SECTION IV: PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND COMBATING THREATS TO SOCIETY
1. BACKGROUND
Finland's precautionary measures, based on the concept of total national defence, have proved to be both effective and appropriate. The increasing inter-dependence between the various sectors of society makes it essential that precautionary measures are based on extensive collaboration. Precautionary measures must also take the growing international dimension into account.
Finland's membership of the European Union and its increasing interaction with the world at large have improved the capacity of Finnish society to tolerate a crisis. In disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances, Finland can draw upon operational means and resources available as a result of international cooperation, complementing and supporting Finland's own arrangements. At the national level, Finland must continue to ensure that society as a whole - not only public authorities but also private individuals and businesses - can function under all circumstances.
Society takes precautionary measures for exceptional circumstances and for various disruptive situations arising under normal circumstances. The aim is to prevent the emergence of situations that could undermine the functioning of society and to create mechanisms for managing such situations and their consequences. In times of exceptional circumstances, the livelihood of the population and the national economy is safeguarded, the rule of law maintained and the territorial integrity and independence of the country ensured.
Exceptional circumstances are defined in the Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act. Exceptional circumstances include a war between foreign countries, a threat of war or actual war involving Finland, an economic crisis, a major disaster, or a significant event outside Finland's borders if it poses a serious threat to the nation's existence and its well-being as defined in the Emergency Powers Act.
In 2000, the Emergency Powers Act was amended to include among exceptional circumstances a state of significant international tension tantamount to threat of war and requiring immediate action to improve Finland's defence capability. This provision is consistent with the definition of 'crisis' in Article 297 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Defence capability as defined in the Emergency Powers Act encompasses all actions and activities of the various sectors of society that are necessary in exceptional circumstances.
Disruptive situations occurring under normal circumstances may be equivalent, in terms of their impact, to exceptional circumstances. While special powers of authority can be invoked in exceptional circumstances under the Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act, normal powers of authority are applied in disruptive situations.
Disruptive situations are amongst the threats defined under the broad concept of security. Other threats include infectious diseases spread as a result of increased mobility, information threats spread through information networks, threats aimed at electronic communications and information systems, the increase in international organized crime, terrorism, changes in the environment, major disasters and sudden, large-scale population movements caused by crisis situations.
In recent years, threats involving the increased use of technology and networking in society and the economy have been highlighted. Such uses are increasingly dependent on integrated systems. The use of information technology has grown significantly. Logistical systems have become more complicated, and their management requires information systems to operate without disruption. Almost all functions in society are dependent on the availability of energy. The vulnerability of the technical infrastructure of society has increased. Disruptions can cause considerable harm to the functions of society.
Under the Emergency Powers Act, public authorities are required to take precautionary measures to ensure the execution of their duties with minimum disruption, even in exceptional circumstances. Precautionary measures are directed, supervised and coordinated by the Government and by each ministry for its particular sector. Businesses essential for exceptional circumstances also undertake contingency planning to ensure the crisis tolerance of society.
The Defence Council issued instructions for contingency planning in 1999, in the directive 'Contingency planning for disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances in society'. The basic guidelines for precautionary measures contained therein are still valid.
On March 1, 2000, the duties of the Defence Council were divided between the Government's Foreign and Security Policy Committee, the Ministry of Defence and the Security and Defence Committee. Coordinating the tasks of public administration related to total national defence is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. The Security and Defence Committee assists the Ministry of Defence and the Government's Foreign and Security Policy Committee.
Total national defence includes military defence, economic defence, civil defence, social welfare and health care, functioning of technical systems in society, public order and security, and defence information activity. Total national defence is supported by a wide array of voluntary non-governmental, cultural and educational work. The needs of various sectors and the actions to be taken in exceptional circumstances are coordinated under the planning principles of total national defence.
Precautionary measures are implemented as a whole. This ensures a common basis for action in the different sectors of society in order to increase the degree of readiness flexibly and to rapidly respond to the requirements of each particular situation. Precautionary measures also contribute to the capabilities of international civilian crisis management.
In disruptive or crisis situations the organizations and activities of the various sectors of society will be changed as little as possible, and new organizations will be established only when absolutely necessary.
2. INTERNAL SECURITY
2.1 Public order and security
The field of activity of authorities involved in internal security, particularly the police, will be affected during any period of exceptional circumstances at an early stage. Significant changes in priorities will take place in the maintenance of public order and security. Offences related to rationing and property crimes as well as acts of terrorism and vandalism will require a review of police priorities. The police will focus their resources on fighting the most serious crimes against society and individuals.
A crisis in Finland's adjacent areas may lead to the Ministry of the Interior having to assume a significant responsibility for large-scale migration to Finland, together with the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The police and other internal security authorities will in future be more closely involved in precautionary measures alongside the traditional military precautionary measures.
