On the basis of a real-time situation picture, this system facilitates the flexible deployment of all services' operational forces as well as the use of long-range weapon systems. The defence system enables effective joint operations comprising all services. Troop strengths will decrease. However, their mobility, firepower and range will increase.

**The military situation picture (MOD).** To support the timely decision-making of state leadership and military leadership, a military situation picture is created by monitoring developments in our security environment. The military situation picture provides early warning, making it possible to prevent a threat from materializing and to implement any required defence measures.

The Defence Force's intelligence, surveillance and command and control systems are developed in such a manner that an integrated operational data transfer, processing and management environment will be in place by 2012, covering all services and branches. This will enable the coordinated use of sensors, weapons systems and decision-making. It will substantially streamline decision-making and other command processes while simultaneously improving the mobility and the survivability of the system.

The operational and administrative information environments of the integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control system will be separated. Simultaneously, partnerships in administrative services and technologies enabling international cooperation and collaboration with national security authorities will be introduced.

Development of the intelligence system will improve strategic and operational early warning capabilities, the situation picture of the Defence Forces and the state leadership as well as the Defence Forces' capability to disseminate intelligence. Advance warning of supranational and asymmetric threats to the Finnish population and infrastructure will be obtained in cooperation with the other authorities. International interoperability, especially with regard to EU and NATO cooperation, is taken into account in developing intelligence and surveillance along NATO standards. This will facilitate cooperation with the intelligence and surveillance systems of other countries in crisis management operations and, if necessary, enable real-time exchange of information.

**The surveillance and safeguarding of territorial integrity (MOD).** The territorial integrity of the nation's land, sea area and airspace is safeguarded by means of the territorial surveillance authorities' cooperation. This involves enforcing territorial integrity regulations as well as detecting, investigating and repelling violations of territorial integrity, if necessary by forcible means.

The Defence Forces' operational/tactical surveillance and targeting capability in an information warfare environment is improved. Flexible interservice use of resources is developed. The surveillance system will process and combine incoming surveillance information and replicate a common operational/tactical situation picture to all services. International interoperability is taken into account in developing territorial surveillance capabilities.

**Supporting society and other authorities (MOD).** In order to make the best use of society's resources, the MOD prepares to provide statutory or agreement-based executive assistance as well as other support across all levels of the public administration. This is accomplished in a manner which does not jeopardize the main task of the Defence Forces.

The role of the Defence Forces in supporting the other authorities and society is strengthened. Pursuant to national legislation and international cooperation obligations, the Defence Forces' expertise and equipment are increasingly used to prevent and combat threats as well as to manage their consequences.

Advances in the information society and increased networking expand the Defence Forces' field of cooperation. This calls for involvement in the development of the national authorities' IT arrangements. The Defence Forces play an active role in creating nationwide preparedness against information warfare threats.

Voluntary defence activities support the general preparedness and functioning of society. Local defence units are the nuclei of provincial regional troops. They are developed so as to be capable of rapidly responding to emergency conditions' threat scenarios and of providing support to the securing of society's vital functions. The main tasks of the local defence units are to defend the Defence Forces' and society's key targets and functions, to control areas crucial for the defence of the nation and to support the authorities.

### 3.3.4 Internal security

**Internal security (MOI).** To support timely decision-making, an internal security situation picture is created. The situation picture provides information on public order and security, emergency and maritime search and rescue services, the border situation and immigration flows. It also displays the international security situation as well as the one in Finland's neighbouring regions.

The crisis management model of the Ministry of the Interior as well as the required IT systems are developed in such a manner that they make it possible to incorporate information regarding the pro-

tection of the population into the internal security situation picture. The development of the situation picture will also take into account the requirements of the EU's emergency and crisis coordination arrangements. In addition, backed-up telecommunications and the local authorities' capabilities are developed. It must be possible for the regional and state administration authorities to rapidly compile the situation picture. Furthermore, local authorities must receive prompt and reliable feedback.

**Safeguarding the law enforcement system (MOJ).** Constitutional rule of law is secured, guaranteeing the protection of life and health, protection of personal freedom and property as well as other statutory rights. This involves the ability of the police, investigative and law enforcement authorities to function and cooperate as well as ensuring the prerequisites of a functioning judicial system.

The powers, number of personnel, training and equipment of the law enforcement authorities are maintained at the level required by the operating environment and their tasks. Preconditions and operational models for prompt handling of matters are established. The technical standards of court buildings will be improved so that even the most serious forms of crime can safely be tried in courts of law. The prison administration is preparing for increasing and new forms of criminality. In order to improve the operating conditions of prisons, their internal risks are taken into account when security systems are developed. The security of prisoner transport is improved.

**Public order and security (MOI).** Serious disturbances in society are prevented. Crimes endangering peoples' basic rights and targeted against the foundations of society and the economy are combated. This involves a police capability to immediately intervene in threats or crimes along with the surveillance of foreign nationals and counter-terrorism actions.

Intelligence, analysis and intersectoral cooperation are developed. This, especially, applies to cooperation within the EU as well as other international cooperation and makes it easier to combat various threats through intelligence-based law enforcement. By engaging in comprehensive security planning, it is possible to have the various actors in society committed as partners in the fight against crime. Measures related to the surveillance of organized crime, financial crime and foreign workers are developed. Expansion of the area in the EU where persons have the right to move freely is taken into account in the maintenance of public order and security. The powers, numbers of personnel, training and equipment of the law enforcement authorities are maintained at the level required by the operating environment and their tasks.

Cooperation between the law enforcement authorities, i.e. the Police, Finnish Customs and the Border Guard (PCB authorities) is intensified and focuses on criminal intelligence and crime analysis. The expansion of the Schengen area presupposes even more effective and comprehensive alternative measures substituting for the abolished border checks. Moreover, it also requires increased law enforcement cooperation between the new and old member states of the EU. Operational inter-authority cooperation is developed in line with the principles of Finnish PCB cooperation.

Sufficient numbers of reserve police will be appropriately trained. The training and equipments of the reserve police as well as the functioning of Emergency Response Centres is developed so as to aptly support the security authorities.

To combat terrorism, a terrorism situation picture is created. This includes data on terrorist activities threatening Finland, possible targets of terrorism as well as persons deemed to be a threat and who either reside in Finland or threaten Finland. As the situation picture is compiled, reports from institutions participating in the EU's police and judicial authorities' cooperation as well as other international contacts are utilized. Appropriate measures are launched to prevent radicalization in Finland.



Police counter-terrorism units, technical capabilities and the legislative basis are maintained at the level required by the situation picture. The implementation and development of the EU's counter-terrorism strategy and plan of action are continued. The common use of the EU's pre-existing and planned information systems in the fight against terrorism in law enforcement is developed. On the national scale, the use of the Border Guard's special capabilities and equipment in counter-terrorism activities is developed together with special police units.

**Emergency services and maritime search and rescue (MOI).** Serious accidents are prevented, detected and warned of. In addition, accidents are restricted by attempting to limit their consequences.

Rescue activities concerning accidents and disasters are developed. When developing the system, the focus is on the capability to launch swift and efficient rescue operations during major accidents. This involves contingency planning as well as the detection, analysis and operating capabilities of the emergency services in situations involving radioactive, chemical or biological agents.

Maritime search and rescue (SAR) falls within the purview of the Border Guard. For this purpose, constant command and communications readiness is maintained, as is an appropriate radio traffic network. SAR at sea is carried out with the supported of other maritime authorities. Related interauthority cooperation is developed in view of major maritime accidents and multipatient situations. The role of voluntary maritime SAR services is strengthened.

Modern and appropriately secure surveillance, warning and command systems are developed for emergency and maritime SAR services. When developing Emergency Response Centres the focus is on establishing sufficient technical facilities and premises in order to create a situation picture for various authorities. The use of electronic media in issuing warnings to the general public is developed with the objective of enabling the authorities to alert the entire population by using some electronic medium.

**Civil defence (MOI).** Rescue capabilities are maintained in emergency conditions. The population can be sheltered in all situations and necessary evacuations are prepared for.

Civil defence preparedness is developed so as to avoid loss of life as a result of substandard shelters. In normal conditions, these mechanisms include sheltering people in residences and other premises as well as by carrying out evacuations. In emergency conditions, the population around defended targets is prepared to be protected by placing people in civil defence shelters and through evacuations. Elsewhere, the population is protected according to risk assessments and the given threat situation by evacuations or by placing them in premises that yield the maximum protection or in existing civil defence shelters. The development of independent preparedness and civil defence measures aids in sheltering the population in residential or other premises. It must be possible to alert people outdoors using general alarm signals around protected targets or in areas where there is a risk of a major accident endangering the safety of the population. Guidelines on the civil defence strategy are implemented.

**Flood risk management and dam safety (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, MAF).** Floods, flood damages and dam failures are prevented and averted and preparedness to mitigate their consequences is maintained.

Flood risk management is improved by charting areas with the potential risk of flooding, assessing flood risks, taking the risks into account in land use planning and implementing necessary flood protection measures at critical locations. In order to improve operational flood prevention, water

level monitoring and forecasting of water situations, warning systems and cooperation procedures are maintained and emergency drills are organized. The proposal for a Directive, presently under consideration in the EU, is taken into account in the management of flood risks and development of dam safety.

**Oil and chemical spill response at sea (Ministry of the Environment, MOE).** Oil and chemical spills at sea are prevented, recovered and limited. This involves vessel safety requirements, vessel traffic service (VTS) systems and oil spill recovery.

It is possible to reduce oil and chemical spills at sea with an efficient VTS system. Another relevant issue is the demand for raising the requirements of transport vessels, such as removing single-hull oil tankers from use. In addition, capabilities to detect accidents and to rapidly limit and manage their consequences are developed.

The Finnish Environment Centre *SYKE* maintains 24/7 duty readiness in view of various environmental accidents. Oil spill response readiness is improved by procuring a multi-purpose vessel capable of recovering oil even under winter ice conditions. Oil spill recovery readiness and capacity in the coastal areas of the Gulf of Finland is improved by establishing an oil spill recovery centre of excellence. The Border Guard's capacity for monitoring and combating oil spills on the open sea is enhanced. The "Polluter-Pays Principle" penalty arrangement for vessel oil spills is to be made permanent.

**Border management (MOI).** Violations of provisions concerning the crossing of the national border and the seaward limit of territorial sea as well as threats against public order and security caused by cross-border passenger traffic are prevented. Furthermore, a safe and smooth flow of border traffic is guaranteed. This involves combating and exposing human trafficking and smuggling, the smuggling of nuclear agents and other radioactive substances, inspecting border traffic, surveillance of the Finnish-Russian border as well as the capability to reinstate border checks at the most important border crossing points on the internal borders of the Schengen area.

In order to sustain and develop the entirety of border management, different actors and equipment are coordinated both nationally and at the EU level. The free movement of people and the expansion of the Schengen area necessitate further development of the EU's integrated border management system as well as bolstering checks and surveillance on the external borders of the Union. Finland actively promotes the EU's policies, legislation and operational cooperation. The European Borders Agency (Frontex) plays the key role in operational cooperation. A pool of personnel is established to support those member states that require assistance in the EU's border management operations. Finland will make use of the future border surveillance fund in developing her own border management system.

In order to guarantee the functioning of the national border management system, a border situation picture is maintained. Furthermore, a model and system capable of producing risk analysis is developed. In addition, efficient border controls and response capabilities are developed to conform to the risk assessments concerning the most important border sections. A new and cost-effective border surveillance model is developed for more peripheral border areas. Criminal intelligence and crime analysis are also developed within the Border Guard's key functional areas. In order to combat human trafficking and smuggling, the development of national and international inter-authority cooperation continues.

To guarantee a safe and smooth flow of border traffic, infrastructure at international border crossing points, human resources and technical equipment are developed to meet the requirements of increasing traffic and security risks. This project is a joint operation, involving the Finnish Border

Guard, Customs and the Road Enterprise. Russian authorities will also be included in the development project with the aim of establishing smooth and safe border crossing practices.

