SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SOCIETY

Government Resolution 16.12.2010
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One of the fundamental tasks of the state leadership is to guarantee the security of society. National and international interdependency increases as a result of globalisation and specialised development. It is necessary to assess and develop security more comprehensively than in the past and from the intersectoral perspective, taking into account all actors in society.

In the Government Resolutions of 2003 and 2006 on Securing the Functions Vital to Society, vital functions and the responsibilities of each administrative sector to secure them were defined. A comprehensive and intersectoral approach is underlined in the reviewed Resolution which, co-ordinated by the Secretariat of the Security and Defence Committee, was amended to better respond to the anticipated development of the security environment and the changes in the Finnish society in the coming years.

The principles, objectives and implementation criteria for Finland’s security and defence policy were provided in the Finnish Security and Defence Policy Report in 2009. The Resolution on the Security Strategy for Society, based on a comprehensive security concept, concretises these principles and goals. The Strategy provides the common basis for preparedness and crisis management for all actors in society. Other strategies and guidelines for preparedness and the management of disturbances are complementary to the Strategy and deepen its approach.

In the reviewed Resolution special attention has been paid to the international dimension and the broad-based presentation of actors in preparedness and crisis management. The role of the business community and organisations is underlined as part of preparedness in society and the management of disturbances. Security research is discussed in more detail. The role of municipalities is in focus more than before; this also applies to the effects of the reorganisation of regional administration. These are also the focus areas in the implementation of the Strategy. In addition, the changes that have taken place in legislation, the experiences gained in VALHA 2010 preparedness exercise and in the management of disturbances were taken into account in the review as well as the reports that assessed the utilisation and implementation of the 2006 Resolution.

The present Resolution harmonises the preparedness activities of the ministries, adhering to both the division of duties provided in the Government Rules of Procedure and co-ordination provisions. Security in society builds on the arrangements made in normal conditions. Each ministry, within its mandate, steers preparedness and include all measures required by
the Resolution in the implementation of their operating and financial plans. Here also the activities of the regional and local administration as well as the activities of the business community and organisations are taken into consideration.

The Resolution was written from the perspective of functions vital to society that will be secured in all conditions. The threat scenarios which pose a risk to vital functions are described. Descriptions of disturbances are concretised with threat scenarios. For the basis of preparedness, preventing and combating threats and, further, for securing the functions vital to society the ministries are given the responsibility to develop, steer and monitor strategic tasks in accordance with the requirements of the security environment. Also other parts of the public administration, in particular municipalities, and the business community and organisations play an important role in the implementation of the strategic tasks.

The Resolution encompasses the implementation and monitoring of the strategy as well as the implementation principles of preparedness exercises. For all the actors contributing to development, each ministry, within its mandate, shall steer and monitor the implementation of tasks and the development of required capabilities related to securing the vital functions. Supported by the meeting of the heads of preparedness of the ministries, the Security and Defence Committee is responsible for the joint monitoring and development of the Strategy. Monitoring creates the preconditions for the possible definition needs of the Strategy and for the co-ordination of the comprehensive defence approach. The Resolution further defines that the top state leadership shall be informed, on a regular basis, of the results of the monitoring.

The Resolution on the Security Strategy for Society replaces the previous Government Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Society, adopted on 23.11.2006. The decision on the next review of the Resolution will be made by the Government.
1 THE CRITERIA FOR THE STRATEGY

1.1 The objective

The most important tasks of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy is to safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity and basic values; promote the population’s security and well-being; and maintain the functioning of society.

The Resolution on the Security Strategy for Society (hereafter Strategy) provides the guidelines to ministries and also to regional and local administration for achieving these goals. The Strategy is based on a comprehensive concept of security and covers the preparedness of society and crisis management of normal and emergency conditions. The Strategy provides information to the authorities in public administration, the business community and organisations and harmonises the grounds of planning in preparedness, crisis management and security of supply. The measures required to implement the policy decisions of the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy are discussed in the Strategy. A number of decisions, strategies and guidelines related to preparedness and crisis management, issued by the Government and different administrative sectors are complementary to it.

The Strategy has been compiled from the viewpoint of safeguarding functions that are vital to society in all situations.

The following are defined:

» the functions vital to society and their desired end states
» the threat scenarios that jeopardize vital functions, including the possible disturbances within each scenario
» the strategic tasks of the ministries to secure and guarantee the continuation of the functions
» the criteria for crisis management as required by the management of disturbances
» the principles of the monitoring and development of the strategy’s implementation
» the principles of exercises in preparedness and crisis management

On the one hand, the Strategy aims to avoid duplication of development efforts and, on the other hand, to prevent a situation in which a capability required for securing the vital functions is not developed. Ministries steer the preparedness of their administrative sector and related research, guidance of activities and legislative measures on the basis of the Strategy.

The Strategy is a public document which aims at giving information to citizens and to international co-operation partners with whom security in society is safeguarded on
the concrete measures taken, on the basis of the guidelines provided by the Government, to strengthen the security of society and the population. The Security and Defence Committee, supported by the meeting of the heads of preparedness of the ministries, is responsible for the joint monitoring of the Strategy in co-operation with the different authorities, the business community and organisations.

1.2 The actors and their responsibilities

1.2.1 The public administration

The President of the Republic conducts Finland’s foreign policy in co-operation with the Government. The Government is responsible for national preparation of decisions to be made in the European Union, and decides on concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision requires the approval of Parliament.

In emergency conditions, the Government, subject to a Parliament decision, may be authorized to use the additional emergency powers provided in the Emergency Powers Act. The decision to begin using powers pursuant to the State of Defence Act is taken by Presidential Decree, subject to a Parliament decision. According to the Emergency Powers Act, presently under review, the Government would introduce the statute on implementing the Emergency Powers Act after having concluded with the President of the Republic that the country faces emergency conditions. Parliament would be the ultimate decision-maker.

Important aspects of foreign and security policy and other matters concerning Finland’s relations with other states, associated key internal security issues, and significant comprehensive defence approach issues are handled at the joint meeting of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. They will have a joint meeting whenever the matters so require. Matters related to securing the functions vital to society are prepared also in other cabinet committees.

EU-related policy issues are decided on at the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs. As to the civil servant level, the co-ordination of EU matters takes place in the Committee for EU Affairs and sector-specific preparative sub-committees.

Government decisions are made either at plenary sessions or within the ministry concerned. The ministries co-operate with each other as necessary, under the leadership of the competent ministry. In addition, ministries direct the regional administration and local government within their respective mandates. The Prime Minister directs the activities of the Government. The Prime Minister’s Office assists the Prime Minister in the overall management of the Government and in coordinating the work of the Government and Parliament.

The Act on the Defence Forces and the Border Guard Act provide for the powers of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, relevant ministers and the Chief of Defence in dealing with military command matters relating to the Defence Forces and the Border Guard.

The Government directs, supervises and coordinates the securing of functions vital to society. Each competent ministry does the same within its respective administrative sector. In order to facilitate preparedness and to instigate activities, all competent
authorities employ their statutory powers, which are already quite exhaustive in normal conditions.

The **Permanent Secretaries** have the task of directing and supervising the activities of their respective ministries. They are responsible for preparing the administrative sector’s objectives, monitoring their implementation and ensuring the preparedness and security of the sector. The **Head of Preparedness** is each ministry assists the Permanent Secretary in the implementation of preparedness and security related tasks. The **Meeting of Permanent Secretaries** and the **Meeting of Heads of Preparedness** are permanent co-operation bodies. When the matters being dealt with so requires, the Secretary General of the President of the Republic participates in the meeting of the permanent secretaries. The **Meeting of Preparedness Secretaries** assists the heads of preparedness.

The **Ministry of Defence** is responsible for co-ordinating comprehensive defence activities. Coordinating the comprehensive defence approach involves synchronising measures of the public sector, that is, the Government, State authorities and the municipalities, and the private sector and voluntary activities by citizens in order to maintain the functions vital to society under all circumstances. The **Security and Defence Committee** (TPAK) assists the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy on matters relating to comprehensive defence and its co-ordination. The Committee monitors changes in the security and defence policy and situation and evaluates their effects on comprehensive defence arrangements. The Committee has the task of monitoring and co-ordinating the different administrative sectors’ comprehensive defence measures.

The public administration is to a large extent and increasingly dependent on the functioning of the common information systems and networks that have been specifically designed for the entire administration, security authorities and the state leadership. In the Government, the **Ministry of Finance** is responsible for the general guidance and development of these systems and information networks; it is also responsible for the general guidance and directing of information security and ICT preparedness in the public sector.

Many branches are involved in **regional administration** the steering of which falls under the remit of relevant ministries or central agencies. Regional administration was reorganised in 2010 when Regional State Administrative Agencies (AVI) and the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres) were established. They play a central role in the preparedness of regional administration; however, their preparedness tasks require further definition and development.

The AVI agencies foster regional parity by executing all legislative implementation, steering and supervision functions in the regions. To this end the agencies strengthen implementation of basic rights and legal protection, access to basic public services, environmental protection, environmental sustainability, public safety and a safe and healthy living and working environment in the regions. In addition, the tasks of AVI agencies include the co-ordination of preparedness in the region and the organisation of relating co-operation, co-ordination of preparedness planning, the organisation of regional national defence courses, supporting the preparedness planning of municipalities, the organisation of preparedness exercises, and promoting
the security planning of regional and local administration. The AVI agencies support competent authorities and, when necessary, co-ordinate the activities when the competent authority directs security-related situations in the region. Regional preparedness committees, which were set up under the leadership of the agencies, are a central body in promoting preparedness and the co-ordination and co-operation within preparedness planning.

The ELY Centres are responsible in their areas for implementing and developing tasks relating to preparedness and crisis management of the respective ministries in connection with the environment and natural resources, traffic and infrastructure, business activities including agriculture, the use of workforce, immigration, education and culture. ELY Centres co-operate with provincial associations and the employment and economic development offices are subordinate to them.

Because municipalities for the most part have the responsibility for organising basic services and other functions vital to society, their role in local administration is central to society’s preparedness and management of disturbances. The obligation of the municipalities to prepare for emergency conditions is based on the Emergency Powers Act; however, the management of security and disturbances under normal conditions require that preparedness in the municipalities is further developed.

Many new trends in local administration and services such as changes in municipal and service structures and the change in the municipal service production need to be taken into account; they are factors that influence preparedness of municipalities and, more widely, their security management in its entirety. Many services that the municipalities are responsible for organising are increasingly produced outside an individual municipality: by joint authorities, the host municipality model in another municipality, companies owned by municipalities, privately owned companies and third sector actors. This trend has a significant effect on the preparedness of municipalities and, consequently, municipalities must take this into consideration when developing their own preparedness. As a result, the roles and responsibilities of supramunicipal organisations and external service providers in preparedness related matters must be defined and well-functioning co-operation procedures are to be established.

The securing of functions vital to society as a whole is related to intersectoral activities between different administrative sectors and the co-operation between the state, municipalities, the business community and organisations. Preparedness and security management in the municipalities as a whole is defined with ordinances and policy advice as well as through planning and reporting activities.

The municipal managers, together with the municipal boards, direct preparedness in accordance with the law. Practical responsibilities for preparedness and operations are widely allocated. All significant decisions regarding policies and resources are always taken by representative bodies. This is why preparedness for emergencies and crisis situations should be integrated into the budget proposals of a municipality and joint municipal bodies. Elected officials should fully familiarise themselves with and be involved in the objectives of preparedness. Municipalities can influence crisis resilience in society also by means of land use planning, thus promoting a crisis resilient community structure.

Apart from municipalities and their co-operation bodies, the actors of the
regional state administration, parishes and religious communities, universities and other educational establishments and the units of the business community that contribute to the service production of the local government play a key role in regional preparedness and securing functions vital to society. Organisations, too, are important service providers and actors in building preparedness. The co-operation and operational models for regional preparedness of these actors are developed and the functioning of the models is tested in joint preparedness exercises.

The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for developing security of supply and the related co-operation between administration and the business community. In the Government decision on the objectives of security of supply (539/2008) the ministries are obligated to steer and monitor, within their mandates, the implementation of the tasks in line with the strategy to secure the vital functions and the required capability to act. The ministries develop security of supply within their respective mandates as part of their strategic tasks. Ministry-specific responsibilities for the security of supply are listed in annex 1.

Well-functioning co-operation between public authorities and the business community create and maintain security of supply in Finland. The security of supply organisation brings together their best expertise to support preparedness planning in normal conditions and steering in emergency conditions. The Finnish organisation for security of supply consist of the National Emergency Supply Agency, which is subordinate to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure, which is part of the security of supply system, and the security of supply sectors and pools which act as permanent co-operation bodies. The voluntary pool agreements of the business community are concluded between the National Emergency Supply Agency and sector-based organisations. The Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure, set up by the Government, maintains and develops relations with the key public sector and business community networks, monitors the state of security of supply and makes proposals for necessary measures.

In addition to national preparedness, the preparedness measures taken in the European Union, the agreement on the International Energy Programme and the multilateral and bilateral agreements on economic co-operation in crisis situations concluded with a number of countries contribute to security of supply.

1.2.2 The business community

The actors of the business community hold a key position in securing the functioning of the economy and infrastructure in particular. The role in the areas of other vital functions has grown when focus has been on functions relating to core competency and increasing subcontracts and services outside the own organisation. Information and communication technology (ICT) services, transportation and the office ownership and management are amongst the service entities where outsourcing is typical. Another trend in the business community is internationalisation. The Finnish business community is part of a global network where industrial plants merge and through the flows of raw material, information and people become an entity where change is permanent. This applies to all functions of a company, their management and ownership. The third change trend is the development
of division of work and of co-operation between public and private sectors. The private sector produces an increasingly larger share of the products and services, the availability of which is the responsibility of the public sector and often also funded by it.

Specialisation, focus on core functions, internationalisation and the reorganisation of the co-operation and division of work between public and private sectors have an impact on how the preparedness related co-operation can be built between them. The co-operation between public and private sectors and its continuous development are essential because the main part of the resources required by security tasks is, as a rule, owned by the business community. Long, even global value chains and the internationalisation of companies have significantly decreased the preconditions of national authorities to regulate, steer or control the activities of companies.

A secure and stable society the development of which can be foreseen is a significant competitive advantage for companies and, ultimately, a precondition for all activities. It is in the overall interests of the business community that it actively participates in the maintenance and development of security in society. This requires, from the perspective of the business community, the possibility to efficiently provide products and services for the needs of the authorities on the commercial basis, which allows it to contribute also to societal discussion. In general, partnership is seen as more flexible than regulations, supporting the continuity of business activities. In addition, the contribution of the business community to preparedness planning has a long history, supported by the values of the key personnel in the companies. This is shown, for example, in the commitment to the security of supply related work, national defence and the development of internal security. The internationally networked competition environment does not allow, however, take into account national security views that go beyond statutory obligations. In practice, co-operation has been improved through the system of preparedness agreements, which was developed as part of co-operation between the security of supply organisation and the business community. To improve the reliable functioning of companies and company networks, preparedness based on agreements and the recommendations of continuity management were developed in the security of supply organisation. As of autumn 2010, the security of supply organisation will be gradually integrated into Huovi information system. The system supports companies in the systematisation of their continuity management. It will be used to produce and transmit sector-specific situation awareness of the business community and national-level situation awareness.

The approach of the companies to security co-operation with the public sector is determined by a number of factors. These include direct and indirect impact on business activities, the agreements concluded with clients, risk management and securing the continuity of business activities. Some sectors such as telecommunications, transport, energy and financing are obligated to preparedness by legislation. Security co-operation between private and public sectors is increasingly important to maintain security in society and relating preparedness. However, this can only be built on the recognition by the business community that the benefits of co-operation are worth the resources invested in it. Structural changes in society and the economy require the public sector to guarantee that the actors
of the business community are genuinely committed to securing the functions vital to society.

1.2.3 Organisations

In securing society's vital functions, along with the public administration and the business community, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that base their activities on voluntariness play a significant role in providing everyday security as well as in improving crisis resilience. They produce and maintain resources and expertise that support the authorities and, in addition, implement education and communication that support and promote preparedness. By supporting the authorities, NGOs play an important role in, for example, search and rescue, air rescue operations and maritime search and rescue, civil defence and fire fighting, voluntary defence as well as organising first aid and psychological support.

National and international organisations also have a significant role in providing humanitarian aid to crisis areas. Various organisations run sports, cultural, youth and other societal activities, representing a significant segment of our civil society.

The ability to recognise individual needs is one of the strengths of these organisations. They are often extensively networked, both nationally and internationally. It is characteristic of voluntary work that, when needed, the actors can rapidly activate their operations without the guidance of the authorities.

The authorities are responsible for their mandates and tasks which organisations support through their own knowledge areas. Each administrative sector bears the responsibility for intersectoral co-operation arrangements with organisations and voluntary actors within their respective mandates. The structural changes of society and the economy require that the necessary organisations are genuinely involved in securing society’s vital functions also in the future. This is why administrative sectors should regard the organisations as an asset to them and launch development measures accordingly.

When co-operation between organisations and the authorities is planned it should be taken into account that the participation of the organisations is based on the operating goals and principles that they have set for themselves and also on national and international law. Apart from preparedness and exercises, co-operation must be extended to planning.

1.2.4 Security research

Produced by scientific and research communities to support the security authorities of the public administration, the business community and other actors, security research plays an important role in the management of preparedness planning and disturbances planning. Security research which is based on national approach provides targeted information to support decision-making, identifies new threats and opportunities in a rapidly changing world and develops courses of action, instruments and systems for the management of various disturbances and crises.

Security research which is of high quality is, by nature, comprehensive and multidisciplinary. It should directly support the authorities and other actors and their co-operation or, indirectly, through the products and services which have been developed by commercial actors. To achieve this objective, the security authorities must communicate
their research needs to the scientific community, recognize the possibilities of the scientific community and be able to use the knowledge gained for management and activities. It is essential to create networks within the security research of the EU and also in a wider context.

1.2.5 The European Union and the international dimension

Many security challenges and threats have far-reaching transnational impacts. Broad-based international co-operation is called for to meet these challenges since Finland's security is closely connected to international development. International activities are one of the vital functions defined in this strategy and constitute at the same time a key element of all the other vital functions.

Finland prepares for security threats both nationally and as a member of the key European and global co-operation structures and organisations. In addition to national preparedness measures, international agreements play an increasingly important role. It is not possible to secure all vital functions merely through national arrangements. National preparedness measures should be supplemented and strengthened through the membership of the European Union and international security co-operation. It is in Finland's interest to take actively part in this work. However, it is essential to prepare for serious crises with national measures.

Finland's membership of the EU is a central element in Finland's security policy, offering possibilities to influence the security environment in the entire field of securing vital functions. Here the key features are both the crisis management operations as part of the Common Foreign and Security policy of the EU and co-operation between member states with regard to terrorism and natural or man-made disasters.

Other EU policies also have a significant impact on Finland's possibilities to secure society's vital functions during disturbances. This particularly applies to the policy areas that fall into the exclusive competence of the European Union. For example, the common agricultural policy provides the framework for securing food safety whereas the common commercial policy provides the framework for securing foreign trade. The common currency of the Euro zone and relating regulations have a key impact on addressing disturbances in the economy. In many other areas, too, such as the energy and communications policy, the EU's legislation and other activities support the securing of vital functions.

When disturbances are going to be addressed in the EU, Finland's approach is processed in the national co-ordination system: the Cabinet Committee decides on Finland's position for the Council and European Council meetings. On the civil servant level the positions are discussed in the Committee for EU Affairs and in its Sub-Committees. Co-operation with Parliament also takes place along the guidelines adopted in the co-ordinating system.

In the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, drafted in 2008, attention is paid in a new way to new challenges such as cyber security and energy security. The EU has adopted a directive to protect critical infrastructures (2008/114/EC) with the purpose of securing infrastructures that serve two or more member states. The objective of the directive is to agree on the procedures with which critical infrastructures are identified and designated. Finland plays an active role in the implementation of the programme. A European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection was being prepared in 2010 to prevent and minimise the damage caused by disturbances or failures in the infrastructure.

In accordance with the Solidarity Clause of the Treaty of Lisbon that came into force in 2009, the Union and its Member States act jointly in the spirit of solidarity if another Member State is the subject of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster and, as a result, requests assistance. First, the Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States. Secondly, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. Finland actively participates in the negotiations about the rules to implement the Solidarity Clause.

The mutual assistance obligation incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon aims at strengthening solidarity between the Member States and their commitment to developing the common foreign and security policy. In accordance with the obligation, if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. The concrete forms and application of solidarity and mutual assistance will be defined in practice through co-operation. Finland will establish the capabilities to provide and receive assistance pursuant to the solidarity clause as well as the obligation to aid and assist another Member State.

The European Parliament has adopted a new financial supervisory structure aimed at amending the past failures. Macro-prudential supervision will improve after the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board through which the monitoring and management of systemic risks will be guaranteed. In addition, new EU-level supervisory authorities will be established as part of the micro-prudential supervisory authorities for banking, insurance and securities. These will strengthen the supervision of cross-border financial markets and institutions and, in particular, the solving of possible problems.

The EU’s Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements (CCA) have been designed for situations where a crisis is so far-reaching or politically significant that to manage it the co-ordination of EU measures is required and the regular decision-making procedures of the Council cannot be employed because of time pressure, for example. The CCA guarantee the EU’s joint situation picture and determine how the EU bodies and Member States co-operate in a situation where two or more Member States face a disaster or an emergency situation (including terrorism). The presidency of the EU activates the co-ordination mechanisms after negotiating with the Member State(s) involved. Being the contact point for the Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements, concrete measures are taken by the Situation Centre (SitCen) of the Council.

The three pillars of United Nations activities are peace and security, development and poverty reduction and human rights and democracy. The United Nations has maintained its position in the international community as the key norm setter, negotiating forum, actor, and guardian of international law for the international community. Finland fosters the strengthening of multilateral co-operation and international law and emphasises the significant role of the UN as the most comprehensive multilateral co-operation mechanism. Finland’s active participation in the activities of the UN promotes securing society’s vital functions.

The Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) of Nato aims at supporting the core functions
of the alliance. According to Nato’s new strategic concept, wide-ranging threats have an impact on national preparedness. National preparedness co-operation has always been open to partner countries. Finland has conducted co-operation in a number of sectors. Through co-operation Finland is informed of practices in other countries and has the opportunity to network internationally. Finland’s internal preparedness expertise can be brought to the table to benefit Nato and partner countries. Participation in co-operation supports the development of national preparedness.

A number of ministries and other actors in preparedness matters co-operate with other Nordic countries in matters relating to preparedness. Nordic co-operation is developed in accordance with the objectives of the Strategy and the strategic tasks. Arrangements on medical supplies, defence materiel and securing electricity transmission systems have been made under the auspices of Nordic co-operation. The Treaty of Lisbon provides the opportunity to deepen Nordic co-operation.

International disaster response activities are developed in such a manner that Finland is able to provide and receive assistance during major accidents and can participate in the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism and in other international rescue co-operation. The existing national resources and the planning of how to use them offer a starting point for development. Rapid mobilisation of resources requires that the international rescue co-operation mechanisms and co-ordination are developed. In addition, sufficient operational readiness requires supplementary acquisitions and plans to stockpile supplies. The development of the operational readiness of the SAR services and organisations is also seen as an argument for supplementary acquisitions to prepare for major national accidents.

Co-operation of prosecutors on the international level is particularly close within the European Union. The mutual recognition of the more serious and, therefore, societally more threatening crimes means, for example, that assistance must be given irrespective of whether similar acts are defined as criminal offences in one’s own legislation. Apart from Eurojust, Finnish prosecutors are represented in many international networks, such as the EU’s national correspondents on terrorism and the cyber crime network of the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP). Prompt and efficient international co-operation is also promoted by liaison prosecutors. Currently Finland has just one liaison prosecutor who is based in Estonia.

Multilateral conventions on international legal assistance constitute a system through which crime prevention and judicial authorities provide mutual assistance in their administrative sectors in pending matters that have an international dimension. Finland plays an active role in developing and monitoring conventions on international legal assistance in the Council of Europe, for example.

As for the policing function, the most important forum for cross-border co-operation is the context of the European Union. The objective of Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency, is to create a more secure Europe by supporting the competent authorities in the Member States to prevent and combat serious forms of international crime and terrorism. In addition, the police co-operate closely with Interpol, the international police organisation, and with Nordic police organisations. It is also involved in co-operation in neighbouring regions. In this context the Baltic Sea Region Task Force, BSTF, plays a particularly important role.
The purpose of all international activities of the police is to develop and improve cross-border co-operation between the police and other law enforcement authorities.

Finland actively promotes the development of the EU border policy and integrated border management. Free movement and the extension of the Schengen area require the development of an integrated border management system and the reinforcing of checks and border controls at the external borders. To secure external borders, the European Agency for external border management, Frontex, co-ordinates operational co-operation between Member States. Finland plays an active role in the border security co-operation co-ordinated by Frontex.

1.3 Threat scenarios and disturbances

A threat scenario in the Strategy refers to a description of possible disturbances in the security environment. The aim here has been to describe the threat scenarios as entities that concern the state, society and population and for which various actors in society prepare intersectorally and in co-operation.

Threats may be looked at from the perspective of the cause, the way they manifest themselves or their effects. It is not relevant, however, to differentiate between military and civilian threats. Instead of advocating one perspective the Strategy aims at ensuring that threat scenarios can be used in a wide range of ways on different levels.

Figure 1. Threats on the individual, national and global levels
administrative levels, including the threat assessments and risk analyses of the actors which contribute to preparedness in society. Global threats such as security policy related threats and large-scale climate threats are addressed in their respective reports but their impact on the threat scenarios defined in the Strategy is taken into account to a relevant extent. The threat scenarios here do not primarily deal with threats that target individuals although such threats do have an indirect impact on the functioning of society. Threats on the individual, national and global levels are presented in figure 1. It is not possible or even relevant to define clear boundaries between threats of different levels because of their interaction and interdependency.

The threat scenarios defined in the strategy for securing the functions vital to society are:
» serious disturbances in the power supply
» serious disturbances in the telecommunications and information systems – cyber threats
» serious disturbances in transport logistics
» serious disruptions in public utilities
» serious disturbances in food supply
» serious disturbances in the financial and payment systems
» disruptions in the availability of public funding
» serious disturbances in the health and welfare of the population
» major accidents, extreme natural phenomena and environmental threats
» terrorism and other criminality that endanger social order
» serious disturbances in border security
» a political, economic and military pressure
» the use of military force

Threats against society’s vital functions may arise individually, several may emerge simultaneously or they may appear as continuums for each other. The speed and duration of the escalation of threats vary. Some of the threats escalate as intentional action taken by a specific actor but there are also threats without intention. The reasons, origins, exact targets, objectives, scope, repercussions or transition from one level to another are difficult to predict. A more detailed description of the threat scenarios is in annex 2.

Analysing the changes of threat scenarios in own activities should be done on a continuous and active basis by all actors who are responsible for preparedness in society and the management of disturbances, thus improving the situation awareness of all those who contribute to preparedness. This underlines the importance of networked and intersectoral co-operation both on the national and international level.

To concretise threat scenarios and to support different actors in the further analysis of threats in connection with their own activities, a number of disturbances have been identified for the Strategy. Disturbances refer to a threat or an incident which endangers, at least momentarily or in a regionally limited way, the security or functioning of society or the livelihood of the population. The authorities and other actors need to co-operate and communicate in a wider or closer fashion to manage such situations. Depending on the perspective, the origin of the threat or its consequences, the same disturbance may be connected to several threat scenarios. Possible disturbances have been presented in annex 3.

Disturbances may occur both in normal conditions and emergency conditions. Disturbances that occur in normal conditions can be managed with the regular powers or
resources of the authorities. The systems and preparedness measures that are built in normal conditions provide the basis for measures in emergency conditions. In the same way, the systems created for emergency conditions can be used for managing disturbances under normal circumstances. During emergency conditions the management of a situation may require additional powers or resources.

Threat scenarios and examples of disturbances are meant for the authorities, the business community and organisations as the joint starting point of preparedness and for background material. A number of actors may benefit from the material when they draw up threat scenarios and assess the impact of the threats on preparedness, on the prevention and management of disturbances and on the development of relating capabilities.
2 SECURING THE VITAL FUNCTIONS

2.1 The entirety of the functions and the principles of securing them

The vital functions encompass the indispensable intersectoral functional entities of society which have to be secured in all situations.

Functions vital to the Finnish society include:
» management of Government affairs
» international activity
» Finland’s defence capability
» internal security
» functioning of the economy and infrastructure
» the population’s income security and capability to function, and
» psychological resilience to crisis

A desired end state has been described for each function, thus making it possible for ministries to determine their respective strategic tasks as well as relevant maintenance and development needs. The functioning of the different administrative levels and the role of the business community and organisations were taken into consideration to the extent appropriate as the descriptions of the said functions and the development requirements for the strategic tasks were compiled. In addition, Finland’s membership in the European Union and activities within the United Nations and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme as well as other international venues were also taken into consideration. The time span of the desired end states varies because of differences in functions and planning systems.

The securing of the functions vital to society builds on long-term and sufficient management of capabilities, on the ability to flexibly use capabilities just in time, and on the ability to employ and coordinate the capabilities already in use. Competent ministries direct the authorities’ management of capabilities by designating the strategic tasks of the ministries. The measures and resource-finding of other ministries, regional and local administrations, the business community and organisations are connected to the development of most strategic tasks and the relating development of capabilities. In the development and use of capabilities the ministries must always take into account the different administrative levels and the role of the business community and organisations.

The ministries’ strategic tasks and related development requirements build on the analysis of recognized threat scenarios as well as on the conditions imposed by concrete special situations which are derived from the scenarios. Each ministry, within its mandate, is responsible for ensuring that the strategic tasks determined on the basis of the desired end states will be completed. The strategic tasks are compiled in annex 4.

In securing the functions vital to society the commonly accepted and observed principles of the Finnish society are to be followed.
Democracy and the rule of law
The inviolability of human dignity, principles of representative democracy, separation of powers, lawfulness of the use of power and other principles of the rule of law are maintained. The basic rights and liberties of the individual are safeguarded in all situations. Provisional exceptions to the rights that are deemed necessary in crisis situations and are adjusted on the basis of the seriousness of the situation may be provided by an Act.

Sharing responsibility across society
Vital functions are secured by the efficient and comprehensive exploitation of society’s resources. This requires that the public sector, the business community, organisations and state churches co-operate and that capabilities are co-ordinated in all situations.

Retaining the normal division of duties
The regular lines of authority for securing vital functions, the organisations responsible for it under normal conditions and the normal division of duties are maintained unchanged as far as is feasible in all situations.

Flexible preparedness control
Resources and readiness levels are appropriately regulated to prevent and combat threats, to minimise their ill effects and to achieve the required level of effectiveness in securing society’s vital functions. Legislation provides the authorities with sufficient powers.

Cost-effectiveness
Society’s vital functions are cost-effectively secured by developing the procedures and structures for normal conditions in such a way that they are also viable in disturbances and crisis situations. Co-ordination ensures that overlapping systems, organisations and functions on all administrative levels are minimised.

Safeguarding of resources
Ministries include their strategic tasks and relevant maintenance and development requirements in their own operating and financial plans and budget proposals. Development is planned within the authorised spending limits. Administrative sectors are responsible for providing the necessary powers by amending regulations, as appropriate to the control of disturbances.

Taking the international dimension of preparedness into account
The underlying causes of Finland’s success are, for example, globalisation and the closely associated international division of labour in many fields. National preparedness arrangements take account of the opportunities and uncertainty factors that arise as a result of international developments. Each vital function of society contains its intrinsic international dimension.

Monitoring of preparedness development
The administrative sectors’ measures for developing and maintaining preparedness are monitored. This makes it possible to suitably and properly guide national preparedness. Each ministry monitors the development of capabilities required by the strategic tasks within its mandate.

Co-ordination of measures
While one of the goals is to identify possible shortcomings in activities and to clarify the roles and responsibilities, the overall goals of co-ordination are to avoid unnecessary duplication. Subject to legislation, the competent authority is always in charge of making decisions, during and after the
implementation of co-ordination. Some or all administrative sectors may be co-operation partners. Depending on the case, the same also applies to the representatives of the business community and organisations.

2.2 Management of Government affairs

2.2.1 Desired end state

Management of Government affairs encompasses the combined activities of the Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Government as well as ministries in drawing on the resources of the nation as required by security situations. Finland’s participation in the EU decision-making is an element of the management of state affairs.

The objective is an end state in which everything is in place to enable Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Government to make decisions with regard to safeguarding society’s vital functions in a given security situation. Decision-making is carried out in accordance with the constitution and existing statutes.

The competent authority leads activities in co-operation with other authorities, the business community and organisations. Intersectoral co-operation bodies can be used to support co-operation and coordinate activities on all administrative levels. Top state leadership may also launch the required co-ordination required by the situation.

Finland’s contribution to the EU’s decision-making is secured by safeguarding the national preparation of EU issues and participating in the work of EU bodies.

The competent ministry is responsible for implementing the Government decisions. The management systems in use in administrative sectors must enable the implementation of statutory decisions to secure the functions vital to society as required by the security situation. Decisions are based on situation awareness which is compiled and analysed by different administrative sectors and transmitted to decision-makers. The Government Situation Centre has access to reliable and up-to-date situation awareness which can be used by the state leadership and other actors.

Ministries and other authorities which are important to securing the functions vital to society ensure their continued functioning under all circumstances through administrative, structural and technical measures. Leadership and operational preparedness is maintained around the clock, when necessary. The operational preparedness of ministries and specifically designated government agencies, which are important for security in society, is maintained by building and maintaining protected command facilities. The authorities on regional and local levels secure their continued functioning under all circumstances. Protected command facilities are maintained to the required extent in particular for emergency conditions on the basis of a national strategy to be drawn up.

Communications support the activities of the state leadership and other decision-makers and guarantee the dissemination of correct and timely information to the general public and the media. Communications and situation awareness generation operate in close co-operation. Both internal and
external communications will be guaranteed. Apart from Finnish and Swedish, the national languages, also the Sami language and other languages will be taken into consideration to the necessary extent.

Authorities on the different administrative levels are prepared to ensure that duties can be discharged as smoothly as possible and, for their part, seek to ensure the overall security of citizens. Through planning a co-operation network to promote security is maintained; authorities, the business community and organisations participate in it. Co-operation is of particular importance in the management of disturbances.

Citizens’ participation in decision-making related to society’s functions is safeguarded by the Constitution. Elections are held in a statutory manner; early elections can be held at the earliest when 50 days have elapsed.

The constitutional right to protection under the law is guaranteed. Decisions depriving people of individual rights and freedoms or placing responsibilities on them will require a legal basis. Acts restricting basic rights may not affect the right to life, protection of health, personal freedom, the protection of property or other core rights. Human rights obligations are observed. The realization of basic and human rights is monitored, as is the legality of the authorities’ actions.

2.2.2 Strategic tasks

Guaranteeing the proper functioning of the Government (PMO). Action will be taken in accordance with legislation and procedures pertaining to Government decision-making and the existing organisational structure. The required premises as well as appropriate functioning and development of technical systems and support organisations are maintained. Co-operation between the Government, Parliament and the President of the Republic is conducted as required by law and in accordance with agreed co-operation practices.

To ensure the Government’s smooth decision-making procedure the times and locations of the Government plenary session, the presidential session, the meetings of the Cabinet Committees and the unofficial meetings of the Government are secured and information is provided on exceptional arrangements according to the established practice. At the same time, needs to convene co-operation bodies will be studied.

The equipment level and readiness to be used of the premises as well as the proper functioning of the support organisation are maintained so that the securing of society’s vital functions is possible in all security situations.

The Government situation centre, which relies on co-operation among ministries, is run by the Prime Minister’s Office and kept in operational readiness so that it is able to support Government-level management in all security situations.

The command facilities of the ministries and relevant central government authorities must be in use already under normal conditions, and the relating personnel must be trained on a regular basis. As premises are being developed, particular attention must be paid to rapidly emerging disturbances and the need to improve command preparedness (including situation awareness) without delay.

Finland’s activities in the European Union and securing the national preparation and handling of EU matters (PMO). National co-ordination arrangements are secured to enable Finland’s well-timed participation in the decision-making of the European Union. Ministries are responsible for issues relating to the EU within their mandates. The
function of the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs is to co-ordinate the preparation and handling of issues relating to the European Union.

Co-operation between the EU bodies and Finland will be further intensified to develop crisis situation management, taking into consideration the duties and opportunities coming with the Lisbon Treaty. Capabilities will be developed to implement the obligations pursuant to the solidarity clause. Finland actively participates in the EU’s emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements with a view to ensuring that the EU can effectively support its Member States in crisis management. Furthermore, Finland will actively contribute to the development of the EU’s Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements (CCA) so that the EU will be able to support member states in the management of crisis situations. The Government Situation Centre acts as a contact point for situations relating to the CCA and the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism.

Functioning of Government communications (PMO). The ability to support the Government through communications is maintained. This encompasses the co-ordination of interauthority communications, dissemination of reliable and timely information to the general public, the media and key interest groups as well as every ministry’s responsibility for providing information concerning issues within its own administrative sector.

The authorities’ joint telephone and internet-based communication services will be further developed for example by setting up a citizens’ portal to serve crisis communications. A sufficient number of civil servants are selected earmarked and trained for crisis communications. The crisis communications capabilities of the companies, communities and organisations that support administration are developed in view of disturbances and emergency conditions.

Maintenance of the Government’s situation picture (PMO). A prognostic and real-time situation picture is compiled to support Government decision-making and communications and to improve situation awareness of security issues relating to the state and society.

The situation picture is developed by taking into account and utilising the authorities’ other pre-existing or future IT environments. Co-operation and planning that serve the compilation of the situation picture are improved among the different sectors of administration including regional and local levels. Co-operation between the gathering of information, the compiling of the situation picture and communications is intensified and tested. National structures tap into the co-operation with the EU’s Situation Centre (SitCen) and the companies and organisations that practise contingency measures. Crisis preparedness of the business community is improved by regular co-operation regarding situation picture.

Securing the rule of law (MoJ). The principle of the rule of law, which guarantees constitutionally protected rights, is secured. This involves the ability of the judicial and law enforcement authorities to function and cooperate as well as ensuring the prerequisites of a functioning judicial system.

The resources of the judiciary and the prison service are tailored to meet demands of the situation. When powers provided for in the Emergency Powers Act are invoked, the powers of the judiciary are updated so that the principles underlying fair trials can be adhered to.
Holding elections (MoJ). The necessary technical arrangements are made to ensure that general elections can be held in accordance with the law in all security situations. Furthermore, the preparedness to hold early general elections is maintained at all times.

Organisational arrangements, data systems and election materials are kept up-to-date in compliance with the schedule and operational requirements. The Ministry of Justice is not the only entity involved in preparedness requirements. Electoral district committees, municipal central election committees, the Population Register Centre and local register offices also have a role to play. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs collaborate in providing voting opportunities for Finns residing abroad. Required funding and communications arrangements for the elections are maintained.

2.3 International activities

2.3.1 Desired end state

By participating in international activities contacts are maintained with foreign states and Finland's operating conditions are secured in international organisations and co-operation arrangements. International information security obligations are observed in accordance with relevant legislation and international agreements that bind Finland. Foreign trade is safeguarded so that import and export, vital to the security of supply and the functioning of the business community, can go on as uninterrupted as possible. Furthermore, international activity also means the capability to obtain any needed external assistance and support as well as providing these to other states, assisting Finnish citizens and those residing in Finland on a permanent basis during disturbances abroad.
International activity is guaranteed by upholding the capabilities of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other actors, securing the preconditions of foreign trade and developing the international contacts of other administrative sectors. Finland's diplomatic and consular missions abroad maintain sufficient consular services and capabilities to assist Finnish citizens and those residing in Finland on a permanent basis when emergencies occur overseas. They also have readiness to co-operate with other Nordic countries and EU member states.

Finland's positions and opinions are conveyed to the attention of foreign states and other international actors in an active, efficient and reliable manner. All ministries are directly responsible for international activities and co-operation within their mandates.

Foreign trade is safeguarded so that import and export, vital to the security of supply and the functioning of the business community can go on uninterrupted in varying security situations. Under emergency conditions it is necessary to ensure that the decisions on trade policy, the preconditions of foreign trade and the single market are consistent with Finland's foreign trade objectives. Responsible authorities co-operate to achieve this objective.

Finland has readiness both to implement its international obligations to provide aid (including the mutual assistance obligation and the solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty) and to receive assistance. Any possible requests and offers regarding support and assistance are rapidly and reliably communicated to other countries and international organisations. Finland is prepared to efficiently receive and provide international assistance. To guarantee rapid and uninterrupted humanitarian aid and rescue activities the authorities aim to provide humanitarian organisations with necessary operating conditions and to facilitate their work with all possible means. Depending on the situation, the provision and reception of assistance is implemented by using all possible international channels. Humanitarian organisations can deliver assistance to and from Finland through their own distribution channels. Finnish authorities safeguard the functioning of foreign missions in Helsinki.

Finland's ability to participate in international crisis management and international humanitarian and civil protection activities will be maintained and developed.

2.3.2 Strategic tasks

Maintaining contacts with foreign states and key international actors (MFA). By maintaining contacts it is guaranteed that Finland can convey its positions and opinions to the attention of foreign states and other international actors. Here the European Union is a key actor. In order to meet these objectives, an appropriately proportioned network of diplomatic and consular missions with expert resources is maintained in relevant locations abroad. Up-to-date and secure telecommunications exist between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the missions abroad. The missions function in close co-operation in particular with the European External Action Service, the EU member states and the missions of the Nordic countries. Up-to-date and dependable telecommunication systems of Finnish authorities on the EU level and with foreign states and international organisations are safeguarded.

In accordance with the Act on International Information Security Obligations, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
acts as the National Security Authority (NSA) whose task it is to direct and monitor that the data to be especially protected is appropriately protected and handled. Following international information security obligations, the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Command and the Security Police act as designated security authorities (DSAs) and the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority as the National Communications Security Authority (NCSA), constituting the security authorities responsible for statutory tasks as well as tasks based on international information security obligations.

All ministries, within their mandates, bear responsibility international activity and co-operation. As regards treaties or other international obligations, the ministry within whose purview the matter falls deals with them. Treaties and other international obligations that pertain to foreign and security policy views are handled by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It also assists other administrative sectors in co-ordinating international matters. Treaties that fall within the competency of the EU are co-ordinated by the Prime Minister’s Office.

In order to support decision-making related to international activity, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other ministries within their administrative sectors maintain a dependable and real-time situation picture related to the international operating environment. The business community and organisations participate, for their field of operations and in the manner they determine, in compiling and conveying the information to authorities, and vice-versa. The Government situation centre compiles, assesses and co-ordinates information and conveys the compiled situation picture to the state leadership, different administrative sectors and, to the appropriate extent, also to the business community and organisations.

Possible requests and offers regarding support and assistance are rapidly and reliably communicated to other countries and international organisations. Authorities involved in humanitarian and rescue tasks co-operate with organisations as appropriate.

In addition to the work within the European Union, Finland continues to co-operate with Nato to further develop civil emergency preparedness. Nordic co-operation is also intensified.

The network of missions is developed to satisfy the demand for consular services created by the growing number of tourists and the needs of business community also outside the EU. The telecommunications links of the Foreign Service are developed by increasing and improving wireless solutions and communications systems, as standalone as possible, and by harmonising it with state IT systems (such as the authorities’ secure ICT system).

Protecting and assisting abroad Finnish citizens and those residing in Finland on a permanent basis (MFA). The preparedness to assist and protect the interests of Finnish citizens abroad in situations where their security is or has become threatened is maintained. This involves, in particular, sufficient and effective consular services and well-functioning on-call and alert systems.

