Dr. Seppo Kääriäinen, Minister Of Defence Of Finland,Speech at the new defence agenda conference, Brussels

Panel III: 'What does NATO do for Europe that the EU still can't do for itself?' Mr.

Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure and an honour for me to speak in front of this distinguished audience. My intention is to present a view from a non-NATO EU country, whose security and defence policy aims to strengthen the ESDP, and at the same time, to reinforce the transatlantic relationship as a Partner with NATO. In fact, these two tracks are anything but mutually exclusive. For Finland, Partnership with NATO is a useful tool also in the development of the ESDP.

As I see it, NATO has a continuing and vital role to play as the backbone of Europe's security and defence. Its core functions of deterrence and defence remain the unrivalled source of stability, not only in Europe but also much wider. In crisis management, the so-called Berlin plus arrangement makes NATO, in a manner of speaking, a force-multiplier for the EU. There are a number of things, which we need NATO to do in Europe and for Europe. Yet, in principle and also in practise, both organizations have their own distinct and complementary strengths.

Let me in my brief remarks, however, focus on one particular practical and most timely issue, which is the relationship between NATO defence planning and EU's capability development. I believe this is one of the key areas where action in both organisations is needed, but where particularly NATO's long experience should be properly harnessed. The relevance of this coordination has grown, as the EU is preparing to field its Battle Groups.

Coordination of NATO's defence planning and EU capability development is necessary, if we aim at achieving compatibility between NATO and EU in this area. And, conversely, close cooperation in capability development is absolutely necessary, if we want to ensure mutual reinforcement between the two organisations.

This is particularly relevant for my own country. Finland is today deeply involved in NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as in the EU-led operation in Bosnia. In addition to sending our troops to these operations, we are providing framework nation capabilities in Kosovo for the Multinational Brigade Centre and in Bosnia for the Multinational Task Force North. We are also establishing two separate EU Battle Groups with our partners: one with Germany and the Netherlands, and the other with Sweden, Estonia and Norway.

For us the issue of coordinating NATO defence planning and EU capability development is highly relevant as we develop the EU Battle Groups in best possible synergy with the NATO Response Force (NRF). These two initiatives, albeit planned on a different scale and for partly different purposes, offer excellent opportunities for building a mutually supportive and coherent NATO-EU defence relationship. But they may also produce competition and weakness, if we fail.

The EU Battle Group concept is complementary with the NATO NRF concept, while taking into account the special characteristics of the EU, most importantly the scope of the enhanced Petersberg tasks. For most countries, the NRF and EU Battle Group assets and capabilities are not only drawn from the same pool of forces, they are actually the very same forces.

We need to deal with three issues here. First of all, commonly defined and agreed, detailed military capability standards and criteria. They should apply to such military capabilities as availability, deployability, flexibility, readiness, sustainability, survivability and interoperability, among others. Wherever possible, such standards and criteria for the EU Battle Groups should be the same as those required for similar formations assigned to the NRF. EU clearly stands to benefit from NATO's earlier work and experience in this area.

Special attention should be paid to non-NATO EU members' contributions. Their Battle Group contributions would most likely be developed through the PARP and OCC Programmes, provided for by NATO’s Partnership. This is at least something my own country intends to do. In fact, as I speak, the Finnish delegation is concluding the annual PARP Assessment negotiations at NATO Headquarters. This year we will accept a new out-of-cycle Partnership Goal, which aims exactly at developing our rapid reaction capabilities according to the NATO standards and criteria.

Secondly, there is a need for regularly organised and realistic training, including multinational exercises as well as command post exercises, in order to prepare the Battle Groups for their readiness periods. Good practical judgment should be exercised here. NATO’s NRF-related training program should be utilized, as appropriate, also for the EU Battle Group training and exercises.

Thirdly, streamlining assessment and certification procedures is very important, since, as I stated above, member states are likely to commit their assets and capabilities to both the EU Battle Groups and the NRF. The NATO certification process should be used to the fullest extent, and it should also be available for the non-NATO EU member states.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Co-ordinating NATO defence planning and EU capability development is just one example, of 'what NATO can do for Europe'. But I think it is an illustrative case among the many similar aspects of EU-NATO relations on a practical level.

What comes to military capabilities, our goal is simple but demanding: We have to get the right kind of forces with the right kind of capabilities to the right place, and do it efficiently and economically without unnecessary duplication. To do this the procedures and planning instruments used by the two organizations do not need to be exactly the same but they need to be compatible.

Thank you for your attention.

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