**Immigration control (MOI).** Permit procedures for legal immigration and the means to prevent illegal entry are maintained. This involves the regulation of controlled immigration, a situation picture on immigration flows as well as an interauthority exchange of information

In order to put managed immigration into practice and to efficiently prevent illegal entry, the interauthority exchange of information is developed and measures are harmonized, taking into account the EU's policy on immigration and asylum, currently under consideration. By vigorously combating illegal entry, the overall fight against crime is supported and the means for responding to massive immigration flows are created. In these kinds of situations, the border security system is tasked to see to it that the authorities are able to properly monitor those wishing to enter the country. Permit application and deportation systems are developed so that the identities of all applicants can be established and their biometric data be promptly and efficiently processed. This also includes agreeing to provide temporary protection, either nationally or pursuant to EU policy. Regulation and permit consideration procedures for legal immigration are developed. This work will take into account the EU's common policy on immigration and asylum, currently under consideration. Furthermore, the Ministry of Labour plays an important role in considering the entry of foreign workers into Finland.

Immigration control and, especially, the fight against illegal entry will take into consideration future groups of national experts in the EU, who will be able to rapidly provide technical and operational assistance to those member states calling for it. In addition, the plan is to establish special expert groups to mitigate the pressures mounting on some of the member states' asylum systems and reception and holding capacities, which may be caused, for instance, by a member state's geographical location.

As legislation is developed, fluctuations in immigration levels and foreseeable immigration risks are taken into account. Furthermore, the exchange of information and coordination is developed among competent authorities. EU cooperation and international collaboration, including the neighbouring regions, is also intensified against the human trafficking and smuggling. The development of common and effective return and deportation policies is crucial as the EU's common policy on immigration and asylum is being created. The EU's integrated asylum policy is also being developed. In combating illegal special attention must be paid to guaranteeing international protection as provided in the Geneva Convention. It must be possible to identify those in need of protection, and their protection must be guaranteed.

**The management of a major influx of asylum seekers (Ministry of Labour, MOL).** Preparedness to control a large-scale influx of asylum seekers (mass exodus) is maintained. This involves establishing reception centres as well as other reception arrangements.

The Employment and Economic Development Centres continue to prepare reception and processing contingency plans for mass exodus situations. Suitable premises are identified together with municipalities, and possibly with other entities. Preliminary contracts are signed to facilitate the reception of up to 100 000 asylum seekers. As additional personnel are recruited, the role of trained volunteers and organizations must also be taken into account.

A national reception register is developed for the purpose of serving the national situation picture as well as for managing a large-scale influx of asylum seekers. The Ministry of Labour, jointly with Economic Development Centres and the transport and communications departments of State Pro-

vincial Offices, makes an assessment of the required transport equipment for different threat situations, makes the necessary provisions and draws up plans for establishing regional cooperation teams tasked to coordinate the immigration.

The minimum standards and establishing arrangements for the planned reception centres are detailed in the reception centres' contingency plans. Logistic services to the asylum seekers, including food services, accommodation, clothing and necessary health services, are to be provided even within a few hours after their having arrived at the reception centre. This entails that food and health services be prearranged between municipalities and departments for social and health care services of the State Provincial Offices'.

### 3.3.5 Functioning of the economy and infrastructure

**Acquiring and allocating financial resources (Ministry of Finance, MOF).** The resources required to ensure the functioning of the public sector are secured. This involves taxation, the reallocation of financial resources as well as processes linked to operating and financial plans and budget proposals.

The information security and usability of the government cash management system will be improved, especially to counter the threats posed by electronic media and information risks. Furthermore, procedures for guaranteeing tax payments and collection will be developed. Radically simplified tax collection methods for use in emergency situations might also become necessary.

**The financial system and money management (MOF).** The finances of households, companies and the public sector as well as the stock exchange and financial transactions will be efficiently organized. This involves collaboration between the authorities and businesses and the need to secure activities with technical backup systems.

Collaboration procedures will be established allowing banks, the authorities and other actors in the financial market to cooperate and monitor situations. The compatibility of the backup systems belonging to different actors (e.g. banks, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland and the (State) Treasury), which are used for official transactions and other essential payments, will be ensured. Developments in the financial markets will be taken into account when drawing up an overall picture of the national situation. Threat scenarios related to the increasingly more international and technically sophisticated financial markets will be specified and taken into account in the preparedness arrangements.

European national payment systems will be merged into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). This will also be used for small payments by households. The introduction of the TARGET2, the new version of the central banks' TARGET system constitutes a topical development project for the near future. The European stock exchanges and securities depositories will probably also continue to further integrate. The preparedness arrangements of money management agents will be harmonized and the role of the private actors in the field will be highlighted.

**Safeguarding the insurance services (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, MSAH).** The capability for providing insurance services is maintained by safeguarding liquidity, cash management, the functioning of IT and information networks, by maintaining an extensive service network as well as private-public partnership cooperation arrangements.

Sufficient insurance services are guaranteed for the individual and the business community by fostering cooperation between insurance companies, other actors in the insurance business as well as the authorities. As the financing business continues to integrate, insurance/banking cooperation is

improved to secure its activities. IT backup systems are developed to guarantee the functioning of payment systems.

Reinsurance guarantees are further developed in such a manner that the state can safeguard the continuation of vital sea, air, rail and road transports in abnormal and emergency conditions by providing temporary reinsurance-type guarantees for certain approved property&casualty insurances, should appropriate reinsurances be unobtainable in the insurance market.

**Securing the fuel supply (Ministry of Trade and Industry, MTI).** Fuel availability is maintained by using different types of fuel, tapping into several sources, promoting the use of domestic fuels and by maintaining emergency stocks. This involves the development of renewable energy sources and bio fuels.

Stockpiles of imported fuels and those earmarked for power production are kept at levels determined by the Government. In view of natural gas delivery stoppages, adequate quantities of alternative fuels are stocked. The emergency stockpiling system studies the possibilities of also including the import of electricity. Preparedness to direct and regulate energy consumption is maintained in view of disturbances.

Development will also take into account the use of domestic energy, i.e. renewable sources and bio fuels, as detailed in the recent National Energy and Climate Strategy. Pursuant to the National Forest Programme and the relevant EU Directive, the usefulness, availability and use of domestic, renewable, agriculture-based energy as well as bio fuels have been increased.

**Safeguarding the electric power supply (Ministry of Trade and Industry, MTI).** The production of electricity and heating, the capacity of the electric grid as well as the functioning of technical systems are safeguarded. Electric power supply relies on a functioning Nordic electricity market, an adequate electric grid, dispersed production facilities and multiple sources of energy as well as the proper balance between peak demand and capacity.

Power production which is based on several types of fuel and sources is promoted in line with the objectives set by the Government. Necessary legislative amendments support the preservation of an adequate peak production capacity. The reliability and quality of the electric grid as well as distributors' preparedness for blackouts and repairs is improved.

**Safeguarding the electronic ICT systems (Ministry of Transport and Communications, MTC).** Society's vital functions relying on communications services, communications networks and other ICT systems are protected against disturbances.

Legislative measures, guidance and supervision are used to secure the construction, development and maintenance of appropriate ICT systems in order to guarantee the maximum feasible information security and usability for the electronic media and online services.

If need be, the authorities prepare to guide, regulate and categorize networks and their services as well as user groups according to their relative importance. Supervision, inspections and preparedness exercises are used to guide and test teleoperators' preparedness. The activities of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, being the general administrative authority for issues concerning information and data security in telecommunications, are further developed.

National information security measures, cooperation between the EU's information security bodies and agencies as well as other international cooperation, for their part, prevent information security breaches to domestic ICT systems from abroad. The increasing use of ICT systems is monitored,

lest this development jeopardize the security and reliability of managing society's functions. Advances in weapons technology are also taken into consideration when safeguarding the functioning of the systems.

**Safeguarding the state administration's IT functions and information security (Ministry of Finance, MIF).** State administration information management functions are safeguarded. These functions comprise the administration of information management, information security, IT architecture and procedures, information systems, online services, basic IT technology, telecommunications and IT services.

The principles of information management are developed and promoted in such a manner that they enable the functioning of the key sectors of the government in all security situations. In line with the Information Society Policy Programme, the National IT Strategy and the National Information Security Strategy, in cooperation with all administrative sectors, information management supervision in the public sector is strengthened. Furthermore, in order to promote the safeguarding of IT functions, projects encompassing the entire central government are launched. These include developing and introducing basic data security standards as well as establishing preparedness requirements and solutions.

**Supporting the construction and maintenance of warning and alert systems (MTC).** It is ensured that legislation enables the construction of technical systems needed to alert the population and to guarantee the necessary dissemination of information in crises both at home and abroad.

Technical arrangements are developed for the purpose of broadcasting the security authorities' and the state leadership's emergency announcements to the entire population via all electronic media promptly, reliably and without altering the content. This is made possible through legislative measures and active cooperation with key partners. The main legislative focus falls on radio and television broadcasting. However, it must be possible to broadcast emergency announcements via other media as well. Legislation shall take into account domestic special situations. Yet, these systems must also be able to reach Finnish citizens staying abroad to warn them, when necessary.

**Safeguarding the continuation of transports (MTC).** The continuation of domestic and foreign transports is secured by maintaining constant and flexible readiness to respond to disturbances and to launch alternative arrangements. This involves directing resources in emergency conditions, guaranteeing the availability of necessary transport vehicles and equipment, protecting the transports as well as securing transport logistic chains.

The preparedness of the transport business to sustain transports is maintained by means of legislation, preparedness guidance and effective interest group collaboration. National preparedness measures highlight procedures which aim to increase transport safety. They are endorsed and mandated by the EU and international transport organizations. Required resource guidance and allocation measures are prepared for emergency conditions. The same applies to the administrative arrangements of crisis organizations, yet to be established. With regard to foreign trade, transports have to be safeguarded and protected, if need be, even using military resources. In order to secure transports and the critical security of supply, and to ensure that sufficient numbers of transport equipment are available in all security situations.

The logistic chain in transport is secured. This does not only call for the development of transport equipment and methods, it also requires that ports and harbours, airports, railway stations and land terminals are secured. Transport routes, too, must be appropriately constructed and maintained. Pre-

paredness measures pay special attention to securing the electronic ICT systems which are necessary for transports.

**Safeguarding the primary production of food supply (MAF).** In line with the objectives established by the Government, the sufficiency, quality and safety of food is safeguarded by means of adequate domestic agricultural production and emergency stockpiling as well as by guaranteeing access to the necessary foreign production inputs.

Efforts are made to influence the EU so as to preserve sufficient economic preconditions for agricultural production in the north as well. Basic agricultural production, such as milk, beef, pigmeat, sheepmeat, poultrymeat and egg production is safeguarded by improving the conditions of profitable agricultural production. International agreements are developed further, together with the Nordic countries and other EU countries, in order to guarantee the availability of critical production inputs.

Sufficient seed production and plant breeding is ensured in normal conditions as well to maintain adequate seed grain stocks even after crop failures. Seed production must take into account that cereals thriving in Finland are not sold in central or southern Europe, while certain plant seeds are not produced in Finland at all. Therefore, the seed grain supply for domestic bread grain, sugar beet and vegetables is secured by means of special arrangements. Should climatic conditions change or availability of production inputs be reduced, preparations are made to alter steering of agricultural production in real time, even in the middle of the growing season. This requires that the food supply situation picture (the so-called MASI model) is kept up-to-date. The information system is improved in such a way that application interfaces do not present problems and that parameters are automatically updated.

Agriculture produces the raw materials for the food industry, which means that the steering of the production must be based on real-time information regarding the raw materials available from agriculture. Preparations are made to steer and refocus production and to regulate, among other things, fuels, fertilizers and seeds in order to guarantee safe, healthy and sufficient nourishment, both quantitatively and qualitatively to the entire population in all security situations. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, each Employment and Economic Development Centre as well as municipal agricultural secretaries in the districts of each Centre steer the production. Once powers contained in the Emergency Powers Act are invoked, fuels, fertilizers and seeds, among other things, are regulated so as to provide sufficient nourishment to the entire population.

Energy and other production inputs for primary production are guaranteed by preparedness measures at each farm. Electricity supply for livestock farms is secured by promoting purchases of individually or collectively owned emergency power generators. Farm animals, feed stocks and some farm machines can be relocated, for instance, in the case of radioactive fallout.

**Safeguarding the water supply (MAF).** Access to clean water as well as appropriate wastewater management, required for health and environmental protection, are secured. This involves water protection and functioning municipal water services.

Legislation concerning the organisation of water supply and the strategic guidance of the abstraction of water are developed. Municipalities, owners of water supply facilities and real estate owners are responsible for water supply and the abstraction of water. Practical development measures focus on communications preparedness, inter-authority cooperation as well as contingency planning. In addition, investments are made in reserve water supplies connecting water pipes, emergency generators and disinfection equipment. A minimum standard of water supply, maintained by water sup-

ply and sewerage establishments, is guaranteed to the entire population by developing cooperation with the authorities.