In order to maintain a satisfactory service and response capability, the MFA's consular rapid deployment teams are kept in operational readiness. Furthermore, the functioning of the on-call and alert system, as well as corresponding IT systems in the Diplomatic Service is guaranteed. Missions are to maintain up-to-date contingency and evacuation plans, proper contacts with the authorities of the host state, possibilities to co-operate with the missions of the Nordic countries and other EU Member States as
well as good working relations with the local Finnish community and travel organisations. Capital-to-capital contacts particularly focus on an appropriate exchange of information between the Nordic countries, EU Member States and EU institutions.

In accordance with the Lisbon treaty, the EU citizens are entitled, when in third countries, to receive assistance from any Member State’s diplomatic or consular service if their own country does not have a competent mission in the area. This also applies to Finland’s missions; assistance will be provided on the same grounds both to Finnish and other EU citizens. When necessary, Finnish citizens can turn to an EU or Nordic mission. The EU’s consular service applies only to EU citizens, not third country citizens residing in Finland on a permanent basis. As agreed among the Nordic countries, receiving and providing assistance is similarly available to all those residing in a Nordic country on a permanent basis at a local Nordic mission. The Nordic mission providing such assistance is agreed on locally.

In addition to the authorities, contacts are maintained to the extent required by the situation with actors and organisations from the business sector, such as travel organisers, transport companies, the health care sector and the Finnish Red Cross. Moreover, by tapping into IT solutions utilising the internet and mobile devices, the MFA guarantees a sufficient capability to receive information from the general public and to provide information to it. This involves, for example, issuing travel advice based on an up-to-date situation picture.

**Securing Finland’s foreign trade (MFA).** By applying trade policies which comply with the trade legislation of the European Community, the preconditions are guaranteed for the import and export that are vital to secure appropriate living conditions for the people and the functioning of the business community.

Regulating foreign trade is a part of the European Community’s common trade policy, in which the Member States exercise joint jurisdiction. Unless specifically permitted in Community legislation, a single Member State’s individual trade policy measures are prohibited. Nevertheless, in order to maintain public order and security, the Treaty on the European Union allows import and export restrictions for the purpose of protecting human, animal and plant health. On corresponding grounds, the free movement of labour and capital can be restricted. Should the security situation compel Finland to implement national measures affecting the Single Market, consultations with the other Member States and the European Commission would be required.

Finland actively contributes to an undisturbed functioning of the Single Market and thus guarantees the availability of strategic products. A Member State can take action which it deems necessary for its key security interests and which relates to the production and of and trade in weapons, ordnance and military supplies. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules include exemptions on national security interests.

It must be possible to control and, if necessary, regulate the export of strategic products in domestic undersupply situations. It must also be possible to link domestic trade regulations to the export and import regulations of comparable products.

Finland’s membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) entails that problems relating to monetary and foreign exchange policies must be primarily solved through the EMU’s common procedures.
In addition to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Finnish authorities participate in the regulation of foreign trade, pursuant to their mandates.

In exceptional situations, which include possible disturbances in the EU’s trade policy, the responsible authorities (MFA, MoEE, MoAF, MoTC and the Finnish Customs) co-operate to safeguard the co-ordination of the decisions relating to the trade policy, foreign trade and the Single Market from the perspective of the objectives set for Finland’s foreign trade.

**Comprehensive crisis management (MFA).** Finland participates in international military crisis management operations. The objective is, in the spirit of solidarity, to prevent and limit crises as well as to prevent their effects from reaching Finland.

Finland’s participation in international crisis management is based on the guidelines established in the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, Finland’s comprehensive crisis management strategy and the decisions taken by the state leadership. Evaluations and decisions regarding Finland’s participation in international crisis management are made under the leadership of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in co-operation with other relevant ministries. The final decision on participating in military crisis management and ending participation is made for each case separately by the President of the Republic on the basis of a proposal by the Government.

Finland supports the development of the EU’s crisis management capability to strengthen the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Capabilities to participate in NATO-led crisis management operations in the future will be improved. Finland’s commitments to the EU and other international organisations are implemented by supporting the development of their civilian crisis management capabilities and by deploying experts to international crisis management operations. Domestic capabilities facilitating civilian crisis management are also seen to.

Finland strengthens a comprehensive approach in crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction in the strategic-level co-ordination group which is led by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Co-operation between different administrative sectors will be further developed. Military and civilian crisis management, development co-operation and humanitarian aid are co-ordinated so as to achieve optimal synergies and lasting effects.

**International military crisis management (MoD).** Finland participates in international military crisis management operations in accordance with the principles of comprehensive crisis management and supports the development of the military element in the EU’s crisis management capability. Finland improves its capabilities of participating in Nato-led crisis-management operations in the future. To this end, co-operation to develop military interoperability, force planning and the necessary capabilities as a Partnership for Peace country are sought. Finland will participate as extensively as possible in exercises.

The Defence Forces’ international interoperability is developed on national grounds and in line with the capability requirements of the UN, EU, Nato and Nordic co-operation standards, focus areas and possibilities to co-operate. Special attention is paid to developing network-centric warfare capabilities as well as rapid deployment and niche capabilities. Troops
earmarked for crisis management are trained and evaluated in a manner enabling international certification.

The development of the Defence Forces’ international co-operation aims to create the capability to operate in all command echelons as well as with various modes of operation and technical systems. Another aim is that all services and niche capabilities are able to participate in international co-operation and operations, in line with our international obligations. Furthermore, capabilities required for receiving military assistance and providing host nation support are created.

**International civilian crisis management (MoI).** Finland participates in international civilian crisis-management operations in accordance with the principles of comprehensive crisis management and supports the civilian crisis management elements of the EU’s crisis management capabilities. Domestic capabilities Domestic civilian crisis management capabilities are strengthened to correspond to Finland’s level of participation by intensifying co-operation in the use of military and civilian resources, improving the comprehensive approach in civilian crisis management activities and co-ordinating the national capabilities of civilian crisis management at Government level.

The Crisis Management Centre, co-located with the Emergency Services College, is responsible for operational tasks related to civilian crisis management: training, recruitment, research and development, materiel and logistic preparedness and the required situation picture. The training and research organised at the Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management which was jointly set up by the Crisis Management Centre and the Finnish Defence Forces’ International Centre (FINCENT), intensifies and improves co-operation with military crisis management.

The training of police and border management experts in civilian crisis management is conducted in co-operation with the Police College and the Border Guard Academy.

The civilian crisis management recruitment system and training of experts ensures that experts can efficiently and promptly be dispatched, observing the values and principles of the national strategy. The terms and conditions of employment for experts are maintained at a sufficiently high level so that the recruitment of top experts is ensured. The solution for the rapid readiness requirement in civilian crisis management lies in establishing and training civilian expert rapid deployment teams. The number of women assigned to crisis management tasks will be increased in line with the Government decisions.

**International disaster response (MoI).** The preparedness for international disaster response is maintained. This involves the capability to provide and receive rescue personnel and relief supplies.

International disaster activities are developed in such a manner that Finland is able to provide and receive assistance during major accidents and that Finland can participate in the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism and in other international rescue co-operation. The procedures and obligations agreed at the international level will be observed. In addition, the training of personnel is developed and required supplementary equipment as well as other necessary gear is procured, and a stockpiling plan that meets the requirements of rapid response is drawn up. The availability and transport options of the existing resources are studied at the planning phase.
Readiness to provide assistance builds on securing the readiness of national rescue services in major accidents. The experience gained in operations raises also the level of domestic readiness.

2.4 Finland’s defence capability

2.4.1 Desired end state

Defence capability refers to readiness which is developed and maintained through defence policy, co-ordination of the comprehensive defence approach and military defence, and the ability to carry out defence tasks in all situations.

Defence capability creates a credible deterrent in our security environment against the use of or the threat of using military force. The deterrence necessitates a demonstrable capability, appropriate to the military capacities within the security environment. The defence capability is scaled to safeguard Finland’s territorial integrity and preparations are made to defend the entire area of the nation. Based on the comprehensive defence approach, defence is implemented in a comprehensive manner including the capabilities of the Defence Forces, other authorities and society.

By the development, maintenance and flexible employment of defence capabilities preparations are made to prevent and, if necessary, repel political, economic or military pressure or the use of military force against Finland. Through co-operation among authorities society prepares against wide-ranging security threats. The defence capability is maintained through networking on the national and international levels.

The defence administration supports other areas of society and authorities who in turn provide support to the defence administration. The development of Finland’s security environment is monitored and by generating information about the current situation other authorities are supported in protecting society’s vital functions and targets. The authorities and communities who take part in voluntary defence cooperate with the defence administration.

2.4.2 Strategic tasks

Finland’s military defence (MoD). The nation’s military defence comprises the following tasks: monitoring and safeguarding territorial integrity, protecting society and its functions, preventing and repelling a military attack and preparing to receive and use military assistance.

The principles of nation-wide territorial defence are followed to conduct Finland’s military defence. It is based on general conscription, a strong will to defend the country and international military cooperation.

Conflicts that erupt in the operating environment may in extreme cases cause intimidation by threatening to use military force or to apply it also against Finland. The use and threat of military force are prevented and military aggression is repelled in the entire area of the nation.

It must be possible to detect early enough the emergence of threats. This requires the compilation of a military situation picture to provide early warning and enough preparation time.
A sufficient prevention capability requires that the key troops and systems of the defence system are capable of repelling an attack. This requires that military force can be rapidly moved in the entire area of the nation and that focal points change to meet the requirements of the evolving situation.

At decisive points the aggressor is repelled and defeated in a joint operation of all services. The services are supported by joint intelligence, surveillance, logistics and increasing the effect of engagement. Crisis resilience and the security of supply in society are promoted by networking. International networking enables Finland to receive assistance, acquire materiel in a cost-effective manner and improve the security of supply. The defence capability is improved against cyber attacks.

Society’s vital targets are protected in co-operation with other authorities. Co-operation among authorities and society’s support to military defence is organised on a contractual basis and through co-operation arrangements and exercises.

Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, the Border Guard which is an integral element of the defence system and participates in national defence. It executes its national defence tasks by participating in defence preparations and taking into consideration the overall reorganisation of the defence system and the structural reorganisation of the Defence Forces and by providing military and border surveillance training to conscripts, reservists and staff. The internal military organisation and the independent status, capable of action, of the Border Guard will be preserved.

Supporting the other authorities (MoD). These functions comprise executive assistance, participation in disaster response and support to an authority in providing assistance to another state.

The arrangements of support given to other authorities will be developed, the exchange of information between authorities will be improved and the capabilities applicable and available to executive assistance maintained. The key capabilities available to executive assistance are the following: area surveillance capability; field communication systems; search and oil spill recovery readiness on land and at sea; intelligence, analysis and decontamination of CBRNE; fire fighting; rescue and clearing; clearing of explosives; building of temporary bridges and roads; first aid and evacuation; land, sea and air transports; SAR by helicopters; guarding duties; accommodation and maintenance services; and expert assistance.

Readiness to support other authorities when they assist other EU Member States will be developed by taking into consideration the obligations coming with the Treaty of Lisbon.
2.5 Internal security

2.5.1 Desired end state

Internal security encompasses the measures which prevent and combat crime against Finland and its population, prevent accidents and environmental damage or other such disturbances and threats and which are used to manage their consequences. The operational measures of competent authorities are highlighted in the maintenance of internal security for which preconditions are guaranteed by legislation. Close co-operation between other authorities and actors on all administrative levels supports this work.

The law enforcement system guarantees the preconditions for the police as well as other law enforcement and investigative authorities. It also upholds the constitutional rule of law. Public order and security protect the basic infrastructure of society, prevent and combat terrorism, organised and other serious crime as well as serious disorderly conduct.

Through an independent and non-biased security analysis of serious accidents and other irregular events that have taken place it is sought to prevent, as effectively as possible, such incidents from reoccurring.

In maintaining internal security, the measures taken by authorities are supported and complemented by organisations and businesses which play an important role in preventing accidents, carrying out independent civil defence tasks and mitigating the repercussions of accidents. The activities of organisations also include tasks for the development of and training and education in internal security. The activities of the organisations and their co-operation with authorities are actively developed and promoted.

Emergency and maritime search and rescue services prevent and detect major accidents and issue relevant warnings. The goal is to prevent accidents altogether, provide aid and assistance to those in immediate danger, rescue the victims and reduce the escalation of such accidents by minimising their damages.

As to civil defence, the tasks referred to in the protocols to the Geneva Conventions are guaranteed. Different authorities and entities are responsible, for their part, for taking into consideration the civil defence obligations in their preparedness planning. Civil defence arrangements are dimensioned to respond to the threat scenarios and military defence capabilities. Independent preparedness is maintained and developed so that communities and businesses are involved to be a part of the system and the population has sufficient preparedness to act correctly during disturbances and emergency conditions. The building of civil defence shelters will be continued primarily to prepare for military threats.

Flood control and dam safety measures are used to prepare for sudden events and accidents as well as for gradual processes such as climate change.

Oil and chemical spills in soil and waters are rapidly detected and controlled. Prevention is well-timed and effective.

State border management guarantees tranquil conditions at our borders and expeditious and safe conduct of border
Managed immigration guarantees regulated migration and control for the relating decision-making. It prevents and combats illegal immigration. The management of a major influx of asylum seekers also includes the capability of receiving the migrants and providing them with basic services appropriate to the situation.

Taking into consideration local circumstances, the availability of emergency response functions is guaranteed and their quality is safeguarded in the entire country. Services are to be provided both in Finnish and Swedish. To the extent required, the Saami language and other languages are also taken into account. The operational model is to be changed so that emergency response functions will be harmonised in the entire country by the year 2015 and that the staff possesses sufficient competences.

2.5.2 Strategic tasks

Guaranteeing protection under the law (MoJ). The functioning of the courts of law and penalty enforcement authorities as well as co-operation between them are safeguarded. Equal protection under the law for the population is guaranteed by, among other things, up-to-date statutes and efficient enforcement of criminal liability.

The powers and number of personnel of the law enforcement and judicial authorities are maintained at the level required by the operating environment and their tasks. Preconditions and operational models for prompt handling of matters are established. The technical standards of court buildings will be improved so that even the most serious forms of crime can safely be tried in courts of law. As stated in the Government Resolution on the Internal Security Programme, the measures aiming at the protection of witnesses, which includes the creation of relevant statutes, will be implemented. The prison administration is preparing for increasing and new forms of criminality. In order to improve the operating conditions of prisons, their internal risks are taken into account when security systems are developed. The security of prisoner transport is improved.

As to the legislation and methods regarding the conditions and treatment of prisoners, the obligations based on the international conventions on human rights and the relating tasks of the International Committee of the Red Cross will be taken into consideration as appropriate.
Public order and security (MoI). Serious disturbances in society are prevented. Crimes endangering peoples’ basic rights and targeted against the foundations of society and the economy are combated. This involves a police capability to immediately intervene in threats or crimes.

Intelligence, analysis and intersectoral co-operation, in particular in the EU and at the international level, are developed. The exchange of information is increased on combating, exposing and solving cross-border crime as well as on operations within the EU and with countries highly significant for Finland. This makes it easier to combat various threats through intelligence-based law enforcement.

By engaging in nation-wide security planning, it is possible to have the various actors in society committed as partners in the fight against crime. Measures related to the surveillance of organised crime, financial crime and foreign workers are developed. Expansion of the area in the EU where persons have the right to move freely is taken into account in the maintenance of public order and security. The powers, numbers of personnel, training and equipment of the law enforcement authorities are maintained at the level required by the operating environment and their tasks.

Co-operation between the law enforcement authorities, i.e. the Police, Finnish Customs and the Border Guard (PCB authorities) is intensified and focuses on crime-fighting. The expansion of the Schengen area presupposes even more effective and comprehensive crime-fighting on the national level, between old Member States and also among the law enforcement authorities of the new Member States. Operational inter-authority co-operation is developed in line with the principles of Finnish PCB co-operation.

Preparations will be started to develop the statutory basis and structures of the reserve police system so that the reserve police could better support the measures of security authorities also during disturbances in normal conditions.

Adopted in the Government Resolution in 2010, the recommended measures presented in the national counter-terrorism strategy will be implemented. To combat terrorism, a terrorism situation picture is created. This includes data on terrorist activities threatening Finland, possible targets of terrorism as well as persons deemed to be a threat and who either reside in Finland or threaten Finland. As the situation picture is compiled, reports from institutions participating in the EU’s police and judicial authorities’ co-operation as well as other international contacts are utilised.

Appropriate measures are launched to prevent radicalisation in Finland.

Police counter-terrorism units, technical capabilities and the legislative basis are maintained at the level required by the situation picture. The implementation and development of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy and plan of action are continued. The common use of the EU’s pre-existing and planned information systems in the fight against terrorism in law enforcement is developed. The use of the Border Guard’s special capabilities and equipment in counter-terrorism activities is developed together with the police. The performance and interoperability of the Defence Forces and the special response units of other authorities are developed under the leadership of the police and in co-operation with other authorities.
Emergency services and maritime search and rescue (MoI). Serious accidents are prevented, detected and warned of. In addition, accidents are restricted by attempting to limit their consequences.

Rescue activities concerning accidents and disasters are developed. When developing the system, the focus is on the capability to launch swift and efficient rescue operations during major accidents. This involves contingency planning, the maintenance and development of sufficient personnel and materiel capabilities as well as developing the detection, analysis and operating capabilities in situations involving CBRNE threats. Emergency services, for their part, contribute to the planning of this area.

Maritime search and rescue (SAR) is organised in such a way that assistance can be provided without delay, scaled as required by the situation. SAR falls within the purview of the Border Guard. For this purpose, constant command and communications readiness is maintained, appropriate radio communications in emergencies is ensured and SAR tasks are carried out with the support of other maritime authorities. According to the division of tasks of responsible authorities, the SAR command and control system of the Border Guard can also be used to lead other security situations and tasks at sea.

Modern and appropriately secure surveillance, warning and command systems are developed for emergency and maritime SAR services. The use of electronic media in issuing warnings to the general public is developed with the objective of enabling the authorities to alert the entire population by using some electronic medium. Particularly in areas where there is a risk of a major accident endangering the safety of the population it must be possible to alert people outdoors using general alarm signals around protected targets.

In emergency conditions search and rescue arrangements including materiel readiness are built on threat scenarios which provide the basis for defence planning.

The population can be warned and alerted to emergencies as well as disturbances in normal conditions. According to risk assessments and the given threat situation the population is prepared to be protected in civil defence shelters, by evacuations or by placing them in premises that yield the maximum protection or temporary shelters. By developing independent preparedness and civil defence measures sheltering in residential or other premises is supported. The building of civil defence shelters will be continued primarily to prepare for military threats.

Flood risk management and dam safety (MoAF). Floods, flood damages and dam failures are prevented and averted and preparedness to mitigate their consequences is maintained.

Flood risk management is improved by assessing the flood risks of waterways and coasts and the risk posed by heavy rains, charting significant flood risk areas and drawing up management plans to contain them, taking the risks into account in land use planning and implementing necessary flood protection measures at critical locations. In order to improve operational flood prevention, water level monitoring and forecasting of water situations, warning systems and co-operation procedures are maintained.
Emergency response functions (MoI). The emergency response functions are improved and their productivity is increased by developing the structures and staff competences in the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) Administration. A nationwide information system and a common database will be developed and introduced.

Emergency response functions will be harmonised and the information systems integrated into the operational command systems of security authorities. For its part, this will create capabilities to use emergency response functions for alerts in emergency conditions.

The operational readiness of the ERCs will be developed so that the standby strength enables the implementation of harmonised processes. In addition, the adaptation to and reliability in different conditions and emergency conditions will improve when, for example, ERCs effectively support each other.

Oil and chemical spill response on land and water (MoE). Oil and chemical spills on land and water are prevented, recovered and limited. This involves vessel safety requirements, vessel traffic service (VTS) systems and oil spill recovery.

It is possible to reduce oil and chemical spills at sea with an efficient VTS system. In addition, capabilities to detect accidents and to rapidly limit and manage their consequences are developed. The Finnish Environment Centre SYKE maintains 24/7 duty readiness in view of various environmental accidents. Oil spill response readiness is improved by procuring a multi-purpose vessel capable of recovering oil even under winter conditions. The Border Guard's capacity for monitoring and combating oil spills on the open sea and coastal areas is enhanced. Collaboration with other Baltic Sea States is developed in view of accidents and the capacity of recovery equipment is assessed. In co-operation with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) a network of chemical expert services and a satellite image service are maintained to detect oil spills.

Oil and chemical spills in land areas are prevented with effective risk management both in the logistic chain and in plants and facilities. The actors are to meet permit requirements, the following of which is supervised at set intervals. They draw up a rescue plan where the prevention and planned recovery measures are entered. The functioning of the rescue plan is tested in the company, both independently and with rescue authorities. Co-operation between authorities and companies is increased and further developed to ensure better management of accidents involving hazardous substances in land areas.

Border management (MoI). Violations of provisions concerning the crossing of the national border and the seaward limit of territorial sea as well as threats against public order and security caused by cross-border passenger traffic are prevented. Furthermore, a safe and smooth flow of border traffic is guaranteed. This involves combating and exposing human trafficking and smuggling, the smuggling of nuclear agents and other radioactive substances, inspecting border traffic, surveillance of the Finnish-Russian border as well as the capability to reinstate border checks on a temporary basis on the internal borders of the Schengen area.

In order to sustain and develop the entirety of border management, different actors and equipment are co-ordinated both nationally and at the EU level. The free movement of people and the expansion of the Schengen area necessitate further development of the
EU’s integrated border management system as well as bolstering checks and surveillance on the external borders of the Union. Finland actively promotes the EU’s border policies, integrated border management and the development of the common environment for exchanging information on the EU’s integrated maritime policy and the EU’s waters. Finland plays an active role in the border security co-operation co-ordinated by Frontex and in the key projects to develop the maritime policy. Finland will make use of the opportunities provided by the European External Borders Fund for the development of its own border management system.