The police have a reserve personnel on which they may draw in order to manage the increased tasks in times of exceptional circumstances. The reserve is largely sufficient, and continuing recruitment is practised to ensure the availability of such personnel. The training system takes into account the needs of total national defence. The police reserve will be engaged by decision of the Government.
The police will protect, either independently or together with the Defence Forces, locations essential to the functioning of society and its administration. The private security sector will support the police during exceptional circumstances, especially in the protection of trade and industry locations. Protection of such locations will be brought up to date to meet present security threats. Available resources will be explored and cooperation between the different parties involved will be increased.
The police are actively participating in international cooperation on crime prevention. Nordic cooperation has intensified. Other important partners include Russia, the Baltic States and other countries bordering on the Baltic Sea. Cooperation between the internal and justice authorities of EU Member States will deepen and will become more concrete, based on the decisions taken at the Tampere European council in 1999. Certain practical projects related to the EU'S Europol police cooperation, and cooperation between authorities based on the Schengen Agreement are also aimed at improving crime prevention. Key areas include common threat assessments, planning of operations, making information systems compatible and exchanging information.
The increase in drug-related crime, a by-product of growing international interaction, is, in turn, raising the level of property crime and violent crime. Increasingly, organized and international crime is also involved. These changes will require more cooperation between the police and other security authorities, and additional resources, particularly during exceptional circumstances.
In combating terrorism, Finland emphasizes international cooperation and respect for human rights. Important instruments in this work are the thirteen international anti-terrorism agreements drawn up within the UN, of which Finland has ratified ten. Particular attention is being paid to preventing the funding of terrorism, and preparations for ratifying the 1999 convention on this matter are underway in Finland. The various international disarmament and arms control agreements are also relevant to combating terrorism, and their enforcement should be made more effective.
The EU aims at more visible and integrated action in combating terrorism and includes anti-terrorism on the agenda in its cooperation with other countries. The G8 countries have also proposed several anti-terrorism initiatives.
2.2 Protecting the population
Protection of the population during exceptional circumstances will take the form of emergency shelters, other protective structures or evacuation. Civil defence measures undertaken during a military crisis must be based on the same planning principles as military defence.
The estimated total capacity of emergency shelters is sufficient for over three million people. Capacity for an average of 80,000 people has been constructed annually. The need and the construction requirements for emergency shelters were last assessed in detail in the early 1980s. A new assessment will be carried out under the Ministry of the Interior.
Readiness for rapid evacuation anywhere in the country must be maintained and planning made more flexible. It is not necessary to determine in advance the receiving municipalities, but all municipalities must have the capacity to house evacuees. More detailed plans should be prepared for areas/regions where risk analysis shows this to be necessary. Evacuation procedures must include transfer of materials and service functions required to safeguard people's living conditions.
The most demanding situation for civil defence, apart from war, is a nuclear accident. Finland has a comprehensive radiation monitoring system. Laboratory functions for processing samples must be further developed.
Despite international agreements, biological and chemical weapons remain a threat to be taken into account, particularly regarding terrorist actions but also in military operations. Threat assessments will be kept up to date, and monitoring and protection systems will be revised accordingly.
Finland has ratified the international agreements restricting the manufacture and use of biological and chemical weapons and participates in monitoring the enforcement of these agreements.
Warning systems and systems required to make an assessment of a situation and to convey the information to others, are essential for civil defence arrangements. These systems will be improved, and they must be sufficiently compatible with the systems of other key authorities in times of exceptional circumstances.
Thirteen state emergency centres will be set up by the beginning of 2006 to handle reception of emergency calls and alarm duties related to fire and rescue services, police, and health and social welfare. These centres must be able to operate in exceptional circumstances. The centres must be placed in protected locations.
The concentration of the population in urban areas and the changes in the age structure will influence accident risks and will also have an impact on the need for and the organization of fire and rescue services.
In order to develop fire and rescue services, there are plans to set up about 20 fire and rescue regions in Finland based on the statutory cooperation between municipalities. The regions must have sufficient resources for providing and operating services even in the event of a major disaster.
The fact that different authorities have their own separate communications systems has made cooperation difficult. The joint communications network for public authorities (VIRVE) now being introduced will remove this problem within a few years.
Finland must have the capability to receive international assistance in the event of a major disaster if its own resources prove insufficient. Finland will also make arrangements to provide necessary assistance. The UN plays a central role in coordinating aid in disaster situations. Rescue services development projects involving several member states are organized and funded within the framework of the EU fire and rescue services action plan. Finland has mutual assistance agreements for fire and rescue services with the other Nordic countries, as well as Estonia and Russia.