**Safeguarding food processing and distribution (MTI).** The food industry's processing capability as well as the functioning of wholesale and retail stores is secured. The entire food supply logistic chain is secured.

Security of the food supply is maintained as prescribed by the Government. Special attention is paid to managing entities and to guaranteeing the availability of retail products in peripheral regions. In addition, the entire food supply chain's logistic processes and outsourced support functions are secured. Preparedness to steer and ration food supply and consumption is maintained. Focus is increasingly transferred from rationing to safeguarding the retail supply chain.

**Safeguarding critical industries and services (MTI).** The prerequisites of key industries for the security of supply are maintained by means of business environment policies. This involves the capability to maintain and repair defence materiel and systems, of stockpiling critical raw materials, components and other production elements, of maintaining a well-functioning private-public sector partnership as well as bilateral or multilateral international treaties concerning economic cooperation.

The capability to produce basic commodities and services required by the security of supply is maintained and the functioning of relevant logistic and technical systems is safeguarded. Industrial capacity, maintained for high-technology products as well as for research and development, improve the competitiveness of the domestic industry and, hence, the security of supply. Emergency stockpiling only involves the most critical raw materials, components and other production elements. Legislation and administrative procedures pertaining to economic defence are developed. The national and material security of supply is augmented by signing bilateral or multilateral international agreements on economic cooperation.

**Guaranteeing housing (MOE).** The preparedness to rehouse large numbers of people is maintained. This involves housing controls, construction of temporary housing and modifying existing premises.

The legislative and administrative preparedness for controlling the housing market and construction field as well as the rationing of building materials is maintained. Systems that serve preparedness planning which are capable of booking premises, machines and business services are developed.

**Securing a sufficient labour workforce (MOL).** Sufficient numbers of workers for companies vital to society, national defence and fields providing basic services to the population are guaranteed. Furthermore, the capability to reallocate required labour resources is maintained.

Even in emergency conditions, the labour workforce is primarily regulated through normal employment services. The necessary workers for companies and public services are guaranteed by invoking the general obligation to work, if necessary. These measures depend on a worker register. The development of the worker register or, alternatively, the planning for a system replacing it will be launched in the beginning of 2007.

Information systems and other tangible prerequisites related to controlling the labour workforce are secured. These include contracts signed on establishing the worker register, secure technical systems and telecommunications networks as well as testing and exercising the compilation, introduction and use of the worker register.



**Maintaining the education and research system (Ministry of Education, MOEd).** By maintaining education and research activities, the level and versatility of competence is guaranteed, as is the availability of a sufficiently professional labour force, according to supply and demand.

The functioning of all levels of education is guaranteed by allocating education resources to different levels and fields of education, as required by the supply and demand of labour. The possibility of transferring from one level of education to the next is guaranteed. Preparations are made for carrying out matriculation and other examinations, to provide daily school meals as well as to see to the welfare of students in all security situations. Education resources are prepared in a manner which permits them to be reallocated as required in security situations. This necessitates the development of education legislation.

The national research system provides information for public decision-making. This requires that research activities in state research institutes and universities be secured. The universities' basic research activities are guaranteed because applied research that supports decision-making is built on solid basic research. The significance of national research activities is highlighted in emergency conditions, as it might be difficult to gain access to information produced elsewhere. By focusing research funding and applying performance management on research institutes and universities, sufficient access to information is guaranteed. Ministries are responsible for refocusing their own administrative sectors' research and reallocating their nonassigned research appropriations in emergency conditions.

**Detecting changes in the environment and adapting to them (MOE).** The preparedness to detect, monitor and forecast changes in the environment as well as society's preparedness to adapt to them is maintained. This involves combating environmental accidents as well as Finland's participation in international cooperation, including EU cooperation, to manage environmental risks and changes.

Monitoring of changes in the environment is maintained. Finland's participation in international cooperation aimed at slowing down global warming as well as national measures to combat environmental accidents are developed. International cooperation is the vehicle by which Finland also aims to promote measures against ongoing environmental changes, such as the thinning of the ozone layer and the deterioration of the Baltic Sea ecosystem. On the national level, environmental threats may cause significant property damage and harm animals and plants as well as alter the pre-conditions of business activities.

### **3.3.6 The population's income security and capability to function**

**Income security (MSAH).** Various payment systems and the nationwide service network facilitating the awarding and disbursing of income security benefits and other benefits vital to the subsistence of the population are maintained. Sufficient funds for the benefits are maintained.

The capability to disburse the statutory income security benefits, pursuant to the provisions that apply in a given situation, is maintained. Extensive private-public partnership cooperation is required to safeguard the collection of pension contributions, the appropriate management of pension funds as well as the preservation of data in the pension register. A minimum income is guaranteed even in emergency conditions. In order to guarantee a reasonable standard of subsistence to the population as well as to safeguard sufficient financing for it, preparations for altering the eligibility provisions used for determining income security benefits are made. Income security prevents poverty and social exclusion, promotes harmony in society, national unity and the population's crisis tolerance.

Due to negative developments in the economy and higher unemployment, an increase in required appropriations must be prepared for in order to organize income security for the population. This includes maintaining the required service system. This challenge can be responded to by maintaining plans for required legislative amendments and by safeguarding the nationwide service network. The Social Insurance Institution and municipalities' backup systems for processing and disbursing minimum benefits must facilitate cash payments, if need be.

Systems are developed to facilitate the essential subsistence of a citizen who has become the victim of an accident in phases when statutory or other insurances do not cover the financial losses, or when the benefits are not yet disbursed.

**Social and health care services (MSAH).** Hospitals, health centres, social welfare establishments as well as outpatient and non-residential care services are maintained in order to provide key social and health care services for the population.

Equal social and health care services are provided for the population, regardless of location. The securing of key services is improved by intensifying regional cooperation, centralizing functions requiring specialized expertise and capabilities, developing the division of duties within the service system and by improving the regional efficiency in jointly procuring and using the required resources, supplies as well as expert and support services.

Services and resources provided by the private and third sector are taken into account as the practical arrangements of providing and guaranteeing social and primary health services in all security situations are developed.

Access to urgent and necessary social and health services is guaranteed for the entire population, regardless of the time of day or location. Emergency social welfare systems are developed in such a manner that a nationwide emergency social service system will be fully operational by 2007.

In order to treat medical conditions and illnesses caused by radiation as well as biological and chemical agents, the functional capacity and resources of the health care service system are developed. The capabilities of diagnosing and identifying patients and contagious cases are improved, as are the required isolation and quarantine facilities.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health may prioritize services and reallocate resources in lengthy abnormal and emergency conditions, so as to guarantee the key social and health services.

The readiness of the public health care system for proactively deploying medical teams to assist Finns in major accidents abroad is developed. The procedures and arrangements of psychosocial assistance and services with regard to major accidents are improved.

**Guaranteeing the availability of pharmaceuticals as well as medical devices and supplies (MSAH).** The availability of pharmaceuticals, vaccines as well as medical devices and supplies is secured. This involves the obligatory stockpiling of medicines, the emergency stockpiling of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical devices and supplies along with international and Nordic agreements and projects.

Regional purchasing procedures for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies are developed. In order to guarantee the functioning of the health care system and to improve its crisis tolerance, obligatory stockpiles of medicines as well as emergency stockpiles of medical supplies and equipment and NBC defence equipment are maintained. As stockpiles are replenished, new threats and changes in the operating environment are taken into consideration. Pharmaceuticals and vaccines as well as associated medical supplies are procured to prepare for a pandemic. Specialized medical care insti-

tutions and the National Emergency Supply Agency negotiate the responsibilities for storing and purchasing said health care supplies. The cooperation between health care preparedness experts and authorities and the National Emergency Supply Agency is strengthened. The objective of this cooperation is to provide uniform minimum levels of material preparedness nationwide.

In order to guarantee access to pharmaceuticals, vaccines and medical supplies, bilateral security of supply agreements are developed. Furthermore, Finland participates in the Nordic project for launching influenza vaccine production. Finland actively promotes the EU's security of health care supply dimension.

**The detection, surveillance and management system for health risks (MSAH).**

Detection and surveillance systems capable of recognizing and managing health emergencies caused by radioactive agents, microbes and chemicals are maintained. This involves the national radiation-monitoring network, communicable diseases surveillance system, including the infectious diseases register, biological and chemical threat expert guidance systems as well as isolation and quarantine capabilities.

Equipment, technical systems and human resources required in radiation monitoring as well as detecting biological and chemical threats are maintained to meet the requirements of changes in the operating environment and threat scenarios. Radiation monitoring takes into account Finland's obligation to fully participate in the monitoring of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In order to maintain and develop the readiness of the automatic external-dose rate-monitoring network and the network of radiation laboratories, the availability of appropriate detection, analysis and transmitting equipment for abnormal radiation situations is secured. Sufficient and appropriate laboratory infrastructure as well as adequate staff is also guaranteed. The laboratory network comprises the laboratories of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland as well as local food safety monitoring and environmental laboratories. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland as well as the National Security of Supply Agency jointly participate in renewing and developing the nationwide automatic external-dose rate-monitoring network and the associated telecommunications network. The ongoing project continues until the end of 2007. It shall be verified that all sources of radiation used in Finland are registered and appropriately marked. Decommissioned sources of radiation as well as radioactive waste are to be safely disposed.

To improve the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases, the local, regional and nationwide communicable diseases surveillance system, including the infectious diseases register, is maintained and improved. Cooperation with food safety and animal disease authorities is increased. In order to confirm epidemics, expert reserves are trained and methods are developed. These measures improve medical treatment, prevent epidemics and enable reliable estimates regarding the success of the countermeasures.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has drawn up a national preparedness plan for an influenza epidemic (pandemic). The plan does not only list the measures required in social and health care, it also determines the guidelines to different administrative sectors and the rest of society on how to prepare for a pandemic. It also determines the lines of authority among public officials as well as the principles of interauthority cooperation during a pandemic.

In order to detect and manage a biological and chemical threat, Finland maintains effective expert guidance systems as well as a network of laboratories capable of sufficiently sophisticated diagnostics and analysis, which have the necessary expertise for diagnostics beyond the routine biological and chemical agents. Health care units, environmental health care, food safety and animal disease authorities as well as environmental authorities develop cooperation procedures with the network of

laboratories and expert establishments. Duty systems operating 24/7 were introduced in 2006. The National Public Health Institute, for its part, coordinates the operation of the nationwide hazardous microbes safety laboratory system, and is also responsible for conducting laboratory examinations which are commercially unfeasible but of crucial importance.

The Centre for Bio Threat Assessment, operated jointly by MSAH, the Defence Forces and the National Public Health Institute, partly coordinates the operation of the nationwide hazardous microbes safety laboratory network. The tasks of the Centre focus on supporting the national laboratory network, coordinating cooperation between international hazardous microbes safety laboratories, biological threat research as well as on expert guidance and training. The planned tasks of the Zoonosis<sup>3</sup> Centre, which will be established for the National Veterinary and Food Research Institute<sup>4</sup> and the National Public Health Institute, are to monitor and fight zoonoses, in cooperation with the Centre for Bio Threat Assessment. Civil-military cooperation improves national research and development capabilities and preparedness against these threats.

To prepare for chemical threats, a Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats will be started. The Centre is a collaboration network of various chemical threat experts who operate in the dispersed facilities of the organisations involved and utilise existing infrastructure. The participants include the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, the National Public Health Institute, the National Product Control Agency for Welfare and Health, the National Veterinary and Food Research Institute, the Defence Forces, the Emergency Services College, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) as well as the Poison Information Centre. The primary task of the Centre is to support the preparedness against chemical threats and to maintain a chemical hazard duty and emergency response system. The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health develops and maintains regional field teams which can be deployed to incident sites for the purpose of collecting samples and evaluating the situation. Finnish Environment Institute laboratories may also provide services in the management of a chemical incident.

The usability of the product register of the national chemicals register in establishing the health impacts of chemical accidents and poisonings is improved by guaranteeing rapid access, 24/7, to the chemicals register. In view of incidents, experts and analysis organizations will compile a national dangerous chemicals database.

The Poison Information Centre provides nationwide medical guidance pertaining to poisonings. It is to be developed into a national expert centre for chemical-induced poisonings and mass poisonings.