A border situation picture is maintained to guarantee the functioning of the national border management system and a model and system capable of producing risk analysis is developed. As to the eastern border, border controls correspond to the risk analysis made; the focus is on the south-east border. Elsewhere on the eastern border the border surveillance model is developed to correspond to the conditions of a peaceful and sparsely populated border area. Criminal intelligence and investigation are developed in the core task areas of the Border Guard. Co-operation between authorities on the national and international level is continued to combat human trafficking and smuggling.

To guarantee a safe and smooth flow of border traffic, infrastructure at international border crossing points, human resources and technical equipment are developed to meet the requirements of increasing traffic and security risks. This project is a joint operation, involving the Finnish Border Guard, Customs and the Road Enterprise. Russian authorities will also be included in the development project with the aim of establishing smooth and safe border crossing practices. The automation of the basic tasks in border surveillance and border controls are continued.

Immigration control (MoI). Legal immigration is consistently developed and, at the same time, the means to prevent illegal entry are maintained. This involves the regulation of legal immigration and decision-making based on law, a situation picture on the development of legal and illegal immigration and the exchange of information between authorities. The EU-related obligations are also taken into account including operational co-operation between the EU and the Member States.

The Finnish Immigration Service handles and makes decisions on matters relating to entry, stay in the country, displacement and Finnish citizenship. A number of ministries are responsible for promoting integration: the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for preparing the integration policy and co-ordinating measures with other administrative sectors; the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for the employment services incorporated into the integration process of immigrants. The regional Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres) are responsible for co-ordinating immigration and integration matters in their regions. In addition, they ensure that integration training, which is a part of labour market training, is provided for immigrants while the Employment and Economic Development Offices are responsible for the services supporting the integration and employment of immigrants. Municipalities bear the overall responsibility to co-ordinate the development, planning and monitoring of the immigrants’ integration. Measures and services that promote and support the integration process are organised by municipalities.
By vigourously combating illegal immigration, the overall fight against crime is supported and the means for responding to extensive unwanted immigration flows are created. Exchange of information necessary for taking practical measures and co-ordination of matters among competent authorities are further developed and made use of when necessary. Co-operation in the EU context and other international co-operation, including regional transboundary co-operation, are utilised and increased when necessary. The development of the EU’s common asylum and migration policies contributes to the management of legal and illegal immigration. Furthermore, the development of common and effective return and deportation policies contributes to managing disturbances.

In combating illegal immigration special attention must be paid to guaranteeing international protection as provided in the Geneva Convention. It must be possible to identify those in need of protection, and their protection must be guaranteed. Similarly, those attempting to abuse asylum procedures are to be quickly identified from among justified applications.

Visa requirements are an effective way to combat illegal immigration already in the country of departure. The knowledge of local conditions that Finnish missions have acquired and co-operation with the embassies of other Schengen countries in visa matters increases both national security and that of the Schengen area.

The management of a major influx of asylum seekers (MoI). Preparedness to control a major influx of asylum seekers is maintained. This involves establishing reception centres, other reception arrangements as well as comprehensive co-operation among authorities. Decisions on temporary protection are made nationally, when necessary, or on the basis of the EU Council decision.

In these kinds of situations, the border security system is tasked to see to it that the authorities are able to properly monitor those wishing to enter the country. Permit application and deportation systems are developed so that the identities of all applicants can be established and their biometric data be promptly and efficiently processed.

ELY Centres continue to maintain preparedness plans with municipalities to set up reception centres and other reception arrangements in case of a major influx of asylum seekers. Suitable premises are identified together with municipalities, and possibly with other entities. Preliminary contracts are signed to facilitate the reception of up to 100 000 asylum seekers. As additional personnel are recruited, the role of trained volunteers and organisations must also be taken into account. Participation in setting up reception centres by bodies governed by public law, private associations and foundations will be decided both on the national level and locally in case of a major influx of asylum seekers.

A national reception centre register is developed for the purpose of serving the national situation picture as well as for managing a large-scale influx of asylum seekers. The Ministry of the Interior, jointly with the ELY Centres and Regional State Administrative Agencies (AVI), makes an assessment of the required transport equipment for different threat situations, makes the necessary provisions and draws up plans for establishing regional co-operation teams tasked to co-ordinate the immigration.
The required standards and setting up arrangements for the planned reception centres are detailed in the reception centres' contingency plans. The task of the Finnish Immigration Service is to make the setting up agreements with municipalities and private actors. The services for the asylum seekers, including food services, accommodation, clothing and necessary health services are to be provided without delay after their arrival at the reception centre. This requires that food services are established and health services are agreed upon in advance with the municipalities and the AVIs.

2.6 Functioning of the economy and infrastructure

2.6.1 Desired end state

The functioning of the economy refers to the economic exchange which meets the population and the business community's basic needs and supports a sufficiently healthy state economy. The maintenance of infrastructure means the technical structures and organisations which are necessary for the population's livelihood and for the functioning of society. This entirety includes the safeguarding of the state economy, the financial market and the insurance business, securing the functioning of food supply as well as the electronic ICT systems and transports. Furthermore, sustaining society's basic economic functions, a competent labour force, preserving a first-rate education system and research structure as well as detecting, controlling and adapting to significant changes in the environment are also included.

The significance of robust public finances increases in emergency conditions. The role of public authorities in securing the welfare of citizens inevitably increases when normal economic activities are disturbed. Decisions regarding state revenue and expenditure guarantee the resources required by the public authorities' functions.
The functioning of the public economy is assessed as an entity. For example, in emergency conditions, municipalities’ responsibilities have to be re-evaluated in order to secure adequate funding for key functions. In the desired end state, economic stability, an effective taxation policy and collection of taxes, controlled central government borrowing and the efficiency of the budgeting system are safeguarded. An efficient budgeting system guarantees that appropriations can be allocated to their appropriate purposes in the given situation. This requires good co-operation between ministries as well as readiness to make proposals and decisions on savings and reallocation of appropriations.

The solid functioning of the financial markets is based on the structures of financial institutions and the European central Bank. The primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The Bank of Finland is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and, for its part, implements the Euro zone’s single monetary policy as defined by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The stable functioning of the financial and insurance markets as well as key services is secured through co-operation among the proper authorities and companies. The functioning of the money supply, payment systems and financial services are secured by appropriate arrangements. Serious financial crises and emergency conditions require measures which are jointly implemented within the Eurosystem but national arrangements have significance, too.

The functioning of infrastructure is a multidimensional entity. The general goals of security of supply are scaled to safeguard the population’s livelihood and to uphold society’s vital functions as well as the material preconditions for national defence. These arrangements are in place to safeguard the population, should the normal functioning of the market not generate sufficient security of supply. The premise of Finland’s security of supply is the proper functioning of the single European market.

Securing a sufficient labour workforce supports the security of supply. When the population’s basic services or accident consequence management so require, the labour force can temporarily be reassigned to needed areas. The general work obligation principle guarantees a sufficient number of workers for companies that are important to the securing of society’s vital functions, national defence and society’s basic services.

To uphold the education and research system, key education services, the training of professionals and research facilities are safeguarded.

Sufficient housing is guaranteed by increasing supply or, if necessary, by imposing regulatory and other measures on housing. Sufficient construction capacity and availability is earmarked for sites of primary importance as regards military defence, civil defence, energy supply, transport routes as well as society’s other technical systems and health care.

The state of the environment is monitored so that harmful long-term changes in the environment can be detected in time to allow for corrective and restrictive measures.

Waste transports are secured, if necessary, with alternative collection and transport equipment. Non-hazardous and hazardous waste is taken to existing landfill areas or temporary areas where environmental and health impacts are low.
Energy availability is safeguarded with domestic solutions and international co-operation. The availability of energy is secured in the first place by domestic measures. The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the EU also take measures to secure the availability of oil products. Natural gas is only imported from Russia and the lack of stockpiling capacity affects the security of supply. Energy supply, comprising fuel and power supply, is safeguarded at the level provided in the Government decision on the objectives of the security of supply. Due to Finland's special conditions, security stockpiles of imported fuels have not been allowed to fall below the minimum levels of EU obligations and IEA agreements regarding the stockpiling of petroleum-based products. A versatile, economic and sufficient power generating capacity, forming the basis for the supply of electricity, is secured.

The critical functions depending on information and communications technology (ICT) systems are safeguarded. The ICT systems used by organisations and the population are reliable and secure. The functioning of these systems is appropriately safeguarded through preparedness of companies and on the basis of agreements between authorities and companies. Information security in communication networks is safeguarded. Statutory basic security requirements are assigned to communication services and service infrastructure. Compliance with regulations concerning system construction, maintenance and functioning is monitored. The ICT systems of the state leadership and security authorities secure, for their part, the timeliness and decision-making capability for the use of information and situation picture. Electronic public services, the state information management and information security are guided. Operating 24/7, the control rooms of society's critical functions use common operating models and joint technical solutions.

The management to develop and maintain public administration's common systems is centralised. The information security arrangements are included in system architecture and all government information systems conform to information security requirements.

The uninterrupted functioning of key information systems is guaranteed as required and a function is established to secure real-time situation awareness and 24/7 response capability for the key information systems in public administration. The public administration has access to a secure telecommunications network.

Technical warning systems are available with which official warnings and advice via electronic media can rapidly be issued to Finnish citizens, both home and abroad in large and sudden catastrophes.

The continuation of transports is secured also during disturbances and emergency conditions. The preconditions for society's necessary transports are safeguarded in all situations. In order to guarantee domestic transports, the public authorities regulate the preparedness and security measures of organisations responsible for constructing and managing transport routes, ports and harbours, airports and other transport hubs. In order to maintain foreign trade, availability of the required vessels is safeguarded. Finland will retain the independent decision-making capability to carry out air transports required for the functioning of society and the security of supply in all situations. Transport infrastructure and the key logistic chains are secured. Contingency plans include the use
of transport equipment and the sufficiency of fuels for the most important tasks with regard to securing society’s vital functions in emergency conditions. When it comes to securing Finland’s vital transports, state guarantees can be issued in situations where commercial insurance is unobtainable.

**Food and water supply as well as securing the quality of drinking water are of significance in meeting the basic needs.** Food supply guarantees sufficient, healthy and safe nourishment to the population as regards the energy and nutrient content. The supply of production inputs (including labour force) needed in the primary production and processing of foodstuffs, logistics, household and mass caterers, and water services is secured. Basic agricultural production ensures the raw material supply for the food and feed industry. Food industry that is founded on self-sufficient production of the most important agricultural products and emergency stockpiles of cereals and certain production inputs is capable of processing the amount of food that meets the regular consumption and to deliver these to the consumers via the trade sector in all security situations. State water supply and controlling the quality of water guarantee access to clean drinking water as well as appropriate sewerage and wastewater management, as required for health and environmental protection. Access to water sources required by large population centres, society’s vital functions and food production is guaranteed.

### 2.6.2 Strategic tasks

**Acquiring and allocating financial resources (MoF).** The resources required to ensure the functioning of the public sector are secured. This involves taxation, the Customs, the reallocation of financial resources as well as processes linked to operating and financial plans and budget proposals.

The information security and usability of the government cash management system will be improved, especially to counter the threats posed by electronic media and information risks. Furthermore, procedures for guaranteeing tax payments and collection will be developed. Radically simplified tax collection methods for use in emergency conditions might also become necessary.

**The financial system and money management (MoF).** The finances of households, companies and the public sector as well as the stock exchange and financial transactions will be efficiently organised. This involves collaboration between the authorities and businesses in the financial sector and the need to secure activities with technical backup systems. Control measures will be established for banks, insurance companies and the securities market to better meet the requirements of international activities.

Co-operation and situation monitoring among banks, the authorities and other key actors in the financial market will be developed and maintained in the financial sector of the security of supply organisation. Developments in the financial markets will be taken into account when drawing up an overall picture of the national situation. A report of the international technical infrastructure of the financial sector will be drawn up to provide the basis for preparedness arrangements.
Significant payment transaction services are based on the European infrastructure. When the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is established people and businesses can make payments in Euros as rapidly, advantageously and safely as from their own country within the entire Euro zone. An efficient infrastructure is needed to harmonise the handling of payments in Euros in the entire Euro zone for the level of service and reliability of payments to correspond to the national level of service.

**Safeguarding the insurance services (MoSAH).** The capability for providing insurance services is maintained by safeguarding liquidity, cash management, the functioning of IT and information networks, by maintaining an extensive service network as well as private-public partnership co-operation arrangements. Sufficient insurance services are guaranteed for the individual and the business community by fostering co-operation between insurance companies, other actors in the insurance business as well as the authorities. As the financing business continues to integrate, insurance/banking co-operation is improved to secure its activities. IT backup systems are developed to guarantee the functioning of payment systems.

The processes and documents relating to granting insurance guarantees of emergency conditions will be developed so that the continuation of vital sea, air, rail and road transports is guaranteed with as little delay as possible during the disturbances in normal situations and emergency conditions where appropriate reinsurances are unobtainable in the insurance market.

**Securing the fuel supply (MoEE).** Fuel availability is maintained by using different types of fuel, tapping into several sources, promoting the use of domestic fuels and by maintaining emergency stocks.

This involves the development of renewable energy sources and, in particular, of bio fuels.

Stockpiles of imported fuels and those earmarked for power production are kept at levels determined by the Government. In view of natural gas delivery stoppages, adequate quantities of alternative fuels are stocked. Preparedness is maintained to allocate and control preparedness.

Stockpiles of imported fuels and those earmarked for power production are kept at levels determined by the Government. In view of natural gas delivery stoppages, adequate quantities of alternative fuels are stocked. Preparedness to direct and regulate energy consumption is maintained in view of disturbances.

Development will also take into account the use of domestic energy, i.e. renewable sources and bio fuels, as detailed in the National Energy and Climate Strategy. Availability and use of domestic, renewable, agriculture-based energy as well as bio fuels will be increased. The share of energy from renewable sources will have to be raised to 38 % by 2020; in practice this means to a large extent that the use of bio fuels will be increased.

**Safeguarding the electric power supply (MoEE).** The production of electricity and heating, the capacity of the electric grid, resilience of functions as well as the functioning of technical systems are safeguarded. Electric power supply relies on a functioning electricity market, an adequate electric grid, dispersed production facilities and multiple sources of energy as well as the proper balance between peak demand and capacity.
Power production which is based on several types of fuel and sources is promoted in line with the objectives set by the Government. In line with the National Energy and Climate Strategy, domestic electricity generation aims at covering domestic consumption also when there are disruptions to importing fuels. This and next decade the main part of Finland’s electricity supply network will be renewed. The reliability and quality of the electric grid as well as the preparedness of electricity distributors to disruptions and recovering from them will be developed particularly as part of the renewal of the network.

Safeguarding the electronic ICT systems (MoTC). It is ensured that society’s vital functions relying on communications networks, communications services and other ICT systems are not paralysed because of functional disruptions and that services can be quickly recovered.

Legislative measures, guidance and supervision are used to secure the construction, development and maintenance of appropriate ICT systems in order to guarantee the maximum feasible information security and usability for the electronic media and online services in normal as well as in emergency conditions.

If need be, the authorities prepare to guide, regulate and categorise networks and their services as well as user groups according to their relative importance. Supervision, inspections and preparedness exercises are used to guide and test the preparedness of teleoperators. The activities of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, being the security authority for issues concerning information and communications systems, are further developed to ensure continuity.

National preparedness measures and international co-operation prevent, for their part, information security breaches to domestic ICT systems from abroad. Through legislation and other measures it is safeguarded that changes in the ownership of companies do not endanger the continuity of critical functions. The development and use of ICT systems is monitored, lest this development jeopardise society’s critical functions or their management. Advances in weapons technology and IT-based development used for criminal purposes are also taken into consideration when safeguarding the functioning of the systems.

Safeguarding the state administration’s IT functions and information security and the service systems common to the state administration (MoF). State administration’s information management functions are safeguarded. These functions comprise the administration of information management, information security, IT architecture and procedures, information systems, online services, basic IT technology, telecommunications and IT services.

The principles of information management are developed and promoted in such a manner that they enable the functioning of the key sectors of the government in all security situations. In line with the Information Society Policy Programme, the National IT Strategy and the National Information Security Strategy, in co-operation with all administrative sectors, information management supervision in the public sector is strengthened. Based on the pilot survey conducted in 2008, state administration’s project to develop ICT preparedness defines and starts the implementation of the proposals regarding state administration’s joint ICT preparedness. The supporting measures and tools for implementing core measures are produced. The objective is to enable public
administration’s consistent and co-ordinated preparedness in a cost-effective manner and as part of each administrative sector’s projects and daily activities.

State administration uses more and more services and systems that are jointly produced to the entire administration. To ensure their good functioning in all situations, clear ownership, responsibilities and procedures are defined. The State Treasury plays a central role in state administration to maintain, develop and bear the responsibility for decisions relating to joint IT services in normal conditions. Departures from procedures in normal conditions are agreed in advance to deal with disturbances and emergency conditions.

Joint services are often produced by an external service provider who produces the same services for the private sector, for example. The competent ministry or government agency is given a role involving the entire state administration and the powers to negotiate with different service providers as to how services are secured for the various actors in state administration during disturbances in normal as well as in emergency conditions when service providers prioritise their production of services.

Supporting the construction and maintenance of warning and alert systems (MoTC). It is ensured that legislation and other measures enable the construction and development of technical systems needed to alert the population and to guarantee the necessary dissemination of information in crises both at home and abroad.

Technical arrangements are developed for the purpose of broadcasting the security authorities’ and the state leadership’s emergency announcements to the entire population via all electronic media promptly, reliably and without altering the content. This is made possible through legislative measures and active co-operation with key partners. The main focus falls on radio and television broadcasting. However, it must be possible to broadcast such announcements via other media as well. Legislation shall take into account domestic disturbances. Yet, these systems must also be able to reach Finnish citizens staying abroad to warn them, when necessary.

Safeguarding the continuation of transports (MoTC). The continuation of domestic and foreign transports is secured through legislation and other measures to maintain constant and flexible readiness to respond to disturbances and to launch alternative arrangements. This involves directing resources in emergency conditions, guaranteeing the availability of necessary transport vehicles and equipment, protecting the transports as well as securing transport logistic chains.

The preparedness of the transport business to sustain transports in all conditions is maintained by means of legislation, preparedness guidance and effective interest group collaboration. National preparedness measures highlight procedures which aim to increase transport safety. They are endorsed and mandated by the EU and international transport organisations. Required resource guidance and allocation measures are prepared for emergency conditions. The same applies to the administrative arrangements of crisis organisations, yet to be established. Preparations are made in co-operation with relevant authorities, businesses and organisations. With regard to foreign trade in emergency conditions, transports have to be safeguarded and protected, if need be, even using military resources.
In order to secure transports and the critical security of supply, it is ensured that sufficient numbers of land, sea and air transport equipment are available in all security situations.

The logistic chain in transport is secured. This does not only call for the development of transport equipment and methods, it also requires that ports and harbours, airports, railway stations and land terminals are secured. Transport routes, too, must be appropriately constructed and maintained. Preparedness measures pay special attention to securing the electronic ICT systems which are necessary for transports.

Safeguarding the primary production of food supply (MoAF). In line with the objectives established by the Government, the sufficiency, quality and safety of food is safeguarded by means of adequate domestic agricultural production and emergency stockpiling as well as by guaranteeing access to the necessary foreign production inputs. The preconditions of fishing industry are safeguarded by seeing to the sustainable use and care of fish resources.

Constant efforts are made to influence the EU so as to preserve sufficient economic preconditions for agricultural production in the north as well. Basic agricultural production, such as milk, beef, pigmeat, sheepmeat, poultrymeat and egg production is safeguarded by improving the conditions of profitable agricultural production.

International agreements are developed further, together with the Nordic countries and other EU countries, in order to guarantee the availability of critical production inputs.

Measures are taken to prevent the spreading of plant and animal diseases that threaten food production. Monitoring and control systems that are implemented through co-operation between authorities and the business are central to food safety. Maintained by the European Commission, the warning systems covering infectious diseases, food safety, and animal and plant diseases enable quick response when cross-border disturbances occur.

Growing conditions in Finland are more demanding than in most other countries. Plant breeding that has been done elsewhere does not produce enough varieties which would be successful in Finnish conditions. Therefore our own plant breeding is safeguarded to ensure that varieties that are suitable for the northern conditions are in production on a permanent basis. Sufficient seed production and plant breeding is ensured in normal conditions as well to maintain adequate seed grain stocks even after crop failures. Seed production must take into account that cereals thriving in Finland are not sold in central or southern Europe, while certain plant seeds are not produced in Finland at all.

Agriculture produces the raw materials for the food industry, which means that the steering of the production must be based on real-time information regarding the raw materials available from agriculture. In co-operation with the Ministry of Employment and the Economy and the National Emergency Supply Agency, preparations are made to steer and refocus production and to regulate, for example, fuels, fertilizers and seeds in order to guarantee safe, healthy and sufficient nourishment, both quantitatively and qualitatively to the entire population in all security situations. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, The Agency for Rural Affairs, each ELY Centre as well as municipal agricultural secretaries in the districts of each Centre steer the production. Once powers contained in the Emergency
Powers Act are invoked, for example fuels, fertilizers and seeds are regulated so as to provide sufficient nourishment to the entire population.

Energy and other production inputs for primary production are guaranteed by preparedness measures at each farm. Electricity supply for livestock farms is secured by promoting purchases of individually or collectively owned emergency power generators. Farm animals, feed stocks and some farm machines can be relocated, for instance, in the case of radioactive fallout.

Safeguarding the water supply (MoAF). As required for health and environmental protection, access to clean water and appropriate wastewater management are secured. This involves water protection and functioning municipal water services.

Preparedness in water supply is developed by reviewing the legislation on the organisation of water supply. Municipalities, owners of water supply facilities and real estate owners are responsible for water supply. Practical development measures focus on communications, inter-authority co-operation as well as contingency planning which also includes the organisation of temporary water distribution. The risks involved in water supply are reviewed comprehensively from water source to sewerage and waste water treatment.

To safeguard the quality of drinking water falls within the remit of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Preventive monitoring measures are taken to deal with health problems caused by contaminated water.