Finland is engaged in nuclear safety cooperation with Russia based on the neighbouring areas cooperation agreement of 1992 and the cooperation protocols negotiated on the basis of the agreement.
Finland is a member of the Nuclear Safety Account and the expert group of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD). The EU has a major ongoing nuclear safety cooperation programme with Russia.
2.3 Border surveillance and movement of people
The Finnish Frontier Guard will continue to monitor all Finland's borders and participate in the defence of the nation. The defence planning and preparations of the Frontier Guard are undertaken in cooperation with the Defence Forces. The military order maintained in the Frontier Guard guarantees sufficient capability to react even to rapidly emerging situations.
Following application of the Schengen Agreement, regular border checks at EU's internal borders will be discontinued. However, this does not mean that border surveillance at internal borders will end, or that the requirements to safeguard the territorial integrity of Finland will be relaxed. The discontinuing of border checks at internal borders will require close national and international cooperation between internal security authorities. Sufficient immigrant controls must also be in place at internal borders.
The Schengen provisions allow internal border checks to be reinstated if public order or national security of a Member State so dictate. Finland must maintain the capability to do this at all internal borders.
Border checks on traffic across external borders will continue at the checkpoints on Finland's eastern border, at international airports and at ports. In order to maintain Finland's internal security, external borders must be controlled credibly and in keeping with the requirements of the European Union.
Finnish border policy takes into account the evolving EU legislation on justice and internal affairs. The Frontier Guard is participating actively in the development of standards regulating external border controls in the EU. The aim is to develop a border surveillance model for those Member States with an EU external border, that will allow for enlargement of the EU without weakening its internal security.
Finland's position as an important centre of business in the Northern Dimension of the EU and the Baltic region requires that the infrastructure at the major checkpoints between Finland and Russia should allow for a smooth flow of traffic across the border. At the same time, the side effects of increased traffic should not be allowed to endanger Finland's internal security. To prevent and combat these effects, exhaustive border checks augmented with technical tools are being instituted.
In bilateral cooperation, the most important area is Russia. In cooperation with the Russian Frontier Guard efforts are made to safeguard good order on the border under all circumstances.
Routes for illegal immigration from Russia and other CIS countries to Central Europe are being closed off due to improved border control in the Baltic States and countries in eastern Central Europe. Consequently, the threat of illegal immigration to Finland is growing. This threat is further augmented by Russia's plans to transfer border surveillance resources to its southern borders, at the cost of the Finnish border. Changes in the operating environment are taken into account in Finland's border surveillance system.
Although the probability of mass migration to Finland remains low, Finland must continue to be prepared for it. Mass migration may be triggered by armed conflict, a nuclear accident, a natural disaster or a serious decline in living conditions in neighbouring areas.
Shipping in the Gulf of Finland is expected to increase significantly. The growth in the transport of oil products together with frequent passenger traffic across the Gulf of Finland increases the risk of a disaster. Finland is seeking to improve maritime safety in cooperation with the other countries bordering on the Gulf of Finland, and also with the Baltic Sea countries in general. Mutually compatible surveillance control procedures can also promote internal security.
Finland's aliens policy is based on openness, internationalization, human rights, good governance and legal protection, and on preventing illegal immigration.
Assistance to source and transit countries can be used to promote voluntary repatriation and to help respective authorities strengthen their capacity to efficiently combat trafficking in human beings.
EThe high-level immigration and asylum working group of the Council of the European Union has drawn up action plans covering a number of countries, to deal with the issue of immigration to the EU. In immigration and asylum matters, Finland is also participating in the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Inter-Governmental Consultations for Asylum organization (IGC), the 'Budapest group' and the Council of Europe.
3. SECURITY OF SUPPLIES
3.1 Effects of the operating environment
Extensive integration in recent years has changed Finland's operating environment in both commercial product and financial markets. The development of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is strengthening Finland's position, for instance through the stability brought by a common foreign currency. Finnish legislation does not give sufficient authority to regulate the financial markets during times of exceptional circumstances.
Telecommunications and information system security is increasingly important to the uninterrupted operation of various sectors in society. Other changes include the deregulation of previously highly regulated markets, stiffening cross-border competition, the depletion of national product, raw material and spare parts stockpiles, and increased dependence on foreign product and service suppliers. Networking has increased, and logistical systems have changed.
Internationalization and the changing structure of trade and industry affect the security of supplies and the range of means available for safeguarding this. Ability to ensure security of supplies using purely national measures has decreased. In a crisis, Finland can be self-sufficient only to a limited extent. Traditional basic supplies such as food, energy and health care can be secured using national substitution measures. Only in exceptional circumstances, is it possible or expedient to take supporting measures to maintain or safeguard critical production.