With regard to guaranteeing the population's ability to function, it is imperative to see to food safety. This task is within the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

### 3.3.7 Psychological crisis tolerance

**Education (MOEd).** The uninterrupted continuation of key educational services is guaranteed. This involves educating pupils and students about threats and different crises, along with the preparedness to use the field of education as a medium for public information and influencing as well as other activities promoting psychological and social unity, people's confidence in society and the will to defend the nation. Upholding education also includes sustaining the sports activities and physical fitness of the general public.

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<sup>3</sup> Any infectious disease that may be transmitted from animals to humans or from humans to animals

<sup>4</sup> Nowadays the Department of Animal Diseases and Food Safety Research of the Finnish Food Safety Authority

The development of education will take into account the possibilities of conveying information on threats and preparedness by means of civic education. Topics promoting psychological crisis tolerance are developed both for curricula and curriculum-based education. Pupils and students receive education on the Finnish way of life as well as information concerning the safety of the population, responsible conduct in life's different situations as well as total defence and security policy.

The marginalization of pupils and students at all levels of education is prevented by guaranteeing equal opportunities and equal rights in education. Pupils and students are encouraged to adopt a healthy lifestyle by expanding the opportunities of participating in sports and physical fitness activities at all levels of education.

Official communications, promoting and strengthening psychological crisis tolerance, lays the foundation for crisis communications. The tasks and responsibilities of crisis communications are included in the strategic tasks of the Prime Minister's Office. Each ministry and government agency is responsible for its own official communications.

**Cultural identity and cultural heritage (MOEd).** The preservation of society's traditions is supported. This involves cultural services and protection of the cultural heritage.

The formation of the cultural identity is promoted by guaranteeing participation in cultural activities to all citizens. This is done by maintaining a comprehensive structure of establishments and grants for art and culture. The opportunity to participate in basic art education, recreational arts and in cultural events is guaranteed to every citizen.

Nationally important cultural heritage is protected. This heritage includes prehistoric sites, historically significant buildings and complexes, works of art, manuscripts, books and objects, scientific collections as well as archival and library collections. Cultural heritage also includes the buildings in which movable cultural heritage is stored or displayed as well as intellectual property rights, crystallized in copyrights.

Symbols of our independence express our cultural and national identity. The noticeable protection of these symbols in crises strengthens the sense of security and unity among the population. The authorities maintain data concerning the quantity, quality and location of cultural heritage deserving protection. In the last analysis, the owner is responsible for protecting the site. It will be ensured that regional and local authorities have the capabilities to monitor and supervise the implementation of existing protection plans.

The preconditions for exporting Finnish innovations to the international market are safeguarded. From the viewpoint of strengthening national identity, it is essential that Finns increasingly penetrate international science and culture networks and that Finnish innovations succeed in the world market. Furthermore, international and national intellectual property right protection is preserved and promoted.

**Religious services (MOEd).** The preconditions for the state churches and other religious denominations in supporting the population's coping and welfare and as providers of psychological assistance are maintained in the spirit of freedom of religion and tolerance. This involves funeral services, diaconal work and other societal services.

The preconditions to perform religious activities and to participate in the provision of psychological assistance and crisis support are guaranteed to the state churches and other religious denominations in all security situations. Funeral services, carried out in a dignified manner and paying respect to the deceased, are guaranteed.

### 3.4 Focus areas

The objective of determining focus areas is to guide administrative sectors in assigning resources to such functions which need them the most, or to those considered the most critical and vulnerable from the viewpoint of the entire society. As per the previous Resolution, it was also considered appropriate to establish intersectoral focus areas of key importance for all administrative sectors with regard to their respective core functions.

Because of the long-term nature of Government level preparedness and guidance, the focus areas in the previous Resolution were accepted as the starting point for establishing new focus areas. The development of these areas has already begun and is continuing. Therefore, no major changes to the previous focus areas were considered appropriate at this stage.

Based on the ministries' expert assessments, it was considered that the increasing dependence on technology - often prevalent in intersectoral cooperation - had to receive ample attention as focus areas were established. Therefore, the situation picture system, already one of the focus areas in the previous Resolution, has now been expanded to also cover the other technical systems required in state crisis management. Electronic ICT systems, too, require extensive intersectoral development measures.

A new focus area, exemplifying the growing dependency on technology, is the security of energy supply. It is a fundamental prerequisite for the systems to function in the information society. Due to more ominous risk estimates, health protection retains its status as one of the focus areas. The intensification of intelligence cooperation in counter-terrorist activities has reached sufficient capability to warrant its deletion from the focus areas.

Ministries must prioritize the development of the focus areas capabilities in their own activities and operating and financial plans. Furthermore, another argument for the prioritizing of resources is the preparedness for the strategic tasks which ministries need to implement while managing special situations within their purview.

The focus areas regarding the development of capabilities in 2006 - 2010 are:

**State crisis management capability.** State crisis management capability refers to the capability of the top state leadership and security authorities to manage situations that jeopardize the vital functions of society. Special attention must be paid to sufficient powers, clarity of coordination responsibilities, communications supporting the situation management, the development of an early-warning system as well as to the development of a secure ICT network for the authorities. In addition, relevant personnel in the top levels of government, including supporting elements, must be inducted into their duties. They must also participate in exercises. When developing crisis management, the duties and opportunities coming with EU membership must be taken into consideration. The interoperability of each ministry's own situation picture systems is improved.

**Preventing and combating serious environmental accidents.** The state of the environment is monitored to detect long-term harmful changes in the environment at an early enough stage. An environmental accident or a gradually developing environmental disaster can harm or even threaten the health of people. They may alter the conditions of business activity, threaten the existence of species or alter the ecological balance. Special attention is paid to the capability of combating oil and chemical spills at sea as well as the ability to limit their consequences. The monitoring of the state of the environment and detection of environmental threats must be maintained and improved.

**Health protection.** Preparedness against serious infectious diseases (pandemic) as well as other threats jeopardizing the health of the population is developed. Special attention must be paid to the

development of a health threat detection and surveillance system, the functioning of the health care system and to the availability of pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, each administrative sector must make sure that it is able to carry out its strategic tasks even during a pandemic.

**Electronic information and communication technologies (ICT).** The basic infrastructure for ICT systems must be sufficiently secure and safeguarded contain redundancies even in normal conditions. Otherwise, they will not survive in all security situations. Special attention must be paid to teleoperators' preparedness obligations, including relevant authority-teleoperator cooperation, data security in networks and services as well as to guaranteeing services to selected user groups.

**Security of energy supply.** The security of energy supply is a fundamental prerequisite for the functioning of the information society. Specifically, with regard to electric power supply, sufficient domestic fuel production must be guaranteed, emergency stockpiles of imported fuels must be kept and the reliability of power distribution must be developed by legislative measures, if necessary. As power companies' preparedness obligations are being considered, international trade regulations as well as the legislation of the European Community must be kept in mind. Prior to issuing the next Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Society, a more comprehensive report of options available for improving the security of energy supply is required.

### 3.5 Monitoring and exercises

Securing society's vital functions relies on ministries being able to carry out their strategic tasks in all security situations. Relevant plans and arrangements must regularly be updated and always when major changes take place in society or in the security environment.

The monitoring of the Strategy enables timely and proper development along with maintenance measures. The maintenance of national security demands correct information on the administrative sectors' preparedness and capabilities. Monitoring provides information to the state leadership regarding how correctly resources are being allocated for the purpose of securing society's vital functions.

Each ministry, within its mandate, directs and monitors the implementation and development of measures related to securing the vital functions. Ministries include all measures related to the development of capabilities required by strategic tasks in their regular operating and financial plans. In addition, these are also to be included in annual reports. Germane monitoring is to pay particular attention to whether the focus areas established in the Strategy are taken into account.

The Security and Defence Committee, cooperating with the meeting of the heads of preparedness, is responsible for the joint monitoring of the Strategy. The monitoring provides for the updating of the Strategy as well as for coordinating total defence development measures. Long-term monitoring is required and, as much as possible, it must be based on routinely produced documents. When required, the Security and Defence Committee reports to the Government (to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy).

Each administrative sector's preparedness for special situations within its purview is monitored by requesting presentations from the ministry. Monitoring also checks the administrative sectors' capability to provide executive assistance. The monitoring of capabilities is based on the following entities:

- Ministry reports on their operating and financial plans, budget proposals and annual reports,
- Ministry reports on the status of preparedness regarding the special situations they are responsible for,

- Compiling and analysing the lessons learned from special situations having taken place, and
- Preparedness exercises involving the administrative sectors, the Government and the authorities nationwide.

From the viewpoint of monitoring crises which have occurred at home or abroad, it is important to comprehensively log and analyse all measures implemented to control the situation. The analysis of so-called “close calls” must also be included into this monitoring. Cooperation bodies go through the lessons learned and resulting conclusions.

Society’s preparedness to survive crises is tested in exercises. These exercises can be categorized into three groups: Intrasectoral exercises, intersectoral special situation exercises as well as large, nationwide preparedness exercises. Government-level exercises are the responsibility of the Prime Minister’s Office. Exercise monitoring focuses on the crisis management system and on intersectoral cooperation.

Administrative sectors organize their own exercises so as to train staff and test their capabilities. The exercises are to concentrate on the focus areas, special situations and other obligations that are established in this Strategy. Ministries promulgate their exercise reports as deemed appropriate.

The capability of the central government to manage special situations is tested in the Government’s special situation exercises. In line with the threat scenarios of the Resolution, these exercises test the preparedness for special situations, the functioning of situation management arrangements as well as cooperation. The topics of the exercises are chosen to correspond to the challenges of the prevailing security environment. They can either be organized as scenario-specific exercises or, alternatively, by arranging several sequential seminars that deal with the management of a special situation chosen as the topic for the exercise.

Large, nationwide central government preparedness exercises are arranged approximately once every four years. These exercises lay the foundation for the next review of the Strategy. In addition to testing all ministries, the exercise also reviews some of the regional contingency plans and cooperation arrangements across several levels of the administration, required by a large-scale situation.

Lessons learned provide tangible information on how the functions vital to society are secured, relevant cooperation and which kind of development is required by the strategic tasks. The experiences also provide useful feedback for reviewing the Strategy and contingency plans.

The Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Security relies on existing statutes, including provisions concerning the ministries’ mandates, powers and tasks. Hence, should relevant statutes be amended, the possible need to update the Resolution with regard to lines of authority and division of duties must be taken into consideration. The next opportunity for comprehensive development is when the Government issues its next security and defence policy report.



## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: THREAT SCENARIOS

#### A disturbance in the electricity grid

Services in society offered by the public sector or the business community make progressively more use of telecommunication networks and, hence, are increasingly dependent on information systems. Society, at an increasing rate, is transforming into an environment in which almost all traditional services have become either computer-controlled or are completely online services. Banking services as well as business systems, linked to controlling production and logistics, serve as examples of this.

Electronic information systems and data transfer networks form system entities. The consequences of system malfunctions can extend from individual services into full-blown system-wide breakdowns. In addition to networks, the entirety consists of computers, mobile telephones, network servers and other ancillary infrastructure. Said systems run on electric power which makes them vulnerable in all security situations. Societal factors may emerge as the new risks, such as the progressively growing use of information networks, ageing of the population, urbanization, increasing technological complexity, real-time requirements, extremism, cultural exclusion, altered behavioural models and moral concepts, progressively growing transparency of society as well as the huge increase in dependencies. Electronic ICT and power supply systems are used to facilitate the authorities', organizations' and companies' management functions in abnormal and emergency conditions.

**Information systems, telecommunications and the electronic media** can be threatened by forces of nature, human error or technical malfunctions, deliberate cyber or physical attacks against systems, unauthorized access or interference. One of the best-known ways to interfere with Internet services is the denial-of-service attack, aiming to flood and saturate Web servers or the capacity of the Internet service with automatic messages. Information systems are threatened by malicious programs, such as worms or viruses capable of infecting or destroying files as well as threats caused by cybercrime, such as wiretapping or computer-assisted fraud, based on false user identity.

In normal conditions, most of the serious cyber attacks are against network operators or e-commerce businesses. Damage is also done to industry, hospitals, bodies governed by public law and the public administration. Organized crime and terrorism are rapidly adopting *modi operandi* based on cyber attacks. Due to its societal importance, the electronic media has also risen to new prominence in conjunction with political and military crises. Planning for interference, hacking and sabotage as well as preparing for countermeasures are normal parts of military operations. Information warfare is an integral part of modern military preparedness. The most extreme vehicles of electronic warfare are still weapons capable of producing an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) or a High Power Microwave (HPM).