Safeguarding food processing and distribution (MoEE). The food industry’s processing capability as well as the functioning of wholesale and retail stores is secured. The entire logistic chain of food supply is secured.

Security of the food supply is maintained as prescribed by the Government. Special attention is paid to managing entities and to guaranteeing the availability of retail products in peripheral regions. In addition, the entire food supply chain’s logistic processes and outsourced support functions are secured. Preparedness to steer and ration food supply and consumption is maintained. Focus is increasingly on safeguarding the retail supply chain.

Safeguarding critical industries and services (MoEE). The capability to produce basic commodities and services required by the security of supply is maintained as well as the technological level of industry and the functioning of relevant logistic and technical systems.

In development work the following are taken into consideration: the capability to maintain and repair defence materiel and systems, stockpiling of the most critical raw materials, components and other production elements, maintaining a well-functioning private-public sector partnership as well as international economic co-operation.

Guaranteeing housing (MoE). The preparedness to rehouse large numbers of people is maintained. This involves measures to improve the use of the housing market. The legislative and administrative preparedness for controlling the housing market and construction field as well as the rationing of building materials is maintained. The preparedness planning of the construction field is further developed.
Securing a sufficient labour workforce (MoEE). Sufficient numbers of workers for companies vital to society, national defence and fields providing basic services to the population are guaranteed. Furthermore, the capability to reallocate required labour resources is maintained.

Even in emergency conditions, the labour workforce is primarily regulated through normal employment services. The necessary workers for companies and public services are guaranteed by invoking the general obligation to work, if necessary.

Maintaining the education and research system (MoEC). By maintaining education and research activities, the level and versatility of competence is guaranteed, as is the availability of a sufficiently professional labour force, according to supply and demand.

The functioning of all levels of education is guaranteed by allocating education resources to different levels and fields of education, as required by the supply and demand of labour. The possibility of transferring from one level of education to the next is guaranteed. Preparations are made for carrying out matriculation and other examinations, to provide daily school meals as well as to see to the welfare of students in all security situations. Education resources are prepared in a manner which permits them to be reallocated as required in security situations. This necessitates the development of education legislation.

The national research system provides information for public decision-making. This requires that research activities in state research institutes and universities be secured.

The universities’ basic research activities are guaranteed because applied research that supports decision-making is built on solid basic research. The significance of national research activities is highlighted in emergency conditions, as it might be difficult to gain access to information produced elsewhere. By focusing research funding and applying performance management on research institutes and universities, sufficient access to information is guaranteed. Ministries are responsible for refocusing their own administrative sectors’ research and reallocating their non-assigned research appropriations in emergency conditions.

The implementation of the security strategy for society and the relating development measures require information furnished by research. In particular multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral research is increased. This requires the development of co-operation structures.

Detecting, controlling and adapting to changes in the environment (MoE). The preparedness to detect, monitor and forecast changes in the environment as well as society’s preparedness to limit and adapt to them is maintained. This involves Finland’s participation in contributing to and implementing international environmental agreements.

Monitoring of changes in the environment is maintained. Finland’s participation in international co-operation aimed at slowing down the climate change is continued. International co-operation is the vehicle by which Finland also aims to promote measures against ongoing environmental changes, such as the thinning of the ozone layer and the deterioration of the Baltic Sea ecosystem. On the national level, environmental threats may cause significant property damage and harm animals and plants as well as alter the preconditions of business activities. Through monitoring, preparedness is maintained also to detect and manage environmental accidents.
Waste management (MoE). In co-operation with the security of supply organisation, the preparedness to organise alternative capacity for the recycling, utilisation and transportation of waste is maintained. Sufficient areas and reserve areas for the disposal of ordinary waste and hazardous waste are reserved in land use planning.

2.7 The population’s income security and capability to function

2.7.1 The desired end state

The population’s income security and capability to function refers to society’s capability to provide comprehensive social security and social and health care services. These prevent social exclusion, promote harmony in society and the population’s independent coping and functional capacity. This entirety includes social insurance, social benefits, social and health care services, protection of the health of the population and a healthy environment.

The constitutional rights to a life of dignity and the essential means of subsistence and care are guaranteed for all. In order to sustain social protection and to prevent social exclusion, civic structures as well as welfare and social policy measures in various fields are maintained. These include employment, housing, education, income and social protection for the entire population regardless of age, gender, wealth, status or domicile. All sectors in society bear particular responsibility for social protection and the prevention of marginalisation.

Key social and health care services for the population are secured by supporting the functioning of service providers, such as hospitals and health centres as well as social welfare institutions and outpatient care units. This entails an adequacy of staff, pharmaceuticals, vaccines and medical supplies as well as the functioning of critical infrastructure. Regardless of the time of day, citizens have access to urgent social and health care services in all parts of the country. The health care system is capable of providing diagnostic and medical services for illnesses caused by radiation and biological or chemical agents.

The availability of pharmaceuticals, vaccines as well as medical devices and supplies is secured. State emergency stockpiling guarantees the sufficiency of crisis-specific medicines and health care devices and equipment.

A reporting and laboratory system is maintained to ensure the detection, monitoring and prevention of health risks, both for infectious diseases, diseases communicated between humans and animals and readily contagious animal diseases, and plant diseases and pests and suspected food-borne and water-borne epidemics. Different authorities co-operate in risk assessment and epidemiological analysis. The CBRNE expert guidance establishments, associated centres of excellence as well as laboratory systems connected to these are capable of identifying and controlling health hazard situations caused by chemicals (C), microbes (B), radiation sources (R), nuclear weapons or accidents at nuclear plants (N) and explosives (E). It is essential to conduct co-
operation with international organisations monitoring microbiological, chemical and radiation threats.

Finland effectively integrates to improve and secure health and social well-being in the EU’s structures, co-operates with the Member States and has actively contributed to addressing international issues with the World Health Organisation.

Preparedness co-operation with the private and public social and health care services will be further developed.

2.7.2 Strategic tasks

**Income security (MoSAH).** Various payment systems and the nationwide service network facilitating the awarding and disbursing of income security benefits and other benefits vital to the subsistence of the population are maintained. Sufficient funds for the benefits are secured. The capability to disburse the statutory income security benefits, pursuant to the provisions that apply in a given situation, is maintained. Extensive private-public partnership co-operation is required to safeguard the collection of pension contributions, the appropriate management of pension funds as well as the preservation of data in the pension register. A minimum income is guaranteed even in emergency conditions. In order to guarantee a reasonable standard of subsistence to the population as well as to safeguard sufficient financing for it, preparations for altering the eligibility provisions used for determining income security benefits are made. Income security prevents poverty and social exclusion, promotes harmony in society, national unity and the population’s psychological resilience to crisis.

Due to negative developments in the economy and higher unemployment, an increase in required appropriations must be prepared for in order to organise income security for the population. This includes maintaining the required service system. This challenge can be responded to by maintaining plans for required legislative amendments and by safeguarding the nationwide service network. The Social Insurance Institution and municipalities’ backup systems for processing and disbursing minimum benefits or benefits paid on a continuous basis must facilitate cash payments, if need be, or another form of payment in co-operation with banks.

Systems are developed to facilitate the essential subsistence of a citizen who has become the victim of an accident in phases when statutory or other insurances do not cover the financial losses, or when the benefits are not yet disbursed.

**Securing the social and health care services and environmental health care services (MoSAH).** Hospitals, health centres, social welfare establishments as well as outpatient and non-residential care services are maintained in order to provide key social and health care services for the population.

Equal social and health care services are provided for the population, regardless of location. The securing of key services is improved by intensifying regional co-operation, centralising functions requiring specialised expertise and capabilities, developing the division of duties within the service system and by improving the regional efficiency in jointly procuring and using the required resources, supplies as well as expert and support services.

When the practical arrangements for providing and guaranteeing social and primary health services in all security situations are developed services and
resources provided by the private and third sector are taken into account. Sopiva-recommendations can be applied to the development of relating outsourcing agreements to harmonise the agreements and to improve continuity management.

Access to urgent and necessary social and health services is guaranteed for the entire population, regardless of the time of day or location. In addition to the duty system of health care services, a nationwide emergency social service system is maintained.

In order to treat medical conditions and illnesses caused by radiation as well as biological and chemical agents, the functional capacity and resources of the health care service system are developed. The capabilities of diagnosing and identifying patients and contagious cases are improved, as are the required isolation and quarantine facilities.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health may prioritise services and reallocate resources during lengthy disturbances and emergency conditions, so as to guarantee the key social and health services.

The readiness of the public health care system for proactively deploying medical teams to assist Finns in major accidents abroad is developed. The procedures and arrangements of psychosocial assistance as well as the operating models and organisation of services are improved and those bearing the nation-wide responsibility for functions are designated for major accidents.

Health hazards caused by the living environment are addressed primarily with the measures of preventive monitoring. Monitoring is based on regionally active environmental management units whose resources and smooth co-operation with other authorities are secured.

Preparedness co-operation of the social and health care services on the Nordic level is implemented and developed on the basis of a Nordic treaty.

Guaranteeing the availability of medical supplies and equipment (MoSAH). The availability of pharmaceuticals, vaccines as well as medical devices and supplies is secured. This involves the obligatory stockpiling of medicines, the emergency stockpiling of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical devices and supplies along with international and Nordic agreements and projects.

Regional purchasing procedures for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies are developed. In order to guarantee the functioning of the health care system and to improve its crisis resilience, obligatory stockpiles of medicines as well as emergency stockpiles of medical supplies and equipment and CBRNE defence equipment are maintained.

Stockpiles are replenished to take into consideration new threats and changes in the operating environment. Pharmaceuticals and vaccines as well as associated medical supplies are procured to prepare for a pandemic. The co-operation between health care preparedness experts and authorities and the National Emergency Supply Agency is strengthened. The objective of this co-operation is to provide uniform minimum levels of material preparedness nationwide.

In order to guarantee access to pharmaceuticals, vaccines and medical supplies, bilateral security of supply agreements are developed. Finland actively promotes the EU’s security of health care supply dimension.
The detection, surveillance and management systems for health risks (MoSAH). Detection and surveillance systems capable of recognising and managing health emergencies caused by radioactive agents, microbes and chemicals are maintained. This involves the national radiation-monitoring network, communicable diseases surveillance system, including the infectious diseases register, biological and chemical threat expert guidance systems as well as isolation and quarantine capabilities.

The surveillance and alarm systems as well as the management systems of the WHO and the EU support national systems. This includes co-operation in accordance with the International Health Regulations and co-operation conducted with the European Commission and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

Equipment, technical systems and human resources required in radiation monitoring as well as detecting biological and chemical threats are maintained to meet the requirements of changes in the operating environment and threat scenarios. Radiation monitoring takes into account Finland's obligation to fully participate in the radiation monitoring and maintenance systems required by international treaties.

In order to maintain and develop the readiness of the automatic external-dose rate-monitoring network and the network of radiation laboratories, the availability of appropriate detection, analysis and transmitting equipment for abnormal radiation situations is secured. Sufficient and appropriate laboratory infrastructure as well as adequate staff is also guaranteed. The laboratory network comprises the laboratories of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland as well as local food safety monitoring and environmental laboratories. It shall be verified that all sources of radiation used in Finland are registered and appropriately marked. Decommissioned sources of radiation as well as radioactive waste are to be safely disposed. The surveillance and alarm systems as well as the management systems of the WHO, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the EU and bilateral and multilateral international treaties support national systems.

The local, regional and nation-wide communicable diseases surveillance system, including the infectious diseases register, is maintained and improved to improve the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases. Co-operation with food safety and animal disease authorities is increased. In order to confirm epidemics, national and international expert reserves are trained and methods are developed. There is an active contribution to co-operation with the ECDC within the EU. These measures improve medical treatment, prevent epidemics and enable reliable estimates regarding the success of the countermeasures.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has drawn up a national preparedness plan for an epidemic (pandemic). The plan does not only list the measures required in social and health care, it also determines the guidelines to different administrative sectors and the rest of society on how to prepare for a pandemic. It also determines the lines of authority among public officials as well as the principles of interauthority co-operation during a pandemic. The plan is updated at regular intervals and the changing threats and the environment are taken into consideration.

In order to detect and manage a biological and chemical threat, Finland maintains
Effective expert guidance systems as well as a nationally comprehensive network of laboratories capable of sufficiently sophisticated diagnostics and analysis, which have the necessary expertise for diagnostics beyond the routine biological and chemical agents. Authorities develop co-operation procedures with the network of laboratories and expert establishments. The National Institute for Health and Welfare co-ordinates the operation of the nationwide hazardous microbes safety laboratory system, and is also responsible for conducting laboratory examinations which are commercially unfeasible but of crucial importance. As to the hazardous microbes which, according to the international safety regulations, cannot be studied in Finnish laboratories, the service contract made with Sweden will be continued.

Established jointly by the Defence Forces and the National Institute for Health and Welfare, the objectives of the Centre of Excellence for Bio Threat Assessment are to increase national competences to prepare for biological threats. Apart from research and development, it aims at strengthening the ability to assess bio threats that endanger society’s functions and to improve capabilities to participate in international co-operation. The Centre of Excellence acts as a link between other actors in the field of infectious diseases and, intersectorally, contributes to official and expert tasks that address B threats. The tasks of the Zoonosis Centre, which is run by the Food Safety Authority and the National Institute for Health and Welfare, are to guarantee effective and continued control and research activities needed to monitor and fight zoonoses. The monitoring of zoonoses and food poisoning is co-ordinated by the Centre. The National Institute for Health and Welfare co-ordinates the monitoring of drug resistance in microbes.

To prepare for chemical threats, the Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats is maintained. Operating in the dispersed facilities of the organisations involved, the Centre is a collaboration network of various chemical threat experts which utilises existing infrastructure. The participants include authorities and expert bodies and units from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and the Ministry of Education and Culture. The primary task of the Centre is to support preparedness against chemical threats and to maintain a chemical hazard duty and emergency response system. The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health develops and maintains regional field teams which can be deployed to incident sites for the purpose of collecting samples and evaluating the situation. The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, the National Institute for Health and Welfare and the laboratories of regional environment centres are capable of providing services to address a disturbance involving chemicals.

Authorities improve decontamination capabilities in a disaster area and hospitals. Co-operation and division of tasks is agreed with the rescue service, health care and the Defence Forces. The decontamination capability in hospitals is to be improved.

The usability of the product register of the national chemicals register in establishing the health impacts of chemical accidents and poisonings is improved by guaranteeing rapid access, 24/7, to the chemicals register. In view of incidents, experts and analysis organisations will compile a national database for dangerous chemicals.

The Poison Information Centre provides nation-wide medical guidance pertaining
to poisonings. It is to be developed into a national expert centre for chemical-induced poisonings and mass poisonings.

With regard to guaranteeing the population's ability to function, it is imperative to see to food safety. This task is within the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

2.8 Psychological resilience to crisis

2.8.1 Desired end state

Psychological resilience to crisis refers to the nation's capacity to endure stress in varying security situations, overcome the consequences and speed up recovery from crises. The nation's psychological resilience to crisis is preserved by parenting, education, communications, religious activities and protection of cultural heritage. Social integrity which promotes psychological resilience to crisis is developed through lifelong learning. Education develops the citizens' solidarity and the will to defend the country and strengthens cooperation with civic activities that promote psychological resilience to crisis.

The nation's crisis resilience is expressed in the collective determination to defend the independence of the state as well as in sustaining the livelihood and security of the population in all situations. The solidarity of citizens and their will to defend the country support their capability to act in all crisis situations of society. In the future, their role will be increasingly important in particular when preparing for disturbances and securing functions vital to society.

The goal of developing psychological resilience to crisis is strength in the long term. The capabilities for crisis communication are developed in the course of education on the different levels of the educational system. In addition, the education for which different administrative sectors are responsible encourages participation in societal activities and promotes the citizens' readiness to act in disturbances and emergency conditions.

The continuation of teaching, the functioning of basic educational structures and the possibilities of schools to succeed in their educational task are secured. The continuance of teaching strengthens the sense of security among children, adolescents and adults and also builds confidence in the post-crisis future. Education takes into consideration the needs of society and those of immigrants in the integration process.

Culture is a key element in the formation of a person's identity and self-esteem. A strong sense of identity fosters inclusion and the individual's capability to commit to common goals. Interaction and meeting of different cultural groups contribute to social unity and prevent subcultures from becoming excluded from the rest of society. Education and civic activities, such as sport, cultural, youth and societal activities.
support interaction, inclusion and contact between different groups.

Authorities, churches and organisations have the capabilities to provide psychosocial assistance which prevents the negative influence of the post-traumatic stress syndrome and disturbances on the nation's psychological resilience. Capabilities are developed as part of safeguarding social and health care services.

Cultural heritage of national importance is protected in all security situations. Many of the things included in the national cultural heritage, such as individual objects and works of art, are symbols of our national identity. By visibly protecting them in crisis situations, the citizens’ sense of security and solidarity is strengthened.

The preconditions to perform religious activities and to participate in the provision of psychological assistance and crisis support are guaranteed to the state churches and other religious denominations in all security situations. This involves diaconal work, funeral services and other societal services, as uninterrupted as possible.

2.8.2 Strategic tasks

Education (MoEC). The uninterrupted continuation of key educational services is guaranteed. This involves educating pupils and students about threats and different crises, along with the preparedness to use the field of education as a medium for public information and influencing as well as other activities promoting psychological and social unity, people’s confidence in society and the will to defend the nation. Psychological, physical and social well-being is upheld through education.

The development of education will take into account the possibilities of conveying information on threats and preparedness by means of civic education. Topics promoting psychological crisis tolerance are developed both for curricula and curriculum-based education. Pupils and students receive education on the Finnish way of life as well as information concerning the safety of the population, responsible conduct in life's different situations as well as the comprehensive defence approach and security policy.

The marginalization of pupils and students at all levels of education is prevented by guaranteeing equal opportunities and equal rights in education. Schools and educational institutions are developed to become communities where the well-being, participation and community spirit of pupils and students are promoted. Co-operation between home and school is intensified in educational matters. Pupils and students are encouraged to adopt a healthy lifestyle by expanding the opportunities of participating in sports and physical fitness activities at all levels of education.
Education strengthens the psychological crisis resilience and solidarity of the citizens. Through education they are encouraged to societal participation and their capability to act during disturbances and emergency conditions.

**Strengthening cultural identity and protecting cultural heritage (MoEC).**
The preservation of society’s traditions is supported. This involves cultural services and protection of the cultural heritage.

The formation of the cultural identity is promoted by guaranteeing participation in cultural activities to all citizens. This is done by maintaining a comprehensive structure of establishments and grants for art and culture. The opportunity to participate in basic art education, recreational arts and in cultural events is guaranteed to every citizen. The interaction and meeting of cultural groups are promoted.

Nationally important cultural heritage is protected. This heritage includes prehistoric sites, historically significant buildings and complexes, works of art, manuscripts, books and objects, scientific collections as well as archival and library collections. Cultural heritage also includes the buildings in which movable cultural heritage is collected for storage or exhibitions, digital information assets as well as intellectual property rights, crystallized in copyrights.

Regional and local authorities ensure that the information on the sites and characteristics of the built cultural environment and other cultural properties is up-to-date and available. Authorities on the national level are responsible for the surveillance of cultural properties and the functioning of national registers.

The preconditions for exporting Finnish innovations to the international market are safeguarded. From the viewpoint of strengthening national identity, it is essential that Finns increasingly penetrate international science and culture networks and Finnish innovations succeed in the world market. Furthermore, international and national intellectual property right protection is preserved and promoted.

**Securing religious services (MoEC).**
The preconditions for the state churches and other religious denominations in supporting the population’s coping and welfare and as providers of psychological assistance are maintained.

The state churches and other religious denominations are guaranteed the preconditions to perform religious activities and to participate in the provision of psychological support as part of the entirety of society’s psychosocial assistance and crisis support in all security situations. Funeral services, carried out in a dignified manner and paying respect to the deceased, are guaranteed.

The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, its parishes, parish unions and cathedral chapters draw up their regional contingency plans. This is co-ordinated by each cathedral chapter in their respective areas. Close co-operation with the AVI agency supports contingency planning and promotes support to psychological resilience to crisis both locally and nationally.
3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

3.1 Management of disturbances

In order to manage threats against the population, society and the state, modes of operation that are known and exercised by all actors who participate in the preparedness and management of disturbances need to be in place. As the vulnerability of society increases, it is essential that initial situation management and co-ordination on unexpected and rapidly emerging disturbances be implemented without delay. Because most disturbances have multi-faceted consequences it is important that the competent authority can rely on as broad-based cross-sectoral support as possible. At the same time is must be ensured that the functioning of society can be secured on an appropriate level despite disturbances. Co-operation plans and exercises have to extend to all levels of administration.

The principle of legality and the established division of administrative duties are observed to manage disturbances which jeopardise the security of society and the population. Both in normal situations and emergency conditions the same principles for the management of disturbances are followed. The divisions of duties as well as operational models customary under normal conditions are retained as long as possible. The lines of authority must be clear. Situations are proactively managed and sufficient resources are immediately put into use. The competent authority empowered by the law to do so leads the operational side and intersectoral co-operation bodies support the responsible authorities. Whoever is responsible for situation management is also responsible for communications. The other authorities, companies and organisations participate to the extent required to manage the situation. Apart from operational measures, provision of information among actors is highlighted as well as the importance of keeping the state leadership well-informed.

On the Government level, the ministry empowered by the law to do so leads activities and co-ordination among ministries, when required. Permanent Secretaries bear the primary responsibility for the organisation of work at the ministries, and therefore the meeting of Permanent Secretaries may be necessary when first addressing the management of a disturbance. Possible disagreements on which ministry bears the responsibility for a matter or handles a far-reaching issue will be solved at the Government plenary session, if necessary. Intersectoral co-operation bodies can be used to support the preparations to manage a disturbance. The meeting of Heads of Preparedness is a central co-operation body which supports ministries in security matters. There can be steering groups at the ministries or civil service departments, which convene together with representatives from interest groups if required for the management of a disturbance.
It may be necessary to bring a disturbance before the Government as soon as possible so that all members of the Government have an opportunity to receive, at the same time, an accurate and correct understanding of the matter. This is essential for the work of the members of the Government and for bearing ministerial responsibilities. Apart from situation awareness also preparation responsibilities and further handling can be discussed. Further handling includes, for example, organising sufficient cooperation between ministries and handling at Cabinet Committees.