On the other hand, the need for national arrangements to safeguard security of supplies has decreased, because internationalization allows Finland to draw upon the resources of the EU and its Member States. Finland's national security of supplies is supplemented by the International Energy Programme (IEP) agreement and bilateral arrangements with Sweden and Norway, for example. Further bilateral and multilateral international agreements to ensure security of supplies will be sought, at the inter-governmental level and also between companies.
Improving security of supplies in the European Union
The European Union has not developed any joint arrangements to ensure security of supplies in a major crisis. Indeed, security of supplies as such does not fall within the competence of the EU. However, rapid technical and economic development and increasing integration in various sectors are creating a growing need to make common progress amongst EU Member States in the area of security of supplies. The concept of security of supplies is not defined similarly in other EU Member States in substance or extent.
Finland has considered security of supplies to form part of a broader concept of security under the EU common foreign and security policy and has maintained that cooperation over security of supplies should be developed within the various policy sectors of the EU. At Finland's initiative, the Nice European Council decided to request the European Commission to undertake a fundamental review of the EU's security of supplies, together with the Council secretariat, and to determine the scope for cooperation in this area.
3.2 Revising the decision on the aims of ensuring security of supplies
In 1995, the Finnish Government confirmed the aims of ensuring security of supplies. The aim is to safeguard independent access to economic supplies based on national measures and resources in the event of disruptive situations and crises.
In order to safeguard security of supplies under all circumstances, sufficient readiness for producing commodities and for controlling production, distribution, consumption and foreign trade must be established and maintained.
In the preamble to the decision on security of supplies, it is emphasized that Finland's security of supplies must be developed and maintained at a more comprehensive level than in other countries, due to its geostrategic position, the openness and structure of its national economy, the vulnerability of shipping and the country's northern climate. No significant change has since occurred in these basic factors.
The decision stipulates that precautionary measures should generally allow for a crisis situation lasting twelve months during which Finland's ability to produce and import products and services critical for security of supplies would be significantly impaired. The requirements imposed by a state of national defence are also taken into account in determining the level of security of access to supplies. These general bases for precautionary measures remain justified.
The target sectors for security of supplies as defined in the decision are those considered essential to the functioning of society. Changes in the operating environment and technology require that special precautionary measures to increase security of supplies must continue to be implemented in these sectors.
Changes in the operating environment will affect the content, priorities and scale of the target sectors involved in security of supplies. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has begun preparations to update the Government decision on the aims of securing security of supplies.
3.3 Food supply
The aim of ensuring security of food supplies is to maintain sufficient domestic production of basic foodstuffs, domestic processing capacity in the food industry and well-functioning commercial distribution systems.
Sufficient reserve stocks of grain, seed grain, seeds for forage crops and other production input materials must also be maintained to guard against exceptional circumstances. Provisions for controlling and regulating production and consumption must also be made.
Reliance on the extensive food production capacity of the European Union will improve Finland's capacity for ensuring security of food supplies. On the other hand, recent food safety crises have shown how vulnerable the EU food supply system can be. This underlines the significance to Finland's security of food supplies of the EU's policy of maintaining agriculture based on family farms throughout the EU territory.
Sufficient domestic production of basic foodstuffs, one of the aims of ensuring security of supplies, has been maintained, although there has been a shortfall in bread grain production for several years now.
Sufficient reserve stocks of grain and other production input materials important for ensuring security of food supplies are maintained to guard against exceptional circumstances. The volatility of seed supply is compounded by the fact that only seeds bred for northern conditions can survive in Finland. Reserve stocks of seed grain must be increased, and essential seed production and breeding enhanced to improve the security of supplies.
The processing capacity of the Finnish food industry has also remained at a sufficient level, and the share of imported food stuffs has not increased too much in relation to the need to ensure the security of food supplies. The commercial distribution system functions adequately, although continuing reductions in the size of stockpiles, due to improved logistics, contributes to the vulnerability of the distribution system in times of exceptional circumstances.
The principal areas for further development are precautionary measures for food supply logistics, ensuring the availability of safe food in the event of nuclear fallout, and the operation of production and consumption controls for exceptional circumstances within the normal administrative framework. The composition of reserve stocks will be reviewed, taking into account Finland's high dependence on certain imported raw materials in animal feed supply.
3.4 Energy supply
The aims of energy supply are to meet Finland's national energy needs and to meet the complementary commitments arising from international agreements.
Traditionally, the security of Finland's energy supply has been very good due to supply arrangements maintained by the energy sector itself. The security of supplies has been augmented through special public sector provisions, most significantly the stockpiling of imported fuels.
Deregulation of energy markets, particularly the electricity market, and opening the markets to domestic and foreign competition has shifted the basis of Finland's precautionary measures in fuel supply, electricity production and electricity distribution. On the open market, it is not financially viable for companies to voluntarily maintain a higher reliability of delivery and security of supplies than the market and customers require under normal circumstances.