In addition to the threats mentioned above, **information networks** are threatened by critical IT malfunctions, mischief and vandalism and the effects of international crime or terrorism. The mushrooming Internet traffic, especially in the open network, may saturate telecommunications capacities, jeopardizing traditional telephone and business communications.

Because of dwindling economic prospects in the information network business, critical investments for renewing and replacing basic infrastructure have decreased. In spite of the reliability of the open Internet, based on its routing, the responsibilities for providing functioning services are becoming blurred. This is caused by, for example, the lengthening of the service chain. Spares required in the upkeep of telecommunication networks are ever more being stocked abroad. Furthermore, the chal-

Challenges in this field include the updating of critical programs as well as retaining a skilled workforce. Uncertainty factors are increased by the free movement of labour, the growing numbers of foreign staff as well as the internationalization of companies. The physical integrity of electronic telecommunications is degraded by lower protection levels in new data centres, specifically at mobile phone base stations, as well as the reluctance of smaller operators to invest in unprofitable preparedness. Neither are users of networks always prepared against the opportunities that new technology offers for unauthorized access. Various kinds of malware spreading over networks are increasingly sophisticated and, thus, more difficult to block. Phishing attacks, aimed at obtaining lucrative financial information, will be focused on a more limited target group in the future.

**Data processing** service producers are merging and concentrating their functions. This poses a challenge to preparedness when most critical systems only operate in a few service centres. The biggest risk for the field involves system software for which source codes are not generally available in Finland, apart from some open systems. Thorough system software knowledge is also concentrated in excellence centres abroad. Moreover, system software licence management is also often conducted entirely from abroad. The possibility of altogether halting our data processing from abroad by means of not renewing system software licences can be considered a major risk.

In an energy-demanding society, better quality is continuously expected from the functioning of the **power grid, especially from electric power distribution**. Due to increasing energy dependence, a major blackout in urban areas, for instance, would virtually paralyse society.

Weather is the typical culprit of power failures in Finland. A comprehensive breakdown of the main grid, a major disturbance for society, can happen even when storms or sabotage are not the cause. The breakdown could be due to a chain reaction of individual transmission line failures. Electricity grids constitute an important target of terrorism-related crime or, in the last analysis, military operations. On the whole, transmission line control and monitoring systems depend on telecommunications. Hence, a problem concerning one immediately generates a problem concerning the other. Key factors with regard to guaranteeing electric power supply for telecommunications also include human resources and contingency planning, among other things, with power companies.

**Payments** in Finland depend on functioning ICT systems and on electric power. Major threats include power failures, disturbances of telecommunications and information systems as well as terrorist acts and crises resembling warlike conditions. The threats may be interwoven and can incorporate problems caused by personnel and premises. With regard to the finance business, challenges can also involve system outsourcing and associated contracts.

Combating the threats against ICT and power distribution systems requires extensive national and international cooperation between the authorities and the business community. This is the case even in spite of the fact that power line transmission capacity, the physical protection of telecommunications structures, network data security and IT services function at a relatively high level in Finland. Service producers bear a significant responsibility in combating the threats and guaranteeing the functioning of the services. In the free market environment, the authorities must provide guidance, among other things, through legislative measures in order to guarantee functioning services to the extent required.

### **A serious disturbance of the health and income security of the population**

The health and income security of the population can be threatened by an extended recession, pandemics and dangerous infectious diseases, radiation accidents and other environmental accidents, contamination of food and drinking water, chemical threats, difficulties in obtaining pharmaceuticals or medical equipment or a large-scale influx of asylum seekers. Challenges posed by ageing, social exclusion and the general deterioration of the health of the population constitute more gradu-

ally developing threats. Disturbances in threat detection, surveillance and response systems can complicate threat management. Threats can materialize as results of accidents, natural disasters or deliberate action and they are more and more global and cross-border. Therefore, prevention and combating often require international cooperation.

An extended recession may generate problems in providing the required social and health care services for the population or in maintaining social protection. Inadequacies in social insurance financing and liquidity may complicate the maintenance of income security. In such cases, the functioning of the social insurance system may become disturbed. Problems can emerge in information systems and telecommunications or in payment systems.

Ageing and urbanization increase disparities in regional service requirements and make it more difficult to provide the key social and health care services for the population, especially, in depopulated areas. Many organizations have significantly trimmed down their nationwide service network, causing problems in the functioning and availability of services. In addition, due to increased tension in the international situation, problems in industrial production or market disturbances, services may be threatened by difficulties in obtaining pharmaceuticals, vaccines or medical supplies from abroad. This may significantly complicate, particularly, the provision of health care services.

A large environmental or nuclear accident in Finland or in adjacent areas may require widespread evacuations as well as long-term and demanding rearrangements of welfare and health care. Epidemics caused by contaminated water also constitute a major threat. Of primary concern in Finland are small groundwater suppliers without adequate disinfection capabilities. Widespread urban epidemics can be caused by the breakdown of the water treatment system.

Internationalization and the mobility of people have, for their part, increased the threat of contagious diseases. New infectious diseases, hitherto nonexistent in Finland, may spawn serious epidemics and require health care capabilities and medical treatment unavailable in normal conditions. The World Health Organization has urged its member states to prepare for a pandemic response. A pandemic may have wide-ranging negative effects to the health of the population, the functioning of the social and health care service system and to society's vital functions. It would also significantly alter people's everyday life, such as working, education, means of subsistence and communal activities, threatening the nation's crisis tolerance. Drug-resistant bacteria and viruses already pose a major challenge to our health care system. The HIV virus rampantly spreads in our near environs.

As the potential for social and regional marginalization increases, people living outside normal society pose a challenge. Unemployment, poverty, dropping-out from education, inadequate integration of immigrants, illnesses and the increasing abuse of intoxicants and controlled substances intensify marginalization. This makes people prone to normal and infectious diseases, accidents and premature death. It also increases domestic violence and serious disorderly conduct, especially, among the youth. Social exclusion and the disturbance of harmony in society weaken national unity and crisis tolerance.

In order to guarantee health and income support services for the population, a fixed nationwide service network and the social and health care service network must be safeguarded and maintained in all situations. Furthermore, one must develop systems ensuring the availability of pharmaceuticals, supplies and equipment as well as for detecting and monitoring medical emergencies.

### **A serious disturbance in the functioning of the economy**

Economic consequences are also usually linked to phenomena or events which damage the functioning of society. Accidents, terrorist acts or minor environmental accidents may only cause lim-

ited damage to the national economy, but considerable damage at the individual or local level. Regarding the national economy, the immediate threat of war and war itself are the most severe crises.

Economic threats may also be considered as individual factors which, upon materializing, may jeopardize the normal functioning of society. Finland, being a small and open economy, depends on the state and prospects of the world economy. Economic integration, in its many forms, has increased the efficiency and output of the world economy. As a result, interdependency among national economies has increased and, hence, they have also become more vulnerable to various economic crises breaking out in different parts of the world. The progressively networking world economy increases interdependency and security. However, disturbances and risks linked to the use of technology also increase.

Business cycles characterise economic development even in normal conditions. Underlying factors often include changes in the demand or production conditions of commodities, which can seriously impact the economic growth prospects of different countries. The consequences of these phenomena are almost immediately witnessed in the world economy through foreign trade or on the financial market. When aggravated, various structural imbalances in the world economy may result in a serious recession. An international recession alone will not jeopardize society's vital functions. However, it can spawn political or other instability, which in turn affects the security of Finland. One of the most significant risks to the world economy involves the United States' massive trade deficit. Imbalances in the world economy may also put pressure on exchange rate changes which, once materialized, would immediately affect the competitiveness and growth prospects of different economies.

Financial market integration is well established and Finland's financial market today is quite international. For instance, Finnish banks and insurance companies are transforming into so-called "European Public Companies". In other words, in the future these would only run branch offices in Finland. To a degree, the integration of the financial market generates "subsidiarization" in the Finnish financial market, which means decision-making is progressively occurring more and more abroad. This increases vulnerability because it makes it possible for foreign crises to reach Finland owing to branch offices.

Crises normally arise either as a result of serious financial disturbances or because of technical and operational problems involving banks, insurance companies and other financing institutions. For their part, Finland's memberships in the EU as well as the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) have increased economic growth and the stability of the financial market. Nevertheless, the possibility of large-scale risks, such as credit, market and operational risks cannot be ruled out.

During an economic crisis, society's dwindling financial activity poses a challenge to the state's ability to obtain revenue. This results in general economic caution and, consequently, diminished tax revenue. It may become more difficult for the state to obtain loans, and expenses arising from debt could increase. Pressure to inflate central government spending normally grows in step with the increase in unemployment.

The information technology industry is presently an integral part of Finland's economic prosperity. The market shares of companies operating in rapidly developing fields and dealing in short life span products are vulnerable to relatively sudden changes. Problems in these fields may have a significant detrimental effect on employment and state economy finances. Specialization, brought about by international division of labour, has increased our dependency on international trade.

Businesses' adopting global operating models has led to concentrated production, increasingly networked activities, longer supply and service chains and smaller stores. This highlights the importance of functioning logistic systems. Due to increased retail market concentration, imports and

internationalization, competition has increased and industrial margins have diminished. This has resulted in improving the efficiency of the entire retail logistic chain. In addition to the decisions made by companies, the EU market also influences the production conditions in Finland as well as our international competitiveness.

Even if a complete and extended cessation of import and export is unlikely, Finland or companies operating in Finland may find it more difficult to obtain critical products and services from abroad. Finland is completely dependent on foreign trade in all security conditions. Because of our geographical position, this specifically applies to sea transports. In normal conditions, sea transports and vessels may be threatened by, among other things, disturbances in transports of critical materials or port functions, restrictions of maritime traffic, threats posed by vessels themselves as well as terrorism and accidents. In emergency conditions, maritime traffic may be impeded by the Gulf of Finland becoming non-navigable, sabotage against vessels and ports, restrictions against using foreign territorial waters or ports as well as the outflagging of Finnish-registered vessels. Transports' vulnerability to disturbances is on the increase and valid insurance on vessels, cargo and crew constitute a necessary precondition for the continuation of maritime traffic. As insurance risks continue to grow, insurance companies share risks on the international reinsurance market, whose sensitivity to the financial market increases the transports' vulnerability to disturbances. Decision-making regarding key issues involving the Finnish transport business is gradually migrating abroad.

A prolonged economic crisis, long-term industrial action or similar reasons could disturb the functioning of water utilities. The reason could also be that it becomes more difficult or altogether impossible to obtain essential maintenance services, spare parts or processing chemicals.

Finland's food self-sufficiency is decreasing. Almost all agricultural raw materials and production elements are, at least to a degree, imported. During disturbances in foreign trade, yield levels may significantly drop. The production and distribution systems of foodstuffs are concentrating and internationalizing. The reason for this is that the actors, observing the so-called JOT-principle (Just On Time), try to minimize stores and deliver the goods only when a specific phase of the production process so requires.

Animal and plant epidemics, also those occurring abroad, may result in serious disturbances in the trade and availability of animals and food. Already even in the threat phase, they generate extra expenses and work. The internationalization of the food market threatens food safety and poses challenges to food safety control. Agricultural crises in the area of the EU are often linked to gradually progressing zoonoses, which are dangerous to humans, or to highly contagious livestock diseases. Should foreign substances enter the food production chain, this could result in widespread recalls of feed and foodstuffs.

Prolonged disruptions in fuel or energy imports could generate an economic supply crisis, which could spill over to other areas and trigger threats in them. While global energy demands have continued to grow, the delivery of key energy reserves, such as oil and natural gas, is being concentrated. This, together with the energy interests of nations with great power steering energy policies, poses greater risks on the price and availability of energy. Being dependent on one source for energy imports in Finland and Central Europe makes these areas vulnerable.

To safeguard the Finnish economy, it is necessary to be able to guarantee economic marketability and the functioning of the public sector in all security situations. This means that the technical functioning of the financial and payment systems must be ensured and steered by legislative means. Furthermore, to safeguard operating conditions for businesses, the reliability of power production and delivery must be reinforced by ensuring that domestic fuels are produced, that fuel supply is secured and that legislative provisions and contractual arrangements are reformed. Processes and technical

systems must be maintained and developed in order to allow the public sector to obtain and reallocate financial resources to its key functions.