When dealing with significant security issues, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (CCFSP) or the joint meeting of the CCFSP and the President of the Republic may prepare the Government decisions. The Committee is augmented by inviting the competent minister and pertinent experts to attend. The Security and Defence Committee (TPAK) assists the CCFSP on matters relating to comprehensive defence and its coordination. The Committee’s secretariat forms the core of the secretariat of the Heads of Preparedness and chairs the meeting of preparedness secretaries. Other Cabinet Committees deal with matters pertaining to their mandate. The Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs prepares the matters to be decided in the European Union. Decisions required by the situation are taken at the Government plenary session, by the competent ministry or some other competent authority.

The Government and the ministries are supported by the Government situation centre, which comprises the high-level leadership as well as the situation centre and the information centre run by the Prime Minister’s Office. The high-level leadership can assemble on the following levels: Heads of Preparedness, Permanent Secretaries or members of the Government (Cabinet Committee, Government meeting, Government plenary session). The situation centre maintains contacts with actors on different levels of the administrative sectors.

The stand-by duty personnel in the ministries and the situation centres of different administrative sectors form the base on the Government level from which to respond to disturbances. The Government situation centre acts as the contact point for the stand-by duties of the ministries, keeping the administrative sectors informed of observed events and convening, when necessary, the co-operation bodies and experts from different administrative sectors to secure up-to-date access to information. Supported by the authorities and other actors who contribute to the management of a disturbance, the situation centre also co-ordinates the compiling of the situation picture, if necessary.

The principles discussed above are presented in figure 2 which focuses on the roles between the top state leadership and the central administration and the point of contact of their co-operation. The responsible authority starts measures relating to the management of the situation, informs other authorities and actors of the situation and involves the actors required by the management of the disturbance.
Figure 2. The principle of the management of disturbances

Top-level national decision-making in crisis management and international co-operation

Preparatory handling of significant security issues
CCFSP = Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy

Support to the authority in charge of the management of a disturbance and to decision-making in national crisis management

Management of a disturbance within own mandate

Support to the authority in charge of the management of a disturbance

CCFSP = Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy

Parliament

President of the Republic

Government (Plenary Session)

CCFSP / President-CCFSP

Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs

Discussion in Government

MEETING OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES

MEETING OF HEADS OF PREPAREDNESS

The Security and Defence Committee

MINISTRY

COMPETENT AUTHORITY

Central, regional and local administration

Other Authority

Business Community

Organisations

National and International Actors
Disturbances have in most cases a local impact which means that their management is primarily based on local measures. Taking into account the extent and gravity of the disturbance co-operation relating to situation management can be implemented also on other administrative levels. Local and regional administrations follow, where appropriate, the general principles of the management of disturbances described in this chapter (the responsibility of the competent authority, standard co-operation measures, exploitation of the resources of society’s different actors). The principles and arrangements of the management of disturbances in local administration are reviewed by taking into consideration the changes that have taken place in the organisations of authorities, the municipal service structures and co-operation arrangements.

When necessary, the obligations imposed on the Presidency country or the Member States by the EU’s emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements are taken into account. The Government situation centre acts as a contact point for these activities and the EU’s civil protection co-operation.

The powers provided for in the Emergency Powers Act can be invoked when the situation so requires. In specific emergency conditions, the position of the President of the Republic is highlighted as the leader of foreign and security policy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and a central decision-maker.

### 3.2 Situation awareness and situation picture

Every organisation needs information of the environment and its events as well as their impact on its own functions. Relevant and rapid situation awareness, based on correct information and assessments, is of particular significance in disturbances when prompt decision-making is called for with possibly far-reaching effects. In order to make the right decisions, decision-makers need to know the basis and consequences of their decisions, how others will react to them and what risks are involved. Decision-makers must therefore possess on all operating levels sufficient situation awareness which is instrumental in timely decision-making and operations. Situation awareness requires co-operation and competence, which enables decision-makers to comprehensively monitor the operating environment, to compile, analyse and disseminate information, to identify research needs and to manage networks. Information systems must allow a systematic use of information sources and co-operation as well as flexible dissemination of situation information.

Because of the expectations of the media and citizens situation awareness is demanded from the political leadership and other decision-makers even when the situation does not require them to take immediate action to manage or address the situation. The flow of information should therefore be guaranteed to the different actors in society to the appropriate extent.

Situation picture arrangements support the forming of situation awareness of organisations and decision-makers. In general, a situation picture refers to a description, compiled by experts, of prevailing conditions and the response
capabilities of various actors, incidents generated by the disturbance and relating background information and assessments about developments. The entity is formed from different sources by using a networking operating mode. The process consists of compiling, grouping and analysing information as well as the timely and effective dissemination of the analysed information to those needing it. The surrounding “information space” is arranged so that the information will be correctly understood and actors can access information which is significant for their activities.

A situation picture can be a general assessment, drawn up at regular intervals, or a more detailed analysis of a current topic or topics where events and their impacts are assessed. This kind of descriptive (strategic) situation picture can be provided to decision-makers on a regular basis (for example, three times a year, once a month or once a week). A situation picture can also be a more often (for example daily) drafted report or a compilation of events which is made available in the information system for actors. Normally it does not contain assessments of situational developments or recommendations for measures.

An operational situation picture is compiled and updated as much in real time as possible during a disturbance. Through continued monitoring and updating it should provide a picture of the development of events and thus enable the management of the situation and the management process required to solve the situation. A decisionmaker must be able to trust that the conveyed situation picture is a reliable one in all its details and that the analyses are made with the best possible expertise.

The Prime Minister’s Office is responsible for compiling the Government’s common situation picture and for constructing and maintaining the relating technical and administrative systems. Other ministries bear the responsibility for arranging the situation picture required by the management process of their respective administrative sectors. The situation picture systems of the ministries are to support the situation picture of the top state leadership as appropriate. For this purpose, the situation picture systems of the Foreign Service, the Ministry of the Interior and the defence administration in particular are developed. Each administrative sector must analyse what situation picture information is relevant to be exchanged with the business community and organisations.

Apart from the central administration, a relevant situation picture system is built also on the regional administration level. The system is to serve the common needs of the regional administration and enable flexible transmission of necessary information to local and central administrations. The situation pictures of the state’s central and regional administrations are to be designed and implemented in such a way that they also support situation awareness in municipalities and the business community. Exchange and exploitation of situational information between systems is to be planned as part of preparedness in an appropriate manner. The situation picture arrangement is built in co-operation with competent ministries, relevant authorities, municipalities, the business community and organisations.

In a situation where a disturbance is managed on the local level, in addition to local actors the regional and central administrations are expected to have situation awareness and sometimes also to take concrete measures and more efficient communications. Therefore it is commonly advised that the local level provides as soon
as possible information to the regional and central administrations on disturbances and other events and threats which significantly affect or may affect the population’s safety and official measures, and which require or may require measures from relevant authorities. In the same way information must be provided without delay on situations which generate or may generate significant public interest in Finland or internationally.

A number of private or public corporations such as universities, polytechnics, joint authorities providing and maintaining all-round education and vocational training, limited companies owned by municipalities and other similar corporations hold a significant position for the continuity and maintenance of society’s functions. These may involve various and sometimes even complicated combinations of public and private actors. Functions are often dispersed across several municipalities or in different parts of the entire country. Also these actors are to be taken into consideration in the compilation and exploitation of a situation picture.

3.3 Communications in crisis situations and disturbances

Communications is a tool for the management. Communications are an integral part of managing a disturbance. The authority responsible for action is also in charge of disseminating information. Disturbances are often situations which involve a number of authorities and where other authorities support the one in charge. It is typical of a serious disturbance that an investigating authority is involved with the responsibility to disseminate information. Consistent communications policies with the authority in charge of the situation have to be secured through effective co-operation procedures. The basis for communications during a disturbance is defined in the Government instruction for communications in crisis situations and emergency conditions (the publication series 15/2007 of the Prime Minister’s Office).

Alarm and duty systems must be organised so that the communications staff receives relevant information without delay and is able to take measures to support the authority in charge. In organising communications the situation awareness of the relevant staff must be seen to so that they can start communications measures to support the competent authority.

The immediate task of communications in disturbances is to warn and save people from a known danger. The more serious the disturbance threatening the health or safety of the population the more important is the speed of communications. In Finland, basic services are the responsibility of municipalities and therefore communications on the local level often faces the biggest challenges during disturbances. It is necessary that on the local level central administrative sectors and rescue services agree on emergency announcements in situations that pose an immediate threat to health; such situations include disruptions in energy supply, contamination of drinking water, radiation and other similar disturbances.

The responsible authority must keep other authorities who contribute to the situation management informed as to the content of their announcements and instructions. This prevents the dissemination of conflicting instructions to the population. Organisations can support the authorities with their communications.
Responsibilities in communications matters must be agreed in connection with securing society’s vital functions in such a way that various actors and administrative levels are clear about their responsibilities in large-scale disturbances. In order to prepare for the most likely risks, it is necessary to negotiate and practise in advance the communications responsibilities as well as the contents and conveying of messages. Preparedness can be made more effective with intersectoral communications instructions.

Communications must be active. Communications are carried out effectively through various channels: official and emergency announcements to rapidly warn the population, news briefings, briefings for the media, web pages, the social media, expert interviews and guidance over the phone. It is important during a disturbance to take the initiative and communicate without delay to avoid rumours and misunderstandings which are very hard to correct afterwards. Speed is not, however, more important than the correctness of information. Furthermore, preparations need to be made for disruptions in the electronic infrastructure and using alternative means for communications.

When extensive disturbances occur, involving several municipalities or provinces, the maintenance and transmission of a real-time situation picture and compiling a media situation picture are essential for managing the disturbance and communications. The situation picture is conveyed to the local and regional levels to the central administration and vice-versa. It is important to monitor the development of publicity.

Communications are co-ordinated on appropriate administrative levels. Each ministry is responsible for their communications during a disturbance and, when necessary, for co-ordinating communications within their administrative sector. The Government Communications Unit is responsible for the Government’s communications, as well as for co-ordinating the dissemination of official information.

There must be regular exercises in arranging communications during disturbances and emergency conditions as part of wider preparedness. Apart from authorities, also other relevant actors in communications need to be involved in the exercises.

Communications have a global dimension. If extensive international disturbances occur Finland must have the capability to convey the country’s political views and policies to international awareness. In practice it is the responsibility of the state leadership to issue relevant messages that provide the basis for all communications. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs plays a central role in foreign communications.

Strategic communications are made more effective in conflict situations, competitive situations and when conducting co-operation. To co-ordinate messages, both regular negotiation mechanisms and mechanisms for daily communications co-operation between administrative sectors are needed. This requires that the Government and key ministries exchange information on a regular basis and increase situation awareness. Different administrative sectors must be able to promptly produce analyses of changing security situations and submit the analyses to the Government. The capability to respond to disturbances and communicate about them is expedited. Ministries must be able to rapidly compile a situation picture of disturbances and co-
ordinate the political guidelines of the state leadership before the situation is analysed in public.

Communications relating to international issues and EU matters as well as necessary co-operation with international authorities must be taken into consideration on all operating levels.

**Communications can be centralised in emergency conditions.** The responsibility for communications may have to be transferred in emergency conditions either partly or entirely, from special authorities to the Government Information Centre. On the basis of the Emergency Powers Act, the Government decides on the moment and extent of transferring the responsibility for communications.

When the State of Defence Act becomes effective a Government Information Centre is established, with communications officers from various ministries and subordinate administrations working there. The duties of the Centre include communications, research, psychological defence and maintaining contacts with organisations, businesses and communities in communications matters.
Security in society and securing vital functions are based on the strategic tasks of ministries and the functioning of the security of supply in all security situations. The implementation of strategic tasks entails a number of other measures to be taken by actors who are involved in society’s preparedness and the management of disturbances. Relevant plans and arrangements must regularly be reviewed and always when major changes take place in society or in the security environment.

To maintain security in society requires correct information about the preparedness and capability to function of administrative sectors as well as resilience to crisis and crisis preparedness. The monitoring of the Strategy should enable timely and proper development along with maintenance measures. Monitoring provides information to the state leadership regarding how correctly resources are being allocated for the purpose of securing society’s vital functions.

Consistent implementation of the principles of the Security Strategy for Society also on the local and regional levels is a prerequisite for securing vital functions. To promote implementation and in particular to benefit from best practices it would be appropriate to prepare threat assessments, risk analyses and common guidelines for implementation as intersectoral co-operation on the local and regional levels, too.

The entity that consists of security management and preparedness measures is to extend on the municipal level all the way to the person(s) carrying out a security measure. On the basis of this and to support implementation and outputs as well as rapid responding to demanding situations, lists of measures should be compiled on the local level by areas of responsibility, linked to threat scenarios and related disturbances. Based on the lists of measures, each participant should be given cards of measures. On the regional level, however, it is not necessary and not always possible either to compile such comprehensive guidelines.

Each ministry, within its mandate, monitors the implementation of tasks related to securing society’s vital functions as well as the implementation and development of the security of supply arrangements. Monitoring is carried out as part of the functional practices established in the administrative sectors in question and it shall cover the perspectives of both the subordinate administration and the key co-operation bodies.

The Security and Defence Committee (TPAK), supported by the meeting of the Heads of Preparedness, is responsible for the joint monitoring and development of the Strategy. For this task, TPAK can ask for expert opinions from independent research institutes and other actor. The monitoring shall provide
the grounds for updating the Strategy as well as for co-ordinating comprehensive defence measures. Long-term monitoring is required and as much as possible it must be based on routinely produced reports and research papers. TPAK submits the results of the monitoring to the President of the Republic, the Government (the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy) and the Parliament (in particular to the Defence Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee).

By informing parliamentary committees it is ensured that society’s preparedness will be implemented in line with parliamentary guidelines.

In co-operation with the subordinate administration and co-operation partners, ministries draw up a report on a regular basis on the functioning of crisis preparedness and development needs for the Security and Defence Committee. The capability of an administrative sector support other administrative sectors and co-operation arrangements are taken into account.

From the point of monitoring it is important that, when disturbances occurring in Finland or abroad have been managed, the management measures are recorded and analysed as comprehensively as possible. The analysis of “close call” situations is to be included in the monitoring in particularly to prevent threats and risks. The lessons learned and the resulting measures are discussed in the co-operation bodies to ensure that best practices are used.

The monitoring of the Strategy’s implementation also produces grounds for security research in administrative sectors and also for national co-operation in the field of security research. National and international security research is conducted and forms of co-operation are developed through the strategy for national security research; the Advisory Board for Sectoral Research is in charge of the strategy’s implementation. Furthermore, the Scientific Advisory Board for Defence (MATINE), the security programme of the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES), the EU’s framework programme for security research and the technology programmes and excellence networks of the Defence Forces produce research to support the Security Strategy.

The monitoring is to be based on at least the following entities:

» ministry reports and assessments on how their strategic tasks have been taken into account in the administrative sector’s preparedness and the capabilities to manage a disturbance
» compiling and analysing the lessons learned from having managed disturbances
» assessments on the functioning and development needs of the security of supply arrangements in their administrative sector, and
» experiences from the preparedness exercises of administrative sectors, the Government and the authorities nation-wide
4.2 Exercises

The preparedness of our society to overcome disturbances is tested in preparedness exercises which provide an opportunity for various actors to train their personnel and develop performance. Exercises can be divided into three groups: extensive national and/or intersectoral preparedness exercises, exercises within an administrative sector and regionally limited exercises. There are also international exercises. Exercises must be planned, and for this reason the Heads of Preparedness meeting, supported by educational institutes giving security training, maintains an exercises’ calendar and makes proposals to co-ordinate and develop exercises.

The responsible body decides on the organisation and arrangements of exercises. The Security and Defence Committee in co-operation with the Heads of Preparedness of ministries, directs the Government's joint exercises and their preparation.

Responsible authorities must be involved in preparing the exercises in good time. Exercise situations are to be built on the division of responsibilities of authorities as stated in law. Exercises must be based on actual powers as well as the principles of the line of authority and disturbance management in accordance with the Security Strategy for Society. When agreement is made with the actors in question, part of administration can be dealt with by means of games. In order to set up games regular arrangements are created for the needs of the Government. The games must enable a two-way playing.

Information security matters must be taken into consideration in exercises and research activities that are connected to the management of preparedness and disturbances. In particular, the confidential operational information on the decision-making system, preparedness and performance as well as the operating modes of public administration must be protected.

The experiences gained from the exercises provide tangible information on securing the functions vital to society and relevant co-operation. In addition, there is also information on what kind of development is required by the strategic tasks and the overall situation of crisis management capabilities. The experiences also provide useful feedback for reviewing the Strategy and preparedness plans.

The capability of the central government to manage disturbances is tested in the Government's joint exercises. In line with the threat scenarios of the Strategy, these exercises test the preparedness for disturbances, the functioning of situation management arrangements as well as co-operation. The topics of the exercises are chosen to correspond to the challenges of the prevailing security environment. They can either be organised as scenario-specific exercises or, alternatively, by arranging several sequential seminars that deal with the management of a special situation chosen as the topic for the exercise.

The pools of the security of supply organisation have a long history of arranging exercises to improve preparedness for disturbances. The exercises that bring together actors from the business community, administration and organisations deal with situations which require the co-operation and expertise of a number of sectors.
In order to develop comprehensive preparedness in society also organisations are taken into account in the exercises. By involving organisations on different administrative levels necessary co-operation models are developed, the preparedness development of organisations is supported and voluntary actors are engaged. The independent exercise activities of organisations can be used to develop the capabilities of authorities. Regional and local administrations play a highly important role in establishing smooth forms of co-operation for exercises.

Administrative sectors arrange their own exercises to train their staff and test and develop performance. The framework for these exercises is built on the threat scenarios defined in this Strategy by taking into consideration possible changes in the security environment. Where possible, the exercises are to be used to develop the strategic tasks of administrative sectors. The reports on the experiences gained in the exercises are distributed to the extent required and taken into account in the annual reports on preparedness monitoring. In order to develop their activities, administrative sectors can take part in the exercises organised in the private sector.

Preparedness exercises are organised when necessary in regional and local administrations. Regional and local actors who play a key role in the management of society’s preparedness and disturbances take part in these exercises. Also actors from the central administration can participate to the extent required.

Finland participates in international exercises which it regards as useful, organised by the EU, Nato, Nato’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and other international organisations and actors.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MINISTRIES FOR THE SECURITY OF SUPPLY

The Government has decided the objectives of the security of supply on the basis of relevant legislation (Government decision 539/2008). The Decision obligates the ministries to direct and monitor, within their mandate, the implementation of the tasks relating to society's vital functions and the development of the capability to function. Each ministry is responsible for developing the security of supply within their respective mandates.

The task of the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) is to promote and co-ordinate the preparedness of the authorities to steer the country's economy for crisis situations and serious disturbances (Government decree 455/2008 on NESA).

The key responsibilities of the ministries' security of supply are listed below to improve the co-ordination of the tasks in accordance with the requirements of the Security Strategy for Society and the security of supply requirements.

In addition to the responsibility to guide and develop ministry-specific security of supply, the Bank of Finland plays a special role in preparing for directing payment systems and money supply.

Ministry of Employment and the Economy
The National Emergency Supply Agency functions as a special authority within the security of supply, directed by Ministry of Employment and the Economy.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy consults the Ministry for Foreign Affairs when necessary regarding concluded security of supply agreements between states and the possible need for new agreements. The ministry promotes the continuity of international trade also from the perspective of Finland's interests in the security of supply.

Ministry of Finance
Determines the participation of its administrative sector in the activities of the security of supply organisation's financial sector and possible other sectors. Guides, develops and safeguards the capability to function of the Government's common information systems and information networks in different threat situations and disturbances. The Ministry contributes to the work of the information society sector within the security of supply organisation.

Ministry of the Interior
Participates in the activities of the security of supply organisation to promote municipal preparedness and co-ordinates the participation of rescue services in the preparedness measures in the security of supply. The Ministry co-operates in situation picture matters with the National Emergency Supply Agency for the needs of the business community.
Ministry of Defence
Participates in the sectors’ work in the security of supply organisation and supports the Defence Forces participation in the pools.

Ministry of Transport and Communications
At the national and regional levels, contributes to the work of the information society sector and the transport logistic sector within the security of supply organisation. Maintains and develops the preconditions for Finland’s transport logistic system and electric communications infrastructure also from the perspective of the security of supply.

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Participates in the work of the food sector and the health care sector within the security of supply organisation. The Ministry maintains and develops the preconditions for primary production also from the perspective of the security of supply.

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
In co-operation with the National Emergency Supply Agency, reorganises and makes the material preparedness and organisation within the health care sector more systematic. Participates in the work of the health care sector within the security of supply organisation.

Ministry of the Environment
Supports the participation of its administrative sector in the work of the water supply pool and waste management committee within the security of supply organisation. The Ministry supports the launching of preparedness agreement arrangements through which a sufficient capability is ensured to implement the construction needs of emergency conditions and serious disturbances.

Ministry of Justice
Assesses the functionality of the Emergency Powers Act against modern threat scenarios as well as possible legislative needs in view of serious disturbances in normal conditions.

Prime Minister’s Office
Develops and maintains a co-ordinated national situation picture system, incorporating into it, when necessary, information on the security of supply situation from the business community, conveyed through the security of supply organisation.
THREAT SCENARIOS

1. **Serious disturbances in the power supply.**

Undisturbed production and distribution of power is the precondition for the functioning of society and, in fact, for all vital functions. Short power failures cause disruptions and damage, but they do not threaten widely vital functions or the well-being of the population. Extensive and long-term failures in production and distribution of power can seriously undermine society’s capability to function.