On international electricity markets, different countries have different systems of precautionary measures for ensuring security of supplies and different associated requirements for companies. Measures to secure supplies must not unduly burden production in domestic suppliers. Responsibility for precautionary measures remains with the State. Maintaining security of energy supply is funded using fees levied on domestic energy consumption.
Due to the deregulation of the electricity market and exceptionally good years in the production of hydroelectric power in other Nordic countries, the share of imported electricity has increased in Finland in recent years. There has also been a moderate increase in the use of natural gas. One of the options in the Finnish climate strategy currently being prepared is that coal as a fuel for electricity production and combined heat and power generation should be abandoned and replaced by natural gas. Natural gas is not stockpiled in Finland. If the above-mentioned policy would lead to abandonment of coal stockpiling, Finland's security of energy supplies would then rest only on domestic fuels and reserve stocks of oil products.
The choice of fuel on which electricity generation is to be founded in the long term is crucial to ensuring security of supplies. If the share of natural gas is to increase significantly, as seems apparent, and if there is no alternative source for procuring gas, the security of natural gas supplies will be based on reserve stocks of economically costly oil products, particularly light fuel oil, the alternative fuel for gas turbines.
Reserve capacity in electricity generation has decreased, as unused or little-used coal-fired plants have been gradually taken out of regular use. The reduction in these 'slow' generation reserves means that there is no reserve capacity available to cope with disruptive conditions under normal circumstances or in times of exceptional circumstances. The maintenance of reserve capacity for electricity generation must be resolved in cooperation with suppliers and companies so that electricity supply can be guaranteed under all circumstances. The possible ban on coal-fired power plants arising from implementation of Finland's national climate strategy may decrease the chances of using 'slow' reserve capacity. The aim is to create a system whereby some of the current reserve power plants would remain with their present owners, whom the National Emergency Supply Agency would compensate for costs incurred in repairing and maintaining the power plants.
Promotion of domestic fuels should be continued and enhanced from the point of view of maintaining security of supplies, as proposed in the Government white paper on the national climate strategy. Production conditions for domestic electricity generation in which investments in domestic production capacity remain feasible and commercially viable must be created. Commercially viable domestic production will provide the basis for precautionary measures in energy supply to meet exceptional circumstances.
The integration of energy markets increases the need for international measures to secure security of supplies. On the Nordic electricity market, security of supplies cannot be maintained by national measures alone, because the arrangements of one country will affect the other countries in the system. The needs and possibilities for concrete cooperation measures to improve security of energy supplies are currently being investigated.
3.5 Transport, storage and distribution systems
The functioning of transport and logistics systems is vital to modern society. Particularly critical are transport movements of food and energy supplies, the functions of central warehouses and terminals, and the repair and spare parts supply of commercial vehicles.
Developments in recent years have led to precautionary measures for transport focusing on entire transport chains rather than securing individual transport systems. Reliable systems must be developed for directing transportation in situations where transport market mechanisms no longer work, insurance is invalid and transport prioritization and pricing are controlled by public authorities.
The main priority is to secure maritime transport. Finland has begun to develop measures for supporting shipping in accordance with guidelines approved by the EU.
Finland's foreign trade transport is secured by maintaining a sufficient body of ice-reinforced ships registered in Finland and by safeguarding vessel maintenance and technical functions in Finnish ports. Through the shipping subsidy arrangements, over 40 per cent of Finland's foreign trade shipping is managed with Finnish vessels. The present merchant marine fleet is sufficient to ensure estimated transport needs in a crisis situation.
Decreasing self-sufficiency in vehicle maintenance and repair, particularly as regards spare parts for heavy road vehicles, is an increasing problem. During exceptional circumstances problems may also arise in the availability of special equipment, such as tanker lorries.
Securing the technical functions of air transport and airports under all circumstances is essential. Care should be taken to ensure that Finland retains the authority to perform essential air transport under all circumstances.
3.6 Information systems
In precautionary measures to safeguard the operation of technical systems in society, the focus has been on telecommunications, major print media, public broadcasting, major information systems, payment systems and money supply, as well as information technology repair, support and maintenance functions. Energy supply transmission and distribution systems are also vital.
An open telecommunications policy will lead to a growing number of foreign companies operating in Finland. Finnish companies may also increasingly pass into foreign ownership. As a result of internationalization, worldwide services will be increasingly available in Finland.
The development and integration of satellite networks, new mobile communications networks, broadband networks, the Internet and conventional telephone and data networks may have unpredictable effects on information security and the usability of services during exceptional circumstances.