### **Major accidents and natural disasters**

Major accidents or natural disasters caused by freak weather phenomena normally bring about widespread destruction or danger to human life, property or the environment. These so-called dynamic accidents occur unexpectedly and have only local impact at first. However, their effect can continue to expand, unless rapid and efficient rescue activities can be organized. Major accidents require rescue resources from a large area and this may impair the ability to conduct other rescue efforts during a major accident. Major accidents in Finland are normally caused by human error or technical system malfunctions.

The most probable culprits for an industrial major accident are plants dealing in hazardous substances, such as nuclear plants and the so-called Seveso-plants, which contain an inherent risk for a major accident. An accident in these types of plants could result in a radiation or chemical accident, presenting a clear danger to humans, property, water sources and the environment. Nuclear radiation or emissions of hazardous substances may restrict the use of certain areas, as well as animals and foodstuffs in the area, for years to come.

Major accidents in aviation, road traffic, shipping or railway traffic may involve hazardous substance transports, passenger traffic or occur as results of acts of terrorism. Public transport accidents could entirely stop the free movement of people.

Large fires or other accidents in public buildings may generate long-term pauses in activities. Fires or acts of terrorism at public events or in public buildings cause a clear and present danger to people, property and the continuation of activities.

Storm and flood damage, at their worst, cause dam failures and devastate buildings as well as other infrastructure. The most often occurring are riparian floods which annually inundate large land areas. Natural disasters are caused by freak weather and natural phenomena. Statistically, a storm flood is the most probable of these. A rise in sea level may cause damage in coastal cities. Finns abroad may encounter any possible kind of freak weather phenomenon or act of terrorism.

Major accident preparedness comprises prevention, early detection, efficient rescue activities and interauthority cooperation. Relevant measures can be improved by planning, counselling and instruction, legislation and technical solutions. Different actors have various statutory obligations.

Preparedness is improved by maintaining and developing technical systems, such as premises security, fire alarm and extinguishing, traffic management, traffic safety, radiation monitoring, chemical measuring systems as well as structural resistance against fire and explosions. Counselling and instruction help people in identifying correct courses of action and in risk avoidance. The consequences of natural disasters can mainly be mitigated through construction regulations and land use planning. In addition, the development of forecasting and alarm systems for freak weather phenomena assists the organizing of rescue activities, the protection of people and property as well as evacuations.

### **Environmental threats**

Environmental threats mean changes in the environment which can harm or even endanger human health, impact the business environment, threaten the existence of species or alter the ecological balance. Environmental threats may happen suddenly and develop rapidly. Such cases normally involve environmental accidents. Gradually developing environmental threats are more difficult to

detect. Their detrimental effects usually reach deep into the ecosystem and often cause massive damage. An environmental accident or a gradually developing environmental disaster may threaten the health or living conditions of the population by destroying the preconditions of business, agriculture and forestry, by contaminating water sources, by killing large populations of species and by eroding the urban environment. This may result in extensive pollution, warranting the evacuation of the entire population and all business activities from the area.

Environmental threats can also be generated by human activity or natural phenomena, such as violent volcanic eruptions, severe earthquakes, meteorite impacts or large changes caused by the mechanisms in nature's own long-term cycles. The impacts of natural phenomena and emissions may only be local, but the result of their effects can travel and be felt at distances of over one thousand kilometres. Different countries' vital economic interests may be at odds. A severe environmental threat may be the result of poor industrial planning involving the use of raw materials, land and minerals as well as potable water and logging. Industry and urban waste often create environmental threats as well. Serious environmental threats are almost always present when nations use military force in their disputes.

At their worst, environmental dangers involve the entire earth. The most serious of these is global warming, causing increased rainfall and flood risks in northern Europe. Global warming is the result of increased amounts of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Other global environmental threats include ozone depletion, pollution of seas and oceans, reduced populations, widespread extinctions of species, depletion of non-renewable natural resources, diminishing potable water resources and land erosion.

Environmental threats may remain regional, even if their effects extend to several countries. The most serious regional threat in our near environs is the deterioration and, particularly, eutrophication of the Baltic Sea as well as threats inherent in the rapidly increasing shipping. One serious oil spill alone in the Gulf of Finland could result in disastrous consequences. Russia's increasing industrial activity, built on her present industrial infrastructure which does not sufficiently take environmental concerns into consideration, can also be considered a regional environmental threat.

A local environmental threat can also be serious. As a result of industrial production, heavy metal or chemical concentrations in the environment can become sufficiently high to markedly increase regional morbidity rates. As a result of poor waste management, the soil can become so contaminated that it cannot be used for housing any longer. Pollution in natural waterways can cause fish deaths or eutrophication.

The only method by which it is possible to prepare for and prevent environmental threats is by joint action among nations. The consequences of environmental threats are still not well known. Moreover, it is difficult to localize them on a regional basis. Finland, by her own action and by engaging in international collaboration, can make a positive impact in the state of the environment, or at the very least, try to slow down the rate of its deterioration. In addition, the monitoring of the environment and detection of environmental threats must be maintained and developed.

### **Terrorism as well as organized and other serious crime**

**Terrorism** means violent, illegal, national or international, activity or the threat of violence with the objective of causing unrest and fear. The aim of a terrorist act is to force political leaders to succumb to the terrorists' wishes. Creating fear and confusion among the population might also be a goal. In order to reach their objective, terrorists commit a violent act or credibly threaten to do so and then make threats regarding certain follow-on action, lest their demands are accepted.

Terrorism is often classified into the following groups: political, nationalist/separatist and Islamic extremist terrorism. Political terrorism aims to institute political/social change. National/separatist terrorism is usually linked to some ethnic group's desire to establish its own state within the area of one or several states. The objectives of Islamic extremist terrorists are more vague and often even impossible to implement.

The threat of terrorism against Finland is considered low. It is possible that terrorists might attempt to use Finnish territory as one of their areas of transit, rest and hiding. Furthermore, there is always the danger of ideologically motivated sabotage. Islamic extremists consider the United States, large NATO countries, Russia, Israel, moderate Arab countries and their citizens, leaders and economic interests as their primary targets. Representatives, foreign missions and other premises of the terrorists' primary target countries, as well as their vessels and aircraft, also exist in Finland, and may be targeted by terrorists. Major international meetings and other comparable events organised in Finland could also be targets for strikes. On the other hand, strikes against infrastructure vital for the functioning of society are considered unlikely. Terrorist acts committed abroad may also introduce direct or indirect spillover effects in Finland. Nevertheless, Finnish citizens, missions or companies may end up as victims of strikes abroad. When it comes to international terrorism, long-term instability is in store. This entails that Finnish society must prepare for terrorism on the level required by fact-based threat assessments.

**Organized crime** in Finland is progressively becoming more networked and is intensifying its mutual cooperation. International and domestic criminal gangs operating in Finland are becoming more active and are increasing their operations. Criminal groups operating in Finland are enhancing their international cooperation, thus influencing the *modi operandi* of criminal activity.

Criminal organizations especially deal with drugs. However, they also use business activities as a front for serious professional criminal activity and expand their operations into economic crime. Simultaneously, the underground economy is penetrating the Finnish business environment.

Tensions between criminal groups exist, even though mutual deals and a division of labour are profitable with regard to criminal activity. Violent clashes and retaliations between criminal groups may cause serious danger to bystanders and weaken public order and security. It is already evident that as crime becomes more organized, violent crime becomes more ruthless and brutal.

As far as international, cross-border, organized crime is concerned, Finland is still a peripheral country and mainly the target of organized crime coming from its neighbouring regions. Because of this, and also owing to eased travel restrictions, the increase in property crime perpetrated by the Russian and Baltic organized crime leagues is clearly observable in Finland. These criminal groups play an important role in supplying Finnish criminal organizations with contraband goods and services. The significance of Estonia has particularly increased as a country of origin and transit of controlled substances. Russian organized crime continues to infiltrate the Finnish business community and seeks ground, for instance, in freight forwarding, logistics and foreign trade. These take advantage of money traffic and investment activities by investing in legally operating Finnish companies. The backers of Russian criminal organizations already wield influence over some Finnish business sectors.

Prisons constitute an integral operating environment for criminal organizations. Several organized criminal gangs are being led from prisons. Members of criminal organizations do not only plan criminal activities while in prison, they also recruit new members, network with other criminal organizations and establish international contacts.

The authorities and key witnesses are increasingly being threatened, complicating the functioning of the law enforcement and judicial system. The credibility of business activities, including its sub-



sectors, may weaken. The increasing adoption and prevalence of the methods employed by organized crime in Finland's neighbouring regions may intensify the risk of corruption.

Efficient international intelligence, situation analysis, sufficient powers, domestic and international cooperation in crime intelligence and analysis as well as in criminal trials and penal enforcement are required in order to better foreshadow and combat terrorism and other organized crime. Increasing the counter-terrorism powers and activities entails a careful consideration from the viewpoint of civil liberties and the protection of privacy. To fight crime and its proliferation, society must develop procedures and business regulations so that criminal ventures are hard to execute. In order to prevent networking in prisons, convicts are continued to be assigned to certain departments and foreign prisoners are more often transferred to their home countries to serve out their sentences.

### **Threats linked to migratory flows**

Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings are global phenomena. Illegal immigration is rooted in social inequality, insecurity, population growth, armed conflicts, ethnic issues and in the quest for a better life. Conflict areas and countries with clearly lower standards of living compared to the west are the countries of origin of illegal immigration and more extensive migrations. During the next three decades, the earth's population will increase to 8.5 billion from the present 6.5 billion. Most of this growth occurs in developing countries. Trafficking in human beings is the fastest growing criminal activity. It is also one way for terrorists to finance their activities. Many other forms of serious cross-border crime are often linked to trafficking in human beings. Millions reside illegally within the EU and in its neighbours. As risks are being assessed, account must be taken of the fact that there are no checks at internal borders when people enter Finland from Schengen countries. The citizens of the EU's immediate neighbours as well as people from third countries, legally residing in them, constitute a major share of the illegal immigration to the territory of the Union.

Finland is both a target and a transit area of illegal immigration. The good security situation and social welfare as well as good connections to the other western countries make Finland lucrative for these purposes. As illegal immigration increases, the threat of more and more people living on the outside of society or the supervision of the authorities increases. However, no massive migratory flows that could directly jeopardize our security have taken place. Nor are they more likely in the foreseeable future.

Illegal immigration and illegal residence lay the foundations for other threats, such as the shadow economy, illegal employment and terrorism. A growing number of people, whose real identity and citizenship will never be established, continue to reside in Finland. Particularly worrisome phenomena involve the smuggling of children and the organ trade.

The strong standing of organized crime and corruption in the countries of origin and transit markedly increase organized trafficking in human beings and human smuggling, both of which jeopardize public security.

Armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing, nuclear accidents, natural disasters or seriously degraded livelihood prospects in Finland's neighbouring regions could generate a major influx of asylum seekers. An epidemic breakout could also spawn dangerous migratory flows if sufficient medical treatment was unavailable in the country of origin. A large-scale influx could also be the result of deliberate action on the part of some state. In such a case, tens of thousands of illegal asylum seekers could arrive at the border in a short period of time. Processing the applications of asylum seekers, identifying accommodation as well as organizing food and health care would significantly tie up society's resources. The border control and asylum policies of Finland's neighbouring regions play an important role in determining whether such a situation could develop. In addition, their position on reac-

cepting people having illegally transited through their own area but refused entry into Finland, matters greatly.

Illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings and human smuggling must be stopped at the EU's external borders, preferably already in the countries of origin and transit. Managed migration requires top quality permit procedures, efficient combating of illegal immigration as well as the capability to manage a large influxes of asylum seekers and their consequences.

### **Political, economic and military pressure**

Political, economic and military pressure means activity by which a state or another actor aims to influence governmental decision-making in Finland or to challenge Finland's sovereignty in order to achieve political, economic or other strategic goals which are non-negotiable or unacceptable as far as Finland is concerned. Such pressure could focus on the state leadership, the public opinion, the functioning of society or the citizens' will or capability to defend the nation. It would also partly aim to demoralize the population. The party putting on the pressure would utilize a wide range of political, economic and military instruments at its disposal in an appropriate manner. The methods of pressure would escalate or, alternatively, be simultaneously used as a coherent operation.

Political pressure may include contesting or limiting the normal cooperation and interaction between states or the preconditions of economic activity. Attempts can be made to limit Finland's international freedom of action. The pressure may also occur as a result of a conflict or a cultural clash between the EU and some other party, in conjunction with which attempts are made to influence Finland in order to weaken the Union's internal cohesion and solidarity. Should a large international interest group, be it political, religious or economic, attempt to influence Finland or Finnish actors, it could be construed as political pressure.