In an energy-demanding society based on electric power connections, better quality is continuously expected from the transmission and distribution of electric power distribution. The reliability of the national main grid and distribution networks and the capability to overcome serious disturbances are essential for the functioning of society. It is therefore important to ensure that the capabilities and skills required for repairs remain in the country. Electricity networks require large capitals and investments have long-term effects.

On the whole, transmission line control and monitoring systems depend on telecommunications. Hence, a problem concerning one of the systems immediately generates a problem concerning another. Key factors with regard to guaranteeing electric power supply for telecommunications also include human resources and contingency planning, among other things, with power companies. Disruptions in power supply are most likely caused by extreme weather conditions or inherent problems in the systems. However, as the energy transmission and distribution networks form a part of the critical infrastructure of society and may therefore invite terrorist attacks, organised crime related attacks or military operations, disruptions caused by an intentional act cannot be excluded from threat scenarios.

The production and distribution of district heating in Finland is almost exclusively managed by the public utility companies owned by municipalities. Distribution of district heating is entirely dependent the availability of electricity. Functional disturbances in the district heating pipes compare technically speaking to disruptions in water supply. As a total of 2 600 000 people depend on district heating, an extensive supply failure in winter could lead to the need to relocate people, which would require co-operation from a number of authorities.
2. **Serious disturbances in the telecommunications and information systems – cyber threats**

In addition to electric power, most of society’s services and functions make increasingly use of electric services and are thus dependent on telecommunication networks. The main part of society’s critical services is based on telecommunications and the use of electric data assets. Services are computer-controlled or they are entirely electric services. Electronic information systems and the connecting data transfer networks merge and form system entities even on the global level. The consequences of system malfunctions can extend from individual services into full-blowen system-wide breakdowns. The very fast development of the used technology has an impact on preparing for threats. Mobile solutions and internet are central to communications. The electric infrastructure may constitute a vulnerable entity which is difficult to control. The threat is highlighted by the fact that information and communications systems which are based on electricity are used to manage society and warn the population in disturbances and emergency conditions make.

The functioning of information systems, telecommunications and the electronic media can be threatened by forces of nature, human error or technical malfunctions and deliberate cyber or physical attacks against systems. In recent years, a widely used way to interfere with Internet services is the denial-of-service attack, aiming to flood and saturate Web servers or the capacity of the Internet service with automatic messages. There are also numerous other possibilities for interfering with Internet services. There are no solutions for absolute protection although there are systems in use which aim at detecting and repelling attacks.

Unintentional or intentional network disturbances may target all actors who use telecommunications and network services in their operations. Today it can be said, then, that the threat may be aimed at all who use electric services. Cyber attacks are directed primarily against network operators or e-commerce businesses but also industry, hospitals and bodies governed by public law are targeted.

Organised crime and terrorism are rapidly making use of the vulnerabilities of information networks. Telecommunications and network services have societal importance and therefore they are vital elements also in political and military crises. For most countries military preparedness also means capabilities to interfere with, exploit and sabotage information systems. Information warfare is an integral part of modern military preparedness. Through networks, systems can be targeted with more traditional and stronger means such as an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), a High Power Microwave (HPM) or physical destruction.

Preparedness in the field of telecommunications and information systems is influenced by the financial situation of companies, tightened international competition and the aim to minimise expenses and concentrate on commercially relevant operations. Outsourcing and chaining of support services have in some cases led to unclear lines of responsibility in safeguarding system entities. Outsourcing is intensified by virtualisation of services. Network management and critical spares are often located abroad. A growing challenge is to keep critical programmes up-to-
date and retain a skilled workforce. The overall preparedness is undermined by lower protection levels in new data centres as well as the reluctance of operators to invest in preparedness. Neither are users of networks always aware of the existing threats or they do not consider them serious.

Data processing service producers are merging and concentrating their functions. This poses a challenge to preparedness when critical systems increasingly operate in a few service centres. Payments in Finland depend on the functioning of telecommunication and information systems and the availability of electricity. As a result of rapid technical development, the maintenance of back-up systems is increasingly difficult and expensive. For the financial sector, decentralising infrastructure and providing services on the European level pose challenges to managing the systems.

3. **Serious disturbances in transport logistics**

The infrastructure of the Finnish society, the functioning of administration and other organisations, security of supply, the business community and trade are today almost entirely dependent on transports. The transport system is based on telecommunications and the use of information systems. The system is vulnerable to disturbances. Extensive and long-term disturbances are very rare, but the consequences of such a disturbance can be very serious for society.

Finland’s transport logistic system includes, apart from transport equipment, transport routes, loading, unloading and removal equipment, ports and harbours, airports and land terminals. Logistics comprise general and logistics guiding information transfer systems and information systems, monetary and payments systems as well as communication and navigation satellites. Transports are regulated by extensive legislation as well as instructions and guidelines issued by authorities. Insurances and guarantees, a reliable maintenance and repair service, spare parts service as well as availability of electricity and fuels all have an impact on functioning of transports. The operating environment of the transport logistic system is global, influenced by the status of the international economy and trade, general political situation as well as investments and financial arrangements.

Sea transports are particularly critical for the functioning of society. In normal conditions, sea transports and vessels may be threatened by, among other things, disturbances in transports of critical materials or port functions, restrictions of maritime traffic, threats posed by vessels themselves as well as terrorism and accidents. In disturbances, maritime traffic may be impeded by the Gulf of Finland becoming non-navigable, sabotage against vessels and ports, restrictions against using foreign territorial waters or ports as well as the outflagging of Finnish-registered vessels. The vulnerability of transports to disturbances is on the increase and valid insurance on vessels, cargo and crew constitute a necessary precondition for the continuation of maritime traffic. When transport risks increase there may be a dramatic rise in insurance costs and international reinsurance markets cease to function. Decision-making of the Finnish transport business regarding key issues is gradually migrating abroad.
4. **Serious disruptions in public utilities**

For the functioning of society, the key elements of public utilities are water supply, wastewater management, waste management and district heating. In addition, securing the preconditions for the public transport system is societally important. Municipalities bear, for the main part, responsibility for these functions.

Contamination of a water source or exceptional drought may cause a disturbance in water supply. This could also be caused by the difficulty in obtaining essential maintenance services, spare parts or processing chemicals. Old distribution networks and cutting investments for renewing the infrastructure increase disruptions of supply. Epidemics caused by contaminated water constitute an extensive local threat to the health care system and the well-being of the population. Of primary concern in Finland are small groundwater suppliers without adequate disinfection capabilities. Widespread urban epidemics can be caused by the breakdown of the water treatment system. Exceptional floods, for example, may cause serious disturbances to the wastewater systems.

Waste management as a whole tolerates disturbances; the most vulnerable part, however, is waste transport. In the disposal and treatment of sudden and exceptional amounts of waste which could be the result of a large-scale oil spill or radioactive fallout, for example, transport and handling capacity would create problems as well as the sites which could be needed for the waste.

Serious disruptions in public utilities are likely to be caused by weather conditions or inherent problems in the systems and not by an intentional or negligent act. However, intentional criminal or terrorist acts can threaten also the functions of public utilities.

5. **Serious disturbances in food supply**

As for primary production, processing and distribution system, food supply is highly centralised regionally, which increases the system's vulnerability. For example energy supply, information systems, outsourced support services, water supply and logistics form central dependency relations. The food industry depends heavily on imports as a large part of raw materials, packing materials and in particular chemicals are either partly or entirely imported. They play a key role in safeguarding agriculture and food supply. Even if the level of primary production were sufficient, the securing of the preconditions for the processing industry poses a challenging entity to the functioning of food supply.

In primary production, livestock farming is more vulnerable than plant cultivation because it is highly dependent on electricity, energy and water supply, transport logistics and the functioning of information systems. Regional centralisation, the intensely increasing farm size and prevalence of automation and machine systems have increased the vulnerability of livestock farming. Dependency on machine and equipment repair services and the risk of epizootic diseases have been on the increase
because of these factors. Today, the difficulty in finding skilled workforce is also a
growing risk factor.

The dependency of farms on inputs for production and the processing industry as
well as the functioning of their resource planning systems forms a chain of functions
where significant disturbances would cause great losses in production. Livestock
farming is today dependent on the feed industry and in particular the availability of
additional protein; protein dependency is one of the key factors affecting production.

Animal and plant disease epidemics may cause serious disturbances in food
supply. Already at the threat phase they generate additional costs and work. The
internalisation of food markets poses threats to food safety and challenges to food
control. Food crises in the area of the EU are often linked to zoonoses, which are
dangerous to humans, or to highly contagious livestock diseases. Should foreign
substances enter the food production chain, this could result in widespread
withdrawal of feed and foodstuffs from the market.

6. **Serious disturbances in the financial and payment systems**

A well-functioning financial and payment system is a fundamental prerequisite for
the functioning of the economy and society. It requires a stable financial system which
is capable of conducting its fundamental tasks such as the transmission of financing
and payments, pricing of financial instruments and risk sharing. Furthermore, the
risk-bearing capability of the actors in the financial market and the confidence of
citizens in financial institutions and infrastructure must be sufficient to sustain
disturbances in the operating environment.

A concrete example of a serious disturbance in the financial market is the global
financial crisis the worst phase of which passed during 2009. The infrastructure of
the financial sector showed its capability to function reliably also in crisis situations.
Liquidity and infection risks, caused by the internal problems of the financial sector,
have diminished. The operating environment continues to be difficult for the actors
in the financial market as recovery has relied on the exceptionally extensive support
measures of authorities. The recovery of economic growth is still uncertain. Despite
weakening performance the profitability and solvency of the Finnish bank sector
have, however, remained good in an extremely difficult operating environment.

In the future, the risk situation of banks will be more and more clearly linked to
general economic development. It is anticipated that a diminishing interest margin
and growing credit losses will weaken the profitability of the bank sector in the
foreseeable future. The large capital buffers of the banks will sustain, however, the
anticipated losses. In the light of the stress tests the solvency of the financial sector
is assessed to be able to take weaker economic development than expected. A key
question is the ability of the financial system to maintain the granting of debts to
support economic recovery.

The internalisation of the domestic financial market infrastructure continues
alongside European integration. When functions are centralised, good governance
represents a way to decrease the exposure of both the infrastructure and its users
to risks. This requires transparency when structures are changing, in other words
the gathering of information for the needs of market participants and authorities is
safeguarded.

The most important risks and threat scenarios that differ from anticipated
development in the coming years are as follows:

» extended recession with the operating environment of the financial sector
  weakening anew
» the banks in crises remain dependent on the support from the financial
  market
» while economy recovers the lending capability of the financial system
  remains weak
» regulatory reforms of the financial system are not implemented and, as a
  result, structural weaknesses remain in the system
» problems emerge in the information technology of an important
  infrastructure actor or in liquidity

The internationalisation of the infrastructure of the payment and security
markets continues. In the future, the different parts of the infrastructure will be
increasingly transferred outside Finland to benefit from European integration
and large-scale production. The adoption of the single euro payments area
(SEPA) continues. It is likely that payments on account will be processed for the
main part outside Finland.

The Markets in Financial Services directive (MiFID) tightens the competition of
trading in securities. As a result of the directive, Helsinki Stock Exchange introduced
central counter party clearing in autumn 2009. Compared to the previous working
methods, the change is considerable and improves the counterparty risk management
of dealers. As a result, one part of the chain of trading in securities was transferred
abroad.

A central threat scenario for the infrastructure is that problems relating to the
information technology or liquidity of an important actor, such as an international
bank, reflect on the infrastructure. Because Finland’s infrastructure is highly
centralised, problems of a substantial actor would strongly reflect on us. If confidence
in financial institutions is diminished the problems of the infrastructure that the end
users face could be more far-reaching than normally. For example, extensive copying
of payment cards could erode the citizens’ trust in the means of payment.

The biggest risks in the insurance business relate to the investments of insurance
companies. A dramatic fall of stock prices rapidly reduces the working capital of
insurance companies and weakens their solvency. The impact is most significant for
employment pension insurance companies.
7. **Disruptions in the availability of public funding**

The work of the public sector plays a central role for the well-being of citizens. Public administration is responsible, for example, for providing various services, allocating income transfers to different population groups and maintaining and developing infrastructure needed for the functioning of society. The expenses of the public sector are for the main part financed by taxes, social security contributions and capital incomes. Furthermore, borrowing can be used to level out the effects of economic fluctuations on the resources available to public administration.

As a result of the financial crisis, Finland’s incurring of debt has increased to a record-high level. Despite improving economic outlook, without strongly balancing measures the state will have to finance a larger part than before of its expenses through borrowing. For the financing of the public economy, the amount of public debt constitutes a larger threat than before. The more in debt the public economy is, the more vulnerable is the availability of financing for disturbances and crises in the operating environment.

It is typical of crises that the financial position of the public economy and, in particular, the state economy tends to weaken when the preconditions for economic activities are degraded. The tax revenue may fall at the same time as public expenditure is under pressure to rise because of unemployment, for example. Furthermore, responding to disturbances that jeopardise the functioning of society usually increases various expenses as the focus is on preventing the repercussions of the crisis.

Apart from various economic phenomena, a serious disturbance in economic development can also be linked to the heightening of a military-political conflict and tension. All crises which lead to reduced economic activity may, when lasting for a long time, jeopardise the availability of funding for the public economy. Possible disturbances in international financial markets or collapsed confidence in Finland’s capability to pay its debts may quite quickly reflect on the availability of loans and an increased interest rate.

As a small and open economy Finland is dependent on the status and development of the World economy. Economic integration in all its forms has increased the effectiveness and production of the world economy. Although the integration development has brought about many positive impacts, the interdependency of national economies has increased and their vulnerability has increased as a result of different economic crises that have happened globally.

Problems in the availability of public funding mean that as different crises come to a head, resorting to tightened taxation and cutting expenditure is unavoidable. Disturbances in the availability of financing the public economy reflect on the functioning of the entire society.
8. **Serious disturbances in the health and welfare of the population**

The well-being of the population can be threatened by an extended recession, pandemics and dangerous infectious diseases, radiation accidents and other environmental accidents, contamination of food and drinking water, chemical threats, difficulties in obtaining pharmaceuticals or medical equipment and the availability of skilled workforce. Challenges posed by the climate change, the ageing of the population, social exclusion and the general deterioration of the health of the population constitute more gradually developing threats.

An extended recession may generate problems in providing the required social and health care services for the population or in maintaining social protection. Inadequacies in social insurance financing and liquidity may complicate the maintenance of income security. In such cases, the functioning of the social insurance system may become disturbed.

Internationalisation and people's mobility have, for their part, increased the threat of epidemics. New and for us very rare infectious diseases may cause serious epidemics and require capabilities and measures which are not in use in normal situations. A pandemic may have wide-ranging effects on the health of the population, the functioning of the social and health care system and society’s vital functions. A pandemic would cause major changes in people's daily lives, for example in going to work, education, making a living and the community spirit. Already now a number of bacteria and viruses which are drug-resistant pose a considerable challenge to our health care system.

As social and regional tendency to exclusion increases the people living outside the regular societal structures are a major challenge. Being outside the working life, poverty, insufficient integration of immigrants, illnesses and the increasing use of intoxicants and drugs strongly contribute to exclusion. It increases the tendency to illnesses, infectious diseases, accidents and premature death; it also increases violence in families and disturbed behaviour especially in young people. Exclusion and disturbed civil peace undermine national unity and the psychological resilience to crisis.
9. **Major accidents, extreme natural phenomena and environmental threats**

Major accidents or natural disasters caused by freak weather phenomena often bring about widespread destruction or danger to human life, property or the environment. They very often have direct and indirect effects of different extent on the well-being of the population. These accidents occur unexpectedly and may have only local impact at first. However, their effect can continue to expand, unless rapid and efficient rescue activities can be organised. Major accidents are normally caused by human error or technical system malfunctions.

The most probable culprits for an industrial major accident are plants dealing in hazardous substances, such as nuclear plants and the so-called Seveso-plants, which contain an inherent risk for a major accident. An accident in these types of plants could result in a radiation or chemical accident, presenting a clear danger to humans, property, water sources and the environment. Nuclear radiation or emissions of hazardous substances may restrict the use of certain areas, as well as animals and foodstuffs in the area, for years to come.

In passenger traffic a major accident causes loss of human lives and, in case of public transport, blocks people's mobility. In passenger and goods traffic and in particular when hazardous substances are transported a major accident may also lead to material damage and environmental problems such as contamination of soil or water and shores.

Widespread fires and other accidents in public buildings may prevent the use of the premises over a long period of time. Accidents or criminal or terrorist acts in large venues and public buildings may pose an immediate threat to people and property as well as to the continuation of all activities.

From the Finnish perspective, the most likely extreme natural phenomena are storms, heavy rains and a sudden rise in the level of water. The adverse effects target in the first place the functioning of critical infrastructure. Extreme phenomena can jeopardise people's health and safety and cause an environmental catastrophe which could have long-term effects on the environment and living conditions.

Environmental threats are changes in the environment which may threaten the health or living conditions of the population by destroying the preconditions of business, agriculture and forestry, contaminating water sources, threatening the existence of species and eroding infrastructures. Changes in the environment may develop rapidly; such cases normally involve environmental accidents. Gradually developing environmental threats, such as gradual contamination, are more difficult to detect. Their detrimental effects usually reach deep into the basic functions of ecosystems and often cause massive damage.

Environmental threats can also be generated by human activity or extreme forces of nature. A severe environmental threat may be the result of poor industrial planning involving the use of raw materials, land and minerals, potable water as well as logging. Environmental threats can also be created by the wrong handling of industry and urban waste.
At their worst, environmental dangers involve the entire earth. Other global environmental threats include ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, depletion of non-renewable natural resources, diminishing potable water resources and land erosion. Environmental threats may remain regional even if their impact was felt in several countries. The most serious regional threat in our near environs is the deterioration and, particularly, eutrophication of the Baltic Sea as well as the risk of averages due to the rapidly increasing shipping. A local environmental threat can also be serious. For example, as a result of industrial production or poor waste management, the heavy metal or chemical concentrations contents can rise above approved limits for health in the surface water and ground water.

Accidents can occur spontaneously and they can also be intentional whereas extreme natural phenomena are, as the name suggests, non-intentional. Also environmental threats must be regarded as non-intentional.

10. **Terrorism and other criminality that endanger social order**

There is not so far a generally accepted definition for terrorism. Terrorism usually refers to violent, illegal, national or international, activity or the threat of violence with the objective of causing unrest and deep fear. Most often the aim of a terrorist act is to force political leaders to succumb to the terrorists’ wishes. It is typical of their action to seek and exploit visibility in the media to achieve their goals.

The threat of terrorism against Finland is considered low. It is possible that terrorists might attempt to use Finnish territory as one of their areas of transit, rest and hiding. Furthermore, there is always the danger of ideologically motivated sabotage which most often targets property. The United States, large Nato countries, Russia, Israel, moderate Arab countries and their citizens, leaders and economic interests continue to be seen as primary targets. However, the possibility of Finnish embassies, companies or individuals being targeted abroad by terrorists cannot be excluded.

Representatives, foreign missions and other premises of the terrorists’ primary target countries, as well as their vessels and aircraft, also exist in Finland, and may be targeted by terrorists. Major international meetings and other comparable events organised in Finland could also increase the risk of terrorism. On the other hand, strikes against infrastructure vital for the functioning of society are considered unlikely. Terrorist acts committed abroad, in particular if weapons of mass destruction are used, may also introduce direct or indirect spill-over effects in Finland.

The threat of terrorist acts where CBRNE elements would be present is less likely than other types of terrorist threats but they would have serious repercussions. Factors relating to the proliferation of hazardous substances such as technological development and other trends may increase the risk in the future. Terrorist acts involving such threats do not need to take place on a large scale to lead to grave physical and psychological consequences. Instead of a large number of casualties, the
objective may be to generate fear, economic and social repercussions or merely to create disturbances.

Violent radicalisation can create a threat if spreading wide and, as a result, contribute to the gradual collapse of the welfare society.

Organised crime which is established in Finland further develops its networks and mutual co-operation. Identified international and domestic criminal organisations become more active and increase their activities. Strengthened international co-operation between criminal groups influence the concrete forms that criminal activities take. From the point of networking and management, prisons are an integral part of the operating environment of criminal organisations.

Criminal organisations are particularly active in drug-related crime but they also make determined use of business activities to support their operations and to expand into financial crime. At the same time the grey economy markets gain ground in the Finnish business sector.

Even if mutual agreements and division of tasks are more advantageous for criminal activities tensions between criminal groups occur. Violent settling of disputes between criminal groups and the resulting retaliations can cause serious situations for outsiders and weaken public order and security. Organised crime has already clearly brutalised violent crime. When threats against authorities and key witnesses increase law enforcement and the legal system can be impeded.

In the context of international organised crime, Finland is still a periphery, providing mainly a ground for organised crime against property and drug-related crime from neighbouring areas. Organised crime from Russia continues its efforts to infiltrate the Finnish business life and seeks to establish itself and influence for example the forwarding business, logistics companies and foreign trade. The reliability of business activities and their various branches can diminish. Corruption can increase if the operating modes of organised crime from neighbouring areas are adopted more and more often.
11. **Serious disturbances in border security**

Illegal immigration is a global phenomenon. An increasingly large part of illegal entry happens as a result of trafficking in human beings and human smuggling, organised by international organised crime. Illegal immigration is rooted in social inequality, insecurity, population growth, armed conflicts, ethnic issues and in the quest for a better life. Conflict areas and countries with clearly lower standards of living compared to the west are the countries of origin of illegal immigration and more extensive migrations.

Trafficking in human beings is the fastest growing criminal activity. It is also one way for terrorists to finance their activities. Many other forms of serious cross-border crime are often linked to trafficking in human beings. Millions reside illegally within the EU and in its neighbours. Particularly worrisome global phenomena involve the trafficking in and smuggling of children and the organ trade the effects of which may be seen in Finland, too.

Finland is both a target and a transit area of illegal immigration. The good security situation and social welfare as well as good connections to the other western countries make Finland lucrative for these purposes. As illegal immigration increases, the threat of more and more people living on the outside of society or the supervision of the authorities increases. However, no massive migratory flows that could directly jeopardize our security have taken place, nor are they more likely in the foreseeable future.