The reliability of information technology systems is founded on a secure basic infrastructure, with backup systems and a cutting-edge, competitive domestic industry, and the availability of a wide range of services.
The precautionary measures obligation enacted by Finnish law, which has long been the basis for precautionary and security measures in telecommunications and electronic communications, is an important basic requirement. Its scope will be reviewed in preparing the new communications market legislation.
The software in major information systems is mainly of foreign origin, and some systems are controlled from abroad. Maintenance and repair functions are often also performed directly from abroad. The related operating uncertainties during exceptional circumstances must be addressed in the precautionary measures taken.
Technological developments in electronic mass media occur at a rapid rate. Digitalization and the convergence of the Internet and TV and of other media will bring significant changes to the media market in the next few years. In moving to digital systems, it must be ensured that the capacity to broadcast warnings and other official bulletins to citizens is retained under all circumstances.
Information and communications systems vital to the functioning of society must be secured through national measures. Separate networks can be constructed for functions critical to security, enabling a better level of information security and reliability than in a public telecommunications network. Public authorities must have at their disposal computer systems that meet the demands of exceptional circumstances.
Finland must improve information security and precautionary measures to deal with information threats that could endanger national security, even under normal circumstances. A bill has been submitted to Parliament on the subject of protecting services in an information society. The principles and procedures of data security administration and related official functions are currently being examined. Administrative responsibilities for information systems in exceptional circumstances must also be clarified. The Telecommunications Administration Centre should be converted into a general administrative authority for all communications and information society services, for example by expanding its responsibilities in the area of data security and protection.
On the financial markets, national and international payment systems, securities market management and other systems serving financial markets are based on sophisticated computer information systems. Overlap between banks, insurance companies, finance companies, securities markets and other actors in the financial markets is expected to increase in the future.
The Ministry of Finance has prepared a bill to amend the Emergency Powers Act in keeping with the needs and demands of monetary union and changes in the financial markets. The bill proposes that the Government would have the right to regulate the financial markets during exceptional circumstances. The financial markets here refer to finance and payment transmissions, related functions, and the institutions and organizations offering these services.
Regulatory measures could be used to regulate the volume and content of services provided in financial markets and the resources used to produce them. It must be possible to secure money supply and payment transactions during exceptional circumstances. The bill proposes that major actors in the financial markets should be required by special legislation to take precautionary measures. The Ministry of Finance is continuing the work on new legislation for the financial markets.
3.7 Social and health care
Threats to social welfare in times of exceptional circumstances include disruptions to technical systems and a weakening of the basic structures and funding base of social security. An amendment to the Emergency Powers Act provides for the Government to have the right during exceptional circumstances to control and regulate benefits and income support which fall under statutory insurance or social benefits. The aim is that the social welfare system should be able to continue supplying social services and income security for citizens even in exceptional circumstances.
In recent years, social and health care functions have shifted increasingly towards outpatient care. In health care systems, the degree of reliance on other countries has increased significantly. However, the basic structure remains comprehensive and can function even in crisis situations.
In exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary to reallocate social and health care resources regionally and to issue binding orders to municipalities and joint municipal authorities.
Management of disaster situations requires that the command system for medical rescue services be harmonized with the command systems of other fire and rescue services.
Finland is participating extensively in international cooperation to combat and manage international health care risks. The main aim of Finland's bilateral cooperation with neighbouring areas is to reduce social and health problems in those areas and to prevent potential safety risks for Finland.
Finland has signed conventions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning rapid notification of nuclear accidents and assistance in radiation hazard and nuclear accident situations. The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is helping to improve safety in nuclear power plants in neighbouring areas and to enhance the radiation safety and accident contingency planning capacity in those areas.
The European Union's early warning and response system for infectious diseases is now well established. The system can be used to prevent and control the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases within or outside the Union.
The availability of essential drugs, medical supplies and equipment must be ensured in disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances. Security of supplies of drugs and vaccinations is mainly based on statutory stockpiles, an increasing share of which is dependent on imports. In addition, it has been necessary to maintain reserve stocks of crisis-specific drugs for use in a state of defence. It is also necessary to continue stockpiling major hospital materials and supplies in order to safeguard the operation of hospitals. Efforts to establish alternative sources of hospital supplies must be continued.
The pharmaceutical industry is undergoing a period of restructuring. This may have a detrimental effect on Finland's security of supplies in the future. For example, production of infusion fluids and vaccinations in Finland will be discontinued.
Finland is involved in the health care aspects of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme by taking part in the work of the Joint Medical Committee (JMC), which operates under the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC).
Threats to the safety of the Finnish population under normal circumstances include extensive environmental health problems, possible widespread epidemics, control of drug-resistant infections and safeguarding sufficient social and health care services in cases of mass immigration. Drawing up precautionary measures designed for exceptional circumstances will also be beneficial in coping with such disruptive situations.
International cooperation in ensuring security of health care supplies is increasingly important. Precautionary measures for maintaining access to drug and vaccine supplies and for stockpiling hospital supplies is necessary for international civilian crisis management, too.
The agreement between Finland and Sweden on security of supplies includes various provisions for improving the reliability of health care services.
3.8 Finland's defence industry
One of the cornerstones of Finland's national defence is a domestic defence equipment industry that is technologically and economically competitive. The national industrial strategy is defined by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The Finnish defence industry is small in volume compared with most other European countries. About 40 companies and several dozen sub-contractors are involved in the sector in Finland. Conventional production is concentrated in the Patria Group, which accounts for over half of the total turnover of the Finnish defence industry. The dependence of military defence on imports has increased, however, and this represents a threat in a crisis situation.
In order to manage production effectively and to improve profitability through economies of scale, the Nordic countries have formed alliances in the defence industry. Finland, Sweden and Norway have founded the ammunition group NAMMO and the explosives group NEXPLO. The vehicle division of the Patria Group is also cooperating with Hägglunds Vehicle of Sweden, which also has production facilities in Norway.
Parallel to transferring production to neighbouring countries, the Nordic countries are also negotiating a joint Nordic agreement to guarantee security of supplies of jointly produced products and to coordinate export procedures to other countries.
To achieve a significant increase in the proportion of domestic purchases in Finnish Defence Forces procurement, the defence industry must improve its competence in international cooperative ventures. Export potential may be created by specializing in fields where competence in the respective Finnish civil sector is high. This will create opportunities for Finnish industry to be involved in deliveries of equipment assembled abroad and in the subsequent maintenance and repair of this equipment at home.
International competition is forcing the defence industry to become more competitive and cost-effective. In the short term, efforts have been made to safeguard the viability of the Finnish defence industry through sufficient domestic orders and minor product development projects.
From the point of view of Finland's national defence, the defence industry must perform well in the three essential areas of competence mentioned in section II of this report.
The ability of the Finnish defence industry to function as a responsible system supplier must be improved, and the capacity to supply system maintenance as an integral part of system procurement must be created. The aim is to conclude long-term contracts with responsible system suppliers; such a goal requires long-term research and product development. Committing the domestic research community, industry and the Defence Forces to long-term product development contracts will ensure coordination of domestic resources.
The aim of international cooperation in the defence industry is to ensure that the Finnish defence industry is in a position to be a major partner with the European industry. Such partnership will increase the potential of the Finnish industry to develop its product range in accordance with the demands of the Defence Forces and to increase the share of defence equipment procured in Finland. Partnership based on technological competence will also increase Finland's capacity to import defence equipment in a crisis situation, while also increasing the role of the Finnish defence industry in materiel procurement.
System interoperability is an important consideration in international crisis management. By participating in the procurement of defence equipment with foreign companies, the Finnish industry will increase its knowledge of the interoperability requirements as defined through various international standards and agreements.
Finland is participating in the efforts to improve European defence equipment cooperation, a goal incorporated in the EU Treaty. In November 2000, Finland was accepted as a member of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), through which it can participate in and influence the development of European defence equipment cooperation projects. Future cooperation through the EU is in Finland's interests.
International materiel procurement and technology projects will provide Finnish industry with the capacity to develop new know-how and to assemble, maintain and update the materiel procured. At the same time, the maintenance costs of technologically advanced systems can be cut.
Procurement funded by the development programmes of the Finnish Defence Forces can cover only part of the turnover necessary to maintain the production capacity of the Finnish defence industry. Thus, the defence industry will have to seek a significant increase in its orders from abroad. The balance of funding required for production that is economically unviable but necessary for national defence should be made up from the supply security fund as required. Amendments to the legislation on security of supplies could be made to improve the potential for safeguarding production in the industry.
4. IMPROVING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
4.1 Drawing up a strategy for national precautionary measures
The basics elements and principles of the precautionary measures taken by society will be set out in a national strategy for precautionary measures. The Government is to initiate the necessary investigation work. The work will involve defining the functions vital to society and drawing up action plans and development proposals.
A national strategy for precautionary measures will need to consider the effects of internationalization, structural change in society and development forecasts.
The strategy will focus on functions vital to society and will consider these in their entirety, not being constrained by ministerial or administrative divisions.
Implementation of the national strategy will involve monitoring each chosen sector or function more closely than in normal precautionary measures and analysing its capacity for operation in exceptional circumstances. Any improvements necessary will be made without delay.
The national strategy for precautionary measures will be updated regularly and its policy recommendations will be included in the next security and defence policy report.
4.2 Other areas of development
Administrative readiness
Development of administrative organizations and management mechanisms has increased efficiency and saved costs. On the other hand it has not always been possible to take into account the special needs of exceptional circumstances when allocating resources. For example, closing central government agencies, reforming regional administration and privatizing important public service functions has emphasized the need for cooperation and precautionary measures. Particular attention must be paid to the distribution of powers amongst the various authorities and the forms of cooperation between them in disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances. Joint command and action capability between public authorities and key units in the business world must be secured at all levels.
In privatizing important public service functions, legislative and other means must be used to ensure that the companies founded retain the responsibility to take precautionary measures for exceptional circumstances and the capability to function in a crisis. In many sectors, competition will improve reliability. The level of precautionary measures necessary in a particular sector must not be allowed to decrease as a result of organizational change. In outsourcing functions, it is vital that contracted services are safeguarded in exceptional circumstances.
Voluntary organizations are active in a number of the sectors of society which are important to functioning in exceptional circumstances. The work of these organizations and the services they produce should be linked more closely to precautionary measures undertaken by the authorities.
Key functions of public authorities must be safeguarded by providing sufficient secure premises and by equipping them with the systems required for command functions and for assessing the situation, monitoring developments and communicating information.
In 2000, an extensive emergency planning exercise involving all levels of administration was carried out under the chiefs of readiness in each ministry, and with the participation of all the main public authorities and private sector units relevant in exceptional circumstances. The exercise demonstrated that the capacity of society to cope with a variety of disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances is high and that the precautionary measures are implementable. At the same time, it became evident that, from the point of view of exceptional circumstances, changes are occurring in society at a rapid rate and affect the very basis of the precautionary measures taken. This makes it especially important to ensure that the principles and arrangements for precautionary measures are kept up to date.
In several key sectors, foreign or foreign-owned companies are managing service functions that would be important in exceptional circumstances. The impact of Finland's internationalization on its precautionary measures and on functioning during exceptional circumstances must be investigated.
By participating in the work of bodies coordinating NATO's civil emergency planning, Finland has access to information on the operational principles adopted and measures taken by NATO and its member countries to prepare for exceptional circumstances.
Preparing legislation as part of precautionary measures
The legal basis of the measures proposed in the emergency plans of the various sectors of public administration and of companies, and the principles for using the available resources and implementing operational arrangements must be based on sector-specific legislation or on emergency powers legislation. The main principle is that provisions for powers required in exceptional circumstances must be decided in normal circumstances.
Preparation of the required legislative changes is an essential component of precautionary measures. Passing emergency legislation should be avoided, and so provisions regarding special powers in exceptional circumstances should be entered in the Emergency Powers Act. Provisions regarding special powers in exceptional circumstances can also be included in sector-specific legislation through the normal legislative procedure, as necessary. This is in keeping with the principle enacted in the Emergency Powers Act, whereby regular procedures applied under normal circumstances should be used as far as possible to manage any situation.
Ministries must prepare in advance, and in sufficient detail, the Presidential and Government decrees and ministerial statutes and regulations required for invoking special powers under the Emergency Powers Act and the State of Defence Act. This will require interministerial cooperation and harmonization to resolve issues involving several branches of administration.
Resources and training
Precautionary measures are part of the regular work undertaken by State and local authorities, and costs thereby incurred must be included in their respective action plans and budgets. This principle is also extended to enterprises and companies under State and local government control.
Private organizations and other units vital to the functioning of society must make allowance for the expenditure necessary to ensure that they remain functional under all circumstances.
The Emergency Powers Act stipulates that public authorities have the responsibility to prepare precautionary measures for exceptional circumstances. For this reason, the authorities must have the necessary economic resources at their disposal.
The Finnish education system should, under normal circumstances, provide both young people and adults with sufficient information and skills for coping with exceptional circumstances. During exceptional circumstances, the country's educational organizations will continue functioning as normally as possible. The comprehensive schooling system enables special training to be organized effectively in the event of a crisis. Universities, polytechnics and research institutions will be particularly important in exceptional circumstances, since their human resources and research facilities can be assigned to duties required by the crisis at hand. Precautionary measures in the cultural and ecclesiastical spheres should focus on protecting the material elements of Finland's cultural heritage in times of exceptional circumstances, and also on alleviating the adverse affect of any crisis on public morale and promoting national unity.
Training in precautionary measures is the task of every organization. In administrative and business sectors, attention must be paid to staffing, the availability and usability of staff, definition of training needs and provision of sufficient training. Staff must be briefed in advance as to their duties and actions in a variety of crisis situations.
Training in precautionary measures and national defence training will be coordinated more closely in order to provide more appropriate training and to facilitate better results. Training to prepare for exceptional circumstances will also be supported by voluntary national defence training.