Economic pressure aims to impact the national economy and create uncertainty among the population. It may include embargo and sanction-related measures, such as impeding or interrupting the import of energy, raw materials and goods as well as e-commerce and financial transactions. Obtaining loans from the international finance market can be made more difficult and unjustifiable increases of debt expenses can be imposed. Finland's or Finnish companies' capabilities to procure critical goods and services from abroad may be obstructed. Furthermore, Finnish companies operating abroad may be interfered with. Vital foreign-owned companies can be regulated or closed down altogether. Transports of critical materials and relevant logistic functions can be interfered with, for instance, by restricting the availability of vessels or their access to certain sea areas or ports.

Military pressure can include violations of territorial integrity, increased military exercises and troop concentrations close to our borders, military intelligence activities, armed skirmishes and sabotage, interference in land, sea and air traffic as well as telecommunications and information operations. The pressure can also be intensified by means of asymmetric warfare.

A pressure situation requires the capability from the entire nation to forecast the situation and prepare for it, nationally and multilaterally. In order to maintain Finland's freedom of action, especially in a situation involving political and economic pressure, the functioning of the EU's structures and the possibility to depend on the Union are of invaluable importance. The preconditions of governmental security policy decision-making and economic activity must be guaranteed in all security situations. The same applies to maintaining contacts with states of special importance from Finland's viewpoint and with international actors. In order to challenge measures of economic pressure, it is of special importance to avoid one-sided energy dependency as well as to guarantee foreign trade transports and the national security of supply. A military pressure situation demands credible defence capabilities from the Defence Forces even in normal conditions as well as the ability to flexibly and proactively regulate readiness. The nation's defence capability and defence will

are demonstrated by mobilizing the required troops and by protecting society's vital functions. This raises the threshold against the use of military force on Finland.

### **The use of military force**

Political, economic or military pressure against Finland may continue with a swift military operation if the party exerting pressure on Finland has not reached its vital objectives by other means.

The use of military force may begin with a strategic attack if the adversary believes that such an attack will be sufficiently successful. The strike aims to force the state leadership to make the desired decisions by crippling vital systems, targets and functions in society and the defence system. Possible military targets include the integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control system as well as air and naval defences, airfields and ports. A strategic attack may include the disruption of air and sea traffic. It can be a single-service or a joint operation, involving long-range weapon systems and special forces. Information operations constitute an integral element of the activities.

A strategic strike is especially suited to bringing a highly advanced society to its knees. Society's increasing vulnerability creates favourable conditions for a strategic strike. When a strike is being considered, key success factors include the functioning of the political decision-making system, the leaders' resolve and the population's crisis tolerance.

Strategic attacks typically involve normal and precision-guided air-to-ground weapons, cruise and artillery missiles, electronic warfare using, for instance, jamming, information system intrusions as well as electronic weapon systems and special forces. Information warfare, such as psychological operations and propaganda, support the goals of the strike. Limited ground operations using troops in high-readiness are possible, especially, when the defender is unprepared for such operations. Weapons of mass destruction can also be used in the strategic strike.

An attack aimed at seizing territory can begin with a strategic strike, continued by intensive use of force involving all services. It would be aimed directly at targets and functions vital for defence, endeavouring to seize key areas from the viewpoint of the war's ultimate goal. An attempt to break the backbone of the defence will use as wide a range of instruments as possible. The objective would be pursued by the combined impact of information warfare, special forces and sabotage, long-range precision weapons and a ground attack, and by isolating the country internationally. Achieving this goal does not necessarily require seizing extensive land areas or annihilating the entire armed forces of the defender. It takes months to prepare for an operation more extensive than a strategic strike.

Preventing the use of military force requires the maintenance of defence capabilities already in normal conditions and, when threatened by an attack, demonstrating defence capability by raising defence readiness to a sufficiently high level. Repelling the use of military force always requires sufficient additional powers and resources, partial or full mobilization as well as assistance from other authorities.

## ANNEX 2: PREPAREDNESS FOR SPECIAL SITUATIONS

Ministries are responsible for overall preparedness regarding special situations and they designate relevant responsibilities to their subordinate government agencies. Administrative sectors' branches have already drawn up contingency plans for many special situations. Existing plans are updated and new ones are prepared, as required. As special situations are prepared for, at least the following entities must be taken into consideration:

- The basic plan to prepare for and manage a special situation, such as:
  - information gathering,
  - compiling and disseminating the situation picture,
  - prevention,
  - preparing for situation management, including advance preparations,
  - crisis management, and
  - communications.
- Threat analysis.
- Implementation of the key tasks, such as
  - necessary measures,
  - specifying responsibilities,
  - resources available,
  - preconditions for operation, and
  - the statutory base.
- Coordination assessment, such as
  - intersectoral cooperation, and
  - cooperation with the rest of society.
- Updating plans, preparedness training and readiness exercises.

The following table lists the special situations, considered crucial in the threat scenarios. They have to be taken into consideration in ministries' preparedness measures, at the very least. **Ministries' preparedness obligations include, but are not limited to, the special situations. Ministries have to prepare for all estimated risks and threats within their purview.**

The column "competent ministry" indicates the ministry primarily in charge of preparedness for the given special situation. This ministry is also responsible for required coordination of measures with other ministries. When evident, ministries supporting the competent ministry are also listed.

The listing of responsibilities does not mention organizations subordinate to ministries or Parliament, or any other organizations for that matter. Instead, the basic premise is that as far as the responsibility for drafting legislation is concerned, all organizations operate within the purview of a ministry.

THREAT SCENARIOS AND ASSOCIATED SPECIAL SITUATIONS	COMPETENT MINISTRY and supporting ministries
<p><b>A disturbance in the electricity grid</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Extensive damage or malfunction in open ICT systems</li> <li>- Extensive damage or malfunction in government authorities' ICT systems</li> <li>- An extensive malfunction in the electronic media's technical systems</li> <li>- A major disturbance in the electricity grid</li> </ul>	<p><u>MTC</u><sup>5</sup> <u>MOF</u><sup>6</sup>, MTC <u>MTC</u> <u>MTI</u><sup>7</sup></p>
<p><b>A serious disturbance affecting the health and income security of the population</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The collapse of social protection financing</li> <li>- A serious disruption in the social insurance service network</li> <li>- A pandemic or other widespread outbreak of serious infectious disease</li> <li>- Difficulties in obtaining pharmaceuticals and other health care supplies</li> <li>- Health threats caused by a serious nuclear accident or other hazardous substances</li> <li>- A serious disruption in water utilities</li> <li>- Widespread contamination of drinking water</li> </ul>	<p><u>MSAH</u><sup>8</sup>, MOF <u>MSAH</u> <u>MSAH</u>, MAF<sup>9</sup> <u>MSAH</u>, MAF, MTI <u>MSAH</u>, MOI<sup>10</sup>, MAF  <u>MAF</u>, MSAH, MOE<sup>11</sup> <u>MSAH</u>, MAF, MOE</p>
<p><b>A serious disturbance in the functioning of the economy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A malfunction in international and domestic payment systems</li> <li>- A significant disruption in the financial market</li> <li>- A problem in government liquidity</li> <li>- Disruption in foreign trade</li> <li>- Disruption of sea transports</li> <li>- Disruption in electric power supply and fuel imports</li> <li>- Disruptions in obtaining critical raw materials or other production inputs</li> <li>- A serious disturbance in the supply of daily consumer goods</li> <li>- A serious animal or plant disease outbreak or an extensive compromise of food safety</li> <li>- Declining conditions in primary production</li> </ul>	<p><u>MOF</u> <u>MOF</u> <u>MOF</u> <u>MFA</u><sup>12</sup>, MOF, MAF, MTI, MSAH <u>MTC</u>, MTI <u>MTI</u>, MAF <u>MTI</u> <u>MTI</u>, MTC, MAF, <u>MAF</u>, MSAH  <u>MAF</u>, MTC</p>
<p><b>Major accidents and natural disasters</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A nuclear accident in Finland or in the near environs</li> <li>- A serious accident involving hazardous substances</li> <li>- Storms, floods or dam failures requiring evacuations or causing extensive destruction</li> <li>- An explosion, fire, other serious deed or accident</li> <li>- A serious aviation accident</li> <li>- An accident in passenger railway traffic or a major road accident</li> <li>- A passenger ship accident</li> <li>- A major accident abroad involving Finns in the area</li> </ul>	<p><u>MOI</u>, MSAH, MOE <u>MOI</u>, MSAH, MTI, MTC, MOE <u>MOI</u>, MAF, MOE, MTI, MTC  <u>MOI</u>, MSAH, MOD<sup>13</sup> <u>MOI</u>, MTC <u>MOI</u>, MTC <u>MOI</u>, MTC <u>MFA</u>, MOI, MSAH, MTC</p>

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Transport and Communications

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Finance

<sup>7</sup> Ministry of Trade and Industry

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Social Affairs and Health

<sup>9</sup> Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

<sup>10</sup> Ministry of the Interior

<sup>11</sup> Ministry of the Environment

<sup>12</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs

<p><b>Environmental threats</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Heavy metal or chemical concentrations contents rising above approved limits for health</li> <li>- Total contamination of soil and waters to make them unfit for use</li> <li>- Oil and chemical transport accidents in sea areas and inland waters</li> <li>- Long-distance fallout of airborne pollutants causing destruction of forests</li> <li>- Radioactive fallout</li> <li>- Mass extinction of species</li> </ul>	<p><u>MOE</u>, MAF, MSAH  <u>MOE</u>, MAF, MSAH  <u>MOE</u>, MOI, MAF, MSAH, MTC  <u>MOE</u>, MAF  <u>MSAH</u>, MOE, MOI, MAF, MTC  <u>MOE</u>, MAF</p>
<p><b>Terrorism as well as organized and other serious crime</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A terrorist attack or the threat of one in Finland</li> <li>- A terrorist attack in Finland or affecting Finns or a concrete threat of one abroad</li> <li>- Serious crimes threatened or committed against senior government officials, prominent institutions or companies</li> <li>- A serious disturbance of public order and security</li> <li>- A major compromise of border security</li> <li>- Hijacking of a public transportation vehicle</li> <li>- Violent clashes between criminal gangs</li> <li>- Violence directed at the authorities and witnesses</li> </ul>	<p><u>MOI</u>, MOJ<sup>14</sup>  <u>MFA</u>, MOI  <u>MOI</u>  <u>MOI</u>  <u>MOI</u>  <u>MOI</u>, MTC  <u>MOI</u>  <u>MOI</u>, MOJ</p>
<p><b>Threats linked to migratory flows</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A major compromise of border security</li> <li>- A large-scale influx of asylum seekers</li> </ul>	<p><u>MOI</u>  <u>MOI</u>, MOL<sup>15</sup>, MFA, MSAH</p>
<p><b>Political, economic and military pressure</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A deliberate attempt to adversely influence decision-making, public opinion or the will to defend the nation</li> <li>- Interfering with land, sea and air traffic and telecommunications</li> <li>- Deliberately leading a migration to Finland</li> <li>- Supporting organized crime that operates in Finland</li> <li>- Causing damage to nuclear power plants and other sources of energy</li> <li>- Cutting off energy supplies</li> <li>- Paralysing e-trading and payments</li> <li>- Territorial violations on land, at sea and in the air</li> <li>- Military exercises and troop concentrations close to the border</li> <li>- Increased military intelligence</li> <li>- Military interference directed at air and sea traffic</li> <li>- Military interference directed at IT systems</li> <li>- Bringing the capability of using WMDs to the table</li> <li>- Armed skirmishes, including special forces and sabotage</li> </ul>	<p><u>PMO</u><sup>16</sup>, MOEd<sup>17</sup>, MOD, MFA  <u>MTC</u>, MTI, MOD, MOI  <u>MOI</u>, MOL, MFA  <u>MOI</u>  <u>MOI</u>, MTI, MFA  <u>MTI</u>, MFA  <u>MTI</u>, MOF  <u>MOD</u>, MFA, MOI  <u>MOD</u>, MFA, MOI  <u>MOD</u>, MOI  <u>MOD</u>, MOI, MFA, MTC  <u>MOD</u>, MTC  <u>MOD</u>, MFA  <u>MOD</u>, MOI</p>
<p><b>The use of military force</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A strategic strike</li> <li>- An attack to seize territory</li> </ul>	<p><u>MOD</u>  <u>MOD</u></p>

<sup>13</sup> Ministry of Defence

<sup>14</sup> Ministry of Justice

<sup>15</sup> Ministry of Labour

<sup>16</sup> Prime Minister's Office

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Education

### ANNEX 3: STRATEGIC TASKS OF THE MINISTRIES

THE STRATEGIC TASKS	COMPETENT MINISTRY	PAGE
<b>Management of government affairs</b>		
1. Guaranteeing the proper functioning of the Government	<u>PMO</u>	26
2. National coordination of preparing and handling issues relating to the European Union	<u>PMO</u>	26
3. Functioning of Government communications	<u>PMO</u>	27
4. Maintaining a situation picture	<u>MOJ</u>	27
5. Guaranteeing the rule of law	<u>MOJ</u>	27
6. Holding elections		
<b>International activity</b>		
7. Maintaining contacts to foreign states, to the bodies of the European Union and other key international actors	<u>MFA</u>	27
8. Protecting and assisting Finnish citizens abroad	<u>MFA</u>	28
9. Safeguarding Finland's foreign trade	<u>MFA</u>	28
<b>National military defence</b>		
10. Preventing and repelling military threats	<u>MOD</u>	29
11. Maintaining a military/strategic situation picture	<u>MOD</u>	29
12. Surveillance and protection of territorial integrity	<u>MOD</u>	30
13. Supporting society and other authorities	<u>MOD</u>	30
14. International military crisis management	<u>MOD</u>	30
<b>Internal security</b>		
15. Maintaining an internal security situation picture	<u>MOI</u>	31
16. Guaranteeing the functioning of the law enforcement system	<u>MOJ</u>	31
17. Public order and security	<u>MOI</u>	31
18. Emergency services and maritime search and rescue	<u>MOI</u>	32
19. Civil defence	<u>MOI</u>	33
20. Flood risk management and dam safety	<u>MAF</u>	33
21. Oil and chemical spills at sea	<u>MOE</u>	33
22. Border management	<u>MOI</u>	34
23. Immigration control	<u>MOI</u>	34
24. Controlling a major influx of asylum seekers	<u>MOL</u>	35
25. International disaster response	<u>MOI</u>	35
26. Civilian crisis management	<u>MOI</u>	35

<b>A well-functioning economy and infrastructure</b>		<b>PAGE</b>
27. Acquiring and allocating financial resources	<u>MOF</u>	36
28. The financial system and money supply	<u>MOF</u>	36
29. The insurance business	<u>MSAH</u>	36
30. Fuel supply	<u>MTI</u>	37
31. Power supply	<u>MTI</u>	37
32. Electronic ICT systems	<u>MTC</u>	37
33. Central government ICT systems	<u>MOF</u>	38
34. Constructing and maintaining warning and alarm systems	<u>MTC</u>	38
35. Guaranteeing the continuation of transports	<u>MTC</u>	38
36. Safeguarding the primary production of food supply	<u>MAF</u>	39
37. Guaranteeing the water supply	<u>MAF</u>	39
38. Guaranteeing the processing and distribution of food	<u>MTI</u>	40
39. Safeguarding the vital industry and services	<u>MTI</u>	40
40. Guaranteeing housing	<u>MOE</u>	40
41. Guaranteeing sufficient labour force	<u>MOL</u>	40
42. Upholding the education and research system	<u>MOEd</u>	41
43. Detecting changes in the environment and adapting to them	<u>MOE</u>	41
<b>The population's income security and capability to function</b>		
44. Guaranteeing income security	<u>MSAH</u>	41
45. Maintaining the social and health service system	<u>MSAH</u>	42
46. Guaranteeing the availability of medical supplies and equipment	<u>MSAH</u>	42
47. Maintaining systems that detect, supervise and manage system of health threats	<u>MSAH</u>	43
<b>Psychological crisis tolerance</b>		
48. Maintaining the education system	<u>MOEd</u>	44
49. Cultural identity and cultural heritage	<u>MOEd</u>	45
50. Guaranteeing religious services	<u>MOEd</u>	45



## ANNEX 4: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

- Border management** Measures implemented at home and abroad aimed at preventing violation of provisions concerning the crossing of the nation's borders on land or at sea, countering threats to public order and security arising from passenger traffic at borders and guaranteeing the safety of border traffic.
- Border management system** All measures encompassing the various levels of policy, legislation, cooperation, burden sharing, personnel, equipment and technology, which the member states' competent authorities carry out in cooperation with each other and, when necessary, with other actors. The system taps into, among other things, the EU's four-tier border security model and utilizes common integrated risk analysis in order to guarantee uniform and high-quality external border controls and smooth border traffic.
- Defence system** The Defence Forces' defence system comprises a command and control system, intelligence and surveillance system, a readiness management system, a logistics system and a troop structure system, i.e. army, navy and air force command echelons and units.
- Emergency services** An entity that encompasses the prevention of accidents, rescue activities and civil defence. Rescue activities consist of urgent tasks in response to during an accident or the risk of an accident carried out to save people and/or property, to limit damage and to mitigate the consequences. Rescue activities are also implemented in situations involving comparable deliberate harm or the threat of it. Civil defence refers to the protection of people and property and the carrying out of rescue services in emergency conditions. It also refers to preparedness for these tasks.
- The EU's emergency and crisis coordination arrangement** The EU's common crisis management system and model for dealing with cross-border crises (Integrated EU Crisis Management Arrangements). It is based on the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. responding to emergencies is primarily a matter for Member States, whose national competence is fully respected. These arrangements come into operation in emergencies within or outside the EU requiring political coordination when:
- the situation directly affects several member states or requires action at EU level,
  - the situation simultaneously involves several member states, or
  - the situation affects the interests of several member states and concerns areas for which EU bodies are competent.
- Focus area** A vital function, a part thereof or a relevant strategic task included in the Resolution which receives special attention by being prioritized it temporally or functionally, or the implementation of which is a prerequisite for several other functions. The monitoring of the implementation of the Resolution concentrates on focus areas.

<b>Independent preparedness</b>	Property owners and occupants as well as business and industrial entrepreneurs, government agencies and other organizations are required to prevent dangers and take proper precautions to protect persons, property and the environment as well as prepare for such rescue activities as they are independently capable of performing.
<b>Information security</b>	Information security refers to the administrative, technical and other measures that protect and secure information, services, systems and telecommunications and manage their risks in all security situations. Information security is also a condition, in which threats against the confidentiality and integrity of information, information systems and telecommunications security do not pose a significant risk.
<b>Internal security</b>	The state of affairs existing society when the judicial system guarantees rights and freedoms for all and people have no cause fear crime or disturbances, or feel insecure about events and changes in Finnish society or in an increasingly internationalizing world.
<b>Major accident</b>	An accident which is considered to be especially serious because of the number of killed or injured persons, damage to the environment or property, or the nature of the accident.
<b>A major influx of asylum seekers</b>	A situation in which the number of asylum seekers is so large that it becomes impossible to process and register them by the means normally available. The situation may arise as a result of a massive refugee crisis or deliberate action by some state.
<b>Maritime search and rescue</b>	An entity comprising search and rescue (SAR) operations needed to help those in distress at sea, the administration of first aid as well as emergency radio communications. In addition to SAR operations resulting from accidents, maritime SAR also deals with sudden illnesses at sea and other comparable rescue situations.
<b>Massive refugee crisis exodus</b>	A large-scale influx of asylum seekers during which large numbers of people have had to abandon their home or country of permanent residence without the possibility of returning because of armed conflict, other violence or an environmental disaster.
<b>Preparedness</b>	All measures implemented to guarantee that tasks can be carried out with minimal disruption in all security situations. These measures include, among other things, contingency planning, advance preparations and preparedness exercises.
<b>Preserving the rule of law</b>	Safeguarding the sovereignty of the state as laid down in the Constitution, abiding by the principle of democracy and the exercise of public powers in accordance with the law in all situations. The aim is to guarantee the people's statutory rights and obligations. With regard to national sovereignty and protection of the rights of the individual., autonomy in the exercise of public powers is especially important in a crisis. All authorities

responsible for internal security, the judiciary and enforcement must adhere to the rule of law.

### **Prevention**

A range of measures and tasks required for maintaining and developing capabilities for the purpose of preventing, sheltering from, responding to and recovering from special situations. Prevention is a continuous process of ongoing measures aiming to mitigate threats and risks, their probability and consequences.

### **Public order and security**

Public order and security encompasses all police activities intended to create and uphold a safe and pleasant living and working environment for the members of society, to combat and prevent violations of justice and disorderly conduct as well as to eliminate disturbances and to solve the violations of justice. Prevention, in the wider sense, embraces crime prevention in its entirety.

### **Security of supply**

The capacity to maintain the basic activities that are indispensable for safeguarding the population's living conditions, for sustaining the functioning of critical infrastructures, and the material preconditions for maintaining national preparedness and defence in case of serious disturbances and emergency situations.

### **Security situation**

A situation in society which varies according to the threat level. Security situations include normal conditions, abnormal conditions and emergency conditions.

Normal conditions constitute an everyday situation, in which threats can be prevented, combated and recovered from by using regular statutes and resources. Arrangements in normal conditions lay the foundation for activities in abnormal and emergency conditions.

Abnormal conditions refer to anomalous, unexpected or sudden changes in the security situation which may jeopardize the functioning of society and the security of the population. The situation may require special measures implemented by the state leadership and the authorities. Abnormal conditions may require the review of enactments.

Emergency conditions involve situations, laid down in the Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act, in which the authorities are no longer able to control the situation by regular powers or resources.

### **Serious crime**

An individual aggravated offence, a widespread series of crimes or crimes committed by professional and habitual criminals or organized criminal groups. Serious crime investigation focuses on a person, a group of persons or a community suspected of planning, preparing or committing a serious crime, aiding and abetting a serious crime or having previously done so, and whose aim is to accrue significant unlawful, individual, societal or economic gains or to cause notable property damage.

### **Situation picture**

The situation picture refers to the situational awareness of decision-makers and their assistants regarding events, contributing circumstances, the aims of various parties and further development perspectives. The

creation and maintenance of a situation picture is promoted by gathering and presenting information in a practical format, such as pictures, texts and diagrams.

<b>Special situation</b>	A sudden or unexpected threat or event in normal or emergency conditions which may jeopardize the security of society or the livelihood of the population, and which may require non-standard management and communications.
<b>Strategic task</b>	A task assigned to a ministry in the Resolution which is indispensable for the securing of society's vital functions in all situations. Each ministry will carry out its strategic tasks as part of its normal operating and financial planning process and implementation thereof.
<b>Terrorism</b>	A criminal is deemed to have terrorist intentions aim if (s)he intends to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- instil widespread fear among the population,</li> <li>- unlawfully force a government, another state authority or international organization to do or not do something, or to tolerate something,</li> <li>- unlawfully overthrow or change a state's constitution, seriously disrupt the state's judicial system, cause grave harm to the national economy or to the foundations of society, or</li> <li>- seriously damage the economy or other basic structures of an international organization.</li> </ul>
<b>Threat assessment</b>	A competent authority's assessment, based on a threat scenario and regarding the tasks and special situations the authority is responsible for. The assessment tangibly describes the origin of the threat, target, method of implementation, probability, effects on the authority's tasks as well as response options and the time required for advance preparations.
<b>Threat scenario</b>	A general description of abnormalities in the security environment which, upon materializing, possibly impinge on national sovereignty as well as the livelihood and security of the population. A threat scenario describes the threat's characteristics, the mechanism, origin, target, effect at target and probability. It also lists the most serious associated special situations.
<b>Total defence</b>	All of the military and civil functions by which Finland's sovereignty and the livelihood and security of its citizens are safeguarded against threats by other nations or other external threats. <p>Coordination of total defence involves coordinating the measures of the public sector, i.e. the Government, state authorities and municipalities, the private sector and voluntary activities by citizens to maintain the functions vital to society under all situations.</p>
<b>Vital function</b>	The collective term for measures vital to the functioning of society. Securing the functions vital to society, helps maintain national sovereignty, security in society as well as the livelihood of the population. Functions vital to society are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- management of state affairs,</li> <li>- international activity,</li> <li>- national military defence,</li> </ul>

- internal security,
- the functioning of the economy and infrastructure,
- the population's income security and capability to function, and
- psychological crisis tolerance.