Illegal immigration and illegal residence lay the foundations for other threats, such as the shadow economy, illegal employment and terrorism. A growing number of people, whose real identity and citizenship will never be established, continue to reside in Finland.

Armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing, nuclear accidents, natural disasters or seriously degraded livelihood prospects in Finland’s neighbouring regions could generate a major influx of asylum seekers. An epidemic breakout could also spawn dangerous migratory flows if sufficient medical treatment was unavailable in the country of origin. A large-scale influx could also be the result of deliberate action on the part of some state. In such a case, tens of thousands of illegal asylum seekers could arrive at the border in a short period of time. Processing the applications of asylum seekers, identifying accommodation as well as organizing food and health care would significantly tie up society’s resources. The border control and asylum policies of Finland’s neighbouring regions play an important role in determining whether such a situation could develop.

Threats to border security are the result of intentional acts. Direct disturbances and problems generated by these threats can be and should be addressed with the authorities’ activities. The main reasons for border security threats are, however, big international social and economic issues which cannot be much directly influenced even with national political decisions.
12. **A political, economic and military pressure**

Through political, economic and military pressure means activity a state or another actor aims to influence, wilfully and deliberately, governmental decision-making in another state or to challenge another state’s sovereignty in order to achieve political, economic or other strategic goals which are non-negotiable or unacceptable for the state in question. Such pressure could focus on the state leadership, the public opinion nationally or internationally, the functioning of society or the citizens’ will or capability to defend the nation. It would also partly aim to demoralise the population. The party putting on the pressure may utilise instruments of influence and strategic communication on the information environment and tie them to political, economic and military measures of pressure. Pressure can be exercised in international relations and international organisations as well as in the media. It may occur in isolated cases, increase gradually or measures of pressure can occur simultaneously. Information operations of various types, such as network interference, are more and more often linked to political, economic and military pressure.

Political pressure may include contesting or limiting the normal co-operation and interaction between states or the preconditions of economic activity. Attempts can be made to limit Finland’s international freedom of action. The pressure may also occur as a result of a conflict or a cultural clash between the EU and some other party, in conjunction with which attempts are made to influence Finland in order to weaken the Union’s internal cohesion and solidarity.

It is possible that, in addition to measures of pressure, Finland would be offered certain advantages if it agreed to accept the demands. Should a large international interest group, be it political, religious or economic, attempt to influence Finland or Finnish actors, it could be construed as political pressure.

Economic pressure aims to impact the national economy and create uncertainty among the population. It may include embargo and sanction-related measures, such as impeding or interrupting the import of energy, raw materials and goods as well as e-commerce and financial transactions. Obtaining loans from the international finance market can be made more difficult and unjustifiable increases of debt expenses can be imposed. The capabilities of companies to procure critical goods and services from abroad may be obstructed. Vital foreign-owned companies can be regulated or closed down altogether. Transports of critical materials and relevant logistic functions can be interfered with, for instance, by restricting the availability of vessels or their access to certain sea areas or ports.

Military pressure can include violations of territorial integrity, increased military exercises and troop concentrations close to our borders, military intelligence activities, armed skirmishes and sabotage, interference in land, sea and air traffic as well as telecommunications and information operations. The pressure can also be intensified by means of asymmetric warfare.
13. The use of military force

Political, economic or military pressure may continue with the use of military force if the party exerting pressure on Finland has not reached its vital objectives by other means. The use of military force against Finland may be part of a European-level crisis which reflects on or escalates to Finland; in such a case the pre-crisis measures would not necessarily be directed against Finland.

The use of military force may begin with a surprise attack if the adversary believes that such an attack will be sufficiently successful. The strike aims to force the state leadership to make the desired decisions by crippling vital systems, targets and functions in society. Possible military targets include the integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control system as well as air and naval defences, airfields and ports. An attack may include the disruption of air and sea traffic. It can be a single-service or a joint operation, involving long-range weapon systems and special forces. Information operations constitute an integral element of the activities.

The use of military force aiming to surprise is especially suited to bringing a highly advanced society to its knees. Society’s increasing vulnerability creates favourable conditions for the surprise element in the use of force. When a strike is being considered, key success factors include the functioning of the political decision-making system, the leaders’ resolve and the population’s crisis tolerance.

Such attacks typically involve normal and precision-guided air-to-ground weapons, cruise and artillery missiles, electronic warfare using, for instance, jamming, information system intrusions as well as electronic weapon systems and special forces. Information warfare, such as psychological operations and propaganda, support the goals of the strike. Limited ground operations using troops in high readiness are possible, especially, when the defender is unprepared for such operations. Weapons of mass destruction and the use of relating materiel can also be used.

A large-scale use of military force can begin with a surprise strike, continued by intensive use of force involving all services. It would be aimed directly at targets and functions vital for defence, endeavouring to seize key areas from the viewpoint of the war’s ultimate goal. An attempt to break the backbone of the defence will use as wide a range of instruments as possible. The objective would be pursued by the combined impact of information warfare, special forces and sabotage, long-range precision weapons and a ground attack, and by isolating the country internationally. Achieving this goal does not necessarily require seizing extensive land areas or annihilating the entire armed forces of the defender. It takes months to prepare for a large-scale military operation.
POSSIBLE DISTURBANCES

By maintaining and developing capabilities it is possible to prepare for the management of disturbances, which comprises planning readiness, materiel readiness and the expertise of organisations and their personnel.

The planning for special situations, which was started and organised on the basis of the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society adopted in 2006, provides the necessary foundation and structure for the ministries to prepare for various disturbances. The planning and organisation of preparedness must be continuous, however, extending to the different administrative levels and taking into account the activities of the business sector and organisations.

Possible disturbances have been compiled in the matrix below where their connection to the threat scenarios described in the Strategy is assessed. A list of disturbances or how they are connected is not unambiguous and extensive but it deals with significant disturbances in society that a number of actors may benefit from and use as support to plan and organise preparedness.

The exchange of information between various actors and the assessment of their capability needs are facilitated when the operational infrastructure and operational concept of preparedness are as congruent as possible. The plan structure below can be used in preparedness planning. It covers the central issues to be taken into account when risk analyses are drawn up and preparations are made for the management of disturbances.

» threat assessment
» the basic plan to prepare for a disturbance and manage a possibly escalated situation
  » prevention
  » information gathering
  » compiling and disseminating the situation picture
  » preparing for situation management, including advance preparations
  » situation management
  » communications
» implementation of the key tasks
  » the areas of responsibility of various actors and lines of authority
  » immediate measures
  » required resources
» an assessment and plan for co-operation needs
  » co-operation with other administrative branches
  » co-operation with other actors in society
» upholding plans, training and exercises
POSSIBLE DISTURBANCES AND THEIR CONNECTION TO THREAT SCENARIOS IN THE STRATEGY

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Possible Disturbances</th>
<th>Serious disturbances in the power supply</th>
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<th>Serious disruptions in public utilities</th>
<th>Serious disturbances in food supply</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disruption in the availability, transmission and distribution of electricity</td>
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<td>Disruptions in the functioning of telecommunications and information systems</td>
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<td>Damage in the ICT infrastructure</td>
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<td>Disturbance in the nation-wide radio and television broadcasts</td>
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<td>Transport disruptions</td>
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<td>Disruptions in the availability of imported fuels</td>
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<td>Disruption in the fuel supply</td>
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<td>Disruption in the supply of non-durable consumer goods</td>
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<td>Disruption in the water supply (incl. wastewater management)</td>
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<td>Disruption in waste management</td>
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<td>Failure of district heating</td>
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<td>Failure of financial transactions</td>
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<td>Disruption in the availability of cash</td>
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<td>Collapse of the credit rating of the state and municipalities</td>
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<td>Downfall of the solvency or reinsurance cover of an insurance company</td>
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<td>A pandemic or other widespread outbreak of serious infectious disease</td>
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<td>A serious animal or plant disease outbreak</td>
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<td>Mass extinction of species</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declining conditions in primary production</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Widespread contamination of soil or waters</td>
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<td>A storm or flooding and a dam disaster</td>
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<td>An accident relating to CBRNE hazards</td>
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<td>Land, sea or air traffic accident</td>
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<td>An accident affecting Finns or action taken against them abroad</td>
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<td>A terrorist attack or a clear threat thereof</td>
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<td>A criminal act that widely endangers the population</td>
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<tr>
<td>A criminal act that widely endangers functions in society</td>
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<td>Jeopardised border security</td>
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<td>Major influx of asylum seekers</td>
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<td>Adversely influencing the State’s capability to function</td>
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<td>Disruption in foreign trade</td>
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<td>Threatening with WMD</td>
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<td>Information operation</td>
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<td>Provocative violation of territorial integrity</td>
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<td>An armed incident</td>
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<td>The use of military force attempting to surprise</td>
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<td>A large-scale use of military force</td>
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</table>
STRATEGIC TASKS

The strategic tasks which are central to securing society's vital functions and the ministry responsible for the development of each strategic task are presented in the table below. The development of most strategic tasks and relating capabilities is connected to measures and resource allocation by other ministries, regional and local administration, the business community and organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC TASK</th>
<th>RESPONSIBLE MINISTRY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management of Government affairs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guaranteeing the proper functioning of the Government</td>
<td>PMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland's activities in the European Union and securing the national preparation and handling of EU matters</td>
<td>PMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functioning of Government communications</td>
<td>PMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance of the Government's situation picture</td>
<td>PMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing the rule of law</td>
<td>MoJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holding elections</td>
<td>MoJ</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintaining contacts to foreign states and key international actors</td>
<td>MFA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protecting and assisting abroad Finnish citizens and those residing in Finland on a permanent basis</td>
<td>MFA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing Finland's foreign trade</td>
<td>MFA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive crisis management</td>
<td>MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International military crisis management</td>
<td>MoD</td>
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<tr>
<td>International civilian crisis management</td>
<td>MoI</td>
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<tr>
<td>International disaster response</td>
<td>MoI</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Finland’s defence capability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland’s military defence</td>
<td>MoD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting the other authorities</td>
<td>MoD</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC TASK</td>
<td>RESPONSIBLE MINISTRY</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guaranteeing protection under the law</td>
<td>MoJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public order and security</td>
<td>MoI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency services and maritime search and rescue</td>
<td>MoI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood risk management and dam safety</td>
<td>MoAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency response functions</td>
<td>MoI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and chemical spill response on land and water</td>
<td>MoE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>MoI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration control</td>
<td>MoI</td>
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<tr>
<td>The management of a major influx of asylum seekers</td>
<td>MoI</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Functioning of the economy and infrastructure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquiring and allocating financial resources</td>
<td>MoF</td>
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<tr>
<td>The financial system and money management</td>
<td>MoF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding the insurance services</td>
<td>MoSAH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing the fuel supply</td>
<td>MoEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding the electric power supply</td>
<td>MoEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding the electronic ICT systems</td>
<td>MoTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding the state administration's IT functions and information security and the service systems common to the state administration</td>
<td>MoF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting the construction and maintenance of warning and alert systems</td>
<td>MoTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding the continuation of transports</td>
<td>MoTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding the primary production of food supply</td>
<td>MoAF</td>
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<td>Safeguarding the water supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding food processing and distribution</td>
<td>MoEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safeguarding critical industries and services</td>
<td>MoEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guaranteeing housing</td>
<td>MoE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing a sufficient labour workforce</td>
<td>MoEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintaining the education and research system</td>
<td>MoEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detecting, controlling and adapting to changes in the environment</td>
<td>MoE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waste management</td>
<td>MoE</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC TASK</td>
<td>RESPONSIBLE MINISTRY</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The population’s income security and capability to function</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Income security</td>
<td>MoSAH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing the social and health care services and environmental health care services</td>
<td>MoSAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaranteeing the availability of medical supplies and equipment</td>
<td>MoSAH</td>
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<tr>
<td>The detection, surveillance and management systems for health risks</td>
<td>MoSAH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological resilience to crisis</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>MoEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening cultural identity and protecting cultural heritage</td>
<td>MoEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing religious services</td>
<td>MoEC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key of abbreviations:**

PMO = Prime Minister’s Office  
MoJ = Ministry of Justice  
MFA = Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
MoD = Ministry of Defence  
MoI = Ministry of the Interior  
MoAF = Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry  
MoE = Ministry of the Environment  
MoF = Ministry of Finance  
MoSAH = Ministry of Social Affairs and Health  
MoEE = Ministry of Employment and the Economy  
MoTC = Ministry of Transport and Communications  
MoEC = Ministry of Education and Culture
### TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Term</strong></th>
<th><strong>Definition</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border management system</strong></td>
<td>Relating to policies, legislation, co-operation, sharing of responsibilities, personnel, instruments and technology of different levels, this is the entity of measures which are implemented by the competent authorities of member states in co-operation with other actors, when necessary. The system benefits, among other things, from the four-step border security model and the common integrated risk analysis to guarantee a consistent and high-level external border control and smooth border traffic.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CBRNE</strong></td>
<td>CBRNE is an abbreviation from the English words chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives. CBRNE threats refer to incidents or weapons in which any of these five hazards are present, aiming at causing significant physical or social damage or destruction.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive approach (CA) in crisis management</strong></td>
<td>A comprehensive approach in supporting crisis management on the ground by various means refers to diplomacy, civilian and military crisis management, development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. The goal is to coherently co-ordinate different activities while respecting the independent role of each actor. The impact of activities must be assessed in its entirety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive concept of security</strong></td>
<td>The comprehensive concept of security comprises security issues which, if exacerbated, may turn into threats that can jeopardise or seriously harm Finland, Finns or the functions vital to Finnish society. Wide-ranging threats include premeditated action such as the use of military force, terrorism or interference with information networks. They can also occur spontaneously, such as widespread failures of the electric grid or extreme forces of nature.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive defence approach</strong></td>
<td>Comprehensive defence approach is all of the military and civil functions by which Finland’s sovereignty and the livelihood and security of its citizens are safeguarded against threats by other nations or other external threats. Co-ordination of the comprehensive defence approach involves co-ordinating the measures of the public sector, i.e. the Government, state authorities and municipalities, the private sector and voluntary activities by citizens to maintain the functions vital to society under all situations.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Critical infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure (CI) comprises the structures and functions which are critical for the continuous functioning of society. This involves physical facilities and structures as well as electronic functions and services; to guarantee these, specific critical points must be found and secured while at the same time paying close attention to the functioning of the infrastructural entity.</td>
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<td><strong>Cyber threat</strong></td>
<td>So far the use of this term is not established on the national level. Here it is used to describe a threat against interdependent networks, including various information networks and data transmission networks, internet, telephone networks, computer systems and the embedded processors and controlling devices of the critical production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence capability</strong></td>
<td>This is developed and maintained through defence policy, co-ordination of the comprehensive defence approach, and military defence, resulting in the readiness and ability to carry out national defence tasks in all situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence system</strong></td>
<td>The defence system is an entity that consists of a command and control system, intelligence and surveillance system, logistics systems and troop structure.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disturbance</strong></td>
<td>This is a threat or an occurrence which endangers security in society, capacity to act or the population's living conditions. Co-operation and communication of the authorities and other actors on a wider or more intensive scale are needed to manage the situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DSA</strong></td>
<td>DSA (Designated Security Authority) is a designated security authority who is responsible for carrying out the tasks enacted by law as well as other tasks generated by international security obligations. The Ministry of Defence, the Defence Command and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service are designated security authorities in Finland.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency conditions</strong></td>
<td>Emergency conditions are laid down in the Emergency Powers Act and in the State of Defence Act; it is not possible to control them with the regular powers or resources of the authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency services</td>
<td>An entity that encompasses the prevention of accidents, rescue activities and civil defence. Rescue activities consist of urgent tasks in response to an accident or the risk of an accident carried out to save people and/or property, to limit damage and to mitigate the consequences. Rescue activities are also implemented in situations involving comparable deliberate harm or the threat of it. Civil defence refers to the protection of people and property, the carrying out of rescue services in an emergency conditions, and to preparedness for these tasks.</td>
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</table>
| The EU’s emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangement | This is the EU’s common crisis-management system and model for dealing with cross-border crises (Integrated EU Crisis Management Arrangements). It is based on the principle of subsidiary, i.e. responding to emergencies is primarily a matter for member states whose national competence is fully respected. These arrangements come into operation in emergencies within or outside the EU requiring political co-ordination when:  
» the situation directly affects several member states or requires action at EU level,  
» the situation simultaneously involves several member states, or  
» the situation affects the interests of several member states and concerns areas for which EU bodies are competent. |
<p>| Independent preparedness | Property owners and occupants as well as business and industrial entrepreneurs, government agencies and other organisations are required to prevent dangers and take proper precautions to protect persons, property and the environment as well as prepare for such rescue activities as they are independently capable of performing. |
| Information security | Information security refers to the administrative, technical and other measures that protect and secure information, services, systems and telecommunications and manage their risks in all security situations. Information security is also a condition in which threats against the confidentiality and integrity of information, information systems and telecommunications security do not pose a significant risk. |
| Internal security | The state of affairs in society when the judicial system guarantees rights and freedoms for all and people have no cause to fear crime or disturbances or to feel insecure about events and changes in Finnish society or the increasingly international world. |</p>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Major accident</strong></th>
<th>An accident which is considered to be especially serious because of the number of killed or injured persons, damage to the environment or property, or the nature of the accident.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Major influx of asylum seekers</strong></td>
<td>This refers to a situation in which the number of asylum seekers is so large that it becomes impossible to process and register them by the means normally available. The situation may arise as a result of a massive refugee crisis or deliberate action by some state.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime search and rescue</strong></td>
<td>An entity comprising search and rescue (SAR) operations needed to help those in distress at sea, the administration of first aid as well as emergency radio communications. In addition to SAR operations resulting from accidents, maritime SAR also deals with sudden illnesses at sea and other comparable rescue situations.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mass influx of refugees</strong></td>
<td>This refers to a large-scale influx of asylum seekers during which large numbers of people have had to abandon their home or country of permanent residence without the possibility of returning because of an armed conflict, other violence or an environmental disaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NCSA</strong></td>
<td>NCSA is a national communications security authority which acts as an expert in all security matters related to the electronic transfer and handling of classified material and sees to related tasks that are based on international information security obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NSA</strong></td>
<td>NSA is a national security authority responsible for providing guidelines for and monitoring that international specially protected data are dealt with accordingly in the state administration, companies and organisations which are to handle international classified material. The NSA coordinates the activities of designated security authorities (DSA, Designated Security Authority) and of the national communications security authority, represents Finland in international conferences on information security, negotiates for bilateral and multilateral agreements about information security and provides personnel security clearances for the purpose of international co-operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Preparedness</strong></td>
<td>The measures with which it is guaranteed that tasks can be carried out with minimal disruption in all situations. These measures include, among other things, preparedness planning, advance preparations and preparedness exercises.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public order and security</strong></td>
<td>Public order and security encompasses all police activities intended to create and uphold a safe and pleasant living and working environment for the members of society, to combat and prevent violations of justice and disorderly conduct as well as to eliminate disturbances and to solve the violations of justice. Prevention, in the wider sense, embraces crime prevention in its entirety.</td>
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<td><strong>Security of supply</strong></td>
<td>The capacity to maintain the basic activities that are indispensable for safeguarding the population’s living conditions, for sustaining the functioning of critical infrastructures, and the material preconditions for maintaining national preparedness and defence in case of emergency conditions and serious disturbances.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Serious crime</strong></td>
<td>An individual aggravated offence, a widespread series of crimes or crimes committed by professional and habitual criminals or organised criminal groups. Serious crime investigation focuses on a person, a group of persons or a community suspected of planning, preparing or committing a serious crime, aiding and abetting a serious crime or having previously done so, and whose aim is to accrue significant unlawful, individual, societal or economic gains or to cause notable property damage.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Situation awareness</strong></td>
<td>The understanding of decision-makers and their advisors of what has happened, the circumstances under which it happened, the goals of the different parties and the possible developments of events, all of which are needed to make decisions on a specific issue or an entity of issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation picture</strong></td>
<td>This refers to a presentation on a situation or capabilities, compiled on a basis of individual pieces of information, which provides the grounds for situation awareness.</td>
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</table>
| **The Solidarity Clause included in the Treaty of Lisbon and the obligation of mutual assistance** | According to the Solidarity Clause, the Union and its Member States act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the subject of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster and requests assistance. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.

The purpose of the obligation of mutual assistance is to strengthen solidarity between the member states and their commitment to the development of the common security and defence policy. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. The concrete meaning and mode of application of solidarity and the obligation of mutual assistance will be defined in practical co-operation.

Finland creates preparedness to provide and receive aid and assistance in accordance with the solidarity clause and the obligation of mutual assistance. |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic task</strong></td>
<td>A task assigned to a ministry in the Resolution, indispensable for the securing of society’s vital functions in all situations. Each ministry will carry out its strategic tasks as part of the normal operating and financial planning process and its implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism</strong></td>
<td>Terrorism is politically motivated use of violence or the threat of it, with the intention to instill widespread fear among the population, unlawfully force a government, another state authority or international organisation to do or not do something, or to tolerate something, unlawfully overthrow or change s state’s constitution, seriously disrupt the state’s judicial system, cause grave harm to the national economy or to the foundations of society, or seriously damage the economy or other basic structures of an international organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat assessment</strong></td>
<td>An assessment of a competent authority or another actor, based on a threat scenario and regarding the tasks the authority is responsible for and disturbances. The scenario concretely describes the origin of the threat, target, method of implementation, probability, effects on the authority’s tasks as well as response options and the time required for advance preparations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat scenario</strong></td>
<td>A threat scenario is a general description of disturbances in the security environment. It presents the impact mechanism, source, target and impact on the target, probability and the most serious disturbances in the threat scenario that are identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vital function</strong></td>
<td>This is the collective term for measures vital to the functioning of society. By safeguarding the functions vital to society, national sovereignty, security in society and the livelihood of the population are maintained.</td>
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